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Abstract 
In 2009, the IASB published IFRS for SMEs, extending their work beyond standard setting for 
listed entities. This thesis investigates the IASB’s political processes in the development of IFRS 
for SMEs. The board’s discourse presents an image of technocratic expertise, which acts to 
obfuscate the ways in which the IASB controls the regulatory conversation to advance its role as 
an agent of financial capital. Previous research and regulatory theory are extended in this thesis 
through the use of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory and Glynos and Howarth’s Logics of 
Critical Explanation.  
Whilst creating IFRS for SMEs, the IASB invoked democratic imageries, which has the effect of 
obscuring their financial capital agenda. This thesis demonstrates that the IASB constructs 
specific conceptions of SMEs as profit-maximising entities and emerging economies as in need 
of development along “Western” lines that reflect the ideology of advanced financial capital.  
Laclau and Mouffe’s Logics of Equivalence and Difference are identified as being constantly in 
play in the development of IFRS for SMEs. This thesis shows that the development of IFRS for 
SMEs is an example of the “politics of condensation”: by condensing the needs of all developing 
countries and all non-publicly accountable entities into one standard, the IASB claims that 
meeting the financial reporting needs of SMEs will automatically meet the needs of developing 
countries. Through the extension of international accounting standards to new entities in a “one 
size fits all” manner, the IASB constructs the “politics of the same” through a logic of 
equivalence.  
The thesis also identifies the influential role of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund in the development, promotion and adoption of IFRS for SMEs. The enforcement activities 
of these international financial institutions are shown to be crucial in allowing the IASB to act as 
a powerful agent of neo-liberal hegemony.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Due to the increasing globalisation of capitalisms, capital, capital markets, and international trade, 
there has been pressure to make capital markets homogeneous. This led transnational and 
international organisations to argue for the necessity of a global accounting language for financial 
reporting. Global capital movement demands uniform financial reporting by corporate entities 
around the world, which raises the question, whom is going to create International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). This is the motivation for a transnational body to construct a global 
financial reporting language. In practice, this role has been taken on by a private body, which has 
gained a great deal of power, but the work could have fallen to other bodies, such as the World 
Bank (WB) or the United Nations (UN). The private body that creates standards is the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which holds a high status and authority in 
IFRS for listed entities. This board has extended its remit beyond listed entities into a new area, 
providing a standard for unlisted Small and Medium-Sized entities (SMEs). This extension is the 
focus of this thesis. This chapter has multiple purposes: to give some background and description 
on the IASB and the development of the International Financial Reporting Standard for Small 
and Medium-Sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs) from the IASB’s viewpoint. Following this, the 
chapter outlines the motivation for the thesis, identifies the gap in the relevant prior literature, 
gives detail on the theory and method and explains the main findings and conclusions of the thesis. 
This is followed by an overview of the thesis chapters.  
1.1 The IASB 
The IFRS Foundation is a not-for-profit organisation, which claims to focus on the public interest:  
We are a not-for-profit, public interest organisation with oversight by a Monitoring Board 
of public authorities. Our governance and due process are designed to keep our standard-
setting independent from special interests while ensuring accountability to our 
stakeholders around the world (IASB, 2015a: 1). 
The IASB claim, in the public interest to:  
• to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent 
and comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting 
to help participants in the worlds capital markets and other users make economic 
decisions; 
• to promote the use and rigorous application of those standards; 
• In fulfilling the objectives associated with (a) and (b), to take account of, as 
appropriate, the special needs of small and medium-sized entities and emerging 
economies; and 
• to bring about convergence of national accounting standards and IFRSs to high 
quality solutions (IASB, 2009e: 6). 
This quote links the public interest, comparability and global consistency to the development of 
IFRS, and give priority to capital markets. IFRS are published by the IASB to give principles and 
methods for financial reporting practice, and individual jurisdictions through national 
governments and national standard setters make decisions regarding adoption and modification 
of these standards. The focus on capital markets is further elaborated by Pacter (2016: 26) a former 
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staff and board member:  
Today, the world’s financial markets are borderless. Companies 
(including small companies) seek capital at the best price wherever it is 
available. Investors and lenders seek investment opportunities wherever 
they can get the best returns commensurate with the risks involved. To 
assess the risks and returns of their various investment opportunities, 
investors and lenders need financial information that is relevant, reliable 
and comparable across borders…. The use of one set of high quality 
standards by companies throughout the world improves the 
comparability and transparency of financial information and reduces 
financial statement preparation costs. When the standards are applied 
rigorously and consistently, capital market participants receive higher 
quality information and can make better decisions. Thus, markets 
allocate funds more efficiently and firms can achieve a lower cost of 
capital.  
The IASB hope to fulfil their role through the due process, which is 
presented as ‘open’, ‘participatory’ and ‘transparent’, through ‘public 
consultation’ (IFRSF, 2013b). The common due process steps are outlined 
in Figure 1.  
Prior to the IASB, the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) set international standards for financial reporting (Camfferman & 
Zeff, 2007). The IASC emerged during times of success for accounting 
firms and bodies, alongside increasing international trade, and growing 
capital markets (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Deegan & Unerman, 2011). 
The IASC identified a necessity to create a standard that met the needs of 
developing countries and/or SMEs (although the distinction or 
combination was never clear), but did not move forward with a standard 
(Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; 2015). The IASC was criticised for not enhancing the comparability 
and understandability of accounting, so it adopted improvement strategies for the content of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; 2015). These improvement 
strategies did not address the structure and processes of the IASC. However, as the culmination 
of these improvement strategies the IASC was replaced in 2001 by the IASB, which was modelled 
on the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (Botzem, 2012; Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; 
2015).  
Over time, the IASB’s structure has evolved, for example, the monitoring board has been added 
(figure 2). The IFRS Foundation (IFRSF) does not deal with technical decisions, but oversees the 
IASB’s governance and funding (Deegan & Unerman, 2011). The IASB claim that IFRS bring 
transparency to financial reporting, enhancing accountability and improving economic efficiency 
(IASB, 2015a).  
Figure 1: IASB’s due 
process (Diagram formed 
from IFRS Foundation 
(2016)). 
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Figure 2: IFRS Foundation and IASB structure diagram (IAS Plus, 2016). 
 
1.2 IFRS for SMEs  
The IASB claim to have created IFRS for SMEs to acknowledge differential reporting, by 
maintaining that it relieves the reporting burden by balancing the costs and benefits for SMEs 
(IASB, 2012a). The IFRS for SMEs is described as a high-quality standard that has been tailored 
for SMEs, with international recognition (IASB, 2012a). International recognition emerges from 
the IASB’s brand, position and expertise, and the alignment of IFRS for SMEs with full IFRS 
(IASB, 2012a). Through this rhetoric, the IASB claim IFRS for SMEs will help SMEs to gain 
access to capital, by increasing confidence in financial statements (IASB, 2012a). This description 
presents the IFRS for SMEs as different from full IFRS whilst simultaneously claiming that it is 
aligned with the rigour and high quality of full IFRS.  
The IASB boast that IFRS for SMEs represents a significant reduction in the complexities of the 
full standards (IASB, 2012a). Additionally, the IASB has created implementation support, 
including extra guidance, self-study, formal training, Q&A’s, and translations of IFRS for SMEs 
(IASB, 2012a). The IASB clarify that they have no enforcement power, the only stipulation being 
that this standard cannot be applied to listed entities (IASB, 2012a). Thus, leaving the role of 
standards adoption and enforcement to national regulators and governments. Further, the 
necessity to get standards adopted by national regulators may constrain or impact the nature of 
IFRS.  
IFRS for SMEs aims to enhance comparability globally and locally, whilst reducing the burden 
on national standard setters for developing and maintaining their own standards (IASB, 2012a). 
The IFRS for SMEs guide states that ‘over 80 jurisdictions either have adopted the IFRS for SMEs 
or have publicly indicated or proposed a plan to adopt it in the next three years’ (IASB, 2012a: 
5). The IASB acknowledge that this extension to SMEs expands their work. Despite the use of 
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the term SMEs, there are no size criterion, instead SME’s are defined by the IASB as entities that 
do not hold public accountability (are not listed) but publish general purpose financial statements 
(intended for external users, including, but not limited to lenders, creditors, investors, employees, 
governments and others outside the company) (IASB, 2012a).  
The IASB claim that ‘the IFRS for SMEs is tailored for SMEs by focusing on the needs of users 
for information about cash flows, liquidity and solvency. It takes into account the costs to, and 
the capabilities of, SMEs to prepare financial information’ (IASB, 2012a: 4). In the guide, this 
quote is linked to claims that IFRS for SMEs reduces complexity and is easier to user than full 
IFRS and national GAAP requirements, through the omission of irrelevant topics, alongside 
recognition and measurement (R&M) simplifications. Further, IFRS for SMEs only draws upon 
the ‘easier’ option, where there are multiple options within full IFRS (IASB, 2012a). The 
development of the IFRS for SMEs follows the standard due process as outlined in figure 1, but 
there were some additions and extensions for further outreach because there was limited input 
from SMEs, SME financial statement users and preparers in the standard due process (IASB, 
2012a; IASB, 2009c). The full detail of this due process can be seen in appendix 1. The following 
section moves to the motivation for this thesis.  
1.3 Motivation  
Due to the political nature of the IASB’s extension to IFRS for SMEs, the motivation for this 
study is three-fold. First, the IASB has extended beyond its usual remit to a standard for unlisted 
entities, so, the IASB gives justifications and rationalities for this extension which constitutes 
discourse for examination. This suggests the first research question:  
Why did the IASB create IFRS for SMEs? 
Second, the IASB make many claims regarding IFRS for SMEs, including extensive consultation, 
meeting the public interest, and meeting the needs of SMEs. The IASB’s discourse presents an 
imagery of democratic ethos, including accountability, transparency, the public interest and 
representation, which obscures its role as a hegemonic agent (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009). This 
suggests the second question:  
How did the IASB extend their work to IFRS for SMEs?  
Whilst the literature offers suggestions for improving the IASB’s accountability, suggesting that 
the IASB fails to achieve the ideals claimed, these incremental critiques can act to reify the 
IASB’s role. Instead, this thesis questions the necessity for the IASB to exist (at least in its current 
form). Moreover, IFRS for SMEs could have a large impact across the globe as SMEs are 
important economically, socially, politically, culturally and ideologically (highlighted in chapter 
six). Thus, this thesis questions why the IASB extended to regulating (rule-making) SMEs, and 
the impact of this, emphasising the danger of ignoring accountings social impact (Hines, 1988; 
Hopwood, 1994; Morgan, 1988). The facilitation of this extension, in a captured and subservient 
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manner, expropriates from and exploits the social poor (particularly emerging economies), 
increasing the wealth of a few (Hopper et al., 2017). So, this thesis hopes to understand the ways 
in which IFRS for SMEs and the IASB’s activities contribute to the agenda of advanced financial 
capital. Which suggests the third question:  
What is the inter-relationship between the IASB, advanced financial capital and IFRS for SMEs? 
1.4 Prior research  
Research has looked at the adoption and utilisation of IFRS, some of which sees the IASB as 
benign (see, Barth et al., 2008; Carmona & Trombetta, 2008; Pacter, 2013; Tarca, 2012; Wang, 
2014). This literature examines the technical role of IFRS, and sees the IASB as improving 
financial reporting quality (Bissessur & Hodgson, 2012; Cheong et al., 2010; Cotter et al., 2012; 
Daske et al., 2008; Iatridis & Rouvolis, 2010; Tarca, 2012). 
Alternatively, this thesis is inspired by critical research, which examines accountings impact in 
society. Despite depictions of accounting as value-free and objective, critical research has shown 
that accounting is complex and subjective (Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1990; 1994). Whilst this thesis 
draws on previous studies that have shown accounting is a means by which to construct reality, 
it also extends those studies by politicising the hegemony of advanced financial capital 
(Lazzarato, 2012; 2015). Critical literature has examined the IASB’s role as promulgator of IFRS, 
as their power and impact has grown (Botzem, 2012; 2014; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Gallhofer 
& Haslam, 2007).  
The IASB justifies this impact through their structure, due process and logics of technocracy, 
which boast claims to transparency, full consultation, inclusion, representation, public interest, 
accountability and independence (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). These 
claims are omnipresent in the extension to IFRS for SMEs alongside metaphors of ‘designing’ 
and ‘tailoring’ standards for SMEs, despite demonstrations of deficits in the IASB’s work, when 
these claims are interrogated (Chiapello, 2007; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Cortese et al., 2010; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; 2007). Whilst the literature offers insightful critiques of the IASB, 
this thesis hopes to extend these critiques through the theoretical ideas of Laclau and Mouffe 
(L&M) (2001), and the notion of politics of accounting standard setting.   
The IASB claims IFRS for SMEs meets SME needs of SMEs, their financial statement users and 
developing countries (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Ram & Newberry, 2013). Literature has shown that 
Western standards (such as those created by the IASB) are not relevant for developing countries 
(Chiapello, 2007; Cortese et al., 2010; Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Kwok & 
Sharp, 2005). This is because the IASB operates narrow ideologies of global capital movement 
and advanced financial capital, which leads to exploitation and the domination of specific groups 
and interests (Chiapello, 2007; Cortese et al., 2010; Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Ram & Newberry, 
2013).  
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Previously, the IASB has concentrated on listed entities owing public accountability, so SMEs 
constitutes a significant extension for the IASB. There has been little research focusing on IFRS 
for SMEs, but there has been some since the standard’s publication. Mainstream research has 
examined the adoption and implementation of IFRS for SMEs (see, Barth et al., 2008; Pacter, 
2013; Tarca, 2012; Wang, 2014). However, some research has been critical of IFRS for SMEs, 
particularly focusing on the impact on developing countries, and criticising the IASB’s due 
process (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Ram & Newberry, 2013). Fearnley & 
Hines (2007) criticise the ‘top-down’ nature of IFRS for SMEs. Ram & Newberry (2013) examine 
the due process around IFRS for SMEs, concluding that, despite the IASB’s rhetoric, it largely 
ignored the interests of SME financial statement users, particularly in developing countries. 
Perera & Chand (2015) investigate implementation, revealing the conceptual and practical issues 
of IFRS for SMEs. Devi & Samujh (2015) examine the politics of convergence in IFRS for SMEs, 
highlighting the primacy of politics within the standard. However, these studies do not locate the 
work of the IASB, particularly IFRS for SMEs, in a broader context of neo-liberalism, and hence 
have limited theoretical explanations for the phenomena observed. Moreover, these critiques offer 
only incremental improvements to the IASB’s work, whilst this thesis extends these critiques by 
questioning the IASB’s system and structure. The theoretical framing of L&M (2001) allows this 
thesis to examine the hegemonic role of the IASB in the development of IFRS for SMEs, giving 
a political understanding how and why the IASB decided to extend to IFRS for SMEs. 
1.5 Theory and method 
This thesis draws on L&M’s Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory (PSDT), which attempts to 
consider holistically, the political, the social, the economic and the ideological. This links to 
critiques of traditional knowledge foundations which are formed through objectivity and 
positivism (a dominant paradigm in accounting), and mask the social and political impact of the 
status quo (Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988). These logics obscure the true nature of 
accounting as a complex and subjective construction of reality, which interplays context, culture, 
values, power and politics (Chua, 1986; Gill, 2009; Hines, 1988). Thus, accounting regulation is 
not neutral, and is instead inherently political (Gerboth, 1973; Peltzman, 1976), so it is necessary 
to adopt a political perspective through L&M’s (2001) Discourse Theory (DT). As Catlett (1960: 
44) explains:  
Accounting has been created and developed to accomplish various desired objectives 
and, therefore, it is not based on fundamental laws or absolute precepts.   
Through L&M’s DT, this thesis examines how rhetorical tropes (through concepts of articulation, 
deconstruction, antagonisms and signifiers) perfect the IASB’s hegemony, functioning the 
objectives of private financial interests with the consequence of inequality and inequity. This 
thesis analyses rhetoric and signifiers within documents and interviews, examining how interested 
parties create and use the system. L&M’s (2001) hegemony is a form of politics which moves a 
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particular to a universal to speak to disparate identities through a common signifier (this is further 
explained in 2.4 and 3.3).  
L&M have been drawn upon within accounting literature, to examine sustainability, financial 
accounting and management accounting (see, Carter & Spence, 2011; Frezatti et al., 2014; 
Gallhofer et al., 2015; Spence, 2007; Tregidga et al., 2014). L&M extends Marxism, Gramsci, de 
Saussure, Derrida and Althusser, explained further in chapter 3.  
L&M’s detailed and flexible theory offers many insights for this thesis. However, L&M’s DT 
holds methodological deficits, so the methodological approach adopted is Glynos & Howarth’s 
(G&H) (2007) Logics of Critical Explanation (LOCE), which constructs key methodological 
steps for the application of L&M’s DT to empirical research. This starts with the Problematisation 
of social inquiry, which identifies present problems, discursive practices and different forms of 
Problematisation. Second, G&H introduce Retroduction which is the process of rendering 
phenomena intelligible, by observing the fact and what gives rise to that fact. Third, G&H’s 
Logics provide mechanisms to understand rules, regimes and practices, identifying ontological 
presuppositions and conditions for the interpretation of objects and subjects. There are three 
logics: Social, Political and Fantasmatic Logics. The fourth step in G&H’s (2007) methodology 
is Articulation, which draws together concepts to give explanations through plausible judgements, 
and the attachment of theoretical concepts to empirical objects. This develops progressive ways 
of thinking about assumptions to deconstruct narratives and discourses. The fifth part of the 
method is Critique, which highlights contingencies and alternatives to deconstruct power 
formations, domination and exclusion. This method is further elaborated on in chapter 4, but the 
chapters that follow are ordered according to LOCE. 
1.6 Overview of main findings  
This thesis investigates the complexity of accounting regulation and standard setting in the 
IASB’s extension to standard setting for SMEs. This extension constitutes an interesting empirical 
site as the standard extends the impact of the IASB. Internationally, there is no consistent 
accounting regulation, but the IASB constitutes an attempt to harmonise accounting. Research on 
SME accounting and financial reporting is limited, with the WB and the IMF existing at the 
forefront, encouraging countries to adopt IFRS and IFRS for SMEs on the basis of little empirical 
research. Within the IFRS for SMEs project the work of the WB, the IMF and the IASB become 
further connected, highlighting the IASB’s role as a geopolitical agent in the hegemony of 
advanced financial capital and neoliberalism.  
This thesis looks specifically at why and how the IASB extended their work to SMEs and 
developing countries, but further, the impact of this extension. The IFRS for SMEs focuses further 
than before on developing countries. Whilst the IASC did originally claim to consider developing 
countries in their aim to construct standards for those that could not construct their own. For the 
IASB the development of IFRS for SMEs constitutes an extension as they had narrowed their 
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focus onto standard setting for listed entities. Thus, this thesis does not offer suggestions for 
incremental improvement of the IASB’s work which would only act to reify the status quo. 
Instead, this thesis argues that this extension extends the IASB’s hegemony, in a manner that is 
detrimental to society. 
This thesis draws conclusions from the case by examining the way that the IASB construct the 
regulatory conversation between regulator and regulated. Within this, the IASB self-defines who 
it will talk to and how it is going to talk to them, which links to issues of accountability. This 
thesis examines the IASB’s political processes as a technocratic regulator, to look specifically at 
how and why they extend their work to SMEs and emerging economies. This political analysis 
explores the way that the IASB have become further integrated as a geo-political player by the 
G20, the WB and the IMF. This role is important as the IASB hold a narrow focus and ideological 
alignment in the extension from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs. The core extensions and contributions 
of this thesis are further explored the conclusion (chapter 11).  
1.7 Thesis structure 
This introduction has outlined the core empirical case, the motivations for the thesis, the prior 
literature and the key empirical findings. As show in figure 3 below the second, third and fourth 
chapters move to the theory and methodology. Indeed, due to the identification of the IASB’s role 
in regulation through standard setting, it is important to examine dominant regulatory theories, 
undertaken in chapter 2. This chapter demonstrates a lack of critique, politics and holistic social 
analysis in prior regulatory theories. These limits and constraints show the necessity to tell a richer 
story of the complexities of standard setting and the impact of the extension by the IASB from 
IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, arguing for analysis of regulation as hegemonic practice and the impact 
of regulatory conversations.  
Thus, chapter 3 outlines L&M’s political theory, explaining the reasoning behind this choice and 
the core theoretical concepts and approach drawn upon. Whilst this theory offers a political 
framing, and allows this thesis to focus on hegemony in the IASB’s extension to IFRS for SMEs, 
the theoretical framework is methodologically lacking. Therefore, chapter 4 outlines the 
methodological framework adopted in the thesis (G&H’s LOCE), and the impact that this 
approach has on the research approach. Following this, chapter 4 moves to the ontological 
assumptions formed out of antagonisms and the ontology of lack. Chapter 4 also outlines the data 
collection methods which are informed by LOCE and DT’s ontological assumptions. The data set 
is from documents and interviews, justified through the methodological assumptions. As are the 
details given on the analysis of data (the interrogation of nodal points and the examination of 
rhetorical description).  
This then leads to chapter 5 and 6 which deconstruct the previous literature through DT. Chapter 
five identifies literature that has examined the impact of accounting on society, and more 
specifically, literature that has critiqued the IASB. This literature has deconstructed the IASB’s 
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rhetoric and their due process, and this thesis demonstrating the limits and gaps within this 
literature to identify extensions of the literature. Chapter 5 also identifies key themes that are 
carried through chapter 6 and examined empirically.  
Chapter 6 focuses on prior research that has examined the IFRS for SMEs, taking the themes from 
the previous chapter and identifying themes specific to the IFRS for SMEs literature. Chapter 6 
identifies the potential impact of IFRS for SMEs by identifying the role of SMEs in society. 
Chapter six then moves to deconstructing rhetoric, the due process, and claims to comparability. 
Moreover, a recurring theme in the IFRS for SMEs literature is the exclusion of developing 
countries in the due process, so, this chapter examines this theme.  
Both chapter 5 and 6 argue there has been a lack of politicisation in the literature. Whilst some 
literature moves away from the mainstream approach to research, the literature does not 
deconstruct the hegemonic movement made by the IASB to IFRS for SMEs to the necessary 
extent, and in many cases, accepts and reifies the role and status of the IASB with limited 
interrogation of the way that subjects are captured (fulfilled in this thesis through G&H’s logics).  
Therefore, the chapters that follow move to the empirics and extend prior literature by politically 
examining why the IASB extended to IFRS for SMEs, how they undertook this extension, and the 
impact of this extension in the inter-relationship between the IASB, financial capital and IFRS 
for SMEs (responding to the research questions). With a focus on hegemony, which finds that the 
logics of equivalence (LoE) and difference (LoD) are constantly interacting to construct and 
maintain the IASB’s hegemony. This simultaneity of LoE and LoD follows five key movements, 
and the operation within these movements of the social, political and fantasmatic logics. There is 
a more detailed outline of this given in the overview of empirical chapters, and figure 17. Figure 
3 below gives an overall thesis outline.  
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Figure 3: Order of thesis 
 
Having outlined the thesis and identified the IASB’s role in accounting regulation through 
standard setting, it is important to examine the different dominant regulatory theories, particularly 
as this thesis is concerned with the construction of regulatory conversations. Thus, the following 
chapter examines insights and limitations of dominant regulatory theories, and their role in 
accounting research.   
Chapter 11: Conclusion
Chapter 10: Discussion
Fantasmatic ideologies and critique
Chapter 7, 8, 9:  empirics
Contestations and 
contingencies Due process (a) Due process (b)
Chapter 5 and 6: A discourse theory examination of the literature
IASB critique literature IFRS for SMEs literature 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4: Theory and Methodology
Regulatory theory Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory
Logics of critical 
explanation and 
Methodology
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
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 Chapter 2: Regulatory theory and accounting research  
2.1 Introduction 
Having outlined the thesis in chapter 1, this chapter examines predominant regulatory theories in 
accounting research, because the IASB play a regulatory rule-making role. This chapter explains 
the choice of Post-Structural Discourse Theory (PSDT), by outlining why other theories are 
inadequate. Many theories downplay the politics of the IASB’s work, and do not recognise the 
idea of a regulator as a hegemonic agent, which is core to this thesis. PSDT raises and answers 
questions that have not previously been asked or answered, the importance of which is outlined 
within this chapter. 
Throughout history there have been many approaches to regulatory theory (see, authors that 
analyse regulatory theory: Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Gaffikin, 2008; Mouck, 1992; 1993; 
Napier, 2014). The thesis examines international accounting regulation, which is a relatively new 
phenomenon (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Napier 2014). Accounting theory has developed over 
time, with the rise of double entry book-keeping, the balance sheet equation, the emergence of 
accounting professionalization and accounting theories of scarcity, historic cost and decision 
making (Gaffikin, 2008; Napier, 2014). As accounting professionalization grew in legitimacy in 
the 1960s, grand theories of accounting emerged (Gaffikin, 2008; Mouck, 1993; Napier, 2014). 
During the 1970s, Positive Accounting Theory [PAT] developed, but also critical accountants 
began to reject current practice, arguing for the consideration of accounting’s impact on society 
(Chua, 1986; Napier, 2014). Napier (2014) also highlights the influential role of conceptual 
frameworks in accounting theory: 
Theories of accounting tend to see the function of financial reporting as representing an 
economic reality that may be complex and difficult to discern but nonetheless exists 
independently of accounting. Hines (1988) denies this, claiming that accounting actually 
helps to construct the reality that it reports. This provides interesting opportunities for the 
future direction of financial accounting theory… (Napier, 2014: 106-107). 
To further examine regulatory theories, this chapter initially divides theories into social and 
economic,1 before moving to critical and political insights. The range of theories examined offers 
different perspectives for this thesis, and highlights the multifaceted and complex nature of 
regulation and regulatory conversations (Black, 2002a, b). By identifying the limits and insights 
that the selected theories offer for IFRS for SMEs, this chapter demonstrates the necessity to draw 
on political theory, which questions the current system. Currently, dominant regulatory theories 
cannot analyse IFRS for SMEs in a pluralistic, holistic and multifaceted manner. This thesis 
                                               
1 Deegan and Unerman (2011) divide regulatory theories into inductive, predictive and prescriptive: 
inductive theories develop through observation; predictive theories explain and predict accounting 
practice; prescriptive theories recommend regulations based on the researcher’s norms, values and 
beliefs. An alternative categorisation offers two main perspectives: the ‘free market’ perspective versus 
pro-regulation (Deegan & Unerman, 2011). 
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focuses on pluralism against exclusion, by problematising theories and demonstrating the 
necessity to consider the hegemonic nature of regulation.  
The dominant regulatory theories have been outlined in table 1, including the key elements of 
each theory, how the theory is applied to accounting regulation, and why the theory is inadequate 
for this thesis. The economic theories outlined are Chicago School Economics; Agency Theory; 
PAT; Public Interest Theory and; Regulatory Capture Theory. The chapter demonstrates the 
arbitrary, exclusionary and limited nature of these theories. This is followed by social theories, 
considering: Legitimacy Theory; Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory. After the table, 
the chapter considers critical research and examines Howarth’s theorisation of regulation as 
hegemonic practice, which leads to the importance of PSDT and hegemony (outlined in chapter 
3).2 The next section of this chapter considers why regulatory theories are important, as the IASB 
construct their role as a technocratic regulator through standard setting.  
2.2 The importance of regulatory theory 
Accounting research using regulatory theory analyses why and how regulation operates in the 
manner that it does, to identify possible changes and improvements (Deegan & Unerman, 2011). 
This chapter offers snapshots of dominant regulatory theories, some of which are considered 
neutral, scientific and objective, whereas others are considered political and subjective (Deegan 
& Unerman, 2011).3 Despite these distinctions, all theories contain subjective decisions, 
assumptions and judgements (as does the application of theory),4 facilitating the divisions in this 
chapter between economic, social and political (Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). Each of these is important because of the role of accounting within society: for Deegan 
and Unerman (2011), regulation controls and governs behaviour, through rules and standards. 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012: 3) define regulation as focusing on control over valued activity, 
giving the following key premises: ‘a specific set of commands… A deliberate state of 
influence… as all forms of social or economic influence’. Nevertheless, a universally-accepted 
definition of regulation has not been determined and continues to be debated (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011). Regulation is complex, and identifying the ‘best’ regulation is subjective, so 
Black (2002a: 163) proposes discursive analysis of regulatory communication, arguing that 
regulatory conversations:  
                                               
2  Throughout the chapter I have assumed that the reader understands research paradigms, but for further 
explanation see, for example, Chua (1986); Crotty (1998).  
3 Accordingly, Llewellyn (2003) outlines different methods of theorising. Distinguishing five 
theorisations for a fuller understanding of theory: metaphor; differentiation; conceptualisation; context-
bound theorising of settings; and context-free “grand” theorising (Llewellyn, 2003: 663). For Llewellyn 
(2003) theories make assertions about behaviour or structure, and researchers should consider multiple, 
pluralistic views, for fuller understandings.  
4  Individual theories cannot be universalised, due to underlying assumptions, meaning each theory cannot 
explain and predict all regulation, but can give insight (Deegan & Unerman, 2011). Theorists make 
decisions concerning ontology (assumptions surrounding the nature of reality), epistemology 
(assumptions surrounding knowledge, truth and justification), methodology and scope – Van Mourik, 
2014).  
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…are constitutive of the regulatory process, that they serve important functions, that they 
can be the basis of co-ordinated action, and that they are important sites of conflict and 
contestation. 
This highlights the importance of regulatory communication, for gaining a deeper understanding 
of inner processes, with links to and influences on ‘…objects, worlds, minds, identities and social 
relations…’ (Black, 2002a: 165). Thus, regulation is functional and motivated to achieve certain 
ends, through rhetorical and persuasive communication. Different forms of regulation act to build 
different understandings, definitions and solutions, as they produce shared meanings, norms and 
social practices (Black, 2002a; Catlett, 1960). Indeed, literature demonstrates that accounting 
regulation is not neutral, and is instead influenced by, and constructed to meet, certain interests 
(Altarawneh & Lucas, 2012; Catlett, 1960; Lehman & Tinker, 1987).  
The following table considers the dominant regulatory theories, looking at their key constituent 
elements for the analysis of accounting regulation.  
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Table 1: Regulatory Theory 
Theory Key elements Regulatory theory and accounting 
regulation 
Why is this theory inadequate for this 
thesis? 
Economic theories  
Chicago School 
Economics (CSE) 
For CSE, there should be little or no government 
intervention, calling for private regulation5 (if 
any). This is premised on the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), and the application of 
market-related incentives, rendering state 
regulation unnecessary (‘free market’ 
perspective)6 (Fama, 1970; Whittington, 1986). 
Moreover, accounting should be treated like 
other commodities (through supply and demand) 
(Friedman, 1962; Hovenkamp, 2007; Stigler, 
1971). However, academics argue that the 
assumptions of EMH do not hold and markets are 
not efficient in the real world (Ball, 2009; 
Shostak, 1997; Williamson, 1968). CSE argues 
we cannot distinguish producers and consumers,7 
as all are opportunistic economic agents 
(Whittington, 1986). Additionally, CSE ignores 
the short-term, seeing social welfare as 
irrelevant, focusing on long-term market 
efficiency (Hovenkamp, 2007). 
CSE argues that accounting regulation is 
unnecessary, as markets should run 
without intervention. If there is 
intervention it should be minimal, have a 
focus on markets and be run privately. This 
theory downplays the politics of 
accounting, and would only consider 
market efficiency, giving little, if any 
weight to the politics of regulatory 
conversations.  
Regarding IFRS for SMEs, CSE would see the 
market as a regulatory force and therefore 
would not regulate SME accounting, seeing 
this as interference. 
However, advocates would consider 
jurisdictional and access questions for SMEs, 
so IFRS for SMEs would give an even playing 
field, which may be beneficial to financial 
capital, and meet shareholder needs. CSE 
focuses on economic issues, through 
positivistic analysis ignoring the social, 
political and cultural issues when examining 
regulation. Agency theory, regulatory capture 
theory and public interest theory oppose CSE, 
by identifying a necessity for financial 
reporting regulation.  
 
                                               
5 The IASB is a private-sector standard-setter, independent from any state, although it relies on states to adopt its standards. At times states intervene in the standard-setting process, 
and they may adapt standards.  
6 Malkiel (2005) advocates EMH, arguing that equity prices adjust efficiently to new information, so returns can only be incurred alongside even risk. 
7 By seeing producers also as consumers, CSE equates consumer surplus with total surplus, meaning any gain for a producer adds to consumer gain, rendering wealth distribution 
irrelevant (Mankin, 2001). 
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Agency theory Agency theory states that the purpose of financial 
reporting is to provide information to resource 
providers (Deegan, 2006). This focuses on 
information asymmetry, the uncertain nature of 
information, and the facilitation of agency 
relationships (Deegan, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Whittington, 1994).  
There are organisational costs for agency theory 
and information production, but agency theory 
holds that increasing information improves 
decision-making and resource allocation: ‘An 
agency relationship exists where one party (a 
principal) delegates some decision- making 
authority to another part (the agent). The 
principal and the agent will enter a contract that 
recognises the relationship’ (Gaffikin, 2008: 59). 
For accounting, agency theory is 
concerned with information asymmetry 
and providing information. Within this 
there will be monitoring costs, to monitor 
the behaviour of the agent, most of these 
monitoring costs are associated with 
accounting and auditing (Gaffikin, 2008). 
Within accounting, agency theory is 
concerned with the supply of information 
from manager to owner, monitoring the 
manager, with a focus on the economic 
(Gaffikin, 2008).  
For agency theory, there is a focus on 
asymmetry, which identifies problems with 
power, but the theory also acts to narrow the 
interests analysed, to only two primary groups: 
shareholders (principals) and preparers 
(agents) (Gaffikin, 2008).  
Agency theory moves towards understanding 
conflicts, but it narrows the conflicts to a 
limited group of interests. The theory is 
therefore unsuitable for this study, which 
requires consideration of a wider range of 
interests (Gaffikin, 2008).  
Positive 
accounting 
theory (PAT)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAT is a nuanced version of CSE and Agency 
theory, promoted by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990), who claim that PAT is: ‘…concerned 
with explaining accounting practice… to explain 
and predict which firms will and which firms will 
not use a particular method’ (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986, p. 7).  
Individual wealth maximisation is central to 
PAT, presenting an atomistic society, in which 
individuals only consider their own self-interest 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Gaffikin, 2008). 
This theory commits to objectivity, realism and 
neo-classical economic theories (e.g. including 
agency theory; contract issues; rational action 
theory) (Chua, 1986; Davies, 2002; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978). Through positivism, this 
theory searches for generalised solutions (Chua, 
PAT is a neoclassical economic theory, 
suggesting human choice can be explained 
entirely in economic terms (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011; Napier, 2014). Therefore, 
PAT argues that economic incentives (e.g. 
management remuneration) impact, 
explain and predict accounting policies and 
practice (Napier, 2014; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; 1986). PAT combines 
agency theory, debt-holder theory (the 
contract between debt providers and 
holders will prevent firms from increasing 
risk), and political costs (managers will 
choose accounting policy options that 
reduce their political costs) to explain 
accounting (Gaffikin, 2008). PAT 
highlights that policy decisions do not only 
PAT has many opponents and is critiqued for 
incoherence (Chambers, 1993; Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011; Sterling, 1990; Tinker, 1988; 
Williams, 1989). For PAT, IFRS for SMEs is 
the IASB gaining further control for their own 
ends (Gaffikin, 2008). Traditionally, PAT 
focused on lobbying, finding that the potential 
impact of standards influenced the way actors 
lobby (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). PAT is 
unsuitable for this thesis because it considers 
only lobbying and the economic. PAT 
examines only economic aspects of 
phenomena, and downplays politics. Even 
though it considers debt, this is couched in 
economic terms. Given the range of choices 
and decisions in regulation and regulatory 
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1986). Similarly, contractarianism purports that 
individuals are free to contract, through 
shareholder primacy, individualism, free market 
theory, agency theory and gives primacy to 
contracts (Carter, 2008; Millon, 1993; Moore, 
1991). 
depend on economic decisions, but also 
debt and political costs, nevertheless the 
focus is still on the economic (Gaffikin, 
2008).  
theories, the theory does not explain standard 
setting holistically.  
This ignores some stakeholders and some 
elements of the discourse. Further, PAT does 
not consider hegemony, the IASB’s role and 
processes undertaken, which are central to this 
thesis, and to a holistic understanding of IFRS 
for SMEs.  
Public interest 
theory (PIT) 
Through Public Interest theory (PIT), Posner 
(1974) contends that accounting regulation 
claims to serve the public interest but this is a 
rhetorical device that masks the pursuit of self-
interest (Gaffikin, 2005). Indeed, PIT argues that 
regulation processes can be understood as actors 
aiming to maximise their economic position by 
supporting regulations that serve their interests 
(Gaffikin, 2005; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976; 
Stigler, 1971).  
For accounting regulation, PIT is 
concerned with information that would not 
be obtained without regulation, so 
regulation is provided due to public 
demand and not private interest (Gaffikin, 
2008). Indeed, ‘the public’ and their 
‘interest’ are contested concepts and it is 
often the case that private, special and 
narrow interests are pursued under the 
rhetoric of public interest (Dellaportas & 
Davenport, 2008).  
This is relevant to the IASB and IFRS for 
SMEs, as the IASB claim to meet public 
interest (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). However, 
scholars argue that the IASB do not meet 
public interest, instead meeting only a certain 
special interest, and drawing on public interest 
as rhetorical persuasion (Gallhofer & Haslam, 
2007). Nevertheless, PIT would not be suitable 
for analysis of IFRS for SMEs, as it only 
considers the public interest and does not 
consider other aspects of the standard, other 
rhetorical tropes, the IASB’s role, or political 
impacts.  
Regulatory 
capture theory 
(RCT)8 
Posner (1974) states that despite regulators 
public interest claims, corporations capture 
decision-makers. Similarly, Stigler (1971) states 
that those regulated dominate regulatory 
organisations, an economic theory (Peltzman, 
1976).  
For accounting regulation, under RCT, 
regulators and/or standard setters become 
captured by special interest groups who act 
to expropriate wealth (Gaffikin, 2008; 
Stigler, 1971).  
Cortese & Irvine (2010) apply RCT for 
examination of the IASB, suggesting the 
IASB’s regulation is captured, meeting 
This theory considers some aspects of IFRS for 
SMEs, but is not holistic. If RCT holds, then 
the IASB act in the interest of large listed 
corporations when regulating SMEs, but this 
theory only captures the economic angle. 
Gaffikin (2005) acknowledges RCT criticisms, 
and argues that theories are complementary, 
not mutually exclusive, as no theory 
                                               
8  Also, known as private interest theory and special interest theory (Gaffikin, 2005). 
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large-listed institutional needs, despite the 
IASB’s claims to consider public interest. 
completely describes all aspects of regulation, 
a key argument within this chapter. 
 
Social theories 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Suchman (1995) advocates legitimacy theory, 
which theorises that society allows legitimate 
companies to exist, so organisations construct 
legitimacy. Often scholars apply legitimacy 
theory to social and environmental reporting 
(SER) and corporate social reporting (CSR) 
(Lanis & Richardson, 2012; Wilmshurst & Frost, 
2000). Legitimacy theory surrounds external 
perceptions of organisations: if the organisation 
is seen as legitimate and appropriate for social 
systems, norms and beliefs, this ensures stability, 
gains support, and/or silences others (Suchman, 
1995). 
In accounting regulation, there are 
attempts to legitimise the accounting 
profession through rhetorical tropes and 
processes (Hines, 1991). Furthermore, 
Hines (1991) argues that accounting 
professions and standards were created to 
legitimise accounting. Through legitimacy 
theory, Burlaud and Colasse (2011) argue 
the IASB’s legitimacy is artificial, and is 
only used to enhance their own self-
interest. Whilst the IASB portray 
openness, transparency and public 
participation, the literature argues that 
standard setting is partial and constructed 
by accountants for professional legitimacy 
(Burlaud & Colasse, 2011; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2007; Hines, 1991; Richardson & 
Eberlein, 2011).  
For legitimacy theory, the IASB’s creation of 
IFRS for SMEs would be seen as an attempt at 
reinforcing their legitimacy to society (Burlaud 
& Colasse, 2011; Danjou & Walton, 2012; 
Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). Moreover, 
legitimacy theory would argue that the IASB 
saw a threat to their standard setting project 
from competing bodies and national 
accounting systems, meaning that they had to 
extend their legitimacy to SMEs, to remove 
those threats. Legitimacy is a key pillar in my 
research, but the theory itself does not consider 
the broader politics. Moreover, the theory 
would place the IASB at the centre, looking at 
how they perceive threats to their legitimacy. 
This is a problematic form of politics, that only 
focuses on how the IASB protect themselves, 
and would not be useful for the broader 
politics.  
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Stakeholder 
theory 
The main proponent of stakeholder theory is 
Freeman (2001), who argues that organisations 
should identify and meet stakeholder needs: 
‘…based on the idea that the entity has a large 
number of interested parties to which it should be 
accountable’ (Gaffikin, 2008: 251). This theory 
argues that each corporation can group 
relationships with constituencies, and considers 
the nature of these relationships (Jones & 
Wickes, 1999). However, constituents may have 
conflicting interests. For example, employees 
have different interests to consumers, leading the 
organisation to make choices between competing 
demands (Jensen, 2001). This often leads to a 
focus on long-term added-value, determined 
through hierarchies, which would not consider 
social welfare or fulfil stakeholder theory 
(Jensen, 2001). Enlightened value maximisation 
and enlightened stakeholder theory attempt to 
resolve these conflicts (Jensen, 2001).  
For accounting regulation, there is a series 
of stakeholders within the regulatory 
space, which can include a great number of 
groups, with many different interests. For 
example, accounting regulation may 
consider (but not be limited to) preparers, 
users, other standard setters, governmental 
bodies and the public (Gaffikin, 2008). 
There are multi-various users of 
accounting, with different needs and 
wants, and stakeholder theory would argue 
that the IASB should consider each of 
these when constructing IFRS for SMEs 
(Gaffikin, 2008).  
 
The IASB are seen as creating IFRS for SMEs 
to further acknowledge and balance 
stakeholder needs and relationships (Gaffikin, 
2008). Thus, stakeholder theory, allows us 
from the outside to describe and explain the 
IASBs actions concerning different 
stakeholders. However, this analysis misses 
other key elements surrounding IFRS for 
SMEs. For example, stakeholder theory does 
not consider the IASB’s political nature, hence 
failing to give a multifaceted examination. 
Moreover, this theory (like others), places the 
IASB at the centre, and enables them to 
identify their stakeholders and exclude others.  
 
Institutional 
theory 
Institutional theory explains collective 
behaviour, by identifying the construction of 
rules (Baxter & Chua, 2003; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). This is completed through 
analysis of social rules, organisational structures 
and behaviours, to give cognitive and cultural 
explanations to the case examined (Baxter & 
Chua, 2003). For institutional theory, regulation 
should acknowledge organisational and social 
settings, focusing on politics and institutions 
(Gaffikin, 2005).  
 
Baxter and Chua (2003) state that 
institutional theory focuses on rules 
generated within society to explain 
behaviour. This develops cognitive and 
cultural explanations of institutions, 
considering the meanings of rules, 
structure and behaviour (Baxter & Chua, 
2003). Thus, scholars argue that elements 
of accounting practice are ‘rational myths’, 
granting social legitimacy and constructing 
rationalised norms (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 
1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Gaffikin (2008) identifies 
Through institutional theory, the IASB’s 
behaviour would be analysed through social 
and institutional settings (Gaffikin, 2008). 
Thus, institutional theory suggests how to 
analyse phenomena. Institutional theory would 
give context, showing how the IASB is 
impacted by institutions (such as large listed 
entities and institutional norms), but would 
ignore many aspects of analysis. For 
institutional theory, analysis of institutions is 
important, examining how they are formed, 
how they change, how they are led, and how 
they are sanctioned. However, similar to PAT, 
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the necessity for understanding 
institutional structures and social processes 
that shape regulation. 
institutional theory misses out the history and 
emergence of the analysis, not considering the 
political.  
 
Having considered key economic and social regulatory theories in this section, the following section focuses on critical social theory, in search of a theory that is 
adequate for analysing the IASB’s work.  
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2.3 Critical accounting research 
Critical accounting research offers lessons for this thesis, particularly the need for social analysis 
and challenging the construction of accounting. Cooper and Sherer (1984: 222) argue that 
accounting problems reflect problems within society, so accountants require further social 
awareness, through a Political Economy of Accounting (PEA): 
…[PEA] is thus a normative, descriptive and critical approach to accounting research. It 
provides a broader, more holistic, framework for analyzing and understanding the value 
of accounting reports within the economy… to explicate and interpret the role of 
accounting reports in the distribution of income, wealth and power in society  
Gaffikin (2008: 239) explains the interaction between accounting and society: 
Those engaged in the practice of accounting have to adopt approaches that are well 
beyond those of the past, and thus an appreciation of the interdisciplinary nature of 
accounting theory and research is essential. Accounting is shaped by the demands placed 
on it, but it also shapes the environments with which is interacts. Consequently, 
accountants need to be aware of social, political, legal and linguistic consideration, and 
not just serve the economic interests of a few members of society. It may be necessary, 
as some have argued, for there to be new accountings.   
These authors call for critical accounting research, because mainstream accounting follows 
limited methods and assumptions (Chua, 1986). Chua (1986) demonstrates the need for a different 
set of assumptions to gain rich insights through interpretative and critical methodologies. These 
approaches enable the researcher to critically analyse different perspectives and to understand 
regulation and accounting in a broader manner (Chua, 1986; Gaffikin, 2008). First, Chua (1986: 
619) discusses the idea that all humans have inner potential that is not fulfilled:  
... every state of existence, be it an individual or society, possesses historically constituted 
potentialities that are unfulfilled. Everything is because of what it is and what it is not (its 
potentiality) ... human potentiality is restricted by prevailing systems of domination 
which alienate people from self-realisation. These material blockages operate both at the 
level of consciousness and through material economic and political relations.  
This inner potential is restricted socially, structurally and ideologically, due to taken-for-granted 
beliefs and views about acceptable behaviour and rules that govern ‘social exchange and the 
ownership and distribution of wealth’ (Chua, 1986: 619). Chua (1986) argues that subjects forget 
that social reality is subjectively constructed and they play an active (but hidden) role in the 
construction of meaning, because of the appearance of objectivity: ‘Social reality is, thus, both 
subjectively created and objectively real’ (Chua, 1986: 620). Chua (1986: 620) goes on to suggest 
that critical analysis of truth and agency should be contextual, and should consider movement and 
change over time:  
Reality as a whole, as well as each particular part, is understood as developing out of an 
earlier stage of its existence and evolving into something else. Indeed, every state of 
existence is apprehended only through movement and change, and the identity of 
particular phenomenon can only be uncovered by reconstructing the process whereby the 
entity transforms itself.  
Critical accounting research has identified power and imbalances, whilst also challenging 
domination and dominant ideologies: 
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Fundamental conflict is endemic to society. Conflict arises because of injustice and 
ideology in the social, economic, and political domains which obscures the creative 
dimension in people (Chua, 1986: 622).  
Context is crucial in this critical analysis, as is the necessity to learn deeply about the 
subject/object relationship, moving beyond interpretation:  
Thus, like the interpretive researcher, it is accepted that social scientists need to learn the 
language of their subject/object. The process of coming to an understanding is also agreed 
to be context-dependent as social scientists are necessarily immersed in and engaged with 
their socio-historical contexts. However, critical researchers argue that interpretation per 
se is insufficient. It cannot appreciate that the world is not only symbolically mediated, 
but it is also shaped by material conditions of domination. Language itself may be a 
medium for repression and social power (Chua, 1986: 621).  
Despite similarities, interpretivism is insufficient, as it is unable to appreciate how domination, 
repression, language, social norms and ideologies shape the world (and the impact that they have) 
(Chua, 1986; Crotty, 1998). Critical analysis is concerned with social change, and with 
challenging the status quo through the demonstration that social norms and behaviour are a 
product of domination (Chua, 1986; Crotty, 1998; Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994). For example, 
Shearer and Arrington (1993) (through feminist theory) critiqued the dominance of masculinity 
embedded in calculations of accounting income. This critical analysis acts to expose and 
transform inequalities, injustices, domination and alienation within accounting, society and social 
orders (Crotty, 1998; Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994). Despite the positivistic portrayal of 
accounting as objective and value-free, critical research in accounting demonstrates that 
accounting is subjective, partial, motivated and one-sided: 
…accounting, far from being a practice that provides a neutral or unbiased representation 
of underlying economic facts, actually provides the means of maintaining the powerful 
positions of some sectors of the community (those currently in power, and with wealth) 
while holding back the position and interests of those without wealth. These theorists 
challenge any perspectives which suggest that various rights and privileges are spread 
throughout society – instead they argue that most rights, opportunities and associated 
power reside in a small (but perhaps well-defined) elite (Deegan, 2006: 456). 
Hines (1988: 257) demonstrates the way that accounting is a construction of reality, which is 
dependent upon context, values, culture and power relations:  
It seems to me, that your power is a hidden power, because people only think of you as 
communicating reality, but in communicating reality, you construct reality. 
Critical research enables examination of accounting through a political perspective, because 
regulation is not neutral, and is political (Catlett, 1960; Gaffikin, 2008; Gerboth, 1973; Hines, 
1988; 1991; Peltzman, 1976;). Morgan (1988: 482) challenges the myth of objectivity within 
accounting:  
Accounting can never be truly objective… objectivity is always as much a part of the 
observer as of the object observed. Accountants are linked to their observations… 
creating partial and one-sided ways of viewing the world. 
Additionally, critical research identifies accounting’s contribution to capitalist domination, 
depicting accounting as the language of capitalism (Chiapello, 2007). This impacts society 
hegemonically: 
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…elaborating the repressive dimensions of accounting’s functionings today and in the 
past; exposing how accounting is captured by problematic hegemonic forces… 
supporting an unjust and exploitative socio-political and economic order… given the 
possibility of accounting’s capture by problematic hegemonic forces, including by an 
aligned professional expert rhetoric (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003:157-160).  
This holds equivalences with Bryer’s (1993; 1999; 2012) Marxist critique, which argues that 
accounting is key to capitalism, society and political ideology. Bryer (2000a, b) highlights 
accounting’s social significance and its support for capitalism through the FASB’s conceptual 
framework. Gallhofer and Haslam (1996: 25) call for changes within accounting to facilitate 
emancipatory social change: 
…challenge current norms, traditions, ways of “doing things” and expose inequalities, 
injustices, oppression and exploitation. Through this, accounting can help engender 
change, contributing to the building of a more liberated, democratic and happier society. 
Currently, accounting has an unbalanced nature, maintaining dominant power and values, by 
creating sanctions that construct certain conceptions of truth (Catlett, 1960; Hines, 1991), and 
dominant foundations of knowledge:  
[t]ear[ing] accounting from its foundations in modernist/Enlightenment ontology and 
epistemology and to situate accounting in the world of lived experience as both a product 
of social construction and as an architect of social experience (Neimark, 1990: 106).  
This demonstrates the discursive power of accounting, in that it can dehumanise, reduce and 
exclude social relations (Morgan, 1988). Critical accounting research employs various methods, 
such as ethnography; participant observation; interviews; case studies; grounded theory; 
discourse analysis; historical analysis; ideological critique; and dialectic analysis, (Chua, 1986; 
Crotty, 1988). These approaches examine social, cultural, political and ideological conditions, 
revealing conflicts, inequalities and oppressions that are endemic to the social order (Carter, 2008; 
Chua, 1986).  
Through a Marxist framework, Tinker (1985) critiques accounting through case studies 
concerning pollution, for example, the failure to report the potential waste disposal costs, which 
leads to exaggerated profits.9 Tinker (1985) argues that accountants are unfamiliar with 
alternative accounting practice, due to the domination of neo-classical economics and 
marginalism; exchange and commodity; and a focus on capital markets. Tinker (1985) outlines 
detrimental flaws within neoclassical economics (economic reductionism and political 
voluntarism) through Marxist theory and value theory, suggesting that narrow regulation should 
be replaced with pluralistic regulation and further state controls, by combining the political and 
economic, with other stakeholder needs. Tinker (1985) draws attention to social exploitation, 
alienation and inequality within capitalism, to argue that profit increases act to increase 
exploitation. Consequently, social alienation occurs through class exploitation, unequal 
commodity exchange and individual alienation, which is ignored in current accounting systems 
                                               
9   This is like Hines’ (1988) river pollution example, in which she argues that accountants construct 
boundaries within accounts for what is included and excluded, leaving out potentially detrimental 
aspects, in order to construct a certain reality of the organisation.  
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(Tinker, 1985). Thus, Tinker (1985) offers radical accounting systems, proposing social 
constituency accounting and emancipatory accounting (like Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). 
Social constituency accounting is an extension of marginalist thinking that acknowledges 
social conflict within the restricted terminology of marginalism. Even with this narrow 
vocabulary, conventional accounting fails to adequately reflect the alienation inherent in 
corporate relations. Emancipatory accounting reaches beyond social constituency 
accounting to incorporate expropriations through unequal exchanges inherent in 
capitalism itself. The accounting literature is less informed about this kind of alienation 
than about any other (Tinker, 1985: 181). 
Mouck (1992; 1995) also argues for pluralistic accounting, to stop ignoring public views, as 
currently accounting is captured by corporate and political ideologies. Instead accounting should 
recognise silenced voices, pluralistically and democratically (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Mouck, 
1992; 1995). Scholars demonstrate accounting’s social and political importance in creating 
inequalities through the powerful protection of capital by a privileged elite (see, Arrington, 1990; 
Cooper, 1980; Chiapello, 2007; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997; Hines, 1988; 2003; 2007; Puxty et 
al., 1987; Tinker, 1980; 1985; 1999; 2001; 2005; Tinker et al., 1991). Analysis through Marxist 
theory of IFRS for SMEs would focus on class and economic determinism, but this is only one 
construct of struggle. This thesis plans to move away from this limited focus through PSDT as 
this permits the consideration of multiple sites of struggle. 
The next section focuses on Black’s political and discursive examinations of regulatory 
communications, and Howarth’s call for the examination of regulation as hegemonic practice.  
2.4 Political theory and regulation as hegemonic practice  
Black (2002b) critically examines regulation, with a focus on law, and conceptions of centred and 
decentred regulation. Black calls for examination of regulatory conversations and the role of 
control and command. Black identifies that regulatory communication, fails to consider society, 
pluralistically, and to understand socio-political relations, regulatory values, power and authority. 
For Black, regulation is formed through discourses, definitions, meanings and identities, which 
frame thought and knowledge, emphasising the necessity for analysis through DT and the concept 
of regulatory conversations:  
Communications between all those involved in the regulatory process concerning that 
regulatory system are an important part of their operation. Understanding such regulatory 
conversations is thus central to understanding the ‘inner life’ of that process (Black, 
2002b: 164).  
This examination of regulatory communication reveals multiple power struggles, 
interdependencies and dispersals (Black, 2000; 2002a, b). Thus, Black (2002a, b) calls for further 
analysis through DT, highlighting the importance of L&M’s PSDT and their conception of 
discourse. Additionally, Black (2000) highlights links between regulation and democracy, 
considering complexities and pressures, to reinvigorate analysis of the political nature of 
regulation. This relates to the analysis of IFRS for SMEs in this thesis, when questioning why the 
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IASB created this standard, through the examination of regulatory communication and 
conversations. Black (2002b: 163) constructs the notion of regulatory conversations as:  
… the communicative interactions that occur between all involved in the regulatory 
`space', are an important part of most regulatory systems… By regulatory conversations 
I mean the communications that occur between regulators, regulated and others involved 
in the regulatory process… The term includes all forms of interpersonal communications, 
extending beyond standards, policy documents, and guidance notes to include all micro-
level conversations that may occur in formal or informal settings, including policy 
briefings, seminars, and conferences, in the course of the regulatory process between 
individuals both within and across organizations or particular cohesive communities. In 
understanding the role played by regulatory conversations it is important to disaggregate 
the regulatory process and to identify at which points regulatory conversations occur, 
between whom, and about what (Black, 2002b: 163, 170, 171).  
This thesis is concerned with the way that the IASB construct regulatory conversations, as the 
IASB self-define their role and these conversations in a limited manner, forming command, 
control and legitimacy (Black, 2002a, b; Black, 2008). Howarth (2013) similarly argues for the 
analysis of regulation through PSDT, asserting the importance of analysing regulation as 
hegemonic practice. This demonstrates the necessity to consider the IASB’s hegemony, and to 
define the term hegemony for this thesis.  
Hegemony has been commonly drawn upon in the accounting literature, for example, there are 
many references to Gramsci’s hegemony and applications of Gramsci’s theorisation (see, Cooper, 
1995; Gray 2006; Mantzari, 2017; Spence 2009; Yee 2009; 2012 (some of which are referred to 
in the previous section on critical accounting research, and further discussed in chapter 3). Whilst 
some research references both Gramsci and L&M, there are less who focus on L&M, but those 
who do are examined in chapter 3 (see, Spence, 2007; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; Gallhofer et 
al., 2015; Tregidga et al., 2013; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003). This thesis moves to L&M’s (2001) 
hegemony which extends Gramsci’s influential work, as Gramsci remains too encapsulated in a 
Marxist framework which narrows the focus to economic determination. L&M (2001) argue for 
the importance of multiple struggles and constant antagonisms. Thus, their hegemony is focused 
on the politics of the movement from the particular to the universal, constructing a universal nodal 
point (this theorisation of hegemony and the literature is further examined in chapter 3 - section 
3.3). Griggs and Howarth (2013: 23) explain: 
On the one hand, hegemony is a type of rule or governance which captures the way in 
which a regime, practice or policy holds sway over a set of subjects by a particular 
entwining of consent, compliance and coercion. On the other hand, hegemony is a 
practice of politics that involves the linking together of disparate demands to forge 
hegemonic projects or ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1995) which can consent a particular 
form of rule, practice or policy ... In practice, of course, these aspects are intimately 
related. Hegemony as a form of rule presupposes various practices of transformism, 
negotiation, compromise and bargaining, while the struggle to develop counter-
hegemonic presupposes certain forms of rule which the movements challenge and seek 
to transform.  
For Howarth (2013) hegemony (L&M’s theorisation) drives regulation and the construction of 
political frontiers. Political frontiers act hegemonically to exclude alternatives and conceal 
contingencies by drawing on ideologies to naturalise domination and hierarchies (Howarth, 
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2013). Howarth (2013) identifies the nature of regulation as hegemonic practice through Polanyi 
(1957) who recognises that markets and regulations are strong forces in society that have been 
socially constructed and instituted. Indeed, they do not exist naturally, nor are they inevitable, 
universal or systematic (Polanyi, 1957). However, ideologies are constructed and used to embed 
certain practices in social life (Howarth, 2013; Lehman, 2013; Neimark, 1994; Polanyi, 1957; 
Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). These market logics also embed logics of profit-seeking and 
greed within society, to the annihilation of community relationships and humanity’s natural 
habitat (Polanyi, 1957; Neimark, 1994; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005).  
For Howarth (2013) researchers should deconstruct and demystify discourses and social practices 
that have been naturalised in everyday society, and construct counter-hegemonic alternatives that 
challenge hegemonic practices for complete reform, not incremental improvements (Aglietta, 
2000; Lipietz, 1987; Jessop & Sum, 2016). Howarth (2013) argues that current regimes of 
accumulation in society give the impression that they are natural and therefore external to political 
struggles and ideologies. Therefore, this thesis gives a constitutive role to politics and ideology. 
Through Polanyi, Aglietta, and Lipietz Howarth (2013) proposes that regulatory studies should 
focus on the socially constructed and partial nature of regulation. Such an approach to social 
construction and partiality is crucial to L&M’s PSDT. Howarth (2013) calls for analysis of 
regulation as hegemonic practice through notions of hierarchy, oppression, domination, alliance, 
subjectivity and ideology. Also, highlighting the importance of articulatory practice, which 
discursively constructs regulation and covers over contingencies (masking problems, issues or 
antagonisms external to the constructed systems) (Howarth, 2013).  
Howarth (2013) argues that hegemony offers alternative ways of understanding and exploring 
regulation, and regulatory movements. So, regulation is conceptualised as hegemonic practice:  
Regulation consists of the ensemble of practices and activities that ensures societal 
reproduction by constructing stable frontiers, which can negate or defuse popular 
antagonisms either by incorporating them into manageable social forms of by displacing 
them to the margins of social order (Howarth, 2013: 219).  
This political and hegemonic work is operated by the IASB, as they repress alternatives and 
partially fix contingent meaning:  
…the creation of ‘historic blocs’ and ‘collective wills’ out of dispersed and contingent 
elements, through a range of hegemonic practises and operations, was the only way in 
which social formations could be forged and transformed (Howarth, 2013; 194).  
For Howarth (2013), hegemony excludes alternatives through signifiers, nodal points and 
ideologies, which institute social identities. In this, there can be various attempts to construct 
hegemony, through power and leadership, which blend different aspects of force, coercion and 
consent, and naturalise hierarchies, domination and exclusion (Howarth, 2013; Lukes, 2005).  
Given the necessity to challenge the IASB’s power, and the extension of this to IFRS for SMEs, 
Howarth’s (2013) argument for the necessity to analyse regulation as hegemonic practice through 
PSDT to challenge the status quo, is important. As is Black’s call for further analysis of 
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regulation, which sees regulation as socially constructed and dialectic and calls for the 
examination of regulatory conversations. Thus, L&M’s conception of discourse is crucial for this 
thesis, alongside their hegemony.  So, this thesis moves to outlining PSDT, but first the following 
section gives a summary of this regulatory theory chapter.  
2.5 Summary  
Howarth (2013) observes that many regulatory theories have been developed, but they are not 
satisfactory, as they tend to disconnect from and downplay politics, and do not regard regulation 
as hegemonic. The table in section 2.2 demonstrates that the dominant ‘economic’ and ‘social’ 
regulatory theories are not adequate for analysis, often because these theories place the IASB at 
the center of analysis, or support the status quo. As discussed in section 2.3, critical accounting 
research challenges the status quo, unpacking domination, ideology, politics and power, and 
demonstrating how accounting maintains power and creates truth conceptions that benefit a 
privileged few (Carter, 2008; Crotty, 1998). Whilst critical research (particularly research that has 
drawn on a Marxist framework) does inform this thesis to an extent, it is not the central 
framework, as often this research oversimplifies political complexity, by tending to focus on 
division (Carter, 2008).  
For Howarth (2013), analysis of regulatory theory through hegemony and DT highlights multiple 
aspects, including: the arbitrary assumptions of other regulatory theories; the necessity for the 
primacy of politics; and the importance of analysis of the object and subject. The progression 
through theories within this chapter with normative expectations has demonstrated how they are 
lacking, with respect to the economic, social, political and ideological. So, this thesis calls for a 
broader, holistic theory, to analyse regulation, and ask different questions:  
Nonetheless, there are still questions we need to ask about the explanatory power of 
regulation theory. In general terms, regulation theorists seek ‘to explain the rise and 
subsequent crisis of modes of development, leaving the question of the long-run 
tendencies of capitalism open until enough historical studies and international 
comparison have been accumulated’ (Boyer, 1990, p. 48). But this deceptively simple 
objective conceals a range of pertinent questions asked by regulation theorists (Howarth, 
2013: 218). 
This leads to a view of regulation as hegemonic and the analysis of IFRS for SMEs through 
L&M’s PSDT. PSDT is appropriate as it gives primacy to politics, in ‘the local’ and ‘the 
particular’, and highlights the linguistic turn, social constructivism and the discursive nature of 
accounting (Hines, 1988). Importantly, this chapter has highlighted problems with regulatory 
theory for the analysis of accounting regulation, which leads to hegemony, to gain a more holistic 
examination of IFRS for SMEs, through political, social, economic and ideological elements. 
Therefore, in line with arguments from Howarth and Black this thesis argues that limits of 
previous regulatory theory are resolved by PSDT which gives primacy to politics. Thus, the 
following chapter outlines L&M PSDT, and examines further their theorisation of hegemony.  
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Chapter 3: Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory  
3.1 How is Discourse Theory Post-Structuralist and why is Post-Structuralist 
Discourse Theory appropriate for this thesis?  
The regulatory theory chapter outlined the necessity for PSDT and a focus on the ontic, by 
demonstrating the arbitrary, exclusionary and constraining nature of dominant regulatory 
theories. The regulatory literature debates how to meet and balance the public interest and the 
balance of exchange through the ‘best’ form of regulation (Powers, 1987; Downs, 1962). Indeed, 
regulation is crucial to the transfer of wealth:  
The essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer of wealth, 
with constituents on the demand side and their political representatives on the supply side 
... the market here, as elsewhere, will distribute more of the good to those whose effective 
demand is the highest (Peltzman, 1976: 212).  
Regulatory decisions are hard to make, especially when considering the public interest and its 
many nuances, rendering the decisions made political and complex:  
When a decision making process depends for its success on the public confidence, the 
critical issues are not technical; they are political ... In the face of conflict between 
competing interests, rationality as well as prudence lies not in seeking final answers, but 
rather in compromise – essentially a political process (Gerboth, 1973: 497).  
This balance of competing interests raises questions of hegemony as the decisions made can 
favour some over others. This lays the foundation for political theory within this thesis. 
Consequently, this chapter outlines L&M’s (2001) DT10 (Howarth et al., 2000; Macintosh, 2002; 
Toring, 1999). PSDT explores the construction of discourses, through social practice and 
pluralism (Howarth, 2013), highlighting the primacy of politics: 
Post-structuralism ... is immanently political… we can say, then, that a post-structuralist 
approach to politics points always to a certain void that makes social and political 
identities indeterminate (Newman, 2005: 153-154).  
This approach implicates the examination of the ‘shadowy underside of politics’ (Devenney, 
2002: 176), as Mouffe (2000: 101) explains:  
By ‘the political’ I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human 
relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social 
relations. ‘Politics’, on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and 
institutions which seeks to establish a certain order and organise human co-existence in 
conditions that are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’.  
The primacy of the political is crucial for the examination of accounting in this thesis, as 
accounting literature demonstrates the political nature of accounting, regulation and the IASB 
(see, Botzem, 2012; 2014; Cooper, 2015; Chua, 1986; Martinez-Diaz, 2005; Perry & Nölke, 2006; 
Power, 2010). Indeed, Martinez-Diaz (2005:4) argues: 
…by ignoring the role of power and politics in standard-setting, this perspective seems 
to be missing a critical part of the story. Standard-setting at the IASC/B is and has long 
been permeated by politics.   
                                               
10     Also, referred to in this chapter as PSDT. 
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There has been Post-Structuralist research in accounting, encompassing Foucault; Derrida; 
Nietzsche; Heidegger; Baudrillard; Laclau and Mouffe (see, Arrington & Francis, 1989; 1993; 
Arrington & Puxty, 1991; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Carter & Spence, 2011; Francis, 1994; 
Gallhofer et al., 2015; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Hopper et al., 1987; Hopwood, 1987; Hoskin 
& Macve, 1988; Loft, 1986; Macintosh, 1994; Macintosh et al., 2000; Macintosh & Shearer, 
2000; Spence, 2007; Spence et al., 2010). For example, Hopwood (1987) draws on Foucault’s 
Archaeology to illustrate the impact of accounting in constructing social discourse, whilst 
Arrington and Schweiker (1992) draw on Derrida’s deconstruction for analysis of accounting 
rhetoric and its social impact. Similarly, Arrington and Francis (1989) deconstruct and criticise 
Positive Accounting Theory, and Macintosh (2002) and McKernan and Kosmala (2007) 
deconstruct truth claims surrounding the assumed nature of accounting to illustrate the 
construction of political signifiers and ‘truth’ in accounting.  
Throughout empirical analysis, the Post-structuralist movement recognises the micro-politics of 
power and resistance (Fogarty, 1996; Kosmala & Herrbach, 2006; Newman, 2005; Thomas & 
Davies, 2005; Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). This thesis examines accounting and its 
organisations as a political process, deconstructing hegemonic discourses to identify how 
meanings gain power and exclude alternatives (Carter, 2008; Connolly 1991; 1995; Hajer, 1995; 
Howarth, 2013; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This is in contradistinction to claims of accounting’s 
objectivity (Carter, 2008; Chua, 1986; Morgan, 1988; Spence, 2007). Hence, analysing IFRS for 
SMEs through L&M (2001), critically examines how and why the IASB extended IFRS to IFRS 
for SMEs and the logics surrounding this extension (Ram & Newberry, 2012; Devi & Samujh, 
2015). In this extension, the IASB attempt to extend their standard setting power further, so they 
construct their authority and legitimacy through logics of expertise (Botzem, 2012; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2007; Hines, 1991; Mitchell, 2002). 
PSDT offers a critical reading of Gramsci, Althusser, Luxembourg, de Saussure, Derrida, 
Foucault and Lacan. L&M challenge essentialism and attempts to move beyond the 
‘straightjacketing’ impact of structuralism (Berlin, 1962: 19 cited in, Chua, 1986: 601). Thus, 
there are three central Post-Structuralist premises:  
• The core of Post-Structuralist critique is concerned with ontology and the ontic 
(Carter, 2008; Crotty, 1998).11 This invokes L&M’s (2001) discourse, which 
focuses on discourse as totality, and calls for the examination of different ontic 
articulations that actively construct discourse (Frezatti et al., 2014).  
• DT critiques universalism and illustrates how equivalences are drawn across 
local contexts and differences, to construct hegemonic universals (Howarth, 
2013). For example, IFRS for SMEs is presented as reflecting different contexts 
and cultures, as it is an international standard. DT calls for the consideration of 
                                               
11    For a further understanding of epistemology and paradigms see Crotty (1998). 
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local contexts, differences and antagonisms from a pluralistic perspective, as the 
common treatment of differences and antagonisms as equivalent universals is 
problematic and only produces antagonisms (Howarth, 2013).  
• PSDT critiques critical research (particularly Marxism) for simplifying the 
analysis of identities. Through Freud (1961), PSDT argues that identities are 
fractured, as multiple elements and antagonisms combine to construct identities. 
Thus, in combination with Althusser’s overdetermination, PSDT argues that 
there are many roles and identities, not one single identity (Althusser, 1969; 
Carter, 2008; Freud, 1961; Zizek, 1994). For PSDT, universalism violates the 
particular and ignores difference, so ontic meaning, particularism and 
contingency are important to political analysis, through the examination of 
rhetoric and interrogation of multiple identities in a pluralistic manner (Carter & 
Spence, 2011).  
• This justifies a focus on the local rather than the global, because voices are lost 
at the global level (Carter & Spence, 2011). This applies to the IASB as they 
create standards internationally and attempt to construct a universal language of 
financial reporting, covering over antagonisms, particularities and contingencies. 
This invites rhetorical analysis because articulations are understood differently 
by individual local contexts and have multiple meanings (Laclau, 1998; Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001).  
Through these premises, Post-structuralism and Post-modernism12 critique the universalising 
logic of progress within positivistic research, and question the crystal-ball gazing and utopian 
logics in some areas of critical research, by challenging the idea of predicting a better tomorrow 
(Howarth, 2013). Within this, PSDT argues that logics and relations of power are unlikely to 
disappear (which differs from Marx’s socialism, within which there is a hope that relationships 
of power and domination disappear) (Laclau, 1998; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Therefore, to 
ground PSDT, the next section moves from these premises to the three core components unique 
to DT. These three core components are the systematicity of systems, post-Marxism and DT as 
post analytical. 
3.1.1 Post-Structuralism critiques the Systematicity of Systems 
PSDT sees systems as open, because there are always antagonisms that challenge the ability to 
close systems. In this sense, Post-structuralism is critical of the constraining nature of 
structuralism (Chua, 1998; Crotty, 1998), as described in the following quote: 
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing 
pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and 
                                               
12  There is common confusion between post-structuralism and post-modernism, as they intersect (Peter, 
1996; Carter, 2008). A distinction can be drawn here by focusing on the dichotomy, as post-modernism 
is focused on modernism, and post-structuralism is focused on structuralism. 
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so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipatory, and at the same time, enslaving 
conceptions. The first step to understanding of men is the bringing to consciousness of 
the model or models that dominate and penetrate their thought and action. Like all 
attempts to make men aware of the categories in which they think, it is a difficult and 
painful activity, likely to produce deeply disquieting results. The second task is to analyse 
the model itself, and this commits the analyst to accepting or modifying or rejecting it 
and in the last case, to providing a more adequate one in its stead (Berlin, 1962: 19 cited 
in Chua, 1986: 601).  
DT extends structuralism to move beyond a closed view of structure, identity, signification, 
relations and discourse (Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). The inability (in the long 
term) to close systems fully due to structural and linguistic limits is central to DT. This employs 
antagonism, Wittgenstein’s language games, and ontological assumptions for the examination of 
subjects, and to illustrate the tensions in attempts to fix meaning and signification (Howarth et 
al., 2000; Laclau, 2003; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Subsequently, DT argues that closed systems 
or attempts at systematicities are always partial, contingent and non-linear.  
Accounting is often presented as a fixed system, which has been critiqued by researchers (Gill, 
2009; Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988). Similarly, DT would argue that accounting systems are 
contingent and attempts to close systems are always tendential, partial and antagonistic. For 
example, the existence of alternative accounting systems for SMEs is antagonistic to the 
international accounting harmonisation project. Despite the constant existence of antagonisms, 
L&M (2001) argue it is human nature to attempt to close systems (Howarth, 2013).  Laclau uses 
this to challenge the deterministic nature of Marxism, thus the next section illustrates L&M’s 
post-Marxist nature.  
3.1.2 How and Why is DT Post-Marxist?  
L&M (2001) challenge the economic determinism and class reductionism of Marx. Regarding 
economic determinism, L&M challenge Marx’s premise that all conflict occurs through class 
(which is identified through the lens of private property ownership), arguing instead for political 
proliferation.  For class reductionism, L&M critique Marx and Gramsci for asserting that class is 
always the site of revolution. L&M critique Marx’s economic determinism and his focus on class 
struggles for oversimplifying identity. Instead L&M argue that there is a proliferation of complex 
political and social movements (not only class) that are unfixed, multiple and antagonistic (such 
as: gender, sexuality, environmentalism, race) (Marx & Engel, 2002). Consequently, political 
signification is both necessary and impossible. For example, a subject may identify with the 
working class, but the subject’s ownership of property would create a class conflict for this 
subject.  
L&M (2001) extend Gramsci’s hegemony by identifying that disparate demands and interests 
within the political are not pre-given, but instead are constituted and crystallised, gradually 
through discourse (Howarth, 2013). Within this hegemony there are counter hegemonies, which 
challenge the dominant hegemony (Howarth, 2013). Within society, there are relations, 
equivalences and hierarchies of power due to uneven politics, so PSDT focuses on relations of 
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domination and oppression (Howarth, 2013). Hegemonic change is not prescriptive and the 
success or failure of hegemonies can be random and spontaneous (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; 
Simon, 1991). Moreover, hegemonic change can occur on a subconscious level, through interests, 
identities and subjects (Freud, 1961; Howarth, 2013; Simon, 1991).  
L&M adopt the Gramscian position when identifying the difference between the superstructure 
and the base. Gramsci (1971) critiques Marx’s distinction between the superstructure (state force 
and ideological consciousness, creating false consciousness), and the base (mode of production 
and civil society) (Gramsci, 1971; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Marx, 1978). Gramsci rearticulated 
the superstructure, shifting civil society into the superstructure (political societies, domination 
and civil society representing many struggles, through the spread of hegemonic messages), and 
the base (decisive economic nucleus) (Gramsci, 1971; Howarth, 2013). This extension of the 
superstructure illustrates Gramsci’s attempts to extend economic determinism and proliferate the 
social space. L&M support this attempt, but critique Gramsci for falling back into class 
essentialism, as Gramsci still holds that revolution must emerge from the working class (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001). Thus, L&M (2001) adopt a pluralistic position, recognising the contingency of 
identity, social movements, hegemony, and articulatory political practice (which often lacks 
democracy). So, L&M (2001) argue that we are unable to reduce all political problems to one 
emancipatory agent. Through L&M, this thesis investigates pluralities and contingencies within 
the IASB’s discourse. Additionally, L&M incorporate the insights of post-analytical philosophy 
from language theorists. The next section illustrates this post-analytical approach from L&M.  
3.1.3 How and Why is DT Post-analytical?  
L&M’s (2001) DT critiques forms of ‘logic’ and ‘analysis’ from analytical philosophy, which 
focus on clarity and precision (Crotty, 1998). Instead, for L&M (2001), language is indeterminate, 
which critiques de Saussure’s presentation that language is relational and differential. L&M 
employ Wittgenstein’s (1974) totality of differences, to consider all elements of difference in 
discourse (this relates to ontic analysis). For both L&M and Wittgenstein, language is limited and 
not everything can be expressed, creating a ‘lack’. This is central to post-analytical philosophy. 
For example, chess and the rules of the game constitute an unquestioned social practice:  
… we could say that the logic of a practice comprises the rules or grammar of practice, 
as well as the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable. Consider 
first the logic of chess playing. Here we can obviously discern the characteristic grammar 
of the practice of playing chess. In other words, we can reconstruct the dominant pattern 
of sequences or actual moves comprising the strategies and counter-strategies, tactics and 
counter-tactics involved in chess playing. On the other hand, there are also the 
presupposed basic entities and types of relationship: the fundamental rules of the game… 
make possible the myriad moves at the level of tactics and strategy. In other words, chess 
playing embodies and presupposes the basic rules of the game, the way the pieces can 
move on the board… they furnish us with the general grammar or ‘rules’ of chess playing 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 136)   
This demonstrates the importance of language games and social practices: 
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I see social logics as involving a rarefied system of statements- that is to say, a system of 
rules drawing a horizon within which some objects are representable while others are 
excluded. So we can talk about the logics of kinship, of the market- even chess-playing 
(to use Wittgenstein’s example)… social logics consist in rule-following… (Laclau, 
2005: 117).  
This post-analytical perspective forms part of the foundations of DT, as in analysis there is always 
a lack so we are not searching for precision but instead deconstructing social practices and 
offering interpretation. Additionally, DT approaches structure and agency in a different way to 
previous theories, seeing them as a duality instead of identifying the domination of one over the 
other, which also forms the foundations of L&M.  
3.1.4 Structure, agency and power  
There are multiple perspectives on structure and agency. For Regulatory Capture theory, 
individualism is focused upon, for Marx and Althusser the agent’s role is marginal; whereas 
Critical Realists and Giddens’ Structuration are human-centred theories (Howarth, 2013). Laclau 
extends the structure and agency separation, by identifying a duality, seeing structures as 
incomplete, contingent and dislocated, while agency impacts, transforms and affects structures 
(Howarth, 2013). Therefore, L&M insert agency into the structure to construct duality and radical 
agency. Thus, L&M’s agency is not determined by structure, because if we operated wholly 
within structures, there would be no agency, and vice versa, so a duality of structure and agency 
is constantly in operation (Howarth, 2013). These foundations are central to DT, 13  and in building 
on these foundations, the rest of the chapter covers five major components: 
1. What is discourse?  
2. Hegemony: Gramsci, empty signifiers, and deconstruction. 
3. Rhetoric, antagonisms and logics of equivalence and difference.  
4. Displacement, condensation, overdetermination and ideology.  
This then moves to the Logics of Critical Explanation (LOCE), which operationalises DT and is 
outlined in chapter 4. This chapter enables me to engage with the following questions: 1. How 
does the theory of hegemony help us understand why the IASB extended IFRS to IFRS for SMEs? 
2. What is the hegemonic significance of the extension by the IASB to IFRS for SMEs? The 
movement to SMEs by the IASB is a movement of equivalence that requires investigation. First, 
this chapter outlines how L&M’s notion of discourse differs from other theorisations.  
3.2 How does DT understand discourse?  
DT as a theoretical framework incorporates antagonism, contingency, and the ontology of lack 
(Glynos, 1999; Hviding, 2003). DT is not in itself discourse analysis, the analysis is instead 
undertaken through DT. DT is a theory of radical democracy which theorises discourse in a 
comprehensive, inclusive manner. L&M’s DT extends beyond limits in previous articulations of 
discourse, such as Foucault or Fairclough, by seeing all social configurations as meaningful: 
                                               
13  See these sources for further information: Crotty, 1998; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2000; 
Howarth, 2013; Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Macintosh, 2002.  
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… this lower level of abstraction, discourses are concrete systems of social relations and 
practices that are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical institution, 
which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. In addition, therefore, they always involve the 
exercise of power (Howarth et al., 2000, pp. 3-4). 
This broadens historical materialism to include elements, ideas, sounds, people, objects, and 
relations, to form complex signification, and extend ontological dualism (Howarth, 2013). 
Fairclough (1995) defines discourse as language (focusing on speech and writing) and a form of 
social practice: 
…in relation to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, which defines “discourse – 
language use in speech and in writing – as a form of ‘social practice’”… Laclau and 
Mouffe’s inclusive “discourse” challenges the narrowness of Fairclough’s definition of 
discourse, as the sophisticated linguistic focus on speech and writing is a limited aspect 
of discourse and ignores the broader social context. The under-theorised social theory 
limits the scope of the discursive inquiry and increases the likelihood that the researcher 
is caught within the problem of the double hermeneutic… (Frezatti et al., 2014: 436).  
L&M challenge this narrowness, seeing discourse as tantamount to the construction of social 
systems, arguing that Fairclough limits discourse, ignores the broader social context, and limits 
discursive enquiry. For Foucault (1970; 1990), statements construct discursive formations, 
subjects, objects and concepts (Howarth, 2015; 2013; Laclau, 1996; 1998; 1994; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). Foucault (1990; 1970) argues that the subject is a discursive function, outlining 
concepts of domination and power. Foucault’s archaeology, presents strategies for understanding 
discourse by returning to the origin of social movements, to understand their truth constitution 
and formation:  
…Foucault talks of formation rules covering objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies 
within the archive… These rules operate as a judgment mechanism for the truth/falsity 
of serious speech acts: to make a serious speech act, the statement must conform to the 
rules… But Foucault fails to account for changes in the archives, as it fails to account for 
speech acts that fall outside the rules. Within the archive, there is no theorisation of 
external speech acts, but logically, Foucault requires the external as he expects archives 
to shift over time, given genealogy. Thus, Foucault’s discourse is unclear: if discourse is 
powerful and totalising, then how do critics of discourse emerge? (Frezatti et al., 2014: 
436).  
This thesis does not artificially draw boundaries of discursive and extra-discursive (extending 
Fairclough) and theorises the constitutive outside (extending Foucault) (Frezatti et al., 2014). 
Therefore, for L&M’s (2001) discourse includes linguistic and non-linguistic elements and 
antagonisms. This is crucial to understanding politics: 
This totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic, is what we 
call discourse, but what must be clear from the start is that by discourse we do not mean 
a combination of speech and writing, but rather that speech and writing are themselves 
but internal components of discursive totalities … Every social configuration is 
meaningful … it establishes a system of relations with other objects, and these relations 
are not given by the mere referential materiality of the objects, but are, rather, socially 
constructed (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 82 [Emphasis in original]). 
DT sees all objects and events as socially constructed, not denying that objects exist, but instead 
arguing that their meaning is constructed within discourse:  
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The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with 
whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition… 
What is denied is not that objects exist externally to thought, but rather different 
assertions that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive 
conditions of emergence (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 108). 
This ontic lens toward events and objects, considers multiple dimensions, including social, 
political, economic, cultural, ideological, and ethical dimensions (Howarth, 2000; Howarth et al., 
2000). For L&M, representation and identity are negotiated and expanded, illustrating ambiguity 
and contingency, within symbolic and political order (Howarth, 2000; Howarth et al., 2000). 
Laclau incorporates many elements to analyse hegemony, through a political, contingent, 
historical and contextual lens, taking account of the social and political construction of subjects 
and identities (Howarth et al., 2000).14 L&M’s DT examines languages, actions, objects, subjects 
and practices, as discourses form relational and contextual systems, and configurations, which 
render identities and contingencies crucial within discursive systems (Howarth, 2000). This 
contributes to the linguistic turn in accounting literature which sees every social configuration 
and discourse as meaningful (Arrington 1997; Frezatti et al., 2014; Macintosh, 2002; Macintosh 
et al., 2000), despite traditional depictions of accounting as technical, objective and value-free 
(Hines, 1988; Macintosh, 2002; 2004; Morgan, 1988). Thus, accounting is powerful and 
accounting discourse can be deconstructed to examine social meanings, rhetoric, dislocations, 
disruptions and change (Arrington & Francis, 1989; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Howarth et 
al., 2000; Shearer & Arrington, 1993). However, this thesis focuses on ontic rhetorical analysis 
rather than epistemological rhetorical analysis, examining multiple-voices and what discourses 
do, Frezatti et al. (2014: 436-437) further explain this:  
This paper is complex in its contribution, primarily for its new approach to the role of 
accounting… by examining what accounting “does”; this invokes the material dimension 
of accounting through a multi-voiced, ontologically-informed understanding of the 
conditions of possibility as what “counts” (and how these articulations count) as 
knowledge within the organisation. We invoke Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to 
discourse due to its focus on discourse as totality and the focus on the ontic articulations 
of “meaningful reality” that constitutes discourse. Thus, in this ontic, rhetorical analysis, 
we focus on the construction of organisational discourses… 
The ontic approach to discourse addresses a gap in the literature by examining what IFRS for 
SMEs does in ‘supporting, facilitating, enabling and constraining’ accounting regulation (Frezatti 
et al., 2014). Some accounting, organisations and management literature has examined the 
politics of business through L&M’s (2001) conception of discourse (examples include Bridgman 
& Willmott, 2006; Frezatti et al., 2014; Gallhofer et al., 2015; Glynos et al., 2015; Howarth & 
Griggs, 2006; Spence, 2007; Tregidga et al., 2013; Walton & Boon, 2014). 
                                               
14  Importantly discourse may shift, but this does not necessarily lead to a change in practice, which is an 
important distinction (Howarth, 2013). 
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Within L&M’s concept of discourse three concepts exist: 
the meta-discourse, the discourse and the discursive field, 
demonstrated in figure 4.  
Within this there are further concepts, including elements, 
moments and nodal points.  
• The discursive: DT extends previous discourse 
theories by combining linguistic and non-
linguistic analysis of signifiers, practices and 
subjects to understand the world (Howarth, 2000; 
Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; 
Norval, 1994). 
• Elements: Within discourses there are a range of signifiers with unfixed discursive 
fragments with the potential for different interpretations: 
The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory practices, that is, 
a field where the ‘elements’ have not crystallized into ‘moments’. In a closed system of 
relational identities, in which the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed, there is 
no place whatsoever for a hegemonic practice. A fully successful system of differences, 
which excluded any floating signifier, would not make possible any articulation; the 
principle of repetition would dominate every practice within this system and there would 
be nothing to hegemonize. It is because hegemony supposes the incomplete and open 
character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated by articulatory 
practices (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 120). 
Elements and moments are never fully exhausted with constant potential for new 
interpretations. However, for there to be discourses, elements are temporarily fixed as 
moments, which leads to the emergence of meaning and the exclusion of other 
understandings (Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 91). Figure 5 illustrates 
elements that are not yet fixed through articulation into moments:  
 
Figure 5: Elements (Adapted from Andrade (2015)). 
• Moments: Figure 6 demonstrates when elements become temporarily fixed into 
moments, through articulation:  
 
Figure 6: Moments (Adapted from Andrade (2015)). 
• Nodal points: Moments and elements become articulated into nodes that link together 
many moments, and become privileged. Elements not articulated into the discourse 
remain excluded, as the node draws boundaries for inclusion and exclusion:  
Figure 4: Discourse 
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Figure 7: Nodal points (Adapted from Andrade (2015).  
• The discursive field: A range of elements become contingently linked through 
articulatory practices, which construct nodal points in the discursive field (Howarth et 
al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). L&M (2001) see discursive fields as contingent, 
because each positive discourse creates an antagonistic other through exclusions, 
boundaries and temporary fixation (Howarth et al., 2000). Discourse has real effects 
within a space/field, in contradistinction to those who argue that DT is idealist (Howarth, 
2000; 2013). The discursive field in this thesis is IFRS for SMEs, within a broader 
discourse of accounting regulation and the hegemony of financial capital (Hopper et al., 
2017; Howarth et al., 2000; Lazzarato, 2012). Figure 8 outlines the interplay of 
discourses. This figure shows how this thesis 
employs DT to examine the extension of IFRS to 
IFRS for SMEs, which interrogates multiple 
discourses, including the discourse of financial 
capital, international accounting regulation and 
accounting more generally.15 This thesis unpacks 
this extension by illustrating how a contested 
discursive field with disparate perspectives was 
condensed together through discursive struggles 
in the institution of IFRS for SMEs. Previously, 
there has been little post-structural analysis of the IASB, and the literature on IFRS for 
SMEs is limited in its theoretical framing, as will be explored in chapter 6.  
In sum, L&M’s discourse includes the linguistic, non-linguistic and extra-linguistic elements 
which temporally fix meaning to construct reality. The concept of discourse is drawn on in this 
thesis to examine the IASB’s extension to IFRS for SMEs. This involves examining how different 
discourses, strategies and politics were involved in constituting a new accounting reality from the 
IASB. The theorisation of L&M’s discourse is essential to hegemony because Laclau’s 
articulation of hegemony is influenced by a critique of structural linguistics, thus the next section 
outlines L&M’s neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony. 
                                               
15  The extent to which accounting is constituted by the IASB’s discourse is questionable, as accounting 
discourses can be separated from the IASB’s discourses.  
Accounting
Regulation
Financial 
capital
Figure 8: Interplay of discourses 
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3.3 Neo-Gramscian Hegemony  
Gramsci’s hegemony is central to L&M’s DT, however, L&M (2001) critique components of 
Gramscian theory: class reductionism, fixation on the state and an over emphasis on planning of 
hegemonic activity. Rather they radicalise hegemony by increasing opportunities for examining 
the role of spontaneity in hegemonic change16 (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Luxemburg, 1906). L&M 
(2001) also deemphasise the assumption that revolution is violent and quick. This is important as 
the work of the IASB and the movement to IFRS for SMEs is a gradual, slow process yet is still 
examinable as a form of hegemonic revolution. Traditionally, Gramsci’s hegemony is:  
... Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling 
class, maintain[ing] their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of subordinate 
groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political 
and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups 
(Strinati, 1995: 165). 
For Gramsci (1926; 1957), hegemony is a persuasive message spread in many ways, through 
consent, coercion, threats of force, persuasion, political and/or ideological leadership, and 
engendering the exercise of power over subordinate classes. Furthermore, Gramsci argues that 
the construction of hegemony is formed through incremental movements, through interaction 
with organic intellectuals. The process of hegemony, connects elements, builds alliances, adjusts 
historic blocs and incorporates new and different demands in the maintenance of control, and 
within this ideology cements diverse struggles (Gramsci, 1971; Howarth, 2013; Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001; Simon, 1991).  
A critical element for L&M concerns Gramsci’s explanation of how disparate groups are brought 
together under a common signifier, Gramsci (1971) illustrated this by focusing on Italy as a newly 
formed country. Gramsci identified tensions between the industrial working class of the North 
and the peasantry of the South as disadvantaged groups that were subject to hegemonic rule. So, 
Gramsci focused on how to bring together disparate interests of the North and the South in a 
counter hegemonic project (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977). To facilitate the use of hegemony 
in broader contexts, L&M (2001: 137-138) extend Gramscian theory by removing elements of 
essentialism: 
... we have moved away from two key aspects of Gramsci’s thought: (a) his insistence 
that hegemonic subjects are necessarily constituted on the plane of fundamental classes; 
and (b) his postulate that, with the exception of interregna constituted by organic crises, 
every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic centre ... these are the 
two last elements of essentialism remaining in Gramscian thought.  
Therefore, L&M extend Gramsican hegemony by ‘speak[ing] of democratic struggles where 
these imply a plurality of political spaces, and popular struggles’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 66-
                                               
16 L&M (2001) extend this through Luxembourg, as Luxembourg previously argued there can be 
spontaneity within hegemony, which is something that Gramsci does not account for. For example, in 
Luxembourg’s Mass Strike examination the workers’ movement transformed into a significant 
revolution in a spontaneous and emergent manner.  
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71). Thus, L&M argue for the primacy of politics and analysis of ontological subjectivity, social 
tensions, dislocatory moments and pluralism (Howarth, 2013). 
L&M (2001) examine hegemony as an interaction between attempts to universalise sets of 
discursive signifiers representative of different interests within a discursive field. This links to the 
discussion of empty signifiers later in this chapter, as actors attempt to take particular signifiers 
to universal positions, but the remaining particularity creates antagonisms (Howarth et al., 2000: 
15): 
Thus, hegemonic practices presuppose a social field criss-crossed by antagonisms, and 
the presence of elements that can be articulated by opposed political projects. The major 
aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilise the nodal points that form the basis 
of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers 
– as possible.  
At its core, hegemony is a form of politics within which a particularity articulates the ‘floating 
signifier’ for disparate groups, taking on a universality that becomes incommensurable with the 
particular (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For Howarth (2013; 2015), the transformation from the 
particular to the universal emphasises hegemony as a political activity which involves the 
articulation of disparate identities and subjectivities into a common signifier (Carter, 2008; Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001; Riha, 2004). Consequently, hegemony draws political frontiers by constructing 
the inside and the outside, which partially constitutes and potentially subverts identity (Carter, 
2008; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). The following points summarise L&M’s (2001) extension of 
Gramscian hegemony: 
• Subject positions are a function of discourse, speech, actions and identity. 
• A focus on political struggle and social signification removes constraining state-based 
analysis. 
• Hegemonic signification creates antagonisms. 
• Hegemonic struggle transforms identities and social agents. 
• Class is one explanation of politics but cannot explain all social struggles. 
• Hegemony is metonymic as hegemonic signifiers represent a deeper set of political 
meanings. 
• The hegemonic process and construction of antagonisms result in social formations, 
meanings, differences and identities becoming partially fixed. 
• The key features of hegemonic formations are contingency; signification; antagonisms; 
and political frontiers.  
• This hegemonic theory considers structure and agency together, as reducible to one 
another.  
Having outlined the core theory of hegemony from L&M, the key components, and the way that 
this theory differs to others, the following section considers hegemony in examining IFRS for 
SMEs.  
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3.3.1 Hegemony and IFRS for SMEs  
This section examines the links between L&M’s hegemony and IFRS for SMEs. Although a call 
for an international accounting standard applicable in the SME space already existed, there is an 
element of ‘spontaneity’ concerning the extension to IFRS for SMEs because the IASB initially 
did not plan to take on the project. The IASB develop international accounting standards for 
global capital mobility, and this is extended through the development of IFRS for SMEs, which 
resonates with L&Ms argument that hegemony is emergent. The equivalence from IFRS to IFRS 
for SMEs among others is explored as they draw disparate groups and interests together, in a 
transformative manner. Thus, IFRS for SMEs represents a significant change for the IASB. The 
political nature and contestations of this are crucial, as there is a hegemonic movement to new 
constituents (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Howarth, 2013; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Thus, hegemonic 
extensions can be gradual (IFRS for SMEs has been on the international agenda from the IASC 
to the IASB), but also spontaneous, which is relevant to IFRS for SMEs because the focus on 
developing countries is spontaneous. These aspects are a significant focus of the empirical 
components of this thesis.  
3.3.2 Hegemony and accounting literature  
Accounting researchers use hegemony to demonstrate the power of accounting discourse.17 Gray 
(2006: 796), in relation to social and environmental reporting (SER) uses Gramsci to argue that:  
…capitalism controls and maintains the world in its own singular view: Financial 
reporting is an essential component of financial capitalism and is mandated by the state… 
to serve almost exclusively those who are power holders… there is no question that those 
who are intended to benefit most from financial reporting are those who already hold 
economic power...  
Further, Gray et al. (1996: 17-18) criticise underlying hegemonic claims within accounting 
regarding markets and in relation to capitalisms:  
If all agents were equal, and if markets were information efficient and if this led to 
allocative efficiency and if this led, in turn, to economic growth and if this ensured 
maximum social welfare and if maximum social welfare were the aim of society then 
accounting is morally, economically and socially justifiable and may lay claim to an 
intellectual framework. Of course, this is not the case. None of these ‘ifs’ can be shown 
unequivocally to hold and most of them can be shown not to hold. 
This research focuses on SER’s protection of economic power, wealth and the status quo (see, 
Gray, 2001; Levy & Egan, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Spence, 2007; Tregidga et al., 2013). These 
criticisms relate to the extension of financial capital, underlying the hegemony of IFRS for SMEs. 
However, this thesis draws on L&M’s (2001) Neo-Gramscian hegemony in a different way to 
prior literature, as this thesis examines hegemony in a significant political manner.  
                                               
17  See for example: Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008; Birkett & Evans, 2005; Boyce, 2000; 
Catchpowle et al, 2004; Cooper, 1995; Ferguson et al, 2005; Frezatti et al. 2014; Gray 2006; Gray et 
al. 2009; Lehman, 2010; Richardson, 1987; 2005; Spence, 2007; 2009; Spence & Carques, 2006; 
Spence et al., 2010; Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Yee, 2012; 2009.  
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With more similarities, Spence (2007), Gallhofer & Haslam (2007) and Gallhofer et al. (2015) 
have drawn upon L&M’s DT to examine hegemony in sustainability and financial accounting. 
Spence (2007) critiques SER from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, by arguing that SER is 
motivated by a hegemonic business case, through ideologies that cover over antagonisms. This 
holds similarities to the extension of IFRS to IFRS for SMEs and the extension of IFRS for SMEs 
to developing countries. Moreover, the IASB is subject to significant critique concerning its 
rhetoric. Gallhofer & Haslam (2003; 2007) deconstruct the IASB’s hegemony by demonstrating 
that the IASB’s rhetoric of inclusionary, open accountability, that meets the broader public 
interest, is actually closed, narrow and motivated by special interest. In this, Gallhofer and Haslam 
(2003: 100) illustrate the role of hegemony and the focus on special interest in accordance with 
the perceived interest of wealthy and powerful capitalists:  
Many critical appreciations of accounting understand the practice as a capitalistic and 
repressive servant of problematic hegemonic forces.  
This research illustrates that the role of the IASB’s accounting as the language of capital (and a 
significant component of advanced capital hegemony) is downplayed through rhetoric, such as 
‘the public interest’. This exposes how accounting has been captured by hegemonic forces for 
exploitation (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003: 157).  
Furthermore, in relation to Laclau’s radical democracy, Gallhofer et al. (2015) argue that there 
are opportunities to improve the relations between accounting, democracy and emancipation. 
Gallhofer et al. (2015) focus on pluralisation and difference from L&M to illustrate this point. 
Hegemony has been used in organisational studies (see, Bridgman & Willmott, 2006; Elmes & 
Derry, 2013; Phelan & Dahlberg, 2011; Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Walton & Boon, 2014; 
Willmott, 2005). However, the use of theory in this thesis offers a novel contribution, by enabling 
the examination of the political nature of accounting regulation. In sum, hegemony is focused on 
a particularity articulating a floating signifier for many different groups, which leads to the 
signifier taking on an impossible universality. Through a Neo-Gramscian hegemonic lens this 
thesis analyses the role of hegemony in the IASB’s work on IFRS for SMEs. As explained, L&M 
radicalise Gramsci’s hegemony, by critiquing structural linguistics and through the introduction 
of empty signifiers.  
3.4 Empty signifiers  
De Saussure (1959) sees language as a system of signs. A sign comprises the signified (concept) 
and the signifier (sound image). For de Saussure, the relationship between signifier and signified 
is arbitrary and the connection is socially constructed (Lalcau & Mouffe, 2001). As Crotty (1998: 
42-43) explains:  
Meaning does not inhere in the object, merely waiting for someone to call upon it ... the 
world and objects in the world are indeterminate ... actual meaning emerges only when 
consciousness engages with them ... We need to remind ourselves here that it is human 
beings who have construed it as a tree, given it the name, and attributed to it the 
associations we make with trees. 
  51 
Furthermore, de Saussure constructs language as a finite structure where meaning is a system of 
interdependent differences,18 where each meaning is referential rather than positive and is defined 
by its role within the system: 
Both Wittgenstein and Saussure broke with what can be called a referential theory of 
meaning- i.e. the idea of language is nomenclature which is in a one-to-one relation to 
objects. They showed that the word ‘Father’, for instance, only means what it does 
because the words ‘mother’, ‘son’, etc., also exist. The totality of language, is therefore, 
a system of differences in which the identity of the elements is purely relational (Laclau, 
1990: 109). 
L&M (2001) critique de Saussure’s structural linguistics to construct the political concept of the 
empty signifier which is important to hegemony. L&M (2001) argue language is infinite, rather 
than de Saussure’s presentation of language as fixed, limited and finite. Whilst L&M (2001) 
recognise the human desire to close systems (the systematicity of systems), the existence of 
antagonisms and contingency renders such fixity tendential and limited.  
...antagonism constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial and 
precarious objectification. If language is a system of differences, antagonism is the failure 
of difference… Antagonism escapes the possibility of being apprehended through 
language, since language only exists as an attempt to fix that which antagonism subverts. 
Antagonism, far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits of every 
objectivity are shown (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 125).  
Carter (2008: 157) offers an example of how there is always something external to the structure:  
Laclau argues that there must be something outside to define what is inside a system… 
The social structure, e.g. ‘family is commonly understood as the elements Mother-Father-
Brother-Sister. However, while the elements represent the ‘family’ structure, the label 
‘family’ is not within but external to the system. Thus, if an external meaning defines the 
‘system’, the ‘system’ is not a ‘system’ in a closed sense. This external element makes 
the ‘system’ possible (illustrating potential limits) and it makes the ‘system’ impossible 
(it is impossible to close the ‘system’ due to the external ‘other’).  
This illustrates that there are always antagonisms external to the system, so fixity can only be 
temporary (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). As the example shows, we can only understand the 
construction of the family by looking outside the system at what is excluded (Carter, 2008). 
Within financial accounting an example which illustrates constant antagonisms is the continuous 
extension of measurement systems: these have evolved over time due to antagonisms external to 
the previous system from historic cost, to modified historic cost, to base value, to fair value 
(Georgiou & Jack, 2011).  
For L&M (2001), excluded possibilities are required for communication, or there would be 
constant repetition. Thus, L&M (2001) deconstruct de Saussure’s structural linguistics to 
illustrate both logics of necessity and contingency. Laclau’s contingency illustrates that closed 
systems are limited, because any system is antagonised by the constitutive outside. Therefore, 
contingency contaminates the essence and there can never be a fully constituted subject. However, 
                                               
18   For a further understanding of de Saussure’s theory and structural linguistic see: de Saussure (1959); 
Belkaoui (1978); Howarth (2013). 
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through social necessity, actors rhetorically attempt to temporarily close systems for the purposes 
of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).   
Empty signifiers attempt to universalise meaning, in a homogeneous way (Laclau, 2005; Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001). This incorporates Derrida’s deconstruction, as hegemony and deconstruction 
are two sides of the same coin (Laclau, 1993; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For Derrida (1978), there 
is always a lack, and this lack is the equivalent to Laclau’s constitutive outside. Laclau radicalises 
the sign for hegemonic politics, introducing politics of equivalence and politics of difference 
which extend chains of signification, extensions that are further explored later in the chapter. 
Master signifiers and floating signifiers are illustrated here:  
 
Figure 9: Signifiers 
This diagram demonstrates the way that the master signifier combines antagonistic signifiers 
together, across the antagonistic frontier, constructing a nodal point (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). In 
reality, the ‘signifier’ can never be entirely emptied of meaning or signification, the ‘nodal point’ 
can fix many antagonisms and floating signifiers together, becoming a ‘Master Signifier’ or 
‘Nodal Point’, and constructing a universality (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).   
Thus, de Saussure’s signified/signifier relationship is structurally limited and closed (Howarth, 
2000). For example, the concept of ‘democracy’ is a nodal point that is always open, with many 
surrounding signifiers (Laclau, 1990), within which groups have shared understandings: 
…what we might call the articulation of ‘floating signifiers’. For example, a signifier like 
‘democracy’ is essentially ambiguous by dint of its widespread political circulation… To 
‘hegemonize’ a content would therefore amount to fixing its meaning around a nodal 
point (Laclau, 1990: 28, See also, Howarth, 2013). 
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Lacan (1988) similarly suggests that many signifiers dominate the sign. These critiques are further 
radicalised by reference to Derrida’s ‘différance’, which incorporates temporality and exclusion. 
Différance incorporates three types of difference, which suggests signifiers change over time: 
a) Difference: things can differ (such as the difference between assets and liabilities); 
b) Differing: the production of difference (such as the production of different rules of 
accounting which have different outcomes when followed, for example, depreciation); 
c) Differing: structures always exclude elements and possibilities considering temporality, 
time, change and exclusion (Howarth, 2013; Derrida, 1992). For example, there are 
different structures of accounting in different countries, such as US accounting and IFRS.  
Hegemony is the process by which a signifier ties together disparate elements to incorporate 
diverse viewpoints, demands, differences and identities:  
This emptying of a particular signifier of its particular, differential signified is, as we 
saw, what makes possible the emergence of ‘empty’ signifiers as the signifiers of a lack, 
of an absent totality…. [through] the unevenness of the social… The presence of empty 
signifiers- in the sense that we have defined them- is the very condition of hegemony 
(Laclau, 1994: 174-5).  
As stated, empty signifiers (the emptying entirely of particularity from the signifier) are a 
theoretical possibility only, as a signifier cannot be entirely emptied of particularity (Laclau, 
1994: 167). Instead, floating signifiers are focused upon as the floating of the signifier does not 
mean it is emptied, but that many understandings can be read into the signifier (Howarth et al., 
2000).  
Floating signifiers are not empty as they hold a constitutive particularity, but the more open a 
signifier the greater the scope for attaching signifieds. For example, Willmott (2008: 921) 
conceives of ‘interpretive accounting research’ as an empty signifier:   
Instead, by lacking any essential identity, I mean that I conceive of IAR as an empty 
signifier. Again, to be clear, by using the term ‘empty’, I do not mean that it is devoid of 
meaning, or vacuous. To the contrary, I mean that – like ‘interdisciplinary’ and 
increasingly ‘critical’ – it is sufficiently open (or drained of particularity) to 
accommodate numerous, and to a degree competing, meanings… none of which is found 
entirely adequate to grasp or fix what it aspires to define, represent or fill.  
This demonstrates that for linguistics, there is no a-priori objectivity. For example, there is 
nothing table-like (signifier sound-image) in the signified concept of table. Through articulation, 
hegemony incorporates disparate interpretations, to form coalitions, clustered around a universal 
signifier, to temporarily close an open system (Carter, 2008; Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau, 1996; 
Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For example, the IASB draw on logics of comparability to construct a 
universal signifier. To function hegemonically, a signifier becomes progressively empty of 
particularity as more demands are incorporated, taking up a universal position when naming 
disparate interests; a universal position that the IASB attempt to take up through comparability, 
indeed there are multiple purposes (signifieds) within international accounting regulation. 
However, comparability has arguably taken up a master signifying position to signify the 
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objective of the overarching project in the name of global capital mobility. The signifier of 
comparability still contains traces of its particularity, as it is possible to demonstrate that elements 
of IASB-based accounting are not comparable in direct comparison (Durocher & Gendron, 2011; 
Lazzarato, 2012; Poullaos, 2004; Rudkin, 2007). In taking this example, the next section outlines 
accounting literature that draws on the concept of signifiers, which offers some further examples.  
3.4.1 Accounting research and signifiers  
Accounting research has employed the concept of signifiers, but in a different way to this thesis. 
For example, Gray et al. (2009) illustrates that social accounting is a signifier, captured by 
corporations and capitalism (Archel et al. 2011; Mouck, 1995). Cooper (2005) links hegemonic 
signification with ideological sense-making, to identify dominant accounting signifiers of profit, 
economy, shareholders and cash. Similarly, DiFazio (1998) identifies ‘Global Capital’ as a 
dominant capitalist signifier in accounting.  
This thesis focuses on a post-structural politics of hegemony and the construction of nodal points. 
Laclau’s approach informed Spence et al. (2010), who argue that social environment accounting 
is incomplete as democracy and accountability are signifiers that reproduce the status quo, 
becoming emptied of meaning. Carter and Spence (2011) critically discuss love as a signifier (in 
response to an article that seeks for love to become the signifier of accounting) to highlight the 
danger in concluding that we hold complete knowledge of signifiers. Further, Carter and Spence 
(2011) illustrate how master signifiers unite political struggles and demands, similar to this thesis. 
Similarly, Brown and Dillard (2013b) analyse the power of deliberative consensual democracy, 
to identify signifiers of neo-liberal hegemony, including equality, liberty and accountability. 
Whereas Ezzamel et al. (2007) show how the tools and techniques of management accounting are 
constructed around the nodal point of ‘class’, which is illustrative of a hegemonic politics around 
capitalism. Alternatively, Tregidga et al. (2014) in a social and environmental context illustrate 
that representations of sustainable organisations are constructed for rhetorical legitimacy to bind 
together systems of meaning, presented as objectified and unquestioned (Everett & Neu, 2000; 
Walton & Boon, 2014). Having outlined empty signifiers, the next section moves to L&Ms 
rhetoric and antagonisms as these concepts are also crucial to L&M’s hegemony.  
3.5 Rhetoric and antagonisms  
PSDT focuses on the ontology of lack, and thus ontology, the ontic and rhetorical analysis are 
core components of DT. This approach focuses on ontological meaning (not epistemological) to 
examine what accounting ‘does’ (Frezatti et al., 2014; Mol & Law, 2004). This thesis draws on 
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the concept of the ontic, and the analysis of competing ontological presuppositions.19 Frezatti et 
al. (2014) describe this focus on the ontic and ontology:  
This paper recognises the strong rhetorical tradition in accounting… However, much of 
the focus of rhetorical analysis is at the epistemological level… explaining “how” 
accounting constructs, persuades and silences. We adopt an ontological inquiry: what 
accounting means or, better still, what accounting “does”? By focusing on ontology and 
the ontic, this study moves through the bounded nature of epistemological, 
interdisciplinary inquiry… Rhetoric operates ontologically as hegemonic interventions 
(Frezatti et al., 2014: 434).  
This methodology links to research that demonstrates the partial nature of accounting (Chapman, 
1998; Frezatti et al., 2014; Hines, 1988; Messner, 2009; Meyer, 1986; Morgan, 1988; Roberts, 
2009). Given this ontological focus, DT employs an Aristotelian approach to knowledge, as 
Aristotle (1947) saw rhetoric as the art of persuasion. Thus, this conception of rhetoric is drawn 
on in the identification of hegemonic process in which a particular, takes up a universal position 
(Bender & Wellbery, 1990; Lalcau & Mouffe, 2001).  
This rhetorical analysis sits alongside the examination of signifiers, which stabilise hegemony 
ideologically (Howarth & Griggs, 2006). These discursive articulations invoke (ever-failing) 
totalities, constructed into nodal points (empty signifiers). These nodal points galvanise the 
consciousness of the masses through chains of equivalence, operating between universality and 
particularity:  
…there is only hegemony if the dichotomy universality/particularity is constantly 
renegotiated: universality only exists incarnating- and subverting- particularity, but, 
conversely, no particularity can become political without being the locus of 
universalizing effects (Laclau, 2001: 10).  
For Nietzsche (1964), rhetoric is constitutive of ontological and political knowledge, whereby 
rhetoric is:   
A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human 
relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned 
and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of 
which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become 
powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no 
longer of account as coins but merely as metal (Nietzsche, 1964: 180). 
These metaphors and metonymies are constructed by the IASB and accounting discourse. For 
example, accounting discourse works through the metaphor of numbers, which give the illusion 
of being fixed, and representative of concepts such as profit (Morgan, 1988; Porter, 1996).  
L&M draw on the rhetorical constructs of metaphor, metonymy, and catachresis to interpret 
hegemony, antagonisms and articulation. For example, hegemony operates metonymically and 
metaphorically in articulating identities, demands and drawing disparate groups together, by 
condensing meaning and constructing nodal points (Laclau, 2005; 2006; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).   
                                               
19  For example, the way that the IASB has defined financing leases within IAS 17 is an ontic interpretation 
of the ontology of ‘substance over form’. Therefore, capital leasing within the IASB which follows 
form over substance is antagonistic to substance over form. 
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a) Metaphor renders the unfamiliar, familiar. For example, the car is ‘green’ is 
metaphorical as it helps us understand the car’s identity, this is a process of 
equivalence as it transfers meanings and values to new domains. L&M deconstruct 
the way metaphor extends, simplifies and aids understanding (Carter, 2008; Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001). For example, profit is a constructed, intangible object, holding 
many equivalences. Profit simplifies many accounting concepts, gradually becoming 
a floating signifier as actors have different understandings of profit.  
b) Metonymy as a rhetorical device, acts by contiguity, to isolate a particular 
characteristic or entity to represent complex phenomenon. Rather than transferring 
quality, metonymy works by substitution, without association of value or quality 
(Carter, 2008; Laclau, 1998; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Within accounting, profit is 
an aspect or particular characteristic of many different concepts, such as success, 
achievement, accomplishment, articulations that do not necessarily consider the 
figures, concepts and calculations that have constructed ‘profit’ (Hines, 1988; 
Morgan, 1988). Indeed, metonymy rhetorically ‘captures the movement from one 
thing to another thing which is adjacent or alongside it. The ‘Crown’, for example, is 
used as a substitute for ‘the queen’ (Griggs & Howarth, 2013: 27).   
c) Catachresis refers to errors in language and represents limits of language: there are 
two distinct categories of catachresis. The first is language errors, such as the leg of 
a table. Usually animate objects such as animals and humans have legs, so the table 
should not have a leg as an inanimate object. An example of this within accounting 
is the use of ‘SMEs’ within the IFRS for SMEs standard, this is the improper use of 
a term because the standard is focused on public accountability, not size. The second 
catachresis specifically relates to the invention of language, such as changes in the 
meanings of words, or naming the unnameable. A linguistic example of this is the 
naming of Watts and Volts (Howarth & Griggs, 2006; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). 
Catachresis occurs in four forms: 
1. Catachresis denotes something radically different from normal meaning, or 
an improper use of a word, as suggested the leg of the table, another example, 
is the conception of reliability within financial reporting and market 
measurement is different to the understanding of reliability in society.  
2. Catachresis may name something without a name, for example, the naming 
of Fair Value in accounting; 
3. Catachresis may draw on a word out of context, for example, in the name of 
prudence as understood to mean neutrality, companies may be prevented 
from making general provisions for uncollectable loans, which is arguably 
an imprudent accounting policy.  
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4. Catachresis may be used paradoxically or in a contradictory manner 
(Carter, 2008; Howarth & Griggs, 2006; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), such as 
the concept in accounting of a true and fair view. 
Laclau links rhetoric to language games, as conceived of by Wittgenstein (1974). L&M argue that 
rhetorical language games are transformative by allowing connections between disparate groups 
to be formed (Howarth, 2015; Laclau, 1996; 1998). Thus, language games and rhetoric form 
constitutive components of hegemonic relationships. This is illustrative of the ontological lack as 
encapsulated by antagonism, as each articulation creates the other:  
In the case of antagonism, we are confronted with [the following] situation: the presence 
of [an] “other” prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full 
totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution… (it is because a peasant cannot 
be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land)… 
Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself… Thus the 
conditions and the possibility of a pure fixing of differences recede; every social identity 
becomes the meeting point for a multiplicity of articulatory practice, many of them 
antagonistic… a constant process of subversion and redefinition (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001: 111, 125). 
These quotes demonstrates the instability of frontiers because equivalences and floating signifiers 
create oppositions:  
…[T]he two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic 
forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them. Only the presence of a vast 
area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite camps- which 
implies a constant redefinition of the latter- is what constitutes the terrain permitting us 
to define a practice as hegemonic. Without equivalence and without frontiers, it is 
impossible to speak strictly of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 122). 
Therefore, Laclau illustrates that there is always a lack, an antagonism external to this system, 
rendering the system necessary and impossible (which is post-structuralism). In the construction 
of a hegemonic claim, the lack is temporarily covered over through fantasy and ideology (Glynos, 
1999; Lacan; 1988; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Norval, 2009; Stavrakakis, 1999). For example, the 
IASB’s harmonisation project is antagonised by the FASB, antagonising comparability, through 
different cultures of accounting practice (Botzem, 2012; Chua & Taylor, 2008; Rudkin, 2007).  
When renegotiating signifiers, hegemony covers over antagonism and contingency by repressing, 
excluding and neutralising oppositions (Laclau, 2003; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Macintosh, 2002; 
Torfing, 1999). This is evident in Black’s (2002a, b) examination of regulatory communication 
through hegemony and deconstruction, which reveals power struggles and political games. For 
example, Black highlights that regulation is threatened by the reliance on those being regulated 
to provide information to regulators.  
Hegemony is always incomplete, as signifiers, constitute meaning and subjects, but 
simultaneously are subversive: 
In political terms, an enemy which makes possible the unity of all the forces opposed to 
it; … this, however, creates a new problem, for vis-à-vis the excluded elements all 
identities antagonised by it are not merely differential but also equivalent, and 
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equivalence is precisely what subverts difference. So that which makes difference 
possible is also what makes it impossible. In deconstructive terms; conditions of 
possibilities are, at the same time, conditions of impossibility… All identity is constituted 
around the unresolvable tension between difference and equivalence (Laclau, 2003: 5; 
[Emphasis in original]). 
Therefore, DT proposes that analysis should focus on the lack: 
But the central feature of language, of the symbolic, is discontinuity: something is always 
missing in language, the symbolic itself is lacking. Words can never capture the totality 
of the real, they can never full represent us (Stavrakakis, 1999: 52).  
This depicts a new form of subjectivity, within subjects and identities (Laclau, 1994; Stavrakakis, 
1999). Indeed, subjects and identities can never be wholly constituted as there is always a lack, 
antagonisms and a subjectivity (Laclau, 1994; Stavrakakis, 1999). Antagonisms are therefore 
crucial to hegemony: 
All social order, as a consequence, can only affirm itself insofar as it represses a 
‘constitutive outside’ which negates it- which amounts to saying that social order never 
succeeds in entirely constituting itself as an objective order. It is in that sense that we 
have sustained the revelatory character of antagonism: what is shown in antagonism is 
the ultimate impossibility of social objectivity... there will always be an ‘outside’ an 
ungraspable margin that limits and distorts the ‘objective’, and which is, precisely, the 
real (Laclau, 1990: 180, 185). 
Thus, the character of antagonism always constructs the constitutive outside, leading to 
hegemonic ruptures (Laclau, 1994; 2001; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Accounting research has 
identified signifiers and rhetoric, PSDT extends this to the ontic, ontology of the lack and 
rhetorical analysis. For example, this thesis examines accountability, public interest, and best 
practice. As each signifier constructs antagonistic oppositions, this thesis traces antagonisms 
concerning IFRS for SMEs. Thus, analysing how the IASB use rhetoric and LoE to bring together 
disparate interests around hegemonic nodal points, in the construction of new identities. The 
construction of this hegemonic position covers over antagonisms, and subverts their identity in 
their political processes and regulatory conversations (Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau, 1994).  
3.6 Rhetoric and accounting research  
Due to misunderstandings of the partial nature of accounting it becomes politically powerful, in 
its rhetorical construction and re-construction of meaning (Chua, 1986; Frezatti et al., 2014; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; 2007; Spence, 2007). Research has examined the way that rhetoric is 
used in accounting to construct this power through persuasion, but much of this research uses a 
different approach to rhetoric (for example, Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Young, 2003). L&M’s 
approach to rhetoric has been used to examine the rhetoric used in sustainability (Spence, 2007; 
Tregidga et al., 2014), and the construction of accounting as codified discourse (Llewellyn & 
Milne, 2007). This thesis focuses on what accounting does (ontic level) rather than the 
epistemological focus of what accounting is and what accounts are (Mol & Law, 2004), in a way 
that very little accounting research does (Frezatti et al., 2014: 434-435): 
For rhetorical analysis, ontic meaning is crucial. Ontological analysis presupposes the 
ontic, explicitly analysing the moments of ontic existence, and for rhetorical analysis, 
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this is where ontic moments acquire (or are attributed) meaning […] a post-structuralist-
informed approach to discursive, rhetorical analysis is concerned with meanings, 
operating at the ontic level, and with the analysis of objects as specified by ontological 
presuppositions. 
Consequently, this thesis contributes to the analysis of the rhetorical nature of accounting, as 
rhetoric drives hegemony (Frezatti et al., 2014). For example, the IASB’s claims to accountability 
operate metaphorically to make the unfamiliar, familiar, metonymically to incorporate many 
interpretations (L&M’s chain of difference) and catachrestically, to name the unnameable, and 
construct meaning.  
3.7 Antagonisms and accounting research 
Accounting research draws on L&M’s ‘antagonism’ to demonstrate that meaning in accounting 
is tendential, open and antagonistic (Frezatti et al., 2014; Spence, 2007). Frezatti et al. (2014) 
apply the concept of antagonism to a Brazilian auto-manufacturer that abandoned management 
accounting systems, to highlight the tendential and open nature of meaning.  Whilst Spence (2007) 
discusses the equivalence drawn over antagonisms within SER and sustainability. 
A related but different theorisation of Mouffe’s ‘Agonisms’ is drawn on in accounting research 
(Brown, 2009; Brown & Dillard, 2013a; Dillard & Yuthas, 2013). Brown (2009); Brown & 
Dillard (2013a) and Dillard & Yuthas (2013) offer insights on agonism in accounting, illustrating 
how social systems mask hegemonizing power, but there are theoretical differences between 
agonisms and antagonisms. Mouffe (1999; 2000) theorises agonistic pluralism whilst Laclau 
(2005) contends that we should not privilege one antagonism over others. Mouffe (2000) 
reintroduces difference, but still holds some exclusion, meaning radical difference is encouraged 
but in keeping with regimes.  
Whilst both agree that there is conflict, agonism differs from antagonism, because agonists come 
to an agreement about how to confront and address conflicts for positivity and results. Whereas, 
antagonists see this as a constraining mechanism which leads to the concealment of antagonisms 
and contingencies, as actors are compelled to engage in a certain way (Griggs & Howarth, 2013; 
Howarth, 2013; Laclau, 2003; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
In sum, antagonisms highlight the impossibility of closure as there are active oppositions in 
society. In this case, SMEs are antagonistic to the IASB’s main aims of regulating listed entities, 
so the IASB make a movement of equivalence to the regulation of SMEs to mask antagonisms 
and gain further power and control over accounting regulation. Hegemony tendentially covers 
over short-term contingencies and antagonisms through mechanisms, such as the logics of 
equivalence and difference. 
3.8 Logics of equivalence (LoE) and difference (LoD) 
L&M draw upon LoD and LoE to explain how constitutive relationships are formed between 
competing signifieds, or how competing signifieds are collapsed into one signifier. This provides 
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a tool kit for understanding how signification is extended across frontiers, or how difference is 
incorporated within a frontier of signification: 
The centrality of hegemonic relations in discourse theory comes from the fact that the 
desire for fullness is always present, but fullness, as such, is unachievable... This explains 
why equivalence and difference, - which broadly speaking correspond to… combination 
and substitution in linguistic analysis – are the two main dimensions of political life 
(Laclau, 2003: 6).  
LoE operate in a metaphorical way to connect disparate interests together (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001; Laclau, 2003). Thus, LoE have the effect of simplification by bringing disparate demands 
together in a hegemonic process (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For example, in the IASBs rhetorical 
use of the public interest, their focus on due process and substantive outcomes extends chains of 
combination through LoE to both internal processes as well as outcomes.  
Society desires social fullness, which shows ‘itself through the presence of its absence’ (Laclau, 
1996: 53). Antagonisms always exist in attempts for fullness, so these antagonisms, for L&M 
(2001) crisscross discourse, but these antagonisms are covered over within discourse, through 
equivalences and differences. LoD operate in a manner akin to metonymy and are used by L&M 
(2001) to highlight the impact of the incorporation of competing articulations within a central 
signifier, in a process of contiguity (Laclau, 2001; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For example, 
reliability as a qualitative characteristic operates metonymically through its focus on 
measurement, so that different systems of measurement such as historic cost, modified historic 
cost, base value and fair value are all simultaneously labelled as reliable measurements (Georgiou 
& Jack, 2011; Miller & Napier, 1993; Power, 2009). Another example of this is comparability, 
which incorporates different approaches, and has the impact of covering over local differences in 
accounting practice, by focusing on the master signifier of comparability (Devi & Samujh, 2015; 
Rudkin, 2007).  
This thesis examines the role of LoE and LoD in the standard setting process which brings 
together disparate groups for hegemony, and incorporates political frontiers through LoD. The 
application of LoE and LoD is summarised in figure 10: 
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Figure 10: Logics of Equivalence and Difference 
LoE and LoD operate to form and maintain hegemony, and for L&M there is also displacement 
and condensation.  
3.9 Condensation, displacement and overdetermination  
L&M (2001) theorise notions of condensation, displacement and overdetermination through 
Freud (1961), Althusser (1969) and Hegel. As Torfing (1999: 98) explains:  
…from Freud’s famous work on The Interpretation of Dreams… Overdetermination 
occurs at the symbolic level and takes the form of either condensation or displacement… 
Condensation involves the fusion of a variety of significations and meanings into a single 
unity… Displacement involves the transferal of the signification or meaning of one 
particular moment to another moment.  
Condensation is the fusing together of meaning and significations, to render the dissimilar, similar 
(metaphor), by incorporating contingencies and antagonisms, whereas displacement conceals the 
primary identity of the dissimilar (metonymy) (Carter, 2008; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). For DT, 
articulations temporarily close discourse by constructing meaning through metaphors, metonyms 
and signifiers. These articulations connect to form nodal points which create, convergence and 
synthesis within discourses (illustrated in figure 11) (Laclau, 1996; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). As 
Carter (2008: 186) explains:  
…the fusing together of different elements to temporarily halt the development of 
competing significations. It is this ‘temporary’ nature that illustrates that the 
particularities of signifiers (their diversity) still contaminate the condensed signifier.  
Logics of equivalence is a discrusive 
strategy which create equivalences to 
connect disparate identities and demands. 
Nodal points partially fix meaning, binding 
together chains of equivalence.
Logics of Difference is a discursive 
stratagey, which incorporates oppositional 
signifiers as a proces of contiguity.
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This is illustrative of the limits of representation, 
as it highlights that there can never be perfect 
representation, because of antagonisms (Lacalu, 
1996; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Subsequently, 
these representations conceal the primary 
identity of the dissimilar and conceal the broader 
politics of in operation. However, as this 
condensation is temporary, it is failing in the 
long term, but the temporary fixation forms 
hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
Displacement operates metonymically to 
displace positions in society (Carter 2008; 
Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Freud’s (1900: 147) 
displacement operates at the conscious and 
unconscious level, and between manifest and 
latent levels. Arguably, the IASB constructs 
nodal points, converging many elements 
(Freud’s dream thoughts), and each element has 
different interpretations, so various 
understandings can be read into nodal points 
(Freud, 1900). This displacement is 
metonymical because it invokes a broad domain 
of usage and an array of associations (Laclau, 2001). Metonymy rhetorically employs a single 
characteristic to obscure and simplify complexities, working through a substitution of words and 
contiguity (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This also links to the concept of overdetermination, as 
condensation and displacement lead to overdetermination.  
Displacement is metonymical because it invokes a broad domain of usage and an array of 
associations (Laclau, 2001). Metonymy rhetorically employs a single characteristic to obscure 
and simplify complexities, working through a substitution of words and contiguity (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). This also links to the concept of overdetermination, as condensation and 
displacement lead to overdetermination.  
Overdetermination is when multiple signifieds surround the signification, rendering it difficult 
for actors to identify their meaning (Carter, 2008; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). However, Althusser 
still talks to essentialism, so L&M (2001) extend these constructs through concepts of articulation 
and identity, and by abandoning the idea of totalising fixity: 
Figure 11: Condensation (S stands for signifier) 
  63 
…through the critique of every type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete, 
open and politically negotiable character of every identity. This was the logic of 
overdetermination… the presence of some objects in the others prevents any of their 
identities from being fixed (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 90-91). 
Additionally, Freud’s (1900) theorisation of dreams and the nodal point constructs 
overdetermination by showing that dreams hold several meanings and have been represented 
many times. These contingencies create complexities within social formations, that need to be 
unpacked and deconstructed (Howarth et al., 2000). This ties to Lacan’s (1988) notions of the 
subject and significations, within which metaphors and metonymies construct hegemonic 
articulations (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
Articulation constructs and modifies practices, relations and identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 
91). Articulation fixes nodal points which construct meaning, and draw together chains of 
significance, to make the dissimilar, similar (metaphor) (Howarth et al., 2000). During 
articulation, heterogeneous signifiers become attached to the signification. The extent to which 
signifiers become attached to signification depends on the openness of the condensation point, 
and the more signifiers that became attached, the less clear meaning becomes (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001). This involves the signifier (nodal point) becoming represented many times, to the extent 
that the primary source of meaning can no longer be identified: 
The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial 
fixations – otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to 
differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning. If the social does not manage to fix 
itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the social only exists, however, 
as an effort to construct that impossible object. Any discourse is constituted as an attempt 
to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. 
We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, nodal points.  
The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which 
partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the 
openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse 
by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 98-100 [Emphasis 
in Original]).  
Articulation is rhetorical and invokes metaphors, with a constant antagonistic lack. Therefore, 
this thesis ontologically examines the role of discourse and articulations surrounding the IASB’s 
extension to IFRS for SMEs, by examining what discourse does (Mol & Law, 2004; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). This moves to discursive objectivity, shifting the focus to what discourse is 
and what discourse does for accounting, to study the political (Mol & Law, 2004). The IASB 
attempt to close systems surrounding SME accounting standards and regulation, and DT allows 
us to investigate these attempts. The rhetorical analysis within this thesis of the IASB’s discourse 
deconstructs language games and nodal points (Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). 
To summarise these concepts, a nodal point is an attempt to partially fix discourse through 
identifying potential meaning, centering discourse, and binding together chains of equivalence. 
Condensation is the fusing together of different elements. Displacement argues that no identity 
is pure, because all meanings and identities are infected by other identities. Whilst, 
Overdetermination is like metonyms in that it works through displacement to conceal identities. 
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There is sparse research in accounting that has drawn on these concepts, as demonstrated in the 
following section.    
3.10 Condensation, displacement, overdetermination and accounting research  
Accounting research has deconstructed nodal points and articulation to examine identity 
construction (Frezatti et al., 2014; Spence, 2007; Tregidga et al., 2014). Frezatti et al. (2014) trace 
events represented by accounting within a company that withdrew from their accounting, showing 
that articulations give partial representations, due to condensation within signifiers (Howarth, 
2015). Tregidga et al. (2014) identify how the nodal point of ‘sustainable organisation’ is 
articulated to partially fix meaning.  Spence (2007) demonstrates how corporate social 
responsibility discourse is constructed around the ‘business case’ nodal point, as responsibility 
becomes tied to commercial concerns. Frezatti et al. (2015) suggest that nodal points, meanings 
and origins become condensed, so that identity becomes complex and at times impossible to 
identify, and representation becomes partial (Spence & Carter, 2011). Carter (2008) deconstructs 
nodal points and condensation surrounding costing in telecommunication debates, in which 
different ideas of costing are condensed into one nodal point for hegemony. 
Scarce accounting literature employs the term displacement from L&M (2001), but it is important 
here as the IASB’s rhetoric obfuscates the nature of the standard, concealing the primary identity 
of the particular.  
If hegemony is a type of political relation, and not a topographical concept, it is clear that 
it cannot be conceived as an irradiation of effects from a privileged point. In this sense, 
we could say that hegemony is basically metonymical: its effects always emerge from a 
surplus of meaning which results from an operation of displacement… This moment of 
dislocation is essential to any hegemonic practice… The condition of this centrality is, 
therefore, the collapse of a clear demarcation line between the internal and the external, 
between the contingent and the necessary… The openness of this social, is, thus, the 
precondition of every hegemonic practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 141-142). 
When the IASB condense signifiers into the IFRS for SMEs, they displace many antagonisms, 
concealing the political identity and impact of the standard. This is concealed through due process, 
technical expertise, capital markets and economic theory (Botzem, 2012; Hines, 1988; Martinez-
Diaz, 2005). For L&M (2001) identity is always contaminated by traces and other identities, so 
no identity is fixed. This demonstrates the relational character of the social and the difficulty of 
identifying meaning and identity within nodal points and signifiers. This is interesting because 
the IASB contaminate the identity of IFRS for SMEs through condensation, so the nature of the 
standard becomes confused. The IASB’s rhetoric conceals wars of position of national capitalisms 
and the hegemony of financial capital, which acts to exclude alternatives and differences, fixing 
discourse through extension, equivalence and condensation.  
This thesis examines the articulation of the nodal point IFRS for SMEs, tracing political struggles, 
meaning construction, and the condensation of multiple significations. These articulations 
displace meaning, and lead to over-determination, in the construction of a universal hegemony. 
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Therefore, this thesis traces how the IASB attempt to institute meaning, politically and 
rhetorically. Recurrent signifiers are seen as ‘”candidates” for discursive nodal points’, 
rhetorically filling the gap, to construct rhetoric and legitimacy (Frezatti et al., 2015: 443). In 
critical policy studies, Glynos et al. (2015) deconstruct nodal points within the UK banking 
reform processes after the financial crisis, identifying a master signifier (stable competition) 
which has organised a range of interventions, marginalising alternative visions. Like research on 
displacement, there has also been limited work on the way that ideologies grip subjects.  
3.11 The subject 
There has been little research in accounting on the subject’s role in constructing meaning, and the 
way subjects are gripped by ideologies. This thesis analyses ideologies, articulations, and subject 
positions, whilst recognising the subject’s role. For DT, identity is acquired through contingent 
subject positions and articulations (Howarth et al., 2000). Positivism separates the object and 
subject, whereas for PSDT there is an object subject dualism (Chua, 1986; Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001). DT focuses on the role of language and rhetoric in constructing the social world, alongside 
the role of subject positions and identities (Hines, 1988). For L&M (2001), Althusser enables the 
consideration of subject positions through notions of ideology. Ideologies articulate the gap 
between socially constructed concepts and individual subject positions, and subjects become 
gripped by ideologies (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This is further explored in LOCE in the following 
chapter, before this, the following section gives a summary of the theory chapter. 
3.12 Theory summary  
As explained, DT theorises political movements and struggles, and this chapter demonstrates the 
importance of the movement in Post-Structuralism to the systematicity of systems, opening the 
constraining nature of structuralism. PSDT identifies the role of constant antagonisms and radical 
contingencies in discourse, extending Gramsci and Luxembourg. PSDT extends Marxist 
economic determinism and class reductionism (Lacalu & Mouffe, 2001). This theory considers 
social complexities and a multiplicity of actors that are located in disparate groups (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). This is examined through the interrogation of discursive constructions, and in this 
case, a range of discourses are considered that interact within IFRS for SMEs, including 
accounting, law, regulation, public policy, politics and economics.  
This thesis empirically examines the IASB’s aims and strategies within IFRS for SMEs, through 
the interrogation of regulatory frameworks, the roles of key political actors, governments and 
national standard setters. This thesis examines how hegemony informs the IASB’s extension to 
IFRS for SMEs. The extension is crucial for power and control and warrants further exploration. 
The regulatory theory chapter demonstrated the need for a diverse, holistic and flexible theoretical 
framework, identifying short-comings in other theories and the highlighting the importance of 
considering the complexity in the political standard setting of the IASB. Therefore, DT is a 
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flexible theory which goes some way in addressing these shortcomings. The following are some 
core conclusions on DT:  
• DT identifies accounting as discursive practice, which involves a linguistic turn, seeing 
accounting regulation as linguistic, focusing on persuasion and rhetoric.  
• DT is flexible and incorporates antagonisms into analysis, including both the linguistic, 
non-linguistic and extra-linguistic, identifying how the discursive temporarily fixes 
meaning and constructs reality. This discourse can be analysed through the 
deconstruction of moments, elements and nodal points. 
• DT sees accounting regulation as political, so this thesis unpacks the IASB’s political 
interface. DT states political interaction views all social objects as meaningful, 
contingent, relational and contextual to social objectivity. 
• L&Ms hegemony extends Gramsci’s to remove elements of essentialism. For L&M, 
hegemony is a form of politics, within which a particularity articulates the ‘floating 
signifier’, which speaks to disparate groups, therefore taking on a universality that is 
incommensurable with the particular.  
• Hegemony at its core is a political activity which articulates the floating signifier so that 
it takes on a universality. Antagonisms are crucial to hegemonic analysis, and within this 
analysis political frontiers are identified. Hegemony has been drawn on within accounting 
literature, but has not focused on the same elements and areas as this thesis does. 
• The most relevant examples of accounting literature that have drawn on hegemony are 
also described in the chapter, demonstrating the Spence (2007), Gallhofer & Haslam 
(2003; 2007), and Gallhofer et al. (2015) hold similarities to the research within this 
thesis, but this thesis extends these applications.  
• Signifiers are crucial to DT, as signifiers name the lack within the society, and become 
hegemonic by becoming empty of meaning so that a variety of content can be read into 
the signifier. 
• Rhetorical analysis is crucial to this thesis as rhetoric is used in hegemony, which is 
especially dominant here because of the partial nature of accounting. This analysis of 
rhetoric and signifiers highlights antagonisms and the lack within discourse because of 
the impossibility of closure within discourse. 
• The LoE and LoD also constitute discursive strategies. LoE connect disparate identities 
and demands, constructing nodal points that fix meaning, whilst LoD incorporate 
oppositional signifiers in a process of contiguity. 
• Condensation is the fusing together of meaning and significations, incorporating 
contingencies and antagonisms. This renders the dissimilar, similar, whilst displacement 
operates metonymically to conceal the primary identity of the dissimilar (in this case, 
concealing the politics of accounting standard setting). Moreover, overdetermination is 
when multiple signifieds become attached to the signification, to the point that it becomes 
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difficult to identify meaning. These strategies construct hegemony, whilst 
overdetermination can threaten hegemony, but further strategies and movements can 
adapt and change hegemony to resolve issues. 
These concepts are crucial to the analysis of the IASB’s extension from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, 
as this thesis is concerned with how the IASB construct and control regulatory conversations. 
Indeed, the IASB, as a private organisation construct their role as technocratic regulator, but 
operate political processes, which are examined in this thesis. This political role has been 
extended as the IASB become further integrated as a geo-political player by the G20, the WB, 
and the IMF, operating the narrow focus of extending the hegemony of advanced financial capital 
and neo-liberalism. Therefore L&M is crucial to this political analysis, because the core of their 
extension of hegemony operates the LoE and LoD simultaneously. This thesis draws on complex 
constructs that are dominant in DT. Whilst these are crucial for analysis they are not clear for the 
analysis of data, so the Logics of Critical Explanation (LOCE) was constructed by Glynos & 
Howarth. For Glynos & Howarth (2007) meaningful analysis arises from detailed concrete cases, 
within which we should apply analytical tools, but ensure there is flexibility (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007; Laclau, 1991). As Glynos (1999:10) explains, we should leave behind outdated ontological 
assumptions:  
After all, it cannot escape engaging with the empirical world ... Instead it is urging 
abandonment of certain outdated ontological presuppositions that still inform mainstream 
social sciences, without ignoring the considerable use- value attaching to its many 
methodological insights (Glynos, 1999: 10). 
However, this flexibility leads to critiques, as critics argue there are normative, reality, 
sociological, epistemological and methodological deficits (see these references for further details 
on these deficits: Critchley & Marchart, 2004; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Torfing, 2005). In 
response Glynos & Howarth (2007) construct the LOCE as a deficit solution (Glynos, 1999; 
Howarth, 2000; 2002; 2004), which was outlined briefly in the introduction. Consequently, 
chapter 4 articulates DT as a research methodology, and identifies the appropriate data collection 
methods by outlining the LOCE, which has been developed by Glynos & Howarth to 
operationalise L&M’s theory and respond to perceived normative and methodological limitations 
of DT.  
 
  
  68 
Chapter 4: Methodological strategies  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined L&M’s theory, a political theory of radical democracy which 
attempts to theorise and explain political movements and social complexity. This social 
complexity is crucial in analysis as there are multiple actors, organisations and disparate groups 
involved in standard setting and the political goals of standard setting. Chapter 3 also identified 
the flexibility of L&M’s PSDT through the complexities of social practices and the open 
antagonistic nature of their theorisation of discourse. The flexibility of this theory and the lack of 
methodological guidance is critiqued by others, so G&H developed the Logics of Critical 
Explanation (LOCE) as a methodological framework to overcome various deficits in DT.  This is 
outlined in further detail in the next section of this chapter. The chapter then goes on to further 
discuss the ontological assumptions of this thesis, as developed from both L&M’s PSDT and 
G&H’s LOCE. Following this, the chapter moves to the data collection methods (document 
collection and interviews) that are operationalised to fulfil the research question and are justified 
in line within the theoretical, ontological and methodological assumptions of the thesis. The 
section justifies the choice of data collection methods and the approach taken. Finally, before the 
chapter summary, the way that the discourse was analysed is outlined, which focuses on the 
deconstruction of nodal points and rhetorical redescription. Thus, the next section outlines the 
LOCE.  
4.2 Developing the Logics of Critical Explanation (LOCE)  
Through L&M (2001), G&H develop the LOCE to offer a methodology with analytical tools to 
resolve the deficits of L&M’s theory, deficits that are highlighted by Griggs and Howarth (2013: 
40):  
How do we study discourses? How do we describe, explain, criticize and evaluate? Here 
we turn to the logics of critical explanation… elaborated in five linked steps: 
problematisation; retroduction; logics; articulation; and critique. 
However, this is not to say that analysis will then become pre-constituted:  
... the discourse analyst’s starting point is not the mapping of pre-constituted, positively-
defined, theoretical categories (rational self-interested ends, structural functions, 
competing lobbying interests, juridico-political forms of economic relations, typologies 
of democracies, forms of identities, etc) onto the socio- political landscape, and then 
invoking tools from corresponding idioms to conduct an analysis ... When dislocation 
and failure become ontologically foundational, the idioms with which we describe and 
analyse political phenomena change modality ... Discourse theory’s anti-essentialist 
stance is thus maintained by adopting an ontology of lack, this being a direct consequence 
of taking seriously the constitutive nature of discourse in human practices (Glynos, 1999: 
5). 
For DT, offering critiques and identifying radical contingencies and exclusions is inherent in 
research, but this is not to say that positive alternatives should be avoided (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). In this approach, researchers should consider varied perspectives and multiple 
contradictions, to avoid adopting a single gaze (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Employing the LOCE, 
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constructs complex and immanent critiques that are acceptable within the boundaries of the 
project, but are not generalizable (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The implications of DT and G&H’s 
methodology are focused on negative ontology (ontology of lack), which holds that signifying 
structures are irreducibly open and flexible, as there is always a lack and contingencies.  
In line with this, for the LOCE, there is no linear trajectory, so researchers adopt an open gaze 
toward events, deconstructing and dissolving familiar stories, to pluralise analysis and 
understandings (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Furthermore, for G&H statements should be 
deconstructed as they construct discursive formations, the rules that govern discourse, and 
decisions about exclusion and inclusion. Specifically, the methodological structure of LOCE 
consists of five steps: the first is problematisation; the second is retroduction; the third offers 
explorations of the social, political and fantasmatic logics; the fourth is articulations and the fifth 
offers the critique element of the examination. Therefore, each of the stages is examined in further 
detail in the following sections.  
4.2.1 Problematisation  
Within problematisation, researchers should analyse discursive constructions and formations, 
mapping out competing discourses, within the problem itself (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). G&H 
argue that within this we should guard against presentism (analysing historic events based on 
present values and concepts). In problematisation, there is an archaeological dimension which 
furnishes concepts to make sense of structures (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Alongside this there 
is genealogy which puts formations into context and focuses on emergence, as an immanent 
critique (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
Problematisation draws primarily on Foucault as the starting point of social enquiry and critical 
analysis, for the identification of problems and solutions by exploring discursive practices 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007). This methodology follows a problem-driven approach to research, 
and the problem identified must be located appropriately in terms of abstraction and complexity. 
The literature review that follows this chapter exposes the limited nature of the IASB’s discourse 
and processes. The IASB operate through claims of technocracy, expertise and objectivity, each 
of which downplay the political struggles in standard-setting and the IASB’s powerful role in the 
geo-political arena, which naturalises their extension to SMEs and emerging economies through 
rhetoric and ideologies. Thus, DT elucidates the problems of this extension, invoking a 
problematisation which occurs on two levels: first the problematisation within the external 
phenomena by the key actors (i.e. the problematisation of differential reporting and IFRS for 
SMEs by the IASB), and second the researcher’s problematisation of this problematisation 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Griggs & Howarth, 2013).  
Whilst this holds similarities to the double hermeneutic, Glynos and Howarth (2007: 51) move 
from the importance of contextualized self-interpretations (raised in the double hermeneutic) to 
providing the tools (social, political and fantasmatic logics) for the researcher to ‘pass through’ 
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self-interpretations and to 'construct convincing explanations which have an equally convincing 
critical bite'. By combining these logics with tools of rhetoric, the methodology enables a 
theorised intervention that combines the identification and examination of the social landscape, 
how the social landscape was instituted (retroduction), the alternatives that were excluded and the 
associated ideologies. The combination of which gives justification to the interpretive and critical 
methodological approach (and responds to the problem of the double hermeneutic). 
The focus on the problem leads researchers to engage with puzzling phenomena and construct 
research questions (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). These problems are not limited as throughout 
research there is a multitude of problematisations, as norms are problematised continuously. This 
looks at moments of being, ways of thinking, practices, policies, regimes and explanations, to 
deconstruct the taken for granted and challenge dominant narratives (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
This thesis examines how and why the IFRS for SMEs was constructed, challenging the dominant 
narratives of the IASB in this extension from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs.  
4.2.2 Retroduction 
Through a review of previous work in science, positivism and critical realism, G&H introduce 
retroduction to resolve issues of induction and deduction (through Aristotle, Peirce, Norwood, 
Hanson, Bhaskar and others). For G&H retroduction renders phenomena intelligible by 
identifying, observing and explaining the facts, and what gives rise to those ‘facts’ (in keeping 
with Hanson’s (1961; 1972) critique of induction and deduction). Whilst inductive research takes 
observational phenomena to induce general axioms, it is limited because individuals are only able 
to observe what can be seen (Hanson, 1961; 1972). So, there is always a possibility that another 
observation could disprove the axiom that was formed inductively (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; 
Hanson, 1961; 1972). Equally, within deductive research subsuming phenomena into pre-existing 
categories creates problems, as the categories and/or observations are not tested (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007). Therefore, retroduction avoids particularism at one extreme and universalism at 
the other, for theory building:  
 …we claim that the default tendency to rely on deductive (and inductive) reasoning, the 
hyopthetico-deductive method of scientific investigation, and the covering-law model of 
explanation, is a product of the hegemonic grip of a particular, though admittedly 
powerful, conception of the natural sciences- what we call the causal law paradigm. Our 
main critical argument is that it is problematic to model social processes on natural 
processes in this way- whether as universal laws, causal generalizations, or robust 
empirical correlations- because it leads to rather narrow conceptions… (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007: 18-19).  
Instead, researchers should investigate the empirical event by reconstructing and problematising 
the phenomena observed. This occurs in the chapters that follow, as they move from the literature 
that focuses on the IASB, to the literature on IFRS for SMEs, and to the empirics, throughout 
which the retroduction (what are the ‘facts’? and what gives rise to those ‘facts’?) occurs.  
Retroduction avoids the search for law-like generalisations, and acknowledges the limits of self-
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interpretations by suggesting that research should avoid partial and misleading interpretations 
through an iterative process, whereby initial interpretations are processed to arrive at a more 
satisfying interpretation through conjecture:  
Retroduction by contrast moves from data to hypothesis to laws. In short, though more 
open-ended than deduction and induction, retroductive reasoning is still a legitimate type 
of inference. While deductive reasoning purports to prove what is the case, and inductive 
reasoning purports to approximate what is the case, retroductive reasoning conjectures 
what is the case (Peirce in Hanson, 1961: 85) (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 26).  
For G&H, the use of case studies is important, in which there are four case study types, formed 
from Flyvbjerg (2001: 202-203): ‘Extreme or deviant cases… Critical cases… maximum 
variation… [and] paradigmatic cases’. They do not see these as stand-alone or exhaustive, instead 
they are overlapping. This thesis combines the critical case (weakening accepted explanations, 
focusing on hegemony), and the paradigmatic case (an exemplary demonstration of a larger 
societal phenomena) (Flyvberg, 2001; Glynos & Howarth, 2007), in the study of IFRS for SMEs. 
Within these case studies there should be examination of causal explanations, mechanisms and 
correlations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
Within this approach, there is a constant retroductive circle (in which analysis is not linear), 
through constant intervention and movement back and forth during analysis (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). The retroductive circle problematises and pre-theorises, which is followed by explanation 
and the construction of theory about the phenomena observed, which renders the phenomena 
intelligible for intervention and persuasion, leading to another circle (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
Thus, the problematisation in the first stage is a preliminary problematisation which is 
problematised again in retroduction and throughout research (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
Retroduction leads to discovering perspectives, and deconstructs the dominant perspective to 
construct narratives and situate the discursive problem. Having developed problematisation, 
retroduction, ontology and resources of explanation, G&H move to the logics which offer the 
basic units of explanation. These logics – social, political and fantasmatic – enable the 
characterisation of the way that regimes and practices are transformed, stabilised and maintained.  
4.2.3 Logics 
The Logics provide the mechanisms used to understand (by identifying ontological 
presuppositions), to identify, and to interpret the rules that govern social practice, and the social 
construction of objects and subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Glynos et al., 2015). For example, 
chess is governed by rules and objects, so the player considers how to conform with these rules 
by grasping the essence and logic of the practice. Drawing on the logics ontologically interrogates 
how rules materialise, fleshing out explanations and criticisms (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
These logics facilitate the investigation of the IASB’s regulatory conversations and political 
processes, to investigate both why (political) and how (social) they extend their standard setting 
to SMEs and emerging economies. These logics also facilitate investigation of the IASB’s 
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hegemonic role which advances the ideologies of advanced financial capital and neoliberalism 
(fantastmatic).  
… social logics enable us to characterize practices in a particular social domain… 
political logics provide the means to explore how social practices are instituted, contested 
and defended… fantasmatic logics are closely linked to the ideological dimension… with 
the logic of fantasy we aim to capture a particularly powerful way in which subjects are 
rendered complicit in concealing or covering over the radical contingency of social 
relations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 133-134).  
G&H construct the order of social, political and fantasmatic logics. However, the empirical case 
examined within this thesis (and perhaps this may be true of other cases) sees the political logics 
as needing to be empirically examined before the social and fantasmatic logics, because (as will 
be explained in the following section), the political logics focus on the politics of emergence. It 
is not clear from Glynos and Howarth (2007) if this order is deliberate, or if the logics are meant 
to be interacting and changing, but in the empirical case the political, social and fantasmatic order 
is clearer.  
a) Political logics 
The political logics investigate how, when and why the social logics were employed. In this case, 
the political logics focuses on the emergence of IFRS for SMEs, looking at why the IASB operated 
the extension to IFRS for SMEs from listed entities. This logic investigates how the practices of 
the IASB and differential reporting were contesting, confronting and creating contingencies in 
the IASBs standard setting. These political logics reveal the contingencies in the social structure, 
to which the IASB respond with the construction of IFRS for SMEs. This considers the political 
contestation over alternatives, which is central to the construction of social logics. 20 This thesis 
needs to analyse the context genealogically, considering the way that the IASB operated public 
contestation, disrupted alternatives and constructed frontiers in the IFRS for SMEs debate.  
… political logics can be said to focus more on the diachronic aspects of a practice or 
regime, whether in terms of how they have emerged, or in terms of how they are being 
contested and/or transformed. Political logics aim to capture those processes of collective 
mobilization precipitated by the emergence of the political dimension of social relations, 
such as construction, defence and naturalization of new frontiers. But they also include 
processes which seek to interrupt or break up this process of drawing frontiers (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007).  
Identifying the political logics facilitates analysis, explanation and critique through LoE and LoD, 
and the investigation of political frontiers and exclusion that are constructed by the IASB. LoE 
and LoD operate in the case of IFRS for SMEs to dismiss and delegitimise alternatives and 
contingencies, restabilising the IASB’s hegemony. This examines social demands and identities, 
as politics institutes social relations and practices (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Moreover, this 
approach considers genealogical possibilities in the emergence of hegemonic practice, 
                                               
20  Often the social logics of a case would be examined first, and the political logics would cause a major 
disruption to the social logics. In this case there is no deeper dislocation as the IASB are always 
operating under neo-liberalism, and instead they are extending hegemony, not radically overhauling 
their practices.  
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considering alternatives to deconstruct the formation of hegemony (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). In 
examining emergence, the political logics examine the space in which new norms, rules and social 
practices emerge and become instituted, amid contestations, struggles and competing 
representations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The political logics enable this thesis to question and 
investigate why the IASB decided to extend to IFRS for SMEs.  
… if political logics are concerned with the institution of the social, they are also related 
to its possible de-institution or contestation. This is because the very institution of a new 
regime or social practice presupposes the possibility that a previous social order is 
successfully displaced from its hegemonic position and thus de-instituted. In short, then, 
political logics are integral to the processes of contestation and institution of social 
practices and regimes (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 142).  
As there is no new regime or practice, only a hegemonic extension of the previous, this thesis 
focuses on the political logics of contestation prior to the IFRS for SMEs. This identifies political 
struggles over what discourse should be instituted (to cover over contingencies) through LoE, and 
illuminating geneaologically the struggles that have been excluded or marginalised through LoD 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Carter, 2008). This thesis is focused on this part as there is no 
dislocation in the creation of IFRS for SMEs, but instead contingencies are exposed and the IASB 
operate LoE and LoD to cover over contingencies. This happens first, and then the social logics 
are formed and extended through the due process.  
This thesis then moves to the social logics, which investigates how the IASB operate this 
extension through socially sedimented practices, examining hegemony as constantly adapting and 
changing to different circumstances and events.  
b)  Social logics  
Social logics are concerned with understanding and criticising practices and regimes that have 
become socially sedimented.21 Here, sedimented social practices are practices that have become 
taken for granted and unquestioned over time, as subjects forget that meaning was socially 
constructed, so social practices take on an objective presence and subjects forget that they made 
the meaning (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; see also p. 39-40 of this thesis for the quote from Berlin 
in Chua (1986) for the impact of sedimentation). Sedimentation is not instantaneous, as it is the 
process of routinisation and forgetting, so the practices become daily practices over time, so our 
values and beliefs become unconscious (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Heidegger, 1962). 
The socially sedimented practices that are investigated operate within the IASB’s due process, 
which follows certain rules. Social logics also focus on the context of those practices, and the way 
in which they become absorbed in the day-to-day, becoming taken for granted. Therefore, the 
social logics investigate the rules of the game, examining how the IASB operate and function the 
due process to maintain their authority, despite disparate interests and alternative articulations. In 
                                               
21  In accounting, sedimentation appears mainly in the physical sense, but some use it metaphorically to 
imply that new accounting practices are laid on top of existing ones rather than replacing them.  
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hegemony, the social logics also see the operation of the LoE and LoD. These logics attempt to 
stabilise the IASB by retaining a focus on the full IFRS standards in LoE, whilst simultaneously 
attempting to construct the standard as different from full IFRS, and therefore suitable for SMEs. 
Through the socially sedimented practices that operate within the due process, the extension to 
IFRS for SMEs becomes hegemonic, as the IASB dismiss alternatives. Within the IASB’s due 
process there are many examples of the operation of equivalence and difference, but not all the 
social logics (or political, or fantasmatic) that are operationalised are examined in this thesis, 
instead there is a focus on key moments that exemplify these logics, indicated in the overview of 
empirical chapters (at the end of chapter 6). 
c) Fantasmatic logics 
For hegemony to be constructed, maintained and sustained it is dependent on the fantasies that 
constitute it (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Therefore, the fantasmatic logics examine how and why 
individuals maintain social practices, and the ideological forces behind these operations, which 
grip subjects (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). These fantasies support reality for subjects, and they 
reinforce the naturalisation of the political and social logics. There are ideologies that reinforce 
the extension of IFRS to IFRS for SMEs which stem from logics of advanced financial capital, 
capital market orientations and neo-liberalism. Through these ideologies, the IASB operate logics 
of technocracy, expertise and comparability to further integrate (but also mask) their role as a 
geo-political agent. These ideologies grip subjects by concealing contingencies and masking 
imbalances and injustices, to maintain the current status quo of structures, identities and social 
understandings22 (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Griggs & Howarth, 2013).  
Thus, alternative ideas become weakened and seen as too ‘radical’ by dominant ideologies 
(Howarth, 2013; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
Fantasmatic logics furnish us with the means to account for the grip of an existing or 
anticipated social practice or regime. They derive from a Lacanian ontology of 
enjoyment, insofar as fantasy is understood as the frame which structures the subject’s 
enjoyment… if political logics are most closely associated with the political dimension 
of social relations, fantasmatic logics are closely linked to the ideological dimension. 
More precisely, with the logic of fantasy we aim to capture a particularly powerful way 
in which subjects are rendered complicit in concealing or covering over the radical 
contingency of social relations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007 :107, 134) 
Subjectivity is crucial to the identification of fantasmatic logics, as fantasies conceal 
                                               
22 Laclau calls a for radicalisation of democracy which incorporates contingency, plurality and freedom 
to construct new views about democratic imaginaries, by constructing new pluralistic ideas through 
radical democracy, which extends and deepens values of freedom and equality (creating inherent 
tensions) (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Laclau argues we should not see the current form of democracy as 
the only democracy, as there needs to be contingency through: 
1. Universal rules with regimes of political equality and freedom; 
2. Looks at popular subjects and always involves the creation and rule of people; 
3. Tries to reach difference and radical pluralism (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Laclau, 2005).  
 Within this articulation is contingent so we need a different form of democracy, for Laclau (2005) this 
is connected to populism which draws equivalential connections between demands. Arguably, the IASB 
in its current from does not fit with radical democracy.  
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contingencies and exclude various demands and perspectives. This constructs power and leads to 
oppression as ideologies hold power over subjects23 (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). These ideologies 
construct hegemony, through claims of universality and objectivity, so they become the bedrock 
for beliefs and identities24 (Glynos, 2001; Howarth, 2013; Stavrakakis, 1999). The deconstruction 
of dominant narratives, identifies how they become dominant, whilst mapping and uncovering 
concealed alternatives (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). G&H include the concept of articulation as the 
next step in the LOCE, for researchers to construct an overarching narrative of the social, political 
and fantasmatic logics, in which empirical and theoretical concepts are drawn together.  
4.2.4 Articulation 
For G&H, articulation draws together theoretical and empirical concepts to give explanations. 
Articulations identify privileged signifiers within discourse, and deconstruct their discursive 
representation. For example, the concept of SMEs becomes a signifier in the development of IFRS 
for SMEs. Within these articulations, pluralities, contingencies and reflections are identified to 
deconstruct dominant hegemonic discourse, language games and rhetorical redescription (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007).  
For G&H (2007), this does not occur arbitrarily or through subsumption, instead connections and 
characterisations occur through reflective and epistemological judgements. Within articulation 
there is theory building as researchers link together elements and logics in a flexible manner to 
produce understandings of puzzling phenomena (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). G&H therefore, see 
DT not as stand-alone, but as requiring supplementation with other theories as necessary. 
Subsequently, articulation connects the three logics together, which in this case are in operation 
in the IASB’s processes to the development of IFRS for SMEs. This therefore, deconstructs the 
IASB’s role as hegemonic regulator and the operation of regulatory conversations.  The leads to 
the final element of G&H’s LOCE, which is concerned with critique, formed out of the 
articulation of the social, political and fantasmatic logics.  
4.2.5 Critique 
The LOCE highlights contingencies, alternatives, power formations and dominations, by giving 
explanations and self-interpretations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). This identifies exclusions, 
closure and radical contingencies through genealogy and the acknowledgement of the un-
decidability of social relations and structure, in political dimensions (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 
192-193): 
                                               
23 Gramsci’s ideology in not just a system of ideas, he distinguishes between arbitrary systems formed by 
intellectuals and organic ideologies, organising human masses, and creating terrains for acquiring 
consciousness (Simon, 1991). 
24 This thesis sees identity as discursively constructed, radically contingent, and flexible to change, so 
deconstruction of ideologies reveals connections between identities and preferences, because interests 
are discursively constructed (Howarth, 2013). 
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Reactivating the political dimension thus presupposes the intrinsic contingency and 
unevenness of power underlying any decision from the point of view of an alternative 
vision, however implicit this might be. The ethical aspect of our critical explanation is 
also linked to radical contingency…   
It is important in critique to acknowledge radical contingency, domination, and ideological 
narratives:  
The ideological dimension is evident in those fantasmatic narratives the function to 
conceal contingency and naturalise relations of domination. In contrast to the role of 
ideology and political domination, we propose a conception of ethics that starts from an 
acknowledgement of radical contingency and fragility of things, while affirming the 
contestability of our political decisions and social practices (Griggs & Howarth, 2013: 
50).  
For G&H (2007), critique is internal and immanent within analysis, because critique is tied to the 
discursive contingencies. This approach develops onto-political interpretation, by looking at 
values, norms and their formation, and is not just negative, as there is also positive evaluation 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007). The approach also avoids both normativism and positivistic research 
and focuses on how we think about fact, through interpretations and values25 (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). The moments that render the lack (and attempts to cover over the lack) visible are crucial 
to critique, exposing ideologies and exclusions. This thesis is focused on why and how the IASB 
extended to the construction of IFRS for SMEs, so this part of the LOCE examines the struggles 
and contradictions within this extension. 
This thesis reveals the way that the IASB attempt to operate this extension through logics of 
technocracy and objectivity, with the aim of covering over contingencies and contestations to 
maintain and adapt hegemony. Thus, there are three key aspects to critique:  
1. The identification of limits: the researcher critiques pure reason by identifying limits and 
boundaries;  
2. The identification of tensions: there are ideals and actualisation, but in practice there is a 
failure to reach the ideal because there are tensions between the ideal and the actualised, 
which are for mismatching;   
3. The identification of contradictions: the inner manifest of contradictions of the social 
order (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
Each of these aspects of the LOCE requires an in-depth scrutiny of the practices of the IASB, 
therefore, the next section considers the empirical methods used in this thesis, to fulfil this depth 
of analysis.  
4.3 Methods and ontological assumptions 
The rest of this chapter illustrates the methods undertaken to fulfil the research questions and 
objectives within this thesis. For critical accounting research, accounting’s impact on social, 
                                               
25 G&H problematise the fact/value distinction, arguing that there is no fact and there is only 
interpretation.  
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economic and political conditions should be examined, with the intention of change (Crotty, 1998; 
Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1989; 1994).  
A critical understanding of the role of accounting process and practices and the 
accounting profession in the functioning of society and organisations with an intention 
to use that understanding to engage (where appropriate) in changing these processes, 
practices and profession (Laughlin, 1999: 73).  
As Hopwood (1989: 141) articulated:  
Accounting is coming to be regarded as an interested endeavour. Rather than being seen 
as merely residing in the technical domain, serving the role of a neutral facilitator of 
effective decision-making, accounting is slowly starting to be related to the pursuit of 
quite particular economic, social and political interest. The active and influential ways in 
which accounting is implicated in the construction and propagation of notions of 
organizational and social control are now starting to be addressed.  
Critical accounting literature considers multiple voices and discourses, to encourage change and 
challenge the status quo (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Morales & Sponem, 2017). Rodrigues and 
Craig (2007: 748) argue that accounting is socially constructed and politically motivated: 
Such “critical accounting” finds “accurate representation” an impossible goal, seeks 
alternative descriptions for what accountants do and the role accounting plays, and 
regards accounting standards to be “politically motivated”…  
Through L&M’s DT, this thesis contributes a deeper, more holistic analysis than prior research 
on the IASB and IFRS for SMEs, following literature that exposes critical perspectives. It is 
therefore appropriate to consider the ontological assumptions of DT, before outlining the specific 
data collection methods and methods of data analysis. 
L&M (2001) extend traditional DT, focusing on social realities, with ontological assumptions that 
centre on negative ontology.26 The impact of this is that social reality is discursively constructed 
through articulations, which simultaneously constitute reality and partially subvert it (Howarth, 
2013). Researchers depict accounting as a subjective, social construction (Hines, 1988; Morgan, 
1988). Shapiro (1997; 1998) outlines relationships between financial reporting practice and 
epistemology, arguing accounting is not objective, despite traditional descriptions. Shapiro (1997) 
also suggests that all propositions should be considered during analysis to discover their limits. 
The IASB develop and mobilise accounting as the language of advanced financial capital, 
operating political processes, through social relations and rhetoric (Glynos 1999; Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007; Hines, 1988; Shapiro, 1997; Stavrakakis, 1999). So, to analyse the IASB’s 
articulations, this thesis introduces reflection and inter-subjective objectivity (Hines, 1988; 
Morgan, 1988). This approach contrasts positivistic methods, which would be unsuitable for the 
discursive nature of this thesis, as instead all discourses are seen as meaningful and as 
contributions to the construction of reality (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Hines, 1988; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001; Shapiro, 1997). For this thesis, there is no universal answer due to articulations 
and antagonisms. Indeed, all social meaning is political, contextual, relational and contingent 
                                               
26 DTs negative ontology draws no clear methodological conclusions, so it is supplemented by methods 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
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(Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This leads to the 
identification of dislocations which threaten discursive systems simultaneously, creatively and 
disruptively (Carter, 2008; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2013).  
4.4 Data collection  
This Post-Structuralist intervention interrogates the IASB’s discourse, rhetoric and narratives. 
The examination of this discourse examines multiple voices and constructs a contextual data set 
that acknowledges the limits of the story, but makes continuous, justified decisions (Frezatti et 
al., 2014; Howarth & Torfing, 2005). This thesis considers multiple interfaces and articulations, 
not just written discourse, and therefore combines document analysis and interviews to fulfil the 
research questions and gain a detailed understanding of the IFRS for SMEs.  
4.4.1 Document analysis  
Documents are commonly used for detailed analysis of a case because the information within 
documents often cannot be gained elsewhere, offering the ability to examine social practices and 
processes. As May (2011: 191-192) describes, documents form social practice and inform 
structures and decisions made in daily life, and offer readings of social events.  
Howarth and Torfing (2004) explain that documents provide researchers with linguistic, non-
reactive data. In this case, the documents are mostly publicly available or archived, constructing 
the IASB’s public discourse. The key documents and websites analysed are listed in the 
bibliography. Howarth and Torfing (2005: 336-337) articulate the importance of documents for 
DT alongside the importance of guarding against reductionism:  
… it is possible to treat all data as text … Discourse theory needs … to guard against 
charges of linguistic reductionism, in which practices are merely the effects of texts, 
while … it must not conceive texts as purely epiphenomenal – as the effects of more 
objective and deeply rooted logics … Derrida suggests there are no fully saturated 
contexts, as the traces of signifiers are always detectable in innumerable other contexts. 
Instead, the researcher is compelled to make decisions about the appropriate level and 
degree of contextualisation and must establish the limits of any particular project. The 
key principles underpinning these decisions are that they must be explicit, consistent, and 
justified. 
This quote explains that there should always be explicit and justified decisions within analysis. 
Any justifications made are constrained by the contingencies of discourse, and there is no 
universal because there is always reflexivity and contestability (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
Articulatory practice is a discursive moment and the research strategies challenge phenomena, 
creating an ontic-political interpretation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
For this thesis, relevant IFRS for SMEs and IASB documents were collected to analyse their 
processes, mainly from the IASB’s website. However, this was not completely relied upon 
because these documents are the IASB’s own selection of documents, so document were gained 
from other sources as well. These documents were read and re-read for full immersion within the 
discourse, followed by the construction of mind maps, and identification of key themes. The 
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document archive includes all currently publicly available documents published by the IASB on 
IFRS for SMEs, including IFRSF document and the education initiative. There is reason to believe 
that not every document generated during and prior to the due process related to IFRS for SMEs 
has been included in the IASB’s archive. The IASB’s documents were analysed along with 
observer notes of the IASB’s board meetings from the time of development of the standard, which 
were privately obtained. Additionally there were documents published by the WB (particularly 
their Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC’s), which were completed in 
partnership with the IMF; and the work that the WB did with the IASB on the education initiative), 
documents from the European Union (EU), the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
International Standard Setting Reports, published by European Research Associates (IStaR), and 
documents created by accounting firms on IFRS for SMEs and any relevant private documents 
offered by interviewees. Further details on this range of documents and their time of publication 
can be found in Appendix 5. Given the timing of the study, after the development of IFRS for 
SMEs, some of the documents were difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, a wide range of documents 
were obtained from the years prior to the development, during the development, and post-
promulgation. 
Throughout analysis DT was applied, focusing on hegemonic positions and articulations. This 
interrogates what was said, but also what was not said, looking for gaps and omissions in the 
discourse, reading the discourse sceptically, and acknowledging the partial nature of discourse 
(Carter, 2008; Frezatti et al., 2014; Rapley, 2007). Documentation can raise issues of authenticity 
and credibility, but in this case documents were collected from official websites or given by 
people with official titles (Rapley, 2007). The documents’ meaning was interpreted subjectively, 
subjectivity that is dependent on the researcher (Bryman, 2004; Rapley, 2007; Scott, 1990). 
Importantly discourse analysis is messy, with imperfections, contingencies and complexity, 
which is acknowledged throughout this thesis (Frezatti et al., 2014). Due to the documents’ 
variety and complexity, combined with transcripts and notes, Scrivener and NVivo (software 
packages for handling and facilitating the analysis of text) were used to organise and analyse 
information.  
4.4.2 Interviews  
This thesis examines data from semi-structured interviews undertaken with predetermined 
explorative questions and themes. Within each interview the same themes were explored, but at 
times more focus was given to specific aspects, depending on the responses given in the interview. 
The nature of the interview enabled interviewees to speak freely and with flexibility, to gain rich 
and informative information (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Howarth & Torfing, 2005). Howarth and 
Torfing (2005) state that interviews give linguistic and reactive information, contrasting non-
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reactive information, leading to the ability to discuss and explore issues raised by interviewees 
(but this flexibility is not without its problems):  
…we are confronted with the difficulty of validating and corroborating what is said in 
interviews, of analysing information which we believe either to be true or false, and of 
accessing information that remains deliberately or unintentionally hidden ... comparing 
different sorts of data (quantitative or qualitative, primary and secondary) and different 
types of method (for example, interviews and textual analysis) to see whether they 
support one another ... is useful in validating evidence obtained during interviews. 
Moreover, material which is shown to be false, distorted, or partial can and ought to be 
analysed precisely because of their inaccuracies and concealments ... they may 
themselves constitute important windows ‘into actors’ understandings and interpretations 
of events. Hyperbolic representations, omissions, over-wording, slips, and unusual 
collocations thus constitute valuable points of condensation in an interview, which 
require closer inspection and analysis ... Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limits 
of information gleaned from interviews ... and thus to supplement interview data with 
other sources such as primary documents ... secondary interpretations, interviews from 
different places of enunciation, and so on (Howarth & Torfing, 2005: 339). 
This quote explains there are some forms of validation, but the work allows for potential 
inaccuracies and concealments, because they are studied and investigated for further validation. 
This thesis corroborates interviews through documentation and vice versa, acknowledging the 
limits of both interviews and document analysis.  
For the combination of two methods of data collection this thesis draws support from social 
science literature. Indeed, the interviews produced information that elaborates on the documents 
in a useful way: 
In short, it is to view the dialogical relationship between interviewer and interviewee as 
... an encounter in language with all the attendant difficulties post- structuralists have 
noted about communication in general (Howarth & Torfing, 2005: 339-340). 
This centralises the researcher’s role, in which the researcher adopts critical reflexivity towards 
theoretical assumptions and the phenomena being examined. This is to ensure that research is not 
reductionist or focused on self-serving information, by adopting critical reflexivity (Howarth & 
Torfing, 2005).  
Importantly, leading and limiting questions within this communication are unavoidable, but the 
semi-structured approach to interviews overcomes these limitations (Fontana & Frey, 2000; May, 
1997). The way that this interview data was collected is now outlined. There were 27 interviews 
conducted for this thesis, and to consider different perspectives people were interviewed from 
both inside and outside the board, including:  
1. International standard setters including board members, staff members, technical staff;  
2. National standard setters; 
3. Key actors in regulatory organisations and bodies external to the IASB (including the 
IASC, the WB, the IFAC, the UNCTAD, and the ICAEW); 
4. Relevant academics.  
These interviews, as listed in figure 12, are from a variety of jurisdictions and continents to 
consider some different geographical perspectives, and voices that were marginalized (as Ram & 
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Newberry (2013) and Devi & Samujh (2015) identify the exclusion of emerging economies in the 
due process). Thus, through professional diversity and geographical diversity, this thesis 
empirically considers different perspectives and identifies different actors, for a well-rounded 
understanding of the phenomena. However, the silenced or missing voices in the debate were 
harder to contact in the interview process, for various reasons. For example, some actors did not 
respond to correspondence, and because the standard was promulgated in 2009 some relevant 
actors were no longer contactable. There was contact and interviews undertaken with voices that 
were marginalised, specifically through interviews with actors from emerging economies. 
However, ‘marginalized voices’ are inevitably hard to contact so documents were used to identify 
and illustrate voices that were excluded or dismissed in the IASB processes and practices. I 
contacted interviewees through connections that my supervisors held in the field, which was 
followed by the snowballing method. Specifically, I asked interviewees if they had the details of 
anyone connected to the project and added the caveat of asking if they had contacts from emerging 
economies. 
As many of the interviews picked to retain anonymity, this anonymity was taken across all 
interviewees, with some details being revealed in the empirics for those interviewees that did not 
require anonymity, and the following roles being shown according to the ethical procedure:  
Interviewee 1 Employee of a professional body  
Interviewee 2 Employee of a professional body 
Interviewee 3 Academic  
Interviewee 4 Academic 
Interviewee 5 Academic 
Interviewee 6 Involved in international standard setting and involved in work with 
IFIs 
Interviewee 7 Academic 
Interviewee 8 Academic  
Interviewee 9 Involved in work with the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards  
Interviewee 10 Involved in international standard setting  
Interviewee 11 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 12 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 13 Involved in national standard setting 
Interviewee 14 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 15 Involved in work with the IFAC  
Interviewee 16 Involved in national standard setting 
Interviewee 17 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 18 Involved in transnational standard setting 
Interviewee 19 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 20 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 21 Involved in national and international standard setting 
Interviewee 22 National standard setter   
Interviewee 23 Academic 
Interviewee 24 Involved in national standard setting 
Interviewee 25 Involved in national standard setting  
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Interviewee 26 Involved in international standard setting 
Interviewee 27 Academic and involved in work with IFIs 
Figure 12: Table of interviewees 
The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to 120 minutes, depending on the availability 
of the interviewee and the knowledge that they held of the subject, 19 of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and 8 via skype. The interviews were recorded and notes were taken. 
Following the interview the data was transcribed in full, and interviewees were given the 
opportunity to see the full thesis manuscript and respond to quotes. The interviewees signed a 
consent letter, and the main contents of the letter were brief details on the project and the terms 
in appendix 2.  
The analysis of this data was conducted using some key analytical techniques that are explained 
in the following section.  
4.5 Analysis of data 
The empirical analysis that is conducted through DT examines the concrete case as an opportunity 
to develop DT, therefore not seeing DT as a set of theoretical tools to be applied, but instead 
identifying the necessity for theory building. DT offers contextual analysis, and analysis of the 
meaning of discourse, through the examination of LoE/LoD, signifiers and rhetoric (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). The analytical task is reading by deconstructing, interpreting and reconstructing 
texts, identifying authority, exclusion and the characterisation of events and acknowledging the 
role of the author within these elements (Carter, 2008). This method is flexible and subjective, 
considering how meaning is constructed, developed and employed, whilst considering different 
potential meanings (Carter, 2008). The steps taken in the analysis of discourse are not necessarily 
sequential, instead there is continuous movement between analysis, writing, theory and previous 
literature. The analysis started during the collection and initial readings of the documentation. 
This developed an understanding of the case, led to the identification of other necessary 
documentation, and aided in the development of questions for interviewees. This analysis 
identified key themes and contested quotes, with the help of software, because of the large amount 
of data and documentation analysed, using Scrivener, NVivo and Word. This analysis was 
informed by L&M’s (2001) DT, and the LOCE, both of which led to the development of key 
themes. For example, a reoccurring term within the discourse surrounding IFRS for SMEs is 
developing countries, so the software enabled me to identify the different uses of this term as a 
key signifier within the IASB’s discourse.  
This thesis argues that IFRS for SMEs constitutes an attempt to fix the contingencies within the 
discourse of differential reporting, and political debates (Howarth et al., 2000). Therefore, this 
research extends to other organisations, to identify the broader context, and political surroundings 
(Howarth et al., 2000). Furthermore, this thesis acknowledges there cannot be an ‘authentic’ 
analysis, as any account is always ‘partial’ (Czarniawska, 2014; Spence & Carter, 2011). 
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However, this thesis contributes an analysis of the impact of the extension of IFRS to IFRS for 
SMEs, problematising regulation and standard-setting, which has ramifications for accounting, 
regulation, law, politics and policy (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2010; Griggs & Howarth, 
2013; Howarth & Griggs, 2012). This examines political contestations and struggles, highlighting 
radical contingencies, the incomplete character of social practices, and examining the fantasmatic 
underpinnings (Glynos et al., 2015). Similarly, Glynos et al. (2015: 395) examine fantasmatic 
ideologies, as explained in the theory chapter:  
These logics offer a language with which to characterize and critically explain the 
dialectical movement governing practices, including the way they come to be instituted, 
maintained, defended or transformed. Logics articulate something about the norms, roles 
and narratives, as well as the ontological presuppositions that, together, render practices 
possible, intelligible and vulnerable to contestation. The language of logics offers a way 
of putting to work a poststructuralist ontology, where critical explanation is understood 
to emerge through deep immersion in the empirical corpus.   
This focus on the logics is important because the methodology:  
…suggests that language and meaning do not simply serve external interests and causes; 
they also constitute them (Glynos et al., 2015: 396). 
To examine the logics, the data was read and re-read. Moreover, this thesis draws upon the 
analytical techniques of nodal point deconstruction and rhetorical redescription. These forms of 
analysis are important because IFRS for SMEs emerged in a political battle over differential 
reporting (Howarth & Griggs, 2006). These two analytical techniques are now elaborated on.  
4.5.1 Empirical analysis: nodal points and contingencies  
Throughout the empirical analysis, nodal points were identified and deconstructed. Moreover, 
this analysis focused on the identification of different contestations. Often analysis through L&M 
and G&H call for the analysis of dislocations. However, the extension to IFRS for SMEs occurs 
because of contestations and counter articulations, within differential reporting, and there is not a 
significant dislocation, as these articulations and the extension do not change the process or 
change the focus of standard setting, as counter articulations are all informed by advanced 
financial capital logics. Discursive contingencies and counter articulations are investigated. 
Within differential reporting there is a failure in the IASB’s structure, but as they construct IFRS 
for SMEs nothing significant changes in their standard setting. The analysis of nodal points, 
contestations and contingencies enables the examination of debates, key actors and the processes 
adopted to develop IFRS for SMEs (Howarth et al., 2000; Laclau, 1990).  
Therefore, this thesis examines how actors succeeded in sedimenting IFRS for SMEs, and the key 
signifiers and nodal points operating within the discourse. Consequently, the empirics also 
consider potential dislocations, and alternatives that could have become the socially sedimented 
practices (Carter, 2008; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth et al., 2000). The empirical analysis 
also focuses on rhetoric and how actors articulate rhetoric, because this constitutes social reality, 
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and is important for understanding and explaining social phenomena, therefore the analysis also 
investigates rhetorical re-description (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth & Griggs, 2006).   
4.5.2 Empirical analysis: Rhetorical Redescription 
Rhetorical redescription (paradiastole) is the re-valuing or de-valuing of the normative 
significance of concepts (Howarth & Griggs, 2006: 11). These ‘redescriptions’ occur in four 
different ways, including: re-conceptualisation (a revision of meaning), re-naming (a change of 
the name), re-weighting (a shift in significance) and re-evaluation (an alteration of normative 
implications) (Carter, 2008). Skinner (2002: 183) describes this through Quintilian’s technique 
of ‘assign[ing] different causes, a different state of mind and a different motive for what was 
done’. Through rhetorical redescription, this thesis politically examines IFRS for SMEs as an 
attempt to fix hegemonic discourse, by examining the IASB’s discourse and rhetorical tropes 
(Howarth & Griggs, 2006). For example, the IASB have reconceptualised (revised the meaning) 
of the term ‘SMEs’, which assembles increasing metonymical tropes (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).  
Similarly, Frezatti et al. (2014: 439) demonstrates that the task of analysing documents is a 
reflective process of ‘deconstruction, interpretations and reconstruction’ in which the researcher 
considers how meanings are ‘constructed, developed and employed’. Accordingly, this thesis 
empirically examines the IASB’s discourse and interviews through rhetorical redescription, with 
themes that are linked to the social, political and fantasmatic logics. This involves a reflective 
process: 
The analytical task is a “reading” of the empirical material, focusing on its symbols, and 
includes deconstruction, interpretation, and reconstruction… It is an inherently flexible 
process, enabling the researcher to consider not how meaning is constructed, but how 
meanings are developed and employed, and thus consequently, what accounting and 
other informational proxies “do” within the organisation. Of importance is the divorce 
between the author’ intended meaning (in performing the act or writing text) and the 
reader’s received meaning (in witnessing the act or reading text). Thus, any text is full of 
potential readings (Frezatti et al., 2014: 439). 
Therefore, empirical questions focus on rhetoric, metaphors and articulations within the IFRS for 
SMEs discourse. These re-descriptions are constantly moving and changing and are ubiquitous 
within political discourse (Griggs & Howarth, 2013; Howarth & Griggs, 2006). For example, 
Griggs & Howarth (2013: 155) identify the act of rhetorical redescription within their examination 
of the ‘freedom to fly’ debate, where they show how rhetoric is constructed by interested parties. 
Rhetorical redescription calls for a constant double loop learning when considering theoretical 
assumptions, research questions and the empirical data, to acknowledge different perspectives, 
ambiguities and complexities (Alvesson, 2003; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1990; Glynos & Howarth, 
2007; Griggs & Howarth, 2013; Khalid, 2009; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Lye, 1996).  
The analysis of the literature, the documents and the interviews was conducted through the 
identification of key words through rhetorical redescriptions. For example, when reading 
documents from the IASB, the empirical analysis searched for key terms, such as ‘defining SMEs’ 
(because of the prominence of the issues surrounding the definition of an SMEs within these 
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documents); ‘developing countries’ (because of the previous literature that has highlighted the 
limits of the due process when considering developing countries); and ‘stand-alone’ (because of 
the repetition of this phrase within the documentation). Interviewees were also asked about these 
key themes to further explore their understandings of the words and their impact. Within external 
documents, such as those from the WB, a series of searches were conducted for key terms such 
as ‘IFRS’ and ‘SMEs’ to identify the articulations about the IASB within these documents and 
examine the external context outside of the IASB’s discourse. A similar logic was applied to the 
analysis of interview transcriptions, with the added consideration of questions asked and biases 
that can occur in the interviewing process. The interviews were listened to multiple times, 
transcribed, read, re-read and divided into themes that linked to the themes from the 
documentation and literature. This offered a richer and deeper understanding of the debates, the 
articulations, and the way that actors understand rhetoric and signifiers. This was undertaken 
using NVivo, for searching and categorising, and Scrivener for the organisation of documents and 
Microsoft word for deeper readings and analysis. Whilst writing the empirical chapter, empirical 
documents were continuously read and analysed to ensure validity and further explore ideas and 
themes. 
The LOCE seeks to understand ontological interpretations of social actors at the social, political 
and fantasmatic levels. Whilst DT seeks to identify nodal points, rhetorical strategies and 
articulations employed by actors as they construct and sediment new discourses. This focus on 
subjectivity in both theory and methodology renders the use of coding or linguistic analysis 
unsuitable, as forms of objectivity are avoided within the research approach. Within this research, 
I am actively engaged in the research as a political actor involved in the research process. 
Therefore, this research represents my interpretation of the political environment surrounding the 
IFRS for SMEs and the IASB’s discourse. So, a key component of this research is that the reader 
considers my empirically and theoretically grounded research, which examines the interface 
between accounting and politics in the IASB’s creation of IFRS for SMEs, and forms their own 
opinion. Therefore, these questions are focused on in terms of rhetoric: 1) what rhetoric has been 
employed by the IASB? 2) How have interested parties constructed this rhetoric? 3) How have 
interested parties responded to this rhetoric? 4) How have various actors shifted their position?  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter has focused on the implications of the methodological approach and the implications 
of DT and data collection methods. As part of this, this chapter focused first on articulating 
G&H’s LOCE as methodology. The key conclusions of this chapter are:  
• The empirical analysis is conducted through DT, examining the concrete case as an 
opportunity to develop DT, not seeing DT as a set of theoretical tools to be applied, 
therefore leading to theory-building. Given the open and flexible nature of DT and 
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negative ontology there are some research methods that are incommensurate with DT – 
such methods have not been used in this research.  
• Responding to critiques of DT (see Chapter 3), G&H developed the LOCE, which 
proposes five movements that are followed within this thesis. LOCE operates as 
methodology for the entire thesis. Moreover, the analysis tools have been used to examine 
the way that actors construct debates around key nodal points, thus also examining how 
interested actors succeed in sedimenting IFRS for SMEs, and the rhetorical and 
metaphorical elements within the development and promulgation of IFRS for SMEs. This 
thesis considers rhetoric by looking at the meaning that are attached to discourse, and the 
decisions that are made in the development of the standard. This involves an 
investigatation into the formation of political identities within the debate surrounding 
differential reporting and the pressure to adopt accounting standards.  
• This thesis has employed document analysis and interviews combining analysis of non-
reactive, linguistic data that is publicly accessible, with greater depth through semi-
structured interviews that offer reactive data.  
Having outlined the methodology employed in this thesis, the following chapter moves to analysis 
of literature on the IASB and the IFRS for SMEs, analysis that is informed by L&M’s PSDT and 
G&H’s LOCE.  
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 Chapter 5: A Discourse Theory critique of the literature on the IASB and 
IFRS for SMEs  
Chapter 1 introduced the work of the IASB on IFRS for SMEs, outlining the rule-making role that 
the IASB plays in regulation, thus pointing to the necessity to examine dominant regulatory 
accounting theories. Regulatory theories were examined in chapter 2, demonstrating the need for 
a theory that would enable further interrogation of the politics within the IASB’s extension to 
IFRS for SMEs. Thus, this thesis is concerned with examining the IASB’s role as a hegemonic 
agent, through L&M’s conceptualisation of hegemony, which was justified in chapter 2 and 3. In 
acknowledging the limits of L&M’s theory this thesis draws on Glynos & Howarth’s 
methodological framework, articulated in chapter 4. The present chapter examines the relevant 
literature on the IASB and the IFRS for SMEs, through L&M’s DT, to give a retroduction and 
identify the way this thesis extends the prior literature. In this sense, this chapter and the next 
chapter are retroductive as they offer an investigation of the empirical event, deconstructing, 
reconstructing and problematising the phenomena observed. In particular, examining what the 
‘facts’ are, and what gave rise to those ‘facts’, and remains open ended (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). These two chapters illustrate different perspectives, deconstruct dominant perspectives and 
situate the discursive problem for this thesis (Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
As explained, this thesis is concerned with the way that the IASB control regulatory 
conversations, in which they place themselves at the centre of the differential reporting debate by 
constructing the extension to IFRS for SMEs. The IASB self-defines who it will talk to and how 
it will talk to them, and speaks on behalf of others, with little concern for different perspectives 
that fall outside of the ‘box’ of the IASB’s approach. Thus, this thesis examines the political 
processes of the IASB as a geopolitical agent, operating through claims to technocracy, by looking 
at how and why they extend their hegemony to SMEs and emerging economies. In their work, 
the IASB construct key nodal points, which have been examined previously in the literature. The 
present chapter focuses on the macro level, as a deconstruction of the IASB’s technocracy, and 
the subsequent chapter focuses on identifying IFRS for SMEs literature.  
This literature review focuses on some core themes, first considering the IASB’s social impact, 
and their rhetorical tropes, which are considered in the second part of the chapter. Within this 
the IASB claim that rhetoric is operationalised through due process, enhancing their claims to 
technocratic regulation, so literature that has examined the IASB’s due process is identified in a 
subsection of section two. Third, Botzem identifies the role of politics in the IASB and the way 
this politics is masked through technocracy, which is important for the examination of the 
extension to IFRS for SMEs.   
Within this construction there are some key rhetorical tropes including (but not limited to) the 
public interest (fourth section), accountability (fifth) and comparability (sixth). Given the 
discussion of comparability and the IASB’s aim to construct a global language for financial 
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reporting the section that follows (seventh) deconstructs claims to geographical diversity. 
Linked to this, the eighth section examines interconnected nature of the WB and the IASB. 
Following this there is a summary which concludes the chapter.  
5.1 Accounting and Society  
As expressed in chapter 3, this thesis aims to consider the social impact of the politics of 
accounting standard setting. This thesis questions the extent to which the IASB considers the 
broader social context. Further than this, this thesis questions the IASB’s ability to do so within 
their current structure, systems and processes. The contingencies that impact the IASB’s 
extension to IFRS for SMEs are of a social nature, but this extension converts social impact into 
problems that hold technocratic and objective solutions through the promulgation of IFRS for 
SMEs. The rhetoric of objectivity is a dominant ideology within accounting, masking 
accounting’s subjective, impure and biased nature. The call to acknowledge the social impact of 
accounting, its organisations and their approaches is not new in accounting (Hines, 1988; 
Hopwood, 1989). Nevertheless, highlighting the necessity to consider accounting’s political and 
social impact needs to be repeated whilst organisations such as the IASB continue to operate with 
little consideration for their social, political, and environmental impact, through claims to 
technocracy that obscure these impacts. Critical accounting research has highlighted the dominant 
role of accounting in capitalism, the myths of survival of the fittest, economic efficiency and 
growth (Bryer, 1999; Chiapello, 2007; Cooper, 2005). Despite this, the hegemony of advanced 
financial capital and neo-liberalism continues to use accounting to the advantage of the powerful, 
wealthy elite (Cooper, 2015). For Cooper (2015) the conceptual framework is a strategic 
legitimacy manoeuvre which constructs the symbolic power of the profession. Due to increasing 
globalisation, and the increasing role of the IASB as a geo-political player it has become difficult 
for countries to avoid the adoption of IFRS, increasing the IASB’s hegemonic position through 
various strategies. For example:  
Hines (1989, p. 72) writes that Conceptual Framework projects are used as a political 
resource in the professionalisation struggle during times of possible intervention by the 
state and at times of competition from other groups… Zhang and Andrew (2014) found 
the same motivations underpinning the most recent (and on-going) IASB/FASB 
Conceptual Framework project which was initiated as a strategic response to threats to 
accounting legitimacy in the form of significant criticism for its role in the recent 
financial crisis. At the time in which Hines was writing (in the late 1980s) it was clear 
that Conceptual Framework projects were doomed to ‘‘technical failure’’ and that the 
major rationale for undertaking Conceptual Frameworks was not functional or technical 
but a strategic manoeuvre for providing legitimacy to standard-setting boards and the 
accounting profession (Cooper, 2015: 69-70). 
This quote demonstrates the changing nature of the IASB’s work as they attempt to maintain and 
extend their hegemony through different strategies. The increasing monopolistic status that is 
given to the IASB over standard setting, eliminates the ability to compare and learn from 
alternatives, or to tailor financial reporting practices to local variations: 
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It also disallows the tailoring of financial reporting to local variations in economic, 
business commercial, legal, auditing, regulatory and governance conditions across the 
globe (Sunder, 2011: 291). 
Sunder (2011: 292) notes that research on the IASB’s claims to comparability through IFRS are 
‘mixed at best’, so Sunder argues that the IASB should not be granted monopoly, as this only 
obscures any costs and risks. To illustrate this, Sunder (2011: 305) suggests that the IFRS rhetoric 
is like the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the ‘tale of the Pied Piper’:  
The ancient tale of the Pied Piper has become a metaphor for a leader who entices people 
to follow (especially to their doom) by offering the promise of benefits, front and centre, 
while hiding the costs and risks behind the fog of time and uncertainty. IFRS-as-
monopoly is not the first example of pied pipers in modern economic and business policy. 
In the 1990s, the so called Washington Consensus on macro-economic policy had the 
backing of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and most major economic 
powers and thinkers in the world. There were few critics then. Today, the Washington 
Consensus lies discredited and ignored, and has no defenders… Similarly, the euro was 
adopted with much fanfare in 1999, and its benefits were promoted by the powerful and 
the knowledgeable. Today, the wisdom of that move is less clear. The IFRS, if allowed 
to develop by choice of investors and reporting entities in a competitive environment, is 
a good idea. If they happen to attain a universal following through such a market process, 
so be it. But let us think again about the damage we could inflict on our markets and 
economies by granting it a worldwide monopoly through the edicts of national 
governments.  
Arguably, the extension to IFRS for SMEs extends this monopoly further. These issues of 
accountability or lack thereof are crucial for this thesis, and L&M enables analysis of the IASB’s 
hegemony through examination of the role of the political, social and fantasmatic logics. While 
Sunder (2011) and others have acknowledged the political role of the IASB and their power, the 
extension, adaptation, and maintenance of hegemony has not been examined to the necessary 
extent, and the extension in the IASB’s role as geo-political agent through IFRS for SMEs has not 
been explored to the extent to which this thesis does. Prior analysis has examined the IASB’s 
rhetorical construction of legitimacy, offering interesting insights for this thesis.   
5.2 Deconstructing the IASB’s legitimacy and rhetoric 
The legitimacy and rhetoric of the IASB has been called into question by various authors, for 
example: Bamber & McMeeking (2016); Richardson & Elberlein, (2011); Wingard et al. (2016). 
Pelger and Spieß (2017) identify that the IASB’s work continuously maintains their legitimacy 
as a rule-maker, for regulation. Additionally, the IASB’s user pronouncements only construct 
faux legitimacy (Pelger & Spieß, 2017). Similarly, Wingard et al. (2016) argue that the due 
process could be improved as poorer countries are impacted by IFRS, but not considered in 
process (Hopper et al., 2017). Bamber & McMeeking (2016) confirm an Anglo-American bias, 
by identifying the dominance of American constituents. Another aspect of the rhetoric constructed 
to legitimise the IASB is the reference made to users. Young (2003; 2006) identified flaws in the 
FASB’s identification of users as investors and creditors that make informed economic decisions. 
This construction of the user is drawn upon as justification (Young, 2006: 580): 
Particular accounting requirements are frequently justified by references to user needs or 
wants or interests. However, these assertions are rarely connected to specific evidence.  
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The construction of the user is also prominent in the due process for SMEs, in which the IASB 
identify a different user. This is further explored empirically. This focus on legitimacy is 
important for examination of the IASB’s process and discourse, but this thesis extends beyond 
legitimacy to further holistic analysis, considering how the IASB construct legitimacy, and the 
impact of this construction. Within this construction of legitimacy, the due process is 
prominent, acting as a signifier for the IASB, to legitimise their standards.  
5.2.1 Deconstructing the due process 
Prior literature has examined the ‘due process’, which acts as a signifier in the IASB’s work under 
the master signifier of ‘technocratic regulator’, with surrounding signifieds such as 
‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, ‘consultation’, ‘geographical diversity’ and ‘public interest’, 
which have been examined in various studies (Botzem, 2012; 2014; Burlaud & Collasse, 2011; 
Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Cortese et al., 2010; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 2003; Martinez-
Diaz, 2005; Richardson & Eberlein, 2011), and are shown in the following figure: 
Figure 13: Signifiers and the IASB 
 
Previous studies identify the politics of the IASB’s due process, a politics that is disregarded and 
masked by the IASB through procedural due process (Bengtsson, 2011; Botzem, 2012; Burlaud 
& Collasse, 2011; Luthardt & Zimmerman, 2009; Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). Burlaud and 
Collasse (2011) identify that actors that participate in the due process have major financial and 
intellectual resources, silencing those who do not. According to Burlaud and Collasse (2011) this 
narrow focus comes from the fundamental principles of the IASB’s work which are sedimented 
in agency theory, efficient market hypothesis and capital markets, despite the limits of these 
approaches. This illustrates socially sedimented practices followed by the IASB, disputing their 
ethos of democracy.  
Research shows that the IASB’s due process is exclusionary, in terms of professional and 
geographical diversity, as they continue to empower Anglo-American domination (Botzem, 2012; 
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2014; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Cortese et al., 2010; Gallhofer & Hasalm, 2003; 2007). The 
concept of ‘Anglo-American power’ in these research papers is extended within this thesis as 
instead this thesis examines the role of the IASB as hegemonic agent for advanced financial 
capital which does not necessarily require a focus on Anglo-American domination. IFRS for 
SMEs was not created for capital markets, showing the importance of this extension, and the 
IASBs claims regarding IFRS for SMEs.  
The IASB serves a regulatory function within accounting, but is a private standard setter. Their 
regulatory role and logics of inclusion, independence, public interest and objectivity that permeate 
their standards and feed into the master signifier of ‘due process’, holds contradictions with their 
role as a private international body seeking to facilitate global capital movement. Critiques of the 
due process analyse the social logics and socially sedimented practices of the IASB, but often 
disregard the political logics which are concerned with the construction and naturalisation of 
frontiers, and the fantasmatic logics which are concerned with the role of the subject, and the way 
that the subject is gripped by ideologies.  
Some literature has focused on the specific social practice of lobbying during standard setting, 
often through analysis of comment letters (Georgiou, 2004; Giner & Acre, 2012; Holder et al., 
2013; Jorissen et al., 2010; 2013; Larson & Herz, 2013; Sutton, 1984). This thesis considers 
comment letters in analysis, but does not focus solely on comment letters. These studies offer 
insight into the most active participation and the dominance of lobbying from large and wealthy 
constituents (Giner & Acre, 2012). They also identify inadequate geographical diversity through 
the quantification of the origin of comment letters (Erb & Pelger, 2015). Studies that move away 
from quantification to qualitative analysis of lobbying (beyond only comment letters) identify the 
role of organisational networks (Erb & Pelger, 2015; Giner & Acre, 2012; Holder et al., 2013), 
identifying political struggles in lobbing between elites through various methods of influence, 
power and rhetoric (Cortese et al., 2010; Georgiou, 2004; Georgiou & Roberts, 2004; Sikka, 
2001; Zeff, 2002). Similarly, Cortese et al. (2010) and Sikka (2001) argue lobbying depends on 
economic consequences, as entities struggle for power in attempts to align with their own interest, 
identifying regulatory capture (Cortese & Irvine, 2010; Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Posner, 1974; 
Walker, 1987). Hansen (2011) finds that attention paid to lobbyists depends on their perceived 
credibility and capital market impact. Alternatively, Weetman (2001) contends that lobbying is 
irrelevant as the IASB determine standards prior to lobbying, only considering comments in 
support, whilst ignoring and suppressing contradictions. 
Importantly, the research on lobbying outlined here suggests that actors will lobby when standards 
are being developed if the benefits that they will gain are likely to outweigh the costs. This is 
interesting for IFRS for SMEs as there are less political players that have the ability or resources 
to comment on IFRS for SMEs, with invested interest. Indeed, the average SME is unlikely to 
have the resources to lobby or comment, and as they are not already a political player in this arena 
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they may not be acknowledged. Further, the lack of geographical diversity has an increased 
impact because IFRS for SMEs specifically targets emerging economies, as explored further in 
this chapter.   
Research has also critiqued individual standards, demonstrating themes of exclusion and 
domination. First this section looks at IFRS 6 (Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources) then IFRS 8 (Operating Segments) and then fair value accounting (FVA). Cortese et 
al. (2010) identify through critical discourse analysis that the IFRS 6 debate was captured by 
powerful entities and the extractive industry leaders through hidden coalitions and covert 
influence. For Cortese et al. (2010) IFRS 6 only codifies practice, as it was captured by those 
being regulated. Arguably, this domination occurs within the due process, which is not objective, 
transparent or representative as claimed (Cortese et al., 2010; Cortese & Irvine, 2010). For 
Cortese & Irvine (2010) there is disparity between processes and visible inputs and outputs, 
identifying a ‘black box’ within the IASB’s work. Cortese & Irvine (2010) offers important 
analysis of the key players within the IASB’s debates. This thesis extends Fairclough’s critical 
discourse analysis through L&M (explained in chapter 3). Focusing on IFRS 8, Crawford et al. 
(2014) illustrate that the EU’s position towards the IASB is weak, so the EU attempted to regain 
control. Arguably, the EU manages to regain control over standard setting, through a process of 
“comitology” which aims to align with European tradition and law in attempts to resist Anglo-
American hegemony (Crawford et al., 2010). This analysis illustrates the EU’s contested 
relationship with the IASB’s standard setting, which will be considered empirically.  
Power (2010) examines FVA and identifies increased professionalisation within the IASB, 
finding that FVA changed their motives through further incorporation of financial economics 
which increased the partiality, selectiveness, ever-changing and impure nature of accounting 
representations. For Power (2010) there are different views of idealism and pragmatism within 
the board, creating problems of reliability. Equally, Erb & Pelger (2015) analyse the replacement 
of reliability, with representational faithfulness, replacing areas of objectivity with further 
subjectivity through fair value and extending boundaries. In concurrence, Müller (2014) argues 
FVA and the focus on shareholder value, propriety of the firm, and the expansion of financial 
markets into non-financial sectors in IFRS has increased capitalistic domination. This highlights 
the juxtaposition between the IASB’s capital market focus (which places certain voices at the 
centre) and the creation of IFRS for SMEs. Similarly, Zhang & Andrew (2014) identify a shift in 
the purpose of accounting through FVA and conceptual framework changes, which supports the 
power of capital markets, and neo-liberalist domination. For Zhang & Andrew (2014) China is 
gradually becoming a part of global neo-liberalism and financialisation, but arguably FVA does 
not fit the Chinese context. Therefore, this impacts the local context and only provides 
opportunities for powerful political and economic elites to dominate and profiteer, by promoting 
certain ideologies. Thus, this thesis questions the creation of, and extension to IFRS for SMEs, as 
the IASB is focused on capital markets and neo-liberalism.  
  93 
The contradictions between the limits of the IASB’s due process and their rhetoric are crucial in 
the maintaining their hegemony, but this thesis extends beyond a focus on the due process and 
the social logics of the IASB to political and fantasmatic logics. Within this hegemonic politics, 
the IASB construct themselves as a technocratic regulator, which is core to Botzem’s critique of 
accounting standard setting. 
5.3 The limits of Botzem’s politics 
This section analyses Botzem’s critique of the politics of accounting standard setting. Botzem 
(2012) examines the rhetorical construct of the IASB as a technocratic regulator which masks the 
politics of accounting standard setting. This is an insightful piece of work which examines 
technocratic politics, but lacks analysis and critique of the impact of technocratic logics, and has 
not considered (due to the time frame) the impact of extending to IFRS for SMEs. Botzem (2012: 
15) briefly considers the IASB’s extension to standard setting for SMEs: 
Today, however, the IASB’s influence extends far beyond listed companies in 
industrialized countries. The standard setter is eager to expand the reach of its norms to 
small and medium sized companies (SMEs) and even nonprofit organizations.  
For Botzem (2012: 7) politics and power is central to the IASB’s standard setting: ‘…even in 
times of financial crisis, the IASB displays remarkable institutional stability and continues to 
shape financial reporting practices worldwide’.  
An important element of the IASB’s power, Botzem (2012) argues, is their independence from 
any state, which is enhanced by their focus on expertise, investors and capital markets and 
legitimised by their rhetoric of accountability and public interest (Botzem, 2012; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2007; 2003; Messner, 2009). Over time the IASB has changed their structure and 
conceptual framework, adapting to critiques posed toward their legitimacy, and accountability 
(Botzem, 2012; 2014). For example, the IASB have attempted to respond to critiques by 
reinforcing their role as technocratic regulator, to maintain their hegemonic position:  
In this regard, the monitoring board was an attempt to square the circle: The IASB wants 
to react to its critics without making any substantial changes to its structure and by 
leaving “technical” decisions making untouched… the IASB organization structure is 
best described as technocratic… the key component in this mode of technocracy is 
expertise, or more precisely, the power to define what is to be considered relevant 
expertise… an especially important means of securing the position of experts in the field 
of accounting… (Botzem, 2012: 109-110). 
The depiction of separation, in which technical decisions are untouched by the IFRS 
Foundation and the Monitoring Board and left to the IASB, constructs the IASB as 
technocratic and gives them the power to define expertise (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). These 
logics are crucial for this thesis, as the IASB construct relevant expertise within their 
regulatory conversations, and through ad-hoc additions such as the Monitoring Board they 
self-define their accountability. The extension of this to new areas is a political and 
contestable movement, but is constructed as rational through logics of expertise and 
technocracy. Botzem (2012) identifies the construction of legitimation strategies within the 
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IASB’s procedures and processes, as further examination shows that their consultation is 
limited (Hopper et al., 2017). For example, Botzem (2012) identifies the hidden, but 
influential role of the IASB’s staff members, as this threatens the IASB’s transparency. 
Similarly, Morley (2016) identifies the role of technical staff and their impact. Morley 
(2016) demonstrates the importance of evidence outside of documentation for revealing 
internal motivations in the standard setting process that are tactical, including group biases. 
This thesis similarly examines internal lobbying, group biases and tactics within the due 
process through social logics.  
Additionally, Botzem (2012) argues that the comment letters and other forms of consultation 
undertaken by the IASB offer little additional insight and are only used to legitimise and 
defend their position (Pelger & Spieß, 2017). Despite these limits the IASB makes claims to 
procedural and substantive due process and the rhetoric of expertise, both of which continue 
to give the IASB universal recognition and legitimacy, despite ‘weaknesses in its democratic 
accountability’ (Botzem, 2014: 951).  
However, Botzem (2012; 2014) focuses on the socially sedimented practices, and despite being 
insightful in examination of the IASB’s due process, Botzem has not considered the politics of 
emergence, the construction of political frontiers and the impact that the IASB have. Further, 
Botzem has not examined the impact on subjects, or considered the ideologies that grip subjects 
in the construction of hegemony. Thus, Botzem outlines technocratic politics, but does not 
examine the impact of this technocratic politics or the extension of technocratic politics. Thus, 
despite examining the politics of accounting standard setting, the political depth is extended 
within this thesis, as the Logics of Critical Explanation add the political and fantasmatic logics to 
examination. Moreover, to examine the extension to IFRS for SMEs this thesis requires extensions 
of prior understandings about the IASB, including their geo-political role, and their role as 
hegemonic agent of advanced financial capital.  
As explained, the construction of technocratic regulator is linked to signifiers of accountability 
and the public interest, which attempt to mask the IASB’s political role in standard setting.  
5.4 The rhetorical construction of ‘Public Interest’ 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) critique the IASB’s rhetoric of the public interest for being 
unfulfilled, as the IASB are instead focused on a special interest. This is important because of the 
large (hidden) impact that standard setting has:  
Accounting standards concern a far greater audience than market actors (companies, 
auditors, bankers and investors). They also determine the information accessible to 
employees, citizens and States (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009:466). 
L&M (2001) would see the invocation of public interest by the IASB as operating metonymically 
for private interest (Botzem 2014; Botzem & Quack, 2009; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; Quack, 
2010). Further, Gallhofer & Haslam (2007) argue that the IASB’s processes are exclusionary, 
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limited and motivated by special interests, with a focus on capital markets. The biases described 
privilege certain views and silence others (Hines, 1991; Morgan, 1998). The construction of the 
public interest allows the IASB as a transnational regulator to justify decisions and construct 
legitimacy through rhetorical strategies: 
A regulatory gap has developed between traditional regulators, which are historically tied 
to the territorial nation state, and global firms which are increasingly influential in new 
transnational regulatory institutions. Professional regulation, at the transnational level, is 
now a negotiated product from an increasingly broad and heterogeneous network of 
actors. The espoused logic promotes commercialism and the protection and promotion of 
capital markets, rather than a direct concern with citizens’ rights and the public interest. 
Accounting, particularly the Big Four firms, are at the center of these changes which 
continue to unfold (Suddaby et al., 2007: 357, see also, Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
Baker (2005) similarly critiques the ‘public interest’ in the US context, illustrating the domination 
of neo-liberal ideology. For Baker (2005) there is an absence of clear definition of the public 
interest, enabling the advancement of self-servient, narrow interest and ideology.  
The IASB claim to satisfy the ‘public interest’ through procedural due process. However, at the 
intersection of regulatory and legal theory, Burkhead and Milner (1971) argue that when ‘public 
interest’ is reduced to ‘due process’, problems and tensions are created (Horwitz, 1989). Black 
(2002a, b) and Posner (1974) reinforce this by suggesting that regulators are not motivated to 
regulate in the public interest, so only powerful groups in society benefit, as described by 
regulatory capture theory. Similarly, Mitchell et al. (1994: 48) argue that the ‘public interest’ is a 
smoke screen, which protects the pursuit of sectional private interest. Therefore, the ‘public 
interest’ is shown to be a messy and captured trope, which is interesting for IFRS for SMEs and 
the broader work of the IASB, because they invoke imageries of the ‘public interest’ in their due 
process and in their role as technocratic regulator. Thus, it is interesting to examine what the 
discourse of ‘public interest’ does for the IASB, despite its messy and captured nature. Whilst 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) offer an interesting critique of the IASB’s public interest and 
suggest improvements in their work. This thesis argues that previous research on the IASB 
accepts the necessity for the continued existence of and legitimacy of the IASB and offers 
suggestions for improvement, whilst this thesis does not, and is instead concerned with the politics 
of the other. By accepting the existence of the IASB, the critiques form incremental improvements 
and reify the status quo, without questioning the deeper politics operating within the IASB. 
Indeed, Gallhofer and Haslam (2003; 2007) believe that democracy will solve the problem, whilst 
this thesis argues that technocracy will continue to resist democracy. 
The IASB, operate through a veil of technocracy as an agent of advanced financial capital, and 
the politics within the extension to IFRS for SMEs is deeper than has been examined before 
because this is no longer about regulating financial markets. The examination of public interest 
leads this thesis to the rhetoric of accountability applied by the IASB.  
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5.5 The rhetorical construction of ‘Accountability’ 
There is significant literature that examines accountability within accounting and accounting 
institutions (see, Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992; Gray et al., 2009; 1996; 
Mouck, 1995; Roberts, 2009), and literature that has critiqued the IASB’s claims to accountability 
(Botzem, 2012; Burlaud & Collase, 2011; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; 
2007; Messner, 2009). Chiapello (2007) and Chiapello and Medjad (2009) argue that the IASB 
invoke a logic of accountability to all, but continue to serve particular, one-sided, powerful, 
private interests. This rhetorically masks their limited, investor-focused exclusion, which is 
reinforced by reification of the market as the guiding heuristic (Cortese & Ivirne, 2010).   
The IASB respond to critiques of their lack of accountability, objectivity and neutrality through 
the construction of legitimacy within their due process, and the addition of the accountability 
mechanisms, such as the Monitoring Board (Botzem, 2012; 2014; Burlaud & Collase, 2011; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). This accountability rhetoric ignores illustrations of accountings 
partial and limited nature, and the power that accountants hold by constructing accountability 
through due process, technocracy and objectivity (Hines, 1988).  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, critiques of the IASB and IFRSF lack of accountability 
increased, further revealing the political nature of accounting standard setting (Botzem, 2012). 
However, the IASB and IFRSF responded in a limited way and there has been no serious change 
(Botzem, 2012). The ad-hoc addition of the Monitoring Board only acts to add another layer, 
creating further impossibilities of accountability, but silencing the critiques that were posed in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Since the addition of the Monitoring Board regulatory actors 
have continued to question its role and criticised the lack of transparency, but there has been 
minimal response (Botzem, 2012).  
When focusing on the construct of accountability itself, Messner (2009) identifies its inherent 
limits, stating that each claim to accountability (defining and redefining) is problematic and 
limited, creating further impossibilities. Messner’s (2009) limits of accountability critiques the 
IASB offering a strong theoretical critique of accountability, but does not consider the role of 
politics within the IASB’s construction of accountability. Similarly, examining the IASB’s 
accountability through Black (2002a, b), the IASB’s construction of their own accountability 
creates a regulatory problem, as the IASB place themselves at the centre, holding command and 
control, which is problematic for other actors in the regulatory space. Despite these limits, the 
IASB continue to draw equivalences of accountability to all, through theories of efficient market 
and agency. These theories of efficient market and agency theory are critiqued by Millon (1993) 
and Lazzarato (2012) who cast significant doubt on any logic of well-functioning capital markets 
that serve the interest of the public, by illustrating the violence of financial capital, uneven wealth 
distribution and domination.  
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In the public at large, accounting’s language is perceived as merely technical, objective and 
‘truthful’, which engenders misplaced faith in accounting (Gill, 2009; Morgan, 1988). As Rudkin 
(2007: 17) argues:  
Accounting is intrinsic to the very meaning, order and stability of society in the ways it 
defines what to measure, how items are measured and how they are communicated… It 
also embraces a moral structure in that it embeds a privileging of capital over other 
interests. 
The IASB also enhance confidence and legitimacy by claiming accountability to a broader public, 
appearing to be open to contact, demands and opinions from all, through a logic of democracy 
used by corporate power that Carey (1995: ix) criticises:  
The twentieth century has been characterised by three developments of great political 
importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of 
corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy.  
This language legitimises the IASB’s role as a technocracy that focuses on investors, regulators 
and big-four accounting firms, whilst claiming to focus on the public at large (Botzem, 2012; 
2014; Chiapello, 2007). This construction of legitimacy and rhetoric leads to remarkable power 
and stability for the IASB (Botzem, 2012). Through this rhetoric, when constructing rules for 
regulation the IASB enjoys high independence, which is problematic for accountability, gaining 
unusually high power for a non-state organisation. Despite problems of accountability, this 
independence rhetoric is drawn on positively by the IASB, giving the IASB the ability to self-
regulate and self-define their role. Whilst the IASB is independent from one particular state they 
are focused on an elite, advanced financial capital interest, so the rhetoric of independence 
become complex and contested (see, Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Lehman, 2005; 
Tyrrall et al., 2007). 
In the case of IFRS for SMEs, the IASB’s accountability and narrow focus can be further 
contested. The IASB construct regulatory conversations around the extension in a highly narrow 
way, through limited accountability, and a limited due process. In their expanding role as a geo-
political actor their accountability issues are masked by the interconnected nature of their work 
with IFIs and logics of technocracy, as will be examined empirically. An aspect of these logics is 
the signifier of comparability, which rhetorically constructs IFRS as the global financial reporting 
language. 
5.6 Comparability as a rhetorical signifier 
Multiple researchers have asserted that the IASB are gradually meeting their aims of achieving 
global comparability through ongoing improvements (Barth et al., 2008; Carmona & Trombetta, 
2008; Held & McGrew, 2000; Nobes, 2013; Pacter, 2013; Tarca, 2012; Wang, 2014). These 
researchers see IFRS adoption as ‘beneficial’ due to increased relevance of accounting measures, 
increased efficiency and liquidity in capital markets, increased value relevance and improved 
accounting infrastructure after IFRS adoption (see, Bissessur & Hodgson, 2012; Cotter et al., 
2012; Cheong et al., 2010; Daske et al., 2008; Iatridis & Rouvolis, 2010; Li, 2010; Tarca, 2012). 
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More specifically, some researchers identify ‘benefits’ of adopting IFRS for SMEs, including a 
reduction in reporting burden and increased comparability (Albu et al., 2013; Litjens et al., 2012; 
Quagli & Paoloni, 2012). However, harmonisation and comparability are complex rhetorical 
tropes, as accounting is subjective, cultural, contextual and flexible. Accounting is also reflective 
of national differences and IFRS adoption reflects traditional accounting systems (Nobes, 2013; 
Rudkin, 2007; Tyrrall et al., 2007). Comparability is central to the aims of the IASB in their focus 
on global capital movements, capital markets and regulatory control (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 
Rudkin, 2007).  
This logic offers justification to IASB’s work in their attempts to standardise financial reporting 
practice across the globe. The myth that the IASB construct of the ability and the necessity for 
financial reporting to be comparable across the globe ignores the local context, alternative forms 
of accounting and accountings subjectivity: 
Perhaps they were convinced by the rhetoric of such phrases as ‘high quality’ and ‘in the 
public interest’ and that local national differences could be sacrificed at the altar of the 
great gods of free markets and global trade! (Devi & Samujh, 2015: 131).  
Critics argue that harmonisation and comparability are rhetorically used to reinforce logics of 
objectivity, creating hidden political power (Chua & Taylor, 2008; Gill, 2009; Hines, 1988; 
Müller, 2014; Rudkin, 2007). This hidden political power means that often the social implications 
of accounting and globalisation, and the interconnection between the two are ignored (Lehman, 
2005; Poullaos, 2004). Poullaos (2004) encourages academics to critique globalisation and 
accounting, to increase awareness of the social impacts and inequalities created, for emancipatory 
accounting. Similarly, Walker (2010) argues that harmonisation should be approached with 
caution, as enforcing a single set of standards has a high impact on countries (Baker, 2005; 
Chiapello, 2007; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Gallhofer & Chew, 2000; Messner, 2009; Rodrigues 
& Craig, 2007). 
Research has identified the impact of the narrow focus currently adopted in the movement toward 
harmonisation and comparability (Hopper et al., 2017; Lehman, 2005; Poullous, 2004; Rudkin, 
2007). For example, Gallhofer, Haslam and Van der Walt (2011b) critique the current approaches 
to accounting practice and regulation for only reflecting capitalism. They theorise this though 
human rights, and L&M’s (2001) democracy, to encourage diversity, away from a focus on 
private wealthy elites (Gallhofer et al., 2011b). Additionally, Yonekura et al. (2012) analyse the 
impact of globalisation in Japan, finding that Japan felt convergence pressure due to the role of 
IFRS in global capital movement. However, each of these critiques is arguing for further 
democracy within the IASB, suggesting improvements that this thesis argues are impossible.  
Chua & Taylor (2008) critically examine convergence politics, questioning why the development 
of global accounting standards is left to the private sector as this political exercise, focuses on 
powerful groups, namely regulators and large audit firms. Thus, the political economy of 
convergence is exclusionary and ignores the interest of many (Chua & Taylor, 2008). This focus 
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on global capital movement is extended to SMEs within IFRS for SMEs. Comparability rhetoric 
will be further examined because many countries have adopted IFRS for SMEs due to this, 
ignoring the suitability of the standard (Devi & Samujh, 2015). This thesis is concerned with the 
way the IASB extend these logics to IFRS for SMEs which extends the hegemony of advanced 
financial capital, and is crucial in the adoption of both IFRS and IFRS for SMEs.  
The IASB expand their role as a geopolitical player and interconnect their work further with IFIs 
through IFRS for SMEs. The IFRS for SMEs claims a focus on emerging economies, and the due 
process makes claims to geographical diversity, both of which have been examined in the 
literature.  
5.7 Deconstructing claims to geographical diversity  
Research has shown that particular constituents (Big-Four Accounting Firms) and Geographical 
areas (Anglo-America and Europe) dominate the IASB’s due process, excluding developing 
countries (Botzem, 2012; 2014; Chiapello, 2007; Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Baydoun & Willett, 
1995; Cortese et al., 2010; Lehman, 2005; Tyrrall et al., 2007). Instead of engagement, the IASB 
mask alternatives and local contexts by acting to repress, dominate and exploit developing 
countries (Lehman, 2010; 2015), which has been extended in the work on IFRS for SMEs, in 
which developing countries have been effectively excluded (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Ram & 
Newberry, 2013).  
Earlier work by Baydoun and Willett (1995) identified that Western accounting is not suitable in 
developing countries as it is not relevant to the local context. Tyrrell et al. (2007: 82) concur, 
when examining IFRS:  
[Standards] were developed in advanced economies, but are increasingly being applied 
in emergent economies, potentially ignoring considerations of whether IFRS are 
appropriate or relevant to such economies. 
For Walker (2010) the suitability of standards is dependent on political and economic systems, 
and these systems have different objectives (Baker et al., 2010; Puxty et al. 1987). These studies 
are relevant to the examination of IFRS for SMEs because the IASB created the standard within 
a Western advanced culture, but are focused on developing countries (Devi & Samujh, 2015; 
Hopper et al., 2017; Ram & Newberry, 2013). Previous research has not examined the power and 
politics within this extension to the necessary extent.  
This examination of national differences links to transnational governance and legitimacy (Djelic 
& Quack, 2010; Ramirez, 2010; Quack, 2010). Through transnational theory, Ramirez (2010: 
147) observes that the ‘establishment of a profession usually involves professionals to exercise 
their unique and specific knowledge under a regime of self-regulation…’. The IASB impacts 
accounting transnationally, gradually hegemonising the global space, so transnational 
professional communities have emerged (Ramirez, 2010: 175):  
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By linking up with and gradually transforming the elite of a previously insulated national 
professional community the transnational professional community around the big 
accountancy firms has effectively expanded its regulatory leverage across national 
borders. 
These observations of the construction of an elite dominant community inform this thesis. Indeed, 
the empirics examine how the IASB invoke the logics of elite professional community to operate 
their extension to IFRS for SMEs. Arguably, big four accounting firms have become somewhat 
homogeneous, and have been identified as having the greatest influence on the IASB, as they 
form coalitions and lobby together in their own self-interest (Botzem, 2012; Botzem & Quack, 
2009; Ramirez, 2010).  
The development and promulgation of IFRS for SMEs is interconnected with structural 
adjustment, particularly the WB and the IMF, so research that has examined the role of accounting 
in the work of IFIs and structural adjustment is relevant to this thesis.  
5.8 The IASB, the World Bank and imperialism  
Research in accounting that focuses on developing countries has identified imperialism and 
colonialism (see, Annisette, 2004; Arnold, 2005; Bakre, 2008; Caramanis, 2002; Gallhofer et al., 
2011ab; Neu, 2003; Tinker, 1980; Uddin & Hopper, 2001; Wickramasingre & Hopper, 2005). 
This is interesting as IFRS for SMEs has further focus on developing countries than previous 
standards, and research has referred to the role of the IASB and IFRS as a new form of imperialism 
(Sian, 2010). 
Moreover, research has examined the connection between the IASB, the WB and other IFIs in 
their promotion of accounting technologies identifying a narrow, capitalistic and Anglo-American 
focus (Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Poullaos & Sian, 2010). However, much of 
the related research has focused on the impact of accounting technologies and control in 
colonialism and imperialism, outside of the IASB’s standards (Annisette, 2004; Neu, 2000a, b; 
Neu, 2003; Neu et al., 2006; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Uddin & Hopper, 
2001; Wickramasingre & Hopper, 2005). 
For example, Neu (2000b) examines the impact of accounting technologies in the control of 
indigenous people in Canada, through governmentality.  For Neu (2000b) accounting ideology 
fixes unequal exchange, inferiority and inequality. The WB’s informing technologies enable them 
‘…to govern and regulate action at a distance’, within which accounting and financial expertise 
holds an often-neglected role: 
The individual is aware that the bank is attempting to exercise governance from a distance 
and that this governance is primarily financial/economic in nature… And while the 
Bank’s requirements often introduce inefficiencies because they are not consistent with 
existing information systems and ways of doing things, at the same time the Bank brings 
a particular expertise… (Neu et al., 2006: 651). 
This demonstrates the role of the rhetoric of expertise, which is important as decisions made often 
only reflect the WB requirements, ignoring the local context (Neu et al., 2006). The arguments 
  101 
from Neu are important for this thesis. Earlier papers by Neu demonstrate that accounting can be 
used as an instrument. Moving to more recent papers, Neu et al. (2006) and Neu and Ocampo 
(2007) demonstrate how the WB uses accounting. Neu and Ocampo (2007) examine the metaphor 
of ‘missionary’ work that the WB draw upon when globalising accounting practice into distant 
fields (which is not without slippage and resistance), through the expert rhetoric of ‘advanced’ 
technologies. This diffuses certain practices and beliefs across the world, through lending terms, 
and education (similar to, IFRS and IFRS for SMEs, as will be explored empirically). The WB 
impact and change the habitus of distant fields, with financialisation across countries, and 
accounting practices form the basis of these changes (Neu & Ocampo, 2007).  
With a focus on IFRS, Gallhofer et al. (2011a: 377) identify post-colonialism within the Syrian 
accounting profession and the way that this displaces and shapes local cultures:  
This [globalisation] has impacted on socio-economic and cultural life and enhanced 
global interdependency. Important here is how especially Anglo-American forces 
threaten to displace the local. Seemingly neutral global institutions may permeate and 
shape local cultures. A key accounting case is the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), whose standards have become a global benchmark for proper accounting. 
This analysis of Syrian accountants frames globalisation as Western imperialism, through the 
logic of open markets, growth and development (Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Gallhofer et al., 
2011a). The interviews conducted with Syrian accountants in this study highlight the exclusion 
of the local voice, as the ‘other’: 
It is cultural imperialism serving to justify replacement of the ‘other’ culture and 
traditions with the Western: representations of Islam present Islam as an ideology deeply 
hostile to the West; the Islamic world is seen as needing lessons about (Western) 
democracy and freedom (Gallhofer et al., 2011a: 383).  
Gallhofer et al. (2011a) find that Syrian accountants adopted IAS because they thought that this 
was necessary to keep up with the rest of the world, an attitude that is informed by Anglo-
American neoliberal thinking, suppressing their local culture and social interests. This thesis does 
not focus on a single geographical context. Whilst this creates complexities because no context is 
the same as another, this thesis considers the broader impact of IFRS for SMEs.  
Comparably, Bakre (2008) identifies accounting as an instrument of control, in which capitalist 
profits always flow back to the mother country in the imperialistic relationship (Tinker, 1980). 
These tools aid in the extraction, accumulation and expansion of capital in the empire and for 
Bakre (2008: 518) financial reporting techniques, practices and calculations are part of this 
movement:  
The way in which such exploitative financial reporting techniques and practices have 
historically occurred, has not significantly changed. While direct colonisation may be a 
thing of the past, exploitative capitalism, imperialism and their tools of operation such as 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), forced or imposed on developing 
economies, are still very much alive and active. However, such forceful imposition on 
developing countries in particular, seems to be in conflict with the democratic process, 
which the Western economic powers’ apostles of IFRS preach all over the world. As a 
consequence, some former colonisers and developed world capitalists still take advantage 
of financial reporting techniques and their position of being at the centre of the world 
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capitalist economy.   
This imperialism leads to Western domination, a cultural superiority of the ‘West over the rest’, 
and creating “us” and “them” (the orient, the other) in the protection of private interests (Bakre, 
2014: 560; Said, 1978). Local capitals feel that they need to attract international capital and this 
is the only way to do so (Bakre, 2014). This analysis informs the examination of the extension 
within this thesis. Bakre notes that IFRS is a tool of exploitative capitalism and imperialism which 
is imposed on developing economies. This thesis extends this analysis by examining the way the 
IASB operate these logics at the macro-level, and the importance of the regulator conversations 
that they construct. This thesis is not going to explore IFRS for SMEs through imperialism, that 
is for further research, but this research is important to note because there are aspects of the 
IASB’s hegemonic extension to IFRS for SMEs that act imperialistically, as part of many 
hegemonic strategies that they operate.  
Similarly, Hopper et al. (2017) examines the impact of globalisation, IAS and the neoliberal 
market basis (economically, politically and socially) as it is forced on developing countries, 
identifying that accounting is an instrument and object of globalisation. For Hopper et al. (2017) 
IAS and IFRS promote neo-liberalism, through an imperialistic logic of development, suggesting 
that developing (poor) countries should learn from developed (rich) countries, ignoring local 
contexts, and increasing financial capital mobility. IFIs promote globalisation through 
‘Friedmenite Chicago’ neo-liberal ideology, focusing on agency theory and transaction cost 
economies through a one-size fits all approach (Hopper et al., 2017; Klein, 2007). Accounting is 
often depicted by IFIs and the IASB a ‘technical matter’ (Hopper et al., 2017: 5). Hopper et al. 
(2017) critiques financialisation of the global economy in the image of financial capital 
hegemony, which relies on the IASB. Indeed, this promotion of the IASB’s standards by the WB 
should be deemed inappropriate, because the WB claims to be socially responsible, but is 
promoting the interests of private advanced capital (Annisette, 2004; Botzem, 2014; Hopper et 
al., 2017). Moreover, developing countries lack the resources and procedures to influence the 
IASB: 
…many DCs lack resources, expertise and sometimes the leadership to influence global 
accounting principles and practices. Many transnational accounting organisations fail to 
recognise this: DCs are under-represented within IFAC and particularly the IASB; and 
the IASB has shown little willingness to countenance challenges to their authority and 
legitimacy (Hopper et al., 2017: 17). 
This constructs the discourse that there is no alternative, so alternative discourses are disregarded 
(Hopper et al., 2017; Samsonova-Taddei & Humphry, 2014; Sunder, 2011). Hopper et al. (2017) 
demonstrate that previous globalisation analysis has been atheoretical, thus the authors call for 
further critical analysis of the social, political and cultural, and critiques of unintended 
consequences, for the consideration of alternatives to market-based accounting. So the 
inequalities and uneven power that is created through this basis in neo-liberalism are no longer 
created, and instead different contexts, premises and questions are recognised, opening debates. 
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Indeed, prior literature on IFRS for SMEs (as examined in the following chapter) does not locate 
the work of the IASB in neo-liberalism and therefore offers limited theoretical understanding of 
the case. Before moving to the literature on IFRS for SMEs in the following chapter, the next 
section offers a conclusion for this chapter. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined some tensions and critiques raised towards the IASB and their role. This 
gives background before the discussion of the ‘particular’, which is IFRS for SMEs, in the 
following chapter. This chapter has emphasised the political role of the IASB and the power they 
hold, emphasising rhetoric and signifiers. The first section highlighted critical accounting 
research, which illustrates the impact of accounting and the IASB on society. The chapter 
considers researchers that have called the IASB’s legitimacy into question, deconstructing their 
rhetoric and due process. This thesis extends this literature through the examination of regulation 
through hegemony and conceptions of regulatory conversations. Following this, the chapter 
locates technocracy as a master signifier in the IASB’s work, with other signifiers connected to 
the master signifier. This thesis gives theoretical explanation in the terms of signifiers and 
examines how these signifiers operate in the extension to IFRS for SMEs.  
This thesis also extends Botzem beyond social practices to look further at the politics of 
emergence and focus on the operation of fantasmatic ideologies. Moreover, this thesis extends 
Botzem’s work by examining the IASB’s role in the hegemony of advanced financial capital, and 
the way this hegemony is reinstituted, maintained and extended. This chapter also looked at 
deconstructions of the core signifiers of accountability and comparability. This thesis extends 
previous literature that has deconstructed these signifiers by examining how they are drawn upon 
and located in IFRS for SMEs specifically. Moreover, in the case of IFRS for SMEs the IASB’s 
claims to geographical diversity has a higher impact than the standards for listed entities, so this 
thesis further locates the IASB’s geo-political role. Prior literature has identified the way that the 
IASB have limited geographical diversity, but has not considered the way that the IASB 
fantasmatically construct emerging economies in a certain way to grip subjects, which is the 
focused of chapter 10.  
Following this, this chapter examined the interconnected role that IFIs and the IASB play in the 
creation of IFRS for SMEs, the impact of which is underexplored in the literature. The connection 
has only become further extended, increasing the IASBs hegemony and the pressure on countries 
to adopt. Moreover, this reinforces an incremental hegemony for the IASB.  
Accounting research has commonly examined the rules and practices that reproduce the IASB’s 
discourse and discourse that constitutes IFRS, and wide spread adoption, representing examples 
of the social logics. In this literature, less attention has been paid to the political (the politics of 
emergence, the construction of frontiers, political contestation and struggle, and the politics of 
the other, and the way that these are covered over through LOE and LOD) and fantamatic logics 
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(how subjects are gripped by ideologies to maintain social practices, examining the power of these 
ideologies), as this thesis extends to. Thus, this chapter has also demonstrated the way that this 
thesis extends prior literature through L&M, through a further emphasis on hegemony, and 
through further focus on the political and fantasmatic logics. This thesis avoids recommendations 
of incremental improvements or increased democracy for the IASB, which would only act to 
reinforce the status quo.  
Methodologically, research on the IASB has often drawn upon comment letter analysis 
(Georgiou, 2004; Holder et al., 2013; Jorissen et al., 2010; 2013; 2014; Larson & Herz, 2013; 
Sutton, 1984), and has frequently applied legitimacy theory (Botzem, 2014; Burlaud & Collase, 
2011; Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). This thesis extends this work methodologically beyond 
comment letters to examine other aspects of the IASB’s discourse and processes.  
This chapter has demonstrated tensions surrounding the IASB, outlining regulatory problems and 
an increasing geo-political role. This chapter has also shows the impact of DT at the macro level, 
offering a deconstruction of the IASB and their construction of technocracy. DT is concerned 
with the macro, meso- and micro- levels and the way that they are interconnected, so the following 
chapter focuses on IFRS for SMEs, and returns to the themes discussed in this chapter. These 
themes are also returned to in the empirical chapters. Therefore, the literature on IFRS for SMEs 
is deconstructed in the next chapter, to look retroductively through L&M at ‘what gave rise to’ 
IFRS for SMEs, and ‘what we have so far’.  
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Chapter 6: The empirical case: IFRS for SMEs 
The previous chapter exposed the political and social nature of the IASB’s work, through research 
that has deconstructed their role and processes as a standard setter. This chapter focuses 
specifically on IFRS for SMEs, which was presented by the IASB as a solution to the issues and 
debates surrounding differential reporting, constructing the IASB as a necessity in the standard 
setting space. This chapter scrutinises the standard through the prior literature in the area through 
both the theory outlined in chapter 3 and the methodology articulated in chapter 4. Thus, this 
chapter examines the epistemological and ontological boundaries within mainstream literature, 
which emphasises the dominance of the IASB’s technocratic expertise, downplays their political 
and social impact, and enhances the hegemony of advanced financial capital. Through this 
examination, the thesis embraces the critical accounting research outlined in the previous chapter, 
which challenges taken for granted knowledge (Chua, 1986).  
This chapter focuses on G&H’s (2007) notion of problematisation, which involves identifying 
discursive formations and mapping out competing discourses. This problematisation has already 
occurred in previous chapters by identifying and critiquing the IASB’s role, but it is taken further 
within this chapter, focusing on the problem, to construct ‘problem-driven research’ (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007). In this thesis, the problem is focused on why and how the IASB extended to 
IFRS for SMEs beyond their usual remit of standard setting for listed entities. This chapter also 
operates retroduction, which is concerned with the empirical event and what has given rise to the 
empirical event, and operates by reconstructing and problematising the empirical site.  
This chapter holds many similarities with the structure of chapter 5 and the key themes that were 
identified in that chapter, but there are also some differences as there are some issues that are 
specific to IFRS for SMEs, that are not specific to IFRS more generally. Thus, this chapter 
highlights that the literature for IFRS for SMEs is a subset of the general literature for IFRS so 
some similar themes are covered, but there are also some separate issues highlighted for IFRS for 
SMEs. The first section looks at the social impact of the creation of a standard for SMEs, and the 
social and economic role that SMEs play; second the chapter identifies the rhetoric that is 
employed by the IASB in the creation of IFRS for SMEs. The third section examines research that 
has interrogated the due process, which is an aspect of the IASB’s construction of legitimacy. 
Fourth, this chapter considers the IASB’s construction of technocracy of expertise in terms of 
IFRS for SMEs. Fifth, the rhetoric of comparability is interrogated, linking to this interrogation 
of comparability, the sixth section highlights research that has examined the geographical 
diversity in the development of IFRS for SMEs. The final (seventh) section before the conclusion 
recognises the role of the standard in structural adjustment.  
6.1 The social impact of IFRS for SMEs  
Over time, accounting standard setting and regulation has evolved, and gained further importance 
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and power (Botzem, 2012; Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Deegan & Unerman, 2011). Accounting 
regulation has increased in volume and complexity in response to various accounting failures, 
crises and increasing globalisation (Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Zeff, 2010; 2012). Nevertheless, 
regulation and standard setting for SME accounting is a more recent movement. This movement 
is of high importance, because SMEs play a large role, politically, economically and socially. 
SME’s have greater social and economic importance in many economies than listed entities 
(Ayyagari et al., 2007; Pacter, 2013). However, there is limited research in this area, often because 
of limits in available data (ACCA, 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2011; ICAEW, 2015). These limits in 
research work in favour of the IASB, as they can construct many of the regulatory conversations 
on SMEs, with little evidence for the decisions made, as there is limited evidence to contest. 
Through their constructions of expertise, technocracy and due process they can make claims to 
the construction of knowledge within this space and self-define their role in the area (Botzem, 
2012; Devi & Samujh, 2015).  
Some research has illustrated the social and economic importance of SMEs (not that these two 
elements need to be separated, they are intertwined) (see, Ayyagari et al., 2007; Chen, 2006; 
Eurostat, 2008; Kitching et al., 2015; OECD, 2005; Pacter, 2013; Perera & Chand, 2015; Reddy, 
2007). For example, Ayyagari et al. (2007) analyse the economic importance of SMEs across 76 
countries, within which they highlight the WB’s commitment to investment in SMEs (ACCA, 
2010; Ayyagari et al., 2011). Research also suggests that SMEs play a crucial role in economic 
recovery:27 ‘It has become commonplace, in the aftermath of the global downturn of 2008–9, to 
refer to SMEs as the backbone of the global economy’ (ACCA, 2010: 8). However, data on SMEs 
is minimal, inhibiting conclusions, and rendering the improvement of economic statistics 
important to many countries to increase their potential access to capital (Ayyagari et al., 2007; Di 
Giovanni et al., 201028). Research highlights that SMEs contribute more to wealth creation, 
employment and GDP than large firms, particularly in developing countries: 
In ACCA’s top 20 markets globally, SMEs as locally defined consistently make up the 
vast majority (85% to 99.9%) of the business population…  If all other countries for 
which reasonably good data are available are added to this total, SMEs can be shown to 
account for 52% of private sector value added and 67% of employment… (ACCA, 2010: 
8). 
However, ACCA (2010) claims that this data can be misleading:  
It is often said that the SME sector is an engine of job creation, but headline data can be 
misleading in this regard. Dynamic analyses show that SMEs undertake the lion’s share 
of both job creation and job destruction in most economies (ACCA, 2010: 9). 
Despite this, ACCA (2010) demonstrates that SMEs make a large economic contribution.29 For 
                                               
27  There is a shadow economy of informal SMEs that also contribute to the economy (ACCA, 2010). 
28  Di Giovanni et al. (2010) reaffirm the importance of SMEs, as most businesses globally are small. 
29  Beck et al. (2005) draws on other publications (for a recent example of this type of publication (see 
World Bank, 2012). Beck et al. (2005) examines if SMEs contribute to the alleviation of wealth, but 
did not find enough support for the conclusion that SMEs alleviate poverty and economic inequality, 
instead reiterating that SMEs contribute to GDP, perhaps because of the complexities of the link. Koshy 
and Prasad (2007) suggest that SMEs contribute to poverty eradication through employment.  
  107 
example, the following quote offers some UK statistics from 2016:  
In 2016, there were 5.5 million businesses in the UK. • Over 99% of businesses are Small 
or Medium Sized businesses – employing 0-249 people • 5.3 million (96%) businesses 
were micro-businesses – employing 0-9 people (Rhodes, 2016: 3, in a briefing paper for 
parliament).  
Enright, Ffows-Williams and Nolan (2001) suggest that, the SME environment should be 
improved, because of SMEs large contribution and increasing globalisation. On this basis, Grosu 
and Domil (2014) call for greater reporting requirements for SMEs. The IASB see globalisation 
as, on balance improving the SME environment, with greater comparability in financial 
reporting, provided by IFRS for SMEs, reducing any negative experiences of SMEs 
during globalization (Pacter, 2005).  
Research by Lukács (2005) on European SMEs highlights the contributions that SMEs make to 
employment: 98% of the EU’s 19.3 million enterprises are SMEs, providing roughly 65 million 
jobs, 66% of EU employment (many of these enterprises have fewer than 10 employees). 
Research by Eurosts (2008) supports the findings of Lukács (2005), finding slight increases. This 
data shows high importance, but focuses on the EU, and both data sets are outdated. In a more 
recent study, the Federation of Small Business (FSB) focused on SMEs in the UK, finding that of 
4.9 million UK businesses:  
SMEs accounted for 99.9 per cent of all private sector businesses in the UK, 59.3 per 
cent of private sector employment and 48.1 per cent of private sector turnover (FSB, 
2013:1). 
In 2013, SMEs in the UK employed 14.4 million people and they are a heterogeneous group, 
operating in various sectors (FSB, 2013).  
ACCA (2010) suggests that it is important to develop the accounting infrastructure in emerging 
economies. However, little research further examines SMEs in developed and developing 
countries, and the users of SME financial reports (ICAEW, 2015). Moreover, ‘SMEs’ are diverse 
and cannot be narrowed down to simple categorisations or understandings, therefore a standard 
that draws equivalences across all ‘SMEs’ leads to problematic homogeneity (Devi & Samujh, 
2015; Lukács, 2005). Many countries have different financial reporting tiers because of 
differences across large SME and smaller SMEs, constructing different levels of complexity 
dependent on size criteria (Eierle & Haller, 2009; Jarvis & Collis, 2003). This section has 
evidenced SME importance, statistically, economically and socially. The IASB claim to have 
created IFRS for SMEs to help SMEs struggling to gain access to capital (Beck & Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Pacter, 2013), but this thesis questions who this helps and 
problematises the IASB’s rhetoric.  
Having confirmed the economic importance of SMEs in developed and developing countries, the 
following section considers the IASB’s rhetoric in the development of IFRS for SMEs.  
  108 
6.2 The IASB’s IFRS for SMEs rhetoric 
In the IASB’s public discourse there are many rhetorical constructions that are examined 
empirically within this thesis. As noted in Chapter 5, some literature on the IASB has 
deconstructed their rhetoric relating to IFRS. This omnipresent rhetoric is extended in the creation 
of IFRS for SMEs. The IASB’s rhetorical constructs are examined as themes throughout this 
chapter and the empirical chapters. An aspect of this rhetoric is concerned with the identification 
of a different set of users for the financial statements of SMEs. These identified SME users 
constitute a reason for the IASB to create the standard for SMEs, as the users of listed entity 
financial statements differ:  
In establishing standards for the form and content of general purpose financial statements, 
the needs of users of financial statements are paramount. Users of financial statements of 
SMEs may have less interest in some information in general purpose financial statements 
prepared in accordance with full IFRSs than users of financial statements of entities 
whose securities are listed for trading in public securities markets or that otherwise have 
public accountability (IASB, 2009c: 12).  
External users such as lenders, vendors, customers, rating agencies and employees need 
specific types of information but are not in a position to demand reports tailored to meet 
their particular information needs. They must rely on general purpose financial 
statements (IASB, 2009c: 19).  
The IASB identified that SMEs have distinctive users from listed entities and their users have 
different needs, resources and requirements (Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Ram & Newberry, 2013). 
Regarding the examination of users, standard setters have commonly been critiqued for not 
considering users (see Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Mkasiwa, 2014; Young, 2006). However, the 
IASB claim to have adapted full IFRS:  
The IFRS for SMEs is tailored for SMEs by focusing on the needs of users for information 
about cash flows, liquidity and solvency. It takes into account the costs to, and the 
capabilities of, SMEs to prepare financial information (IASB, 2012a).  
The IFRS for SMEs fact sheet outlines omissions, simplifications, disclosure reductions and 
language simplifications (for understandability and translation) (IFRSF, 2016b). However, prior 
research has shown that the notion of users in financial reporting and standard setting is socially 
constructed, and used to benefit the standard setter (Young, 2003). Research on IFRS for SMEs 
has demonstrated that the IASB have not clearly engaged with ‘users’, and the IASB’s expertise 
does not fit with SMEs and SME user needs (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; 
Ram & Newberry, 2013). This thesis extends this analysis by empirically questioning the 
construction of the user and the SME subject.  
The connection that this standard makes to SMEs also relies on the rhetoric of cost-benefit 
considerations:  
In the Board’s judgement, the nature and degree of the differences between full IFRSs 
and an IFRS for SMEs must be determined on the basis of users’ needs and cost-benefit 
analyses. In practice, the benefits of applying accounting standards differ across reporting 
entities, depending primarily on the nature, number and information needs of the users 
of their financial statements. The related costs may not differ significantly. Therefore, 
consistently with the Framework, the Board believed that the cost-benefit trade-off 
  109 
should be assessed in relation to the information needs of the users of an entity’s financial 
statements (IASB, 2009c: 13).  
The IASB’s claim to ‘cost-benefit analyses’ rhetorically constructs a detailed analysis for the 
IFRS for SMEs, but further evidence of a detailed cost benefit analysis is limited. Moreover, the 
construct of cost benefit has been criticised previously within accounting for objectifying that 
which cannot be objectified and covering over antagonisms and contingencies (Bebbington et al., 
2007; McGarity & Shapiro, 1996; Sinden, 2004; Wolcher, 2007).  
The IASB also claim that they created IFRS for SMEs in the interest of emerging economies and 
based on their demands:  
The IFRS for SMEs responds to strong international demand from both developed 
and emerging economies for a rigorous and common set of accounting standards for 
smaller and medium-sized businesses that is much simpler than full IFRSs (IASB, 2009a: 
1).   
The IASB claim that they created the standard as there was an external demand for it, both SMEs 
and developing countries needed the IASB to create a standard that reduced to complexities of 
IFRS, because they were being over-burdened and have a lack of resources (Pacter, 2013). This 
rhetoric of strong international demand gives the IASB justification for creating the standard. 
However, these claims are subject to further empirical analysis. The IASB also claim that there 
was a demand for IFRS for SMEs from developed and emerging economies, to increase access to 
capital, reduce reporting burdens and costs, to also enhance comparability. The IASB leaves 
decisions of enforcement and scope (apart from public accountability) to jurisdictions. In an 
official IFRS Foundation ‘pocket guide’ to IFRS, Pacter (2017: 4) claims that since 2009 
publication, 57% of jurisdictions have adopted IFRS for SMEs (85 of 150 profiled). Pacter (2017: 
27) also claims that IFRS for SMEs is ‘tailored’ to SME users and their capabilities, focusing on 
lenders and creditors, centring on cash flow, liquidity and solvency. This quote also refers to 
simplifications, constructing the rhetorical claim that IFRS for SMEs is rigorous, but is much 
simpler than full IFRS.  
The IASB claim to be able to meet this rhetoric through their rigorous due process:  
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued today an International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) designed for use by small and medium-sized 
entities (SMEs), which are estimated to represent more than 95 per cent of all 
companies. The standard is a result of a five-year development process with extensive 
consultation of SMEs worldwide. 
 
In developing the IFRS for SMEs the IASB consulted extensively worldwide. A 40-
member Working Group of SME experts advised the IASB on the structure and content 
of the IFRS at various stages in its development. The exposure draft of the IFRS, 
published in 2007, was translated into five languages to assist SMEs in responding to 
the proposals. More than 50 round-table meetings and seminars were held to receive 
direct feedback, and the draft IFRS was field-tested by over 100 small companies in 20 
countries. As a result, further simplifications have been achieved in the final document. 
Paul Pacter, Director of Standards for SMEs for the IASB, has agreed to lead a group to 
support international adoption of the standard. Further details of this group will be 
announced shortly (IASB, 2009a: 1 [emphasis added]).  
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Within this, the IASB claim that the standard has been ‘designed’ for SMEs, and that the standard 
meets the needs of 95 per cent of all companies. This ‘design’ metaphor acts as rhetoric for the 
IASB, through a ‘five-year development process with extensive consultation of SMEs 
worldwide’. The IASB draws on the due process to legitimise the movement to IFRS for SMEs, 
with the aims of improving comparability and enhancing confidence in SME financial statements: 
In particular, the IFRS for SMEs will: 
• provide improved comparability for users of accounts 
• enhance the overall confidence in the accounts of SMEs, and 
• reduce the significant costs involved of maintaining standards on a national basis 
(IASB, 2009a: 1).  
This draws on logics of comparability, confidence and expertise, and the idea of needing to ‘help’ 
both SMEs and national standard setters. Not only do the IASB draw on the concept of design, 
they also claim that the standard is tailored for SMEs, taking the design metaphor a step further, 
as “tailored” acts metaphorically to invoke various understandings of the standard:  
 
The IFRS for SMEs is a self-contained standard of about 230 pages tailored for the 
needs and capabilities of smaller businesses. Many of the principles in full IFRSs for 
recognising and measuring assets, liabilities, income and expenses have been simplified, 
topics not relevant to SMEs have been omitted, and the number of required 
disclosures has been significantly reduced. To further reduce the reporting burden 
for SMEs revisions to the IFRS will be limited to once every three years (IASB, 
2009a).  
This draws on the rhetorical construct of tailoring which will be examined further empirically. A 
core aspect of the creation of IFRS for SMEs is access to capital, which has been rhetorically used 
throughout to justify development and adoption. This follows a line of argument in which SMEs 
face substantial growth constraints due to lower access to capital, so these constraints should be 
alleviated by giving SMEs further access to capital (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), and IFRS 
for SMEs claims to fulfil this role (Pacter, 2013).  
However, this thesis questions this claim for three reasons. First there is research that highlights 
the unsuitable nature of IFRS for SMEs and the negative impact that this can have on SMEs (Devi 
& Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Ram & Newberry, 2013;). Second, research shows 
that SMEs do not require access to capital, and only a narrow set of SMEs have the goal of growth, 
instead they are focused on survival and do not often consider investors (Fearnley & Hines, 2007; 
Ram & Newberry, 2013):  
SMEs are very different from global corporations in highly developed capital markets. 
They have different stakeholders, objectives and accounting demands (Baker and Barbu 
2007; Cole et al. 2009; Mage 2010). SMEs are not only different from big business, they 
are also a heterogeneous group (Devi and Samujh, 2010) that are more likely to focus on 
survival than on growth and profit maximisation (Bunea-Bontas et al. 2011; Samujh 
2011) (Devi & Samujh, 2015:127).  
Third, structural adjustment and access to capital, is access to debt, which for Lazzarato (2012; 
2015) extends further indebtedness and control to developing countries and SMEs. These claims 
of helping developing countries have been similarly critiqued by other research (Lawson, 2007), 
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as outlined in the previous chapter. Subsequently, the rhetoric of access to capital can be 
questioned, and will be further explored empirically.  
A core aspect of this rhetorical construction is the due process, which requires further 
examination. The IASB’s due process has been deconstructed in Chapter 5, but there are specific 
deconstructions of the due process for IFRS for SMEs.  
6.3 Deconstructing the due process 
Research has examined the IASB’s due process undertaken for the creation of IFRS for SMEs 
(Devi & Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Ram & Newberry, 2013). This research 
identifies an initial problematisation by the IASC, but notes the the IASC did not move forward 
with an SME standard (Baldarelli et al., 2007; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Hussain et al., 2012; 
Pacter, 2013). Once the IASB was formed there was scepticism towards a standard for SMEs, 
some believing SMEs should apply full standards, while others thought that the IASB should not 
be using their resources outside of their core remit30 (Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Pacter, 2013; Ram 
& Newberry, 2013). Ram & Newberry (2017) investigate the way IFRS for SMEs entered the 
IASB’s agenda, and the complexities of changing their jurisdiction to encompass the project. 
They examine the necessity for the IASB to expand their role, and the use language in a certain 
way, highlighting the importance of the title used. Ram and Newberry (2017) explain that the 
IASB believed that they had to extend their standard setting role to avoid criticism. They 
emphasise the way that the IASB manoeuvre the complex environment of standard setting, and 
call for further research of the impact (Ram & Newberry, 2017). 
Ram & Newberry (2013) identify primary reasons given by the IASB for the creation of IFRS for 
SMEs:  
… first being to cater to the needs of users of SME financial statements, the other being 
to ease the financial reporting burden on SMEs (Ram & Newberry, 2013: 13). 
However, Ram and Newberry (2013) critique these claims, because the development of the 
standard was dominated by minimal divergence from full IFRS, regardless of the tensions created 
for SMEs:  
…little or no serious consideration of users’ need. As became apparent from EFRAG and 
ISAR’s responses to the ED, the appropriateness of the IASB’s standard-setting response 
for SMEs and for micro-entities was questionable (Ram & Newberry, 2013: 13). 
Therefore, Ram and Newberry (2013) conclude that the IASB do not fulfil claims made, as full 
IFRS was over-riding these aims, and developing countries were not considered to the necessary 
extent. Earlier than this, Fearnley and Hines (2007) had found that SME representatives argued 
for the project to be abandoned due to the many conflicts, tensions and burdens between the 
IASB’s capital market orientation and the specific needs of SMEs, for which the IASB lack 
                                               
30  Due to this resistance, views about the technical aspects of the standards evolved over time. For 
example, the first draft had fall backs to full IFRS but these were gradually removed, alongside 
reductions in disclosure, and more simplifications in measurement and recognition (Pacter, 2013). 
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expertise. Nevertheless, the  rhetoric of expertise which surrounds the IASB’s standard setting is 
hard to dispute: even when they are working on projects that are not in their specific area of 
expertise, these logics become extended (Botzem, 2012; Quack, 2010).  
Additionally, the IASB claim to have identified SME ‘experts’ who helped in the development 
of the standard (Pacter, 2013). Therefore, both this logic of expertise and the IASB’s due process 
are subject to further empirical analysis within this thesis. The due process is critiqued by previous 
research mainly because the IASB started from full IFRS, simplifying the standard to create IFRS 
for SMEs, which is arguably an unsuitable foundation (Fearnley & Hines, 2007). This thesis 
argues that the politics and motivations for the extensions are nuanced, and this can be 
demonstrated through the theoretical framework of L&M (2001).  
Kamp (2010) analysed the comment letters that were submitted in response to the IFRS for SMEs 
due process. Drawing on Gray’s (1988) framework to identify the impact of culture, Kamp (2010) 
concluded that countries considered to have a culture of high professionalism under Gray’s (1988) 
framework react positively to IFRS for SMEs. However, Gray (1988) draws upon Hofstede, which 
has been critiqued, leaving the cultural distinctions made by Kamp (2010) arbitrary and 
problematic. With a similar focus on comment letters, DiPietra et al. (2008) conclude that:  
• The IASB did not justify the need for them to create a standard; 
• The IASB treated SMEs as homogeneous, failing to recognise specific contextual needs; 
• Practical problems will occur from adoption; 
• The full IFRS basis for IFRS for SMEs created a standard that is unsuitable for SMEs; 
• Further research is required for such a standard to be created.   
This thesis examines the IASB’s consultation in the light of their rhetoric of ‘rigorous’ due 
process that claims to meet the public interest (which is informed by and links to critiques in the 
previous chapter). Prior research contradicts these claims, identifying that some important aspects 
of the due process are not in the public domain, and SME user needs are not considered to the 
necessary extent (DiPietra et al., 2008; Ram & Newberry, 2013). Arguably, instead of meeting 
public interest the IASB act condescendingly during their due process, only considering narrow 
interests (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Devi & Samujh, 2015). Research suggests that the IASB’s 
due process is an attempt to self-legitimise, as the IASB do not make changes dependent on public 
will, instead they rely on technical and procedural due process to counter critiques (Botzem, 2012; 
2014; Burland and Colasse, 2011; Richardson & Eberlein 2011). These due process logics are 
extended in the development of IFRS for SMEs.  
Ram and Newberry (2013) find that external pressure (from the WB and the EC) pushed the IASB 
through the due process to completion, as the IASB wished to issue the international SME 
standard before other organisations, such as the EFRAG. Moreover, Ram and Newberry (2013: 
4) demonstrate that the IASB moved to the development of IFRS for SMEs due to “turf 
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protection”, and suggest that the due process, which aims to build legitimacy, is in fact only 
procedural and administrative: 
This paper has reported on research into the IASB’s due process, which included some 
events that were not apparent in the public domain. Research into these less visible parts 
of the due process has revealed that the IASB had decided on its stance before the public 
parts of its due process commenced and that it was strongly committed to maintaining, if 
possible, all recognition and measurement requirements contained in full IFRS. A 
problem with this approach was that it exposed a tension between the IASB’s 
commitment to a single set of standards primarily for financial market participants and 
one of the primary objectives it claimed for the SME project of producing accounting 
requirements that would be useful for users of SME financial statements (Ram & 
Newberry, 2013: 12-13). 
Despite the changes that were made to recognition and measurement for IFRS for SMEs, the focus 
on full IFRS narrows the due process, as will be explored empirically in later chapters. Fearnley 
and Hines (2007) believe that there was an incorrect approach adopted during the IASB’s due 
process. They argue that creating IFRS for SMEs through a simplification and reduction of full 
IFRS does not meet stakeholder needs and leaves too much complexity (Fearnley & Hines, 2007). 
This illustrates tensions in the IASB’s consultation claims, suggesting that the due process is a 
limited public relations exercise, and questioning if the standard meets SME user needs (Ram and 
Newberry, 2013). Fearnley and Hines (2007) called for fuller consideration of SME needs, 
through a bottom up-approach, thinking small first, which would increase suitability, feasibility, 
and accuracy, and reduce burdens. 
Ram & Newberry (2013) point out that IFRS for SMEs is a modified version of full IFRS, 
scrutinising the suitability. As explained above, this calls into question the IASB’s rhetorical 
claims to public interest, which links to questions of accountability. As the IASB construct IFRS 
for SMEs, their accountability relies on the due process and their organisational structure, even 
though research has identified this as limited (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Ram & Newberry, 2013). 
As the impact of the IASB’s standards expands, their accountability remains unquestioned and 
unchanged, as it is masked by a focus on expertise (Black, 2008; Botzem, 2012; Quack, 2010). 
As a private organisation, they hold a self-referential and self-constructed accountability, as they 
operate all aspects of their due process.  
6.4 The way the IASB make decisions- technocracy  
The IASB claim to have used their due process, and expertise to simplify IFRS from the top down 
to construct IFRS for SMEs. Decisions about reductions and omissions within the IFRS for SMEs 
are made through the due process, and have been critiqued for showing a capital market 
orientation (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007). Nevertheless, the IASB continue to 
rely on the rhetoric of technocracy. A legitimacy issue surrounding transnational governance that 
Quack (2010: 10) calls into question:  
An argument frequently used by both private transnational governance schemes and 
international organizations is that they possess the necessary expertise to provide 
effective problem solutions. This expertise is often of a specialized and technical 
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character, and its claimed superiority is difficult to assess for outsiders, not least because 
the borderlines between the pursuit of commercial self-interest and the provision of 
expertise are often blurred. 
Academics have suggested that a lack of research means that the decisions made by the IASB in 
the creation of IFRS for SMEs were unjustified (Alp & Ustundag, 2009; Devi & Samujh, 2015; 
Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Perera & Chand, 2015). Appendix 3 highlights the key differences and 
similarities between IFRS and IFRS for SMEs (2009). As the project leader, Pacter (2013) outlines 
controversial issues that occurred during the development of IFRS for SMEs: recognition of 
deferred taxes; requirements for consolidated statements and a cash flow statement; a separate 
micro-entity standard; financial instrument measurement; share-based payment recognition; 
requirement of accruals for undefined liabilities; whether SMEs can follow full IFRS rather than 
IFRS for SMEs; and the name of the standard.  
The IASB claim that during development of the standard they increased understandability for 
IFRS for SMEs by simplifying both the language used and the resulting accounts, to ease the SME 
financial reporting burden, and increase publication and comparability (however this assumption 
of increased compatibility is a non-sequitar, as a burden reduction does not necessarily lead to 
increased comparability) (Mitra & Sana, 2011). This rhetoric places the IASB in the role of the 
experts that need to help others by simplifying their standards, and within this the IASB speaks 
on behalf of others about simplifications, extending their role as technocratic regulator (Botzem, 
2012).  
The differences between IFRS and IFRS for SMEs for the IASB arguably demonstrate that full 
IFRS has been simplified to the necessary extent for SMEs, but research has suggested that this 
process was inadequate, leading to many practical problems and creating further costs and 
burdens for SMEs (Fearnley & Hines, 2007; Lungu et al., 2007). Arguably, these costs and 
burdens should be considered, and the full IFRS conceptual framework does not fit SMEs, leading 
to further gaps or burdens (Lungu et al., 2007; Perera & Chand, 2015). Similarly, Deaconu et al. 
(2012) conduct content analysis on IFRS for SMEs exposure draft (ED) comment letters, finding 
that the standard’s complexity does not fit with expertise in emerging countries, and that preparers 
have been favoured over users.  Perera and Chand (2015) agree that the IASB has not considered 
users extensively and that the standard is unsuitable for SMEs. They also add that there is an 
injustice in grouping together micro, small and medium entities as they have different needs, so 
lumping them together is nonsensical (Perera & Chand, 2015). There is a focus on practical and 
technical problems within the published research, but this is not the focus of this thesis. This thesis 
extends existing critiques by focusing on the way that the IASB construct frontiers and 
boundaries, which leads to silencing and othering, in the construction of hegemony. Moreover, 
this thesis focuses on the ideologies that are constructed in the IASB’s processes and discourse.  
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In developing IFRS for SMEs from full IFRS the IASB focus on comparability to enhance 
legitimacy. The following considers SME regulation pre- and post- IFRS for SMEs across 
countries to further consider the IASB’s comparability claims.  
6.5 Deconstructing the IASB’s notion of comparability  
Researchers argue that comparability is a rhetorical ideal constructed for the IASB’s legitimacy 
and global promotion of their standards (Botzem, 2012; Hines, 1991; Rudkin, 2007), as Lazzarato 
(2012: 100-101) articulates:  
[Accounting] dictates to and imposes upon private firms a new ‘measure’ of value, 
implemented through new international accounting standards…developed in the 
exclusive interest of investors and shareholders…The new accounting is supposed to 
allow for comparisons between companies’ financial performance at any point in time 
and for any business sector. 
Regarding the case of SMEs, Perera and Chand (2015) have shown that comparability is not as 
important for SMEs, so this rhetoric is questioned further when examining IFRS for SMEs. The 
regulation of SMEs differs across jurisdictions, as does the way that jurisdictions define SMEs, 
drawing on various size criteria, differences that are acknowledged by the IASB (Pacter, 2013). 
For example, the European Union considers ‘micro’ entities to be those with less than 10 
employees, less than 2 million total assets and total turnover, with ‘small’ being less than 50 
employees and less than 10 million assets and turnover, and ‘medium’ as less than 250 employees 
and less than 43 million assets less than 50 million turnover (Perera & Chand, 2015). Whilst 
Australia focuses on employees, with ‘micros’ as less than 4 employees, ‘small’ as less than 19 
and ‘medium’ as 20-199 (Perera & Chand, 2015).  Whereas in Pakistan, ‘SMEs’ are defined as 
those with less than 250 employees, capital up to Rs. 25m and sales of up to Rs. 250m (Perera & 
Chand, 2015). These micro debates on different definitions have an impact on the development 
of IFRS for SMEs, which is discussed further in chapter 8.  
In attempting to reach their aim of comparability, the IASB persuade countries to adopt their 
standards. The table in appendix 4 outlines regulation across some example countries, looking at 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs and some information on countries pre-adoption, alongside research 
that has been conducted.31 There are five core elements concerned with the comparability of IFRS 
for SMEs that can be taken away from the table in appendix 4. First the research on adoption and 
enforcement and its impact is limited. Second, research identifies that many countries and actors 
perceive the adoption of IFRS for SMEs as good, and hope that it will enhance SME access to 
capital, but empirical evidence beyond these perceptions is limited. Third, research in different 
jurisdictions identifies that in many cases the standard is unsuitable for SMEs and for the local 
context. Fourth, this table is indicative of the limited nature of research in this area, which 
demonstrates that many of the IASB’s decisions are made with little justification (as also noted 
                                               
31  Empirical research does not exist for all countries, so there are gaps within the table.  Not all countries 
that have adopted (or not adopted) the standard are considered, as the table focuses on some key 
exemplars, covering the research that has been conducted.  
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by an ICAEW report (2015)). Fifth, many studies draw conclusions about the necessity for further 
education in the IASB’s standards, these conclusions are problematic and repetitive and do not 
further consider consequences of such education (Hopper et al., 2017).32 
Albu et al. (2013) compare stakeholder perceptions of IFRS for SMEs across the Czech 
Republic,33 Hungary, Romania and Turkey, finding support for the standard for increasing 
accounting quality, but they argue that gradual convergence is necessary. There are positive 
perceptions regarding costs, comparability and quality, but they find that the impact of the 
standard will differ depending on context (Albu et al., 2013). Hussain et al. (2012) agree 
convergence is necessary in emerging economies, to improve reporting quality and comparability 
(Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 2013; Jonas & Blanchet, 2000; Lantto & Sahlström, 2009; Soderstrom 
& Sun, 2007). However, these concepts of quality and comparability are complex, subjective and 
unclear, constructing ideologies and logics that are informed by neoliberalism. This leads to the 
following section which discusses empirical research on the impact of IFRS for SMEs on 
developing countries.  
6.6 The impact of IFRS for SMEs on developing countries  
This section discusses empirical research that analyses the impact of IFRS for SMEs on 
developing countries, but first it is important to define what is meant by a developing country. 
There is an ongoing debate within the literature that questions what is meant by this term. Some 
authors draw upon GDP and HDI for distinctions (Hopper et al., 2009). Defining countries that 
are less developed with development rates as a basis is also seen as problematic because these 
can be varied and discontinuous (Hopper et al., 2009). Research also argues we should leave 
behind this distinction and labelling, because it only continues to enable domination (Hopper et 
al., 2009; Hopper et al., 2017). This thesis focuses on how the IASB and the WB define 
developing countries/ emerging economies and the limited and homogenous nature of this use of 
the terms, as this is an aspect of critique within the thesis, identifying problems that this labelling 
creates, as it ignores local cultures. Having detailed issues of defining developing countries, the 
following section identifies the literature that examines the impact of IFRS for SMEs on 
developing counties.  
Kaya and Koch (2015) research early evidence regarding IFRS for SMEs adoption, finding that 
countries decide to adopt because they cannot develop their own GAAP, have small governance 
institutions, and/or previously adopted full IFRS for all reporting entities. Arguably IFRS for 
SMEs improves financial architecture and accountability, increasing loan attractiveness and 
attention from the WB and IMF, which is not as relevant for developed countries (Kaya & Koch, 
                                               
32  There is an education initiative constructed by the IASB which is based on IFRS for SMEs, but this is 
not examined in depth within this thesis and is a site for further research. 
33  Jana and Jikta (2010) compare the treatment of tangible fixed assets in full IFRS and IFRS for SMEs, 
and the Czech Republic’s understanding, this research argues further education is necessary.  
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2015). However, it is important to note that further access to capital and attention from the WB 
and IMF is not always favourable, so the impact of the spread of advanced financial capital 
requires further investigtion (Annisette, 2004; Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Klein, 
2007; Lazzarato, 2012; Peet, 2009). The IASB rhetorically claim that IFRS for SMEs was created 
for and in consideration of developing countries. However, as explained, research has shown that 
the IASB do not consider developing countries extensively enough, a problem that only continues 
to be identified in the IFRS for SMEs project (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Hopper et al., 2017; Ram & 
Newberry, 2013). Therefore, this thesis questions the motives of the IASB’s extension to 
developing countries due to their focus on global capital movement, their capital market 
orientation and the dominance of private interest within their work (Lazzarato, 2012). Regarding 
IFRS for SMEs, research shows that adoption has been common in low economic performance 
countries (under the logic of development and access to finance), whilst developed countries do 
not adopt as they commonly already have well-developed accounting systems (Devi & Samujh, 
2015). Furthermore, Devi & Samujh (2015) critically examine the stakeholder participation 
within IFRS for SMEs, identifying a lack of representation of emerging economies:  
Access to global financial markets and the expansion of global business has been reliant, 
to some extent, upon the development of a set of accounting standards, which facilitate 
the capital markets, both domestically and internationally… It appears that the general 
purpose of financial reporting is ‘geared to the conventionally assumed interests (per 
economic and finance theory) of investors . . . consistent with the presumption of one 
type of capitalism, broadly equating to the Anglo-American variant’… The IASB set out 
to create ‘technically competent standards to meet the needs of advanced capital markets 
and the regulation of international capital in- flows’… without appropriate cognisance of 
differing cultural, political, legal and economic structures and beliefs of the developing 
economies. The capital market assumption is a stumbling block for SMEs… which are 
more concerned with liquidity and solvency… The diversity of local accounting practices 
for SMEs (and whether they keep accounting records at all), is affected by a large number 
of factors… that includes: stage of development of the local economy; legal systems; 
local and national government regulations; property rights; social climate; currency 
stability; existence of accounting laws; a ‘recognised’ accounting professional body; and 
education levels (Devi & Samujh, 2015: 128).  
Devi & Samujh (2015) argue that not enough has been done to analyse the impact of IFRS for 
SMEs, especially in developing economies, and user needs. These limits are illustrated by tallying 
of comment letters in the research papers: 
Submissions from Number of 
Submissions 
Developed countries  70 
Developing countries  9 
European Organisations  12 
International Organisations  4 
International Accounting Firms  3 
Regional Accounting Bodies  2 
Individuals  2 
Others 18 
Total  120 
Figure 14: Respondents to IASB Discussion Paper. Adapted from:  Singh and Newberry (2008) and Devi & Samujh 
(2015).  
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This demonstrates that the responses from developing countries to the discussion paper (DP) were 
limited, as were responses from international organisations that may have held some 
representation from developing countries. Similar input can be shown for the ED:  
Submissions from Number of 
Submissions 
Developing countries 41 
Developed countries 101 
International Organisations 13 
European Bodies 5 
Unknown 1 
Total 161 
Figure 15: Adapted from Ram (2012) and based on the submissions received from the ED 
And, the responses to the recognition and measurement (R&M) questionnaire issued by the staff:  
Responses from Number of 
Responses 
Developed countries 60 
Developing countries 20 
International Organisations  9 
European Bodies  11 
Unknown 1 
Total 101 
Figure 16: Table adapted from Ram (2012) and based on submissions to the R&M questionnaire 
Currently, the standard does not consider contextual factors, culture, or regulatory infrastructures, 
as it is dominated by ‘Anglo-American’ capitalism and a capital market orientation because the 
full IFRS framework has been forced to fit with SMEs through minimal modifications (Devi & 
Samujh, 2015). Many contextual needs and local differences become overlooked during IFRS 
global convergence as it is politically motivated (Devi & Samujh, 2015). Further, Devi & Samujh 
(2015) uncover the political interlay and external convergence pressure placed on developing 
countries by various IFIs (e.g. The WB and the IMF), which does not represent their needs, and 
only works in favour of powerful interests (Bohušova & Blaškova, 2012; Chua & Taylor, 2008; 
Perry & Nölke, 2006; Shutte & Buys 2011ab). For Devi & Samujh (2015) the IASB’s outreach 
occurred too late (2007), and lacks input from academics, developing countries and users 
throughout, enabling the dominance of corporations, accounting firms and certain geographical 
areas:  
Reduced disclosure requirements of the IFRS for SMEs, whilst using the same capital 
market orientation of the IFRS, appears to us to be out of touch with SME operations and 
user requirements of financial reports… This research reinforces the need to identify 
users of SME financial statements and then to identify the predominant information needs 
of those users (Devi & Samujh, 2015: 128).   
Due to their lack of enforcement power the IASB become reliant on rhetoric:  
…the IASB has to practice restraint as they have no legal power to enforce convergence. 
This may be why they have been said to be heavy on rhetoric (Biondi and Suzuki 2007), 
and reproducing myths of what is ‘good for us’ (Richardson and Eberlein 2011) (Devi & 
Samujh, 2015: 132).   
Thus, convergence is politically powerful, and despite resistance it often occurs through a domino 
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effect, due to powerful and persuasive rhetoric (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). 
The IASB’s lack of SME expertise was highlighted by the UNCTAD’s (2009) report, the IASB’s 
response to these and other critiques focuses on the due process. However, critics claim that these 
are faux legitimisation attempts to silence accusations of a lack of expertise and geographical 
diversity, among others (Biondi & Suzuki, 2007; Devi & Samujh, 2015). Indeed, evidence shows 
that there is a lack of willingness from the IASB to engage and consult with certain voices 
(Chiapello, 2007; Cortese et al., 2010; Devi & Samujh, 2015; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). This 
thesis extends these critiques by examining the hegemony of advanced financial capital, this 
demonstrates a new phase of accumulation, new wars of positon and the extension of the 
dominance of capital markets (Lazzarato, 2012). Therefore, this thesis focuses further on political 
and fantasmatic logics than these critiques which focus on the due process and social logics.  
Devi & Samujh (2015) call for further research that examines the rhetoric constructed by the 
IASB. To summarise critiques of IFRS for SMEs, Fearnley & Hines (2007) criticise the ‘top-
down’ nature of standard-setting for SMES by the IASB. Ram & Newberry (2013) examine the 
due process around IFRS for SMEs, concluding that, despite the IASB’s rhetoric, the IASB largely 
ignored the interests of SME financial statement users, particularly in developing countries. Devi 
& Samujh (2015) examine the politics of convergence in IFRS for SMEs, highlighting the primacy 
of politics within the standard. However, these studies do not locate the work of the IASB, in a 
broader context of hegemony, advanced financial capital and neo-liberalism, and hence do not 
have theoretical explanations for the phenomena observed. Furthermore, these critiques do not 
analyse the political and fantasmatic to the necessary extent. Indeed, they do not examine the 
frontiers and ideologies that the IASB construct and the impact that this has on alternatives and 
other voices. 
It is important that the work of the IASB is acknowledged for its role in structural adjustment, 
especially as they extend their work to IFRS for SMEs, which has a greater impact on ‘developing’ 
countries than it does ‘developed’ countries.   
6.7 Structural Adjustment and the IASB 
The work of the IASB has been connected to the WB, with further links in IFRS for SMEs. The 
WB conducted research through their ROSC A&A programmes which assessed current 
compliance in various countries with international standards, and recommended action plans 
(IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2004a, b, d). At the early stage (from 2001 to 2003) there were ROSC 
reports conducted in 14 developing countries, which identified poor compliance with IAS by 
private companies, so the WB began to recommend differential reporting regimes, retaining a 
focus on IAS:  
29. This section presents a brief outline of the actions needed to improve Kenya’s 
accounting and auditing system… 29.1 Revise the Accountants Act, the Companies Act, 
and related regulations to achieve a legal and regulatory framework under which the 
preparers of financial statements (corporate entities), auditors, and regulators will be 
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required to play appropriate roles in ensuring high-quality financial reporting. Take 
appropriate legal and institutional steps to differentiate between the financial reporting 
requirements for listed companies and financial institutions and those for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Make IASs legally mandatory for large enterprises and 
financial institutions, and establish simplified reporting requirements for SMEs (World 
Bank, 2001a: 11). 
At this stage, ‘simplified reporting requirements for SMEs’ appeared to be left to the jurisdiction, 
as the IASB did not have differential reporting. Subsequently, these recommendations changed 
moving forward to 2007, when the IASB was creating IFRS for SMEs:  
Currently, there are no specific IFRS pronouncements for small and medium-sized 
entities (SMEs). However, IASB is keenly aware that SMEs are in dire need of their own 
customized accounting standards… On a global level, however, IFRS could be used to 
meet the varied needs of market participants, for reliable financial information, to assist 
in cross-border lending, and to stream- line the preparation of financial statements. 
Indeed, IASB’s customized standards for SMEs would reassure global stakeholders. For 
the time being, SMEs could fall back on IFRS concepts and apply them accordingly, 
given that the financial statements would not be extensive (World Bank, 2007b: 68). 
This quote calls for full IFRS to be required by all, until the IASB’s standard is promulgated, 
showing a reiteration of their previous requirements regarding full IFRS for all. Also, this 
demonstrates the WB advocating for the IASB to create a standard, using here terminology such 
as ‘dire need’ and, in the following quote from a WB report, ‘urgent need’:  
International standards are not necessarily appropriate to govern all financial reporting 
obligations, this being especially the case with International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
/ International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). There is an urgent need for the 
International Accounting Standards Board to specify the circumstances in which the use 
of “full” IAS/IFRS is appropriate, and to develop different standards that would meet the 
needs applicable to the users of financial statements of other entities, particularly small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Many stakeholders continue to have 
misunderstandings with respect to the very nature of international standards, which 
complicates efforts to plan, define and measure progress towards successful 
implementation (Hegarty et al., 2004: ii).  
This quote highlights the WB’s encouragement of the IASB to create the IFRS for SMEs. Within 
this there are contradictions, as the IASB and IFIs originally advocated for countries to adopt full 
IFRS for all. However, as contingencies are revealed the WB (in their reports) criticise countries 
for adopting IFRS for all entities, and for ‘misunderstanding’ the ‘very nature of international 
standards’. This combination of the work of the IASB and the WB and IMF, gives the IASB 
further power and forms coalitions between them, blocking alternatives and local contingencies 
(Hopper et al., 2017). Before moving to the empirical chapters that further discuss these 
connections and criticisms, the following section draws conclusions for this chapter.   
6.8 Conclusion and overview of empirical chapters 
This chapter has examined research on the IASB’s extension, identifying some issues and 
tensions, and describing the development of IFRS for SMEs, raising issues for further analysis:  
• The IASB define SMEs through public accountability, opposing common definitions that 
focus on size, which raises controversy for the IASB.  
• The IASB draw equivalences across many different entities under the umbrella of SMEs.  
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• SME’s are of high economic and social importance in developed and developing 
economies, through their strong contribution to the economy, GDP, employment and 
society. There are national differences in SME regulation and some countries are hesitant 
about IFRS for SMEs adoption, especially those with developed accounting systems. 
Moreover, some scholars find the standard to be unsuitable for most SMEs.  
• The benefits and costs surrounding IFRS for SMEs are debated, as the standard claims to 
be beneficial in these terms. However, academics identify that the costs outweigh the 
benefits to SMEs. Early IFRS for SMEs research concludes: education is necessary; the 
standard is unsuitable for emerging and developing economies; different countries have 
different reactions; SMEs have many obstacles and the standard holds many practical 
problems; and implementation is costly and time-consuming. Research also shows that 
the IASB did not consider SMEs or their financial statement users, and highlights the 
heterogeneous nature of both.  
Importantly, creating a standard for SMEs holds tensions with the IASB’s original aims and 
capital market focus. The importance of SME accounting is high, due to their social and economic 
significance, but there is sparse academic research in this area. L&M has not been applied in this 
area, and this thesis argues that this gives a more holistic analysis, of the IASB’s discourse and 
processes, as shown in both the regulatory theory chapter (2) and the theory chapter (3). 
Regarding the social, political and fantasmatic logics, this chapter has shown that the more critical 
literature has examined the social logics of the extension to IFRS for SMEs by examining the due 
process, but the deeper politics of their work and the role of subjects and ideologies is yet to be 
examined. This thesis focuses on how and why the IASB decided to extend to IFRS for SMEs, 
and in many ways the literature so far is lacking. The literature focuses on mainstream approaches 
to offer incremental improvements, without considering the broader politics and the impact of the 
IASB’s extension. Therefore, the empirical chapters extend this literature and the following gives 
an overview of those empirical chapters, their order and narrative. 
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The chapters that follow move to the empirical examination of the IASB’s development of IFRS for SMEs, looking empirically at why and how they operated the 
extension beyond listed entities. To give an overview, figure 17 below outlines the structure of the empirical chapters, which follows five key moments34 within the 
extension to IFRS for SMEs, each hegemonically operating the LoE and LoD.  
                                               
34  This is in line with the chronology of development of IFRS for SMEs outlined in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 17: Empirical movements  
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Chapter 7 starts by examining the contestations surrounding differential reporting, which led the 
IASB to create the IFRS for SMEs. Thus, this chapter identifies the problematisation of 
differential reporting by the IASB and other actors in the regulatory space. Within this 
problematisation, LoE and LoD are in operation as the IASB attempt to reinstate their expert role 
in the regulatory conversation. This simultaneously constructs the necessity for differential 
reporting to remain within IFRS through LoD, whilst also operating LoE through the idea that 
IFRS for listed entities can be extended to become suitable for SMEs. This reinstates the position 
of the IASB as technocratic regulator to counter any threats of contestation that could question or 
dislocate this role. This operates the political logics from LOCE, by focusing on the extension 
and/or construction of new frontiers (within the differential reporting debate), through defence 
and naturalisation. In this case, the political logics occur before the operation of the social logics 
and due process, which changes the order in G&H’s methodology.  
Chapter 8 examines how the IASB use their existing due process, logics and rhetoric to operate 
the extension to IFRS for SMEs. In this, the IASB cover over competing articulations through 
condensation (operating within the LoD). This condensation constructs the IFRS for SMEs as able 
to meet the needs of all, to cover over articulations, contingencies and contestations, by rendering 
alterntives unnecessary and delegitimised. Additionally, within this moment the LoE is also in 
operation, as the IASB draw equivalence from SMEs to developing countries, developed 
countries to developing countries and across all developing countries, seeing them as 
homogeneous, which ignores local contexts. This chapter examines how the IASB operated this 
extension through their socially sedimented practices, to persuade political actors that the IASB’s 
expertise and technocracy is required at the centre of standard setting.  
Chapter 9 moves to the third key movement in figure 17, which examines the way that the IASB 
simultaneously claim to conduct extra outreach to reach other views and make IFRS for SMEs 
different to IFRS, whilst also retaining a focus on full IFRS for two reasons. First, to enhance the 
strength of their brand and expertise, and second to maintain the inter-relationship with IFIs who 
include the IASB’s standards in structural adjustment. This chapter reinforces the examination of 
both the LoE and LoD in hegemony and the IASB’s control over the regulatory conversation. 
Thus, this chapter examines further social logics, by examining social practices and regimes that 
the IASB operate and deconstructing the depiction of the IASB as technocratic regulator with 
neutral due process (which masks the political hegemony of their extension to IFRS for SMEs). 
The movements in each of these chapters are connected to the chronology of the development of 
IFRS for SMEs in appendix 1, especially the due process.  
In keeping with the LOCE, the chapter that follows (chapter 10) deconstructs the fantasmatic 
logics which operate in the extension to IFRS for SMEs by the IASB. These are crucial in the 
examination of the way that subjects become gripped by the IASB’s promulgation of the standard, 
due to the ideologies that the IASB have constructed, both during the due process and in the 
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standards publication. The extension of hegemony requires the IASB, as an agent of advanced 
financial capital hegemony, to construct fantasies that grip subjects and cover over the 
contingencies of those fantasies by naturalising and instituting the social structure. This chapter 
also offers an overarching critique of the extension by the IASB to IFRS for SMEs, through the 
articulation of the impact of the political, social and fantasmatic logics as they operate together 
in the construction of hegemony.  
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           Chapter 7: Contestations and contingencies 
In following a technocratic line of argument, in which the IASB are the expert standard setters 
that operate a neutral due process, the story of IFRS for SMEs could be deceptively simple. Within 
this analysis, we would see international organisations, standard setters and the IASB as 
acknowledging a demand for standards that meets the needs of emerging countries and the SMEs. 
So, the IASB, as a legitimate expert international standard setter responds to this demand, as 
depicted in the IASB’s public rhetoric, outlined in the previous chapter. Following promulgation, 
national standard setters adopt IFRS for SMEs, which claims to remove regulatory burdens for 
national standard setters, clarify reporting issues for practitioners, and benefit SMEs, including 
SMEs in emerging economies.35 
However, this ignores political contestations, nuances and power struggles and does not consider 
the importance of the IASB as a geo-political player, extending their command and control. 
Nevertheless, the IASB’s rhetoric attempts to persuade various actors (SMEs, preparers, national 
standard setters and IFIs) of the technocratic nature of their standards, depicting IFRS for SMEs 
as a high quality solution to problems that SMEs experience:  
It can play an essential role in helping SMEs gain access to capital. This is because the 
IFRS for SMEs improves the quality of reporting as compared with many existing 
national accounting requirements. At the same time, it reduces the burden on entities in 
jurisdictions where full IFRSs or national requirements that have converged with IFRSs 
are now required. Furthermore, the IFRS for SMEs provides enhanced comparability for 
users of accounts both within a jurisdiction and across borders. This improves the overall 
confidence in the financial statements of SMEs. Clearly, it reduces significantly the costs 
of developing and maintaining standards on a national basis (IASB, 2012a: 2). 
This rhetoric is crucial to the IASB because they do not have enforcement power, but as an agent 
the IASB’s work is intertwined with IFIs that hold powerful political goals, including, but not 
limited to, the WB and the IMF. The combination of rhetoric and the inter-relationship of the 
IASB with IFIs constitutes an environment with significant pressure to adopt, and constructs and 
maintains hegemonic ideologies.  
The extension of the IASB’s work from standard setting for listed entities stems from debates on 
the necessity for differential reporting. This debate holds many contestations, and subsequently 
leads to problematisation by IFIs and the IASB for the necessity of IFRS for SMEs. Prior to the 
decision that differential reporting was necessary, IFIs and the IASB decided (and promulgated) 
that there could be one-size-fits-all for financial reporting standards, in which full IFRS was 
suitable for all entities, no matter their size or focus.  
7.1 Deconstructing one-size-fits all 
Since the 1980s there has been an oscillation between the belief that there should be one set of 
standards for all organisations due to the need for comparability; against issues of cost-benefit for 
                                               
35  In the empirical chapters the terms developing countries and emerging economies are both used because 
they are both used by interviewees and in documentation. 
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unlisted entities. Originally, the IASB, the WB and the IMF advocated for ‘one-size-fits-all’ for 
financial reporting standards: 
…and certainly in the 1990s it [the World Bank] insisted that if it lent money to anybody 
they used IAS (Interviewee 27).  
However, this changed during the early 2000s due to the growing complexity of financial 
reporting standards for listed entities (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; 2015; Harvey & Walton, 1996; 
Ram, 2012; Walton, 1998), as interviewee 6 explains:  
… but by 2000-2005 the World Bank had recognised that IFRS, or recognised what was 
happening in the world and its line had changed, it was going along the lines of saying 
IFRS for listed, for banks, for insurance, and for unlisted, for SMEs, something else…  
As this quote explains, the WB supported a uniform approach to accounting, but the specification 
of this approach shifted post-2000. The identification by IFIs and others that international 
standards were creating issues concerning the cost and complexity of compliance, posed a threat 
towards the IASB’s program for harmonisation and comparability and their standard setting 
expertise, as standards were unsuitable for or unusable by SME organisations. Interviewee 6 
explained that the WB originally advocated for ‘everyone to use full IFRS for everything’ but this 
understanding was contingent. This contingency is important because SMEs are potentially 
valuable to advanced financial capital.  
Taking the UK as an example, UK financial reporting held the belief that all companies, 
irrespective of their size and/or listing, should be subject to the same accounting requirements. It 
was necessary to give a true and fair view and it was argued that there could not be a different 
true and fair view:  
…we don’t have different versions of that set of standards which has been developed to 
give a true and fair view or a fair presentation, so how can you have a different version 
of that? (Interviewee 2).  
This interviewee highlights the standard setting belief that there can only be one true and fair 
view, which is challenged by the existence of differing reporting standards. This is crucial to the 
accounting standards concept that ‘one-size-fits-all’ and holds that any difference would damage 
the quality of financial reporting. For example, CL01 (2004)36 which replied to the IASB’s 
discussion paper (DP) on IFRS for SMEs states:  
I feel strongly that the existence of the FRSSE in the UK damages the credibility of its 
accountancy profession by sanctioning the use of inconsistent accounting rules for 
different sizes of entity.  
This comment letter (CL) draws an equivalence between a loss of credibility and differential 
reporting. This is noteworthy because accounting standards have been critiqued for only being 
constructed to legitimise the existence of the profession (Hines, 1991). Thus, questioning the 
                                               
36  CL stands for comment letter throughout the empirical chapters. If the date is referenced 2004 then this 
was a comment letter on the DP. If the comment letter is referenced 2005 then this was a comment letter 
on the Recognition & Measurement (R&M) questionnaire. If the comment letter was referenced 2007 
then this was a comment letter on the ED.  
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credibility of the profession is risky for the IASB as a standard setter and an agent of advanced 
financial capital.  
The IASB similarly took the view that IFRS was suitable for all, but in 2004 they began to change 
this: 
…the paper says that five million companies in Europe are under a statutory requirement 
to produce financial statements but were not covered by the EU Directive that will require 
IAS accounts from 2005. Someone had asked him, he said, whether the IASB intended 
the SME standards to apply to all five million companies. The Board, he said, had already 
stipulated that it believed that full IFRSs were suitable for any company. The issue, he 
added, was whether the Board wished to see a two-tier structure or a three-tier structure. 
A three-tier structure would not be so far-fetched, he added, since the UK, Germany and 
some other countries already operate one (ISTAR, 2004c: 33). 
This quote explains, with the example of unlisted companies in Europe, that the IASB believed 
full IFRS was suitable for any company. However, as the IASB were considering a two-tier 
reporting structure, this illustrates the deconstruction of the one-size-fits-all approach. As the two-
tier structure emerged the IASB had to adapt to maintain their legitimacy, against changing views 
on the growing complexity of full IFRS:  
I think generally speaking, if you ask why [IFRS for] SMEs came in or why any form of 
differential reporting came in, it was because of a growing feeling that GAAP as we had 
known it as a singular set of requirements was too ornate for smaller entities and many 
of the discourses in particular were becoming quite elaborate courtesy of financial 
instruments (Interviewee 22).  
Interviewee 22, as an international standard setter, recognised the complexity critique of IFRS, as 
does interviewee 4:  
So, there was this growing concern that the IFRS were getting increasingly complex and 
focusing more towards fair value accounting which developing countries and some of the 
other less developed countries felt that they were not able to cope with.  
This development (shown in the above quotes) illustrates that a two-tier reporting system emerged 
because IFRS was problematised as too complex with financial instruments and fair value 
accounting being considered unsuitable for SMEs and developing countries. However, this is 
illustrative of a LoD, because the IASB effectively construct a modified version of one-size-fits-
all, rather than a bottom up creation, specifically developed standard that would be appropriate 
for SMEs. Contemporaneously, national standard setters and IFIs were debating differential 
reporting leading to questions about the ability of the IASB to set standards for and regulate the 
SME environment.  
7.2 A proliferation of differential reporting approaches  
7.2.1 The IASC and contingency  
Originally, the IASC and the WB set up an SME accounting project, but subsequent events and 
the institution of the IASB meant that the project was not pursued further:  
The IASC had an SME accounting project, and it formed a committee to work on it… 
back in about 1999 or something like that and my understanding was that when the IASB 
came in they really didn’t want to pursue that… (Interviewee 27). 
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International standard setters had, for a time, recognised the necessity for an SME approach, but 
initial reluctance from the IASB was noted by multiple interviewees (including interviewees 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 11, 17, 19, 20, 21, 27) explaining that initial reluctance from the board was due to a focus 
on listed entities and capital markets by the IASB and the IASC. As the IASC began to focus on 
work with IOSCO, this led them away from developing countries to listed entities and capital 
markets:  
…generally speaking the thinking was, was that we were writing standards which would 
be applied by all businesses and if you go right back in the history of IASC, you will see 
that, that there was no distinction made [between listed and unlisted entities], but then 
during my time we started to focus more on capital markets, and establish this 
relationship with the international organisations securities commissions, which was all 
about producing standards which could be used by listed companies, in foreign listings 
(Interviewee 6). 
This focus on listed entities became an all-consuming focus for the IASC, so when the IASB was 
constructed they were not focused on the necessity for expertise in SME financial reporting 
(interviewee 24, 27, 11, 15 and 3, also reference the necessity to have a working group of experts 
in SME reporting). Thus, this had an impact on the IASC’s and IASB’s work as it facilitated an 
advanced capital agenda. As the IASC began to focus further on listed entities, they were also 
concerned about various countries picking individual standards instead of following all IAS 
standards:  
…the use of international accounting standards was not compulsory for anybody. A 
number of companies in a number of countries started picking individual standards to 
add to their local standard, this was particularly true in France, and they would say we 
report according to French GAAP and the international standards, and then you would 
have to read the notes, and see that yes we do the pension standard except we don’t do 
the liability. That was referred to as IAS Lite, and… the IASC was very concerned about 
that because it felt that this was diminishing the value of its product and they couldn’t do 
anything about it. One of the issues for the IASB was to prevent people using individual, 
picking and choosing their standard (Interviewee 27, similar sentiments were made by 
interviewee 7 and 8). 
The IASC saw ‘IAS Lite’ as diminishing the value of their product, which constituted a threat to 
the legitimacy of international standards. The IASB dealt with this issue by requiring either all or 
nothing in standards adoption, which removed the ability for constituents to ‘pick and choose’. 
However, the IASB continued to be concerned with the concept of ‘IAS lite’, as noted in board 
meetings:  
…the use of the phrase ‘IAS Lite’ meant that they were already diminishing the IAS 
brand (ISTAR, 2003I: 40) 
Thus, there were contingencies and threats to the IASC and IASB, but with regards to SMEs, as 
interviewee 27 explained in the first quote within this subsection: ‘when the IASB came in they 
really didn’t want to pursue that’. Therefore, international standard setters constructed differential 
reporting which posed a threat to the international accounting standards project, so the IASB acted 
to protect their legitimacy and their brand (Black, 2008).  
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7.2.2 Proliferation of articulations by standard setters 
Before IFRS for SMEs, certain national standard setters constructed differential reporting and 
disclosure exemptions, which led to multiple sets of accounting standards depending on criteria 
(Harvey & Walton, 1996; Jarvis & Collis, 2003). For example, New Zealand introduced 
differential reporting in 1994, Canada in 2002 and Hong Kong in 2002 (Eierle, 2005). This 
proliferation of jurisdictionally dependent differential reporting standards posed a challenge for 
IFRS: 
…constituents who were urging us to do something to simplify this standards and to make 
a set of standards that were appropriate for small or medium sized non-public entities and 
then there were a number of jurisdictions who were thinking about or on the way to 
adopting IFRS who had already created a separate sort of standards (Interviewee 21, 
sentiments also supported by interviewee 4, 6, 18, 27).  
This led to a situation where multiple jurisdictions had reinforced the idea of differential reporting 
by having different accounting standards for listed entities versus more simplified standards for 
SMEs. For example, interviewee 21 gave the specific example of the FRSSE which identified 
that SMEs had different users:  
…where in most of the jurisdictions that had made differential reporting or something 
like the FRSSE they had done enough research to conclude that the main users of the 
financial statements were lenders and by definition… somebody who is providing you 
with a good deal of your capital, and has some kind of a lending agreement (Interviewee 
21).  
This interviewee explains that these differences were identified because lenders, particularly 
banks are key SME financial statement users (reference to the approach taken by the FRSSE and 
users as lenders is made throughout the IASB’s board meetings). This highlights the contradiction 
between the IASB’s focus on ‘big’ advanced financial capital and financial (including bond) 
markets vs. ‘small’ financial capital from banks. The IASB are focused on advanced financial 
capital, but national standard setters were creating standards for a different purpose in the 
knowledge that SME financial statements were used for bank lending decisions rather than for 
raising loans from financial markets. If national standard setters create standards like the FRSSE 
then the IASB lose their influence, and their role as an agent of advanced financial capital is called 
into question. The FRSSE does not by itself constitute a major threat, but the existence of a series 
of national standards does, as it reduces the ability for advanced financial capital to gain access 
to new and emerging markets. The creation of differential reporting standards could have been 
dislocatory for the IASB, as the existence of various standard setters constructing their own 
regimes is potentially a threat to the IASB, especially once developing countries are creating their 
own standards. This potential proliferation highlights many contingencies in the IASB’s work 
and politically threatens their technocratic role. Despite many of these differential reporting 
regimes stemming from full IFRS, the risk is that the IASB could lose their influence as another 
group begins to control standard setting at the macro level.  
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These articulations pose threats towards the IASB’s technocracy, because if other people can 
simplify IFRS and create standards for accounting, this destabilises the idea that the IASB are the 
right people to set standards. Indeed, it is not the existence of the alternative, but that other groups 
might be seen as the experts, which threatens the IASB’s technocratic expertise. So far, the 
proliferation of different articulations that this section has looked at, has been from multiple 
developed countries. But, there were threats to this technocracy from emerging economies, which 
is important as the extension to IFRS for SMEs plays a prominent role in emerging economies.37 
Interviewee 18 explains a further counter articulation from the Eastern Central and Southern 
African Federation of Accountants [ECSAFA] (during the development of IFRS for SMEs this 
organisation was called the Pan African Federation of Accountants [PAFA]) which threatened 
the IASB:  
Even before the IFRS for SMEs was created, from the original perspective in Africa we 
developed a reporting framework, which we hoped would be used by SMEs, I believe 
that was part of the push that helped, that made the IASB think about having an IFRS for 
SMEs… they start to think we are playing in their battlefield… I think the pressure, the 
pressure was growing… from various parts of the world, people wanted a reporting 
framework for SMEs, if they had continued to resist, it is possible that people would have 
created something that would have rendered [the IASB] irrelevant in certain parts of the 
financial reporting supply chain. 
This interviewee explains that part of the reason why the IASB created IFRS for SMEs was 
because others had created standards which were ‘playing on their battlefield’. Thus, the IASB’s 
move to protect standard-setting territory at the macro level, is for the purposes of protecting their 
technocratic expertise, so they do not become ‘irrelevant in certain parts of the financial reporting 
supply chain’. This is similar to the ‘turf protection’ that Ram and Newberry (2013) articulate, 
but the turf to be protected is the IASB’s technocratic expertise. However, the IASB, in 2007, 
constructed this as a legacy and a logic issue: 
The answer is that this is both a legacy and a logic issue. For Bob Garnett, a Board 
member since the foundingof the IASB, it is about facing up to responsibilities. ‘When 
the IASB was set up in 2001’, he said, ‘theTrustees told the Board that it should deal 
with the world’s capital markets.’ That was the focus that hasled to the implementation 
of IFRSs for listed companies in Europe and around the world and has now openedup 
the possibility of IFRSs becoming the world’s accounting language. To get there has been 
an immense achievement. But it has been a different focus from that of the IASB’s 
predecessor standard-setting body, IASC, which was charged with producing accounting 
standards that attempted to be relevant to all companies, not just listed ones. 
Consequently, once IFRS implementation was under way, the legacy question of the 
small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) returned to the agenda. As IASB Chairman, Sir 
David Tweedie, said to the European Parliament recently, ‘When the Trustees and the 
IASB consulted different interested parties throughout the world, there was an uneasy 
feeling that the IASB was failing to live up to its obligations as an international 
organisation. During the Constitution Review, more than 40 participants representing 
emerging economies in Asia and Latin America called for the IASB to take into account 
the special needs of SMEs, and for that reason the Trustees urged the IASB to initiate a 
project aimed at SMEs.’ (IASB, 2007e: 10). 
                                               
37  The homogeneity of the IASB’s conception of developing countries and emerging economies has been 
discussed within this thesis, and is further discussed empirically in chapter 8 as it is highly problematic, 
but for the purposes of explanation the IASB’s language is being used.   
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Therefore, this shows that rather than saying that they are the experts in standard setting, the IASB 
chooses to explain that the construction of IFRS for SMEs is about logic and legacy, constructing 
a form of inevitability. This statement makes the claim that due to the IASC’s original aims of 
‘producing accounting standards’ that are ‘relevant to all companies’, the IASB had to ‘live up to 
its obligations’. However, this thesis has illustrated that the IASB only acted when there were 
threats to their status. The IASB claimed SME reporting away from national standards, as their 
‘turf’, and the creation of IFRS for SMEs is a hegemonic extension to a new area that the IASB 
had not previously occupied, because of the macro-threat to their role as principal standard setters. 
As SMEs were given more attention in the global arena this threat grew. Therefore, these 
rhetorical constructs of ‘obligation’, ‘legacy’, and ‘logic’ are crucial to the IASB, as they operate 
metaphorically to legitimate the movement to IFRS for SMEs (that was not previously within the 
IASB’s remit, despite being an aim of the IASC). This offers the IASB ideological cover for the 
politics of extension. Indeed, there was not only a proliferation of differential reporting standards 
from national standard setters, there was also the UN who created a standard for SMEs and the 
EFRAG who threatened to do so as well.  
7.2.3 Articulations from larger transnational bodies 
The ISAR department within the UNCTAD conducted research in developing countries and 
identified challenges in enforcement and compliance, so they argued for a simplified standard for 
developing countries:  
…we actually did research in Africa, so Botswana, Cameroon… the research that we did 
identified that accounting technology, if you like, was a major barrier to development 
because there weren’t any cheap accountants… [we developed] a four tiered system 
which starts with cash accounting at the bottom end, no rules to speak of just cash… to a 
simple accruals systems with or without debits and credits as you want, but you know 
where people have no intangibles, nothing like that, they’re buying or making stuff and 
selling it or they’re providing very simple services and then this middle level where 
companies have 10, 20, 30 employees and they actually need substantive records, and 
they should be paying tax and stuff like that… (Interviewee 27).  
This articulation identifies access to capital as a barrier to development. From this research, the 
ISAR developed the Accounting and Financial Reporting Guidelines for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises [SMEGA]. This is a guideline which, as explained in the above quote, goes to the 
basics of the IASB’s accounting framework, to reduce complexity. This is a threat to the IASB, 
as although the standard is based on IFRS (and so does not constitute a dislocation), this removal 
of complexity and the necessity for ‘advanced expertise’ as constructed by the IASB is threatening 
to their role, status, and legitimacy. This reinforces Hines (1991) who argued that accounting 
standards are developed to legitimise the accounting profession and practices, as experts are 
constructed as the only people that can interpret accounting (which links to interviewee 27’s point 
regarding ‘cheap accountants’ in the quote above). Moreover, this reinforces the IASB’s role as 
a technocratic regulator protecting their position of expertise. The standard created by the 
UNCTAD was simplistic, which delegitmises the IASB’s global accounting language. Within 
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this document, the ISAR made decisions about what to include and what not to include, based on 
the interests of developing counties. Interviewee 27 recalls the IASB’s disapproval of these 
decisions in a conversation with a board member:  
[An international standard setter] was making the argument that look, if there is a big 
need for it out there and people like even the UN, you know as much as we like you, it’s 
not your standard it’s our standard. If anybody is going to mess with our standard it had 
better be us, and so we should do it because if we don’t do it there will be a proliferation 
of people doing their own standards. 
This illustrates the claim that the IASB saw the work of the UN as a threat, because they did not 
want a ‘proliferation of people doing their own standards’. Interviewee 4 noticed a similar feeling, 
stating the IASB would not ‘endorse anyone else’s standards’. This shows the increasing external 
pressure on the IASB, as is summarised in the following quote from CL 90 (2004: 3):  
If the IASB decides not to meet the demand for simplified IFRS for SMEs, several things 
could happen: 
• national or regional bodies could develop their own or ‘regional’ simplified IFRS for 
SMEs; 
• national bodies may continue to allow or require SMEs to comply with old IAS; or 
• another body (for example, the United Nations, IFAC, the European Commission or the 
World Bank) could develop simplified IFRS for SMEs or even a competing set of SME 
Standards.  
This comment letter explains that if the IASB do not react to the demand then various alternative 
systems could emerge which threaten the IASB’s expertise and technocracy (the pressure of 
alternatives is also noted by interviewees, 4, 27, 18 and 6). The construction of a competing set 
of standards is threatening to the command and control that the IASB hold in regulatory 
conversations, and the way the IASB dismiss alternatives is further discussed in chapter 8 and 9.  
Another alternative that constituted a threat towards the IASB was the EFRAG (Ram, 2012; Ram 
& Newberry, 2013). The EFRAG placed pressure on the IASB, stating that if they did not create 
a standard for SMEs, then they would, as interviewee 27 explains:  
…but nonetheless [an IASB board member] was under pressure for Europe to do 
something about it, and at the same time EFRAG thought that they might do something 
about SME accounting which is part of the same issue… if you look at the press release 
when EFRAG was formed it actually specifies that they would do SME accounting. In 
the end they never did, in the end the IASB restarted its project, and EFRAG then 
provided some kind of support committee to the IASB’s effort, it was necessary for the 
IASB to take that initiative to prevent other people taking those  initiatives. So I would 
say that was the political issue and the consequences of that to some extent were on the 
one hand, as I say it stopped other organisations developing their own, which might have 
been a good thing, might have been a bad thing, but it did have that consequence… 
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Interviewee 4 references similar work by the EFRAG. This shows a further proliferation of 
standards from national standard setters in both developed and developing countries, from the 
larger bodies including the UN, the EFRAG, and PAFA (ECSAFA). These contingencies and 
contestations lead to the necessity for the IASB to extend their work to reinforce their expertise 
and technocracy by blocking counter articulations. As illustrated in the following figure 18.   
 
 
Alongside these threats there was also demand, and a call to respond to these contingencies, 
particularly from the WB and the IMF. Thus, the WB and the IMF were problematising 
differential reporting, as they are focused on ‘high-quality’ ‘expertise’ from the IASB, and they 
begin to share the risk in these political power struggles. Indeed, the IASB’s role as an agent of 
advanced financial capital, should increase the access of advanced financial capital, so if they do 
not respond to the demand, they are not fulfilling this role and may lose legitimacy with IFIs. 38 
This is further discussed in the following section of this chapter. The following sections examine 
                                               
38  It should be noted that this thesis does not consider this a dislocation, as there is nothing radically 
shifting or altering, even in the construction of these alternative articulations, as these alternatives are 
restricted to the logics constructed by the IASB. In these alternatives there is nothing that radically alters 
the base of accounting, as these articulations are constructed out of full IFRS. Whilst these contingencies 
and alternatives could (in the longer term) have had a dislocatory effect if the IASB had not responded, 
instead they are able to restabilise, retain their current form and only lead to marginal debates about 
what accounting looks like, so the IASB’s fundamental hegemony is not shifted. This leads to the 
question, why is there not a radical alternative to the logics of IFRS and advanced financial capital that 
could be destabilising? As L&M articulate dislocation, there should be clear re-articulations, instead 
what is demonstrated here is the IASB restabilising their work as hegemonic standard setter in the face 
of contestations and contingencies.  
 
Figure 18: Blocking counter articulations 
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the call to action, the IASB’s problematisation, and the impact of this on their role, their position 
and the attempt to protect their authority as an international standard setter. 
7.2.4 Problematisation of the necessity for IFRS for SMEs: the call to respond to 
contingencies  
During the early 2000s the WB, in combination with the IMF began their Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) program, assessing compliance with international 
accounting and auditing standards, and making recommendations for improvement for various 
countries (IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2004a, b, d). From 2001 to 2003, the WB assessed 14 
developing countries (they continue to construct these reports), finding that SME reporting 
requirements were complex, unsuitable, and therefore impacted the quality of financial reporting 
in those countries (an impact that the WB and IMF tie to their development) (see, World Bank, 
2001a, b; 2002a, b, c, d, e, f; 2003a, b, c, d, e, f; 2004a, b, c, d). Due to recommendations from 
IFIs, and a lack of resources, many countries had adopted full IFRS for all entities, which created 
complications for SMEs:  
…the first group are people who… were forced by the World Bank or the IMF to put in 
place the requirement to use IAS, that was a big problem… because IAS wasn’t suited 
for those economies anyway and often the funding agency did a point in time translation 
of the standards and then didn’t give them enough money to keep the translations up to 
date when modifications were made, so… it was actually the 1990 standards because that 
was the last translation they had, so, and so they basically wanted to be part of, you know, 
they wanted reasonable accounting standards, the full IFRS or full IAS never mind IFRS 
was not suitable, but in order I think, in some cases to try to keep on side with those 
international agreements they needed some set of accounting standards, IFRS wasn’t 
suitable, they didn’t have the capacity to develop their own standards nationally, the IFRS 
for SMEs was basically the only thing that would work of them… (Interviewee 21). 
…although full IFRS is very useful in its prescribed role, its requirements are far too 
detailed and far too prescriptive and particularly its disclosure requirements are far too 
onerous for small companies that don’t have a broad user base… (Interviewee 14). 
Interviewee 14 is criticising the use of IFRS outside of its ‘prescribed role’, whilst interviewee 21 
identifies that the WB forces unsuitable IAS requirements. The IASB focus on the ‘voluntary’ 
nature of their standards to portray that countries want and use them of their own accord (which 
constructs logics of external demand and support for the IASB). However, there is extensive 
pressure from IFIs as the WB and the IMF identify that full IFRS is too complex, so the IASB 
must respond because of their role in global capital movement and the development of a global 
accounting language. Indeed, these countries were and continue to be following WB 
recommendations:  
…the World Bank is one of, is the biggest hidden harmoniser of accounting in the world, 
and certainly in the 1990s it insisted that if it lent money to anybody that they used IAS, 
and so it was far more important in getting people to use IAS than any other organisation, 
and it is still the case that they regard training people in doing accounting as a prerequisite 
for development and lending them money… (Interviewee 27). 
This quote demonstrates the interconnected nature of international accounting standards and IFIs. 
IFIs insist on the uptake of international standards as requirements for loan agreements and 
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development through structural adjustment. Thus, the WB and the IMF contribute to the IASB’s 
movement to become the international language of financial reporting. However, differential 
reporting leads the WB and the IMF to identify contingencies in the IASB’s work, so it is 
necessary for the IASB to respond to maintain their legitimacy (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). This 
constitutes a subtle critique of the IASB. By identifying full IFRS as too hard and as creating too 
many problems, the IFIs are critiquing the IASB’s expertise for not constructing suitable 
standards that help the WB and the IMF to extend their access.  
Furthermore, pressure was placed on the IASB during the creation of IFRS for SMEs, as the WB 
and the IMF began to recommend adoption of IFRS for SMEs to developing countries before the 
standard was completed (sharing the risk of the creation of the standard), through their ROSC 
reports:  
In this perspective, the IASB has initiated a project to issue a standard dealing with 
Financial reporting by small and medium sized entities. The IASB has recently 
announced that it would release a discussion document in the second quarter of 2004. In 
this context, SMEs in Ecuador should continue to follow NEC until IASB releases an 
international “SME standard”. By improving the quality of the financial information they 
produce, Ecuador’s SMEs will gain easier access to credit, which in turn will help boost 
their development (World Bank, 2004c: 20). 
This is also shown in the ROSC report from Cambodia:  
Develop an arrangement for continuing development and issuance of simplified financial 
reporting requirements for SMEs, in line with the pronouncements of IASB (World Bank, 
2007a: 26).  
Indeed, the WB, the IMF and the IASB were tying IFRS for SMEs to development and access to 
capital. Subsequently, this tied IFRS for SMEs to the goal of increasing the field of advanced 
financial capital. Thus, these pressures were prevalent in the decision to adopt:  
…the decision to implement IFRS for SMEs was probably not concerned on the quality 
of the reporting of those SMEs, but on providing some support for the IASB in order to 
say, hey IASB [our country is] on board, we are all entirely on board with you, and to, 
not only to the IASB but to international audience to say hey we are at the up front, [this 
country] is at the upfront of accounting reforms, we just implemented IFRS for SMEs, 
and that point there is a big difference between issuing and publishing a rule, I wouldn’t 
say a law because it’s not a law, it’s just a, the decision to implement the IFRS for SMEs, 
was not made by the congress it was made by the accountants’ board like the 
[interviewees home country] CPA, we are about to go for another ROSC report the 
observance of the standard setting codes… (Interviewee 25).   
This interviewee explains that their country was not ‘concerned’ with the ‘quality of the reporting’ 
that would be gained from adopting the standard. Instead, they were concerned with showing 
support for the IASB, gaining acknowledgement in political debate, and ensuring that they 
adopted before their next ROSC reports, because of what this signals to IFIs and the rest of the 
world. This shows an institutional and isomorphic pressure, which ensures the spread of advanced 
financial capital.  
This work with the WB removes the necessity for the IASB to have enforcement power, as the 
pressure to adopt comes from another, powerful organisation. Indeed, the adoption of IFRS and 
IFRS for SMEs as a differential reporting framework has become a main part of the WB and 
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IMF’s structural adjustment criteria (Hopper et al., 2017). Therefore, the brand, and the logics of 
expertise and technocracy that the IASB form is enhanced by the work of the WB and the IMF, 
acting to silence the local, and dismiss alternatives. Through a focus on the ‘high-quality’ nature 
of standards and the necessity to gain further access to capital, this political and social decision 
to adopt a standard with a narrow neo-liberal focus, becomes an economic decision filled with 
the rhetoric of logic and necessity. This pressure to adopt is turned into necessary targets through 
tables with time limits, which ignore the local context and makes standardised decisions for all, 
alongside criticisms for any alternatives:  
The level of awareness of IFRS for SMEs and its Guide for Micro-sized entities is very 
low. As a result, many entities that are supposed to be applying IFRS for SMEs are opting 
to use the Ghana National Accounting Standards instead, which may significantly affect 
the quality of their financial reporting considering the fact that these standards have not 
been updated since their enforcement in the late 1990s (World Bank, 2014: 8). 
 
Figure 19: Extract of Recommended action table with Ghana’s ROSC (World Bank, 2014: 10). 
Whilst criticisms may be justifiable, within this table there is no room for alternative 
recommendations, ideas or frameworks to be considered, constructing a hegemonic monopoly for 
the IASB in the political arena, and ignoring the local context (Hopper et al., 2017; Sunder, 2011). 
The impact of the ROSC reports is that funding and resources (that countries need to deal with 
social issues, such as poverty) become dependent on the adoption of IFRS, a connection that this 
WB report makes:  
5. As an institution committed to the fight against poverty, the World Bank undertakes 
a number of activities to support the development and implementation of international 
accounting and auditing standards, as it recognizes the contribution that high-quality 
financial reporting can make to development. These activities include financial 
support to the relevant international standard-setting organizations; diagnostic work to 
benchmark countries’ financial reporting standards and practices against international 
standards; policy advice and financial assistance to support the enhancement of these 
standards and practices; and participation in international discussions and initiatives 
aimed at strengthening the regulatory environment, both nationally and globally, in which 
international standards are applied (Hegarty et al., 2004: 1-2 [emphasis added]).  
This connection between poverty, development and accounting is crucial, moving the IASB 
further into their geo-political role, which is also a social and political role that can no longer be 
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ignored or masked as technocratic. This further reinforces the links between the IASB and the 
spread of advanced financial capital. Another example, in a report titled ‘Accounting for Growth 
in Latin American and the Caribbean (Improving Corporate Financial Reporting to Support 
Regional Economic Development)’:  
A simplified set of financial reporting standards would make it easier for SMEs to 
improve the quality of their financial information and, ultimately, to use that 
information to access credit. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
recently issued a simplified set of standards for financial reporting (referred to as “IFRS 
for SMEs” or “IFRS for Private Entities”) that requires a lesser level of disclosure and 
eliminates the most complex options provided in IFRS, especially those requiring the use 
of fair values. The authorities in most LAC countries should consider adopting these 
standards for use by local SMEs— although there is legitimate concern in some countries 
that these standards might still be challenging to apply for entities at the smaller end of 
the corporate spectrum (Fortin et al., 2010:113 [emphasis added]). 
This emphasises the role of the IASB as an agent for the spread of advanced financial capital with 
a focus on access to credit and development. These connections offer further support and extend 
arguments made in accounting research on the role of imperialism, the construction of the other, 
and the necessity to standardise any differences (Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; 
Poullaos & Sian, 2010). Indeed, the narrow aims of globalisation are crucial to the foundation of 
the IASB. The IASB constructed the IFRS for SMEs for globalisation and to lift the standard of 
reporting:  
Well in some countries the current institutions of financial reporting are relatively 
unsophisticated. Increasingly we live in a globalized world with the desire to attract 
investment and capital for business, and IFRS, including IFRS for SMEs, is promoted 
by the World bank and others who are trying to build up capacity in those developing 
countries… internationally respected accounting which would mean IFRS… So the IFRS 
for SMEs as it’s a much simpler set of standards, but still with international credibility, 
is a suitable vehicle for that process of lifting the standard of reporting… 
(Interviewee 1 [emphasis added]). 
The IASB, the WB and the IMF work only to promote neo-liberal, advanced financial capital 
technologies and ideologies, whilst claiming to be neutral bodies. This has been extended to 
national capitalisms and local environments further than before in the extension to IFRS for SMEs, 
because of the focus within this standard on SMEs and emerging economies. These concepts of 
development, growth and ideologies of neo-liberalism are imperialistically forced upon 
developing countries and gain greater depth and entanglement in everyday lives, in a gradual, 
moving, changing and adapting hegemony. These development logics are used by the WB, the 
IMF and the IASB to rhetorically portray that they are ‘helping’ countries to develop and improve, 
which offers ideological cover to political struggles (Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; 
Lazzarato, 2012). Interviewee 11 also describes a logic that developing countries ‘sincerely want 
to do the right thing’ in adopting high quality standards, invoking a moral aspect to the hegemony 
of IFRS:  
…as you can understand they were screaming, saying we can’t handle this, even a 
company with 50 employees, they got maybe a part time high school trained book keeper, 
that’s it, and the book keeper says I don’t know IFRS, I can do accrual accounting, so 
there was a lot of pressure from small companies, there were pressure from developing 
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countries, because many developing countries had no accounting standards at all and they 
weren’t interested in developing accounting standards, and really countries that sincerely 
want to do the right thing, a lot of the Caribbean countries for example a number of 
African countries, particularly the former British ones, they wanted to do good 
accounting so they say OK everyone will use IAS, IFRS, but then as a few years go by 
they say well wait a minute, what did we do, were forcing all these little companies to 
know a 4000 page book that really wasn’t written for them, it was written for listed 
companies anyway. 
This interviewee explains that those who were overburdened were ‘screaming, saying we can’t 
handle this’ because they did not have training in IFRS, and many developing countries did not 
have accounting standards, but that they wanted to ‘do the right thing’. This moral element of 
hegemony has not been developed within the literature in financial accounting and IFRS, but this 
constructs the idea that to do the right thing countries need to adopt IFRS, invoking logics of 
moral necessity which mask the nature of IFRS, and depict any alternative as wrong. This further 
confirms pressure to adopt and the focus on the spread of advanced financial capital. These logics 
construct fantasmatic ideologies which will be explored further in chapter 10.  
Interviewee 27 explains that the UNCTAD had little uptake of their standards, due to the power 
of the IASB’s brand, that the UN guideline did not hold:   
…there is the IFRS brand, nowadays, that brand is very powerful, you talk to people at 
the UN say, national delegates and you would say to them well why don’t you use the 
UN guideline, it’s better than the IFRS for SMEs, and they would say yes but it is not put 
out by the IASB, Ok… The brand is powerful and they think that it makes the financial 
statements more credible (Interviewee 27).  
These sentiments regarding credibility are also referred to by interviewee 7. This brand is 
rhetorically constructed in many ways, which is explored throughout the thesis, but has a focus 
on expertise. Despite their threats of creating alternative standards, the UNCTAD and the EFRAG 
similarly hand over control to the IASB:  
• The existing international and some national accounting and reporting requirements 
have been intended primarily to meet the accounting and reporting needs of large, listed 
companies; 
• Many SMEs do not keep proper financial records and accounts; 
• Many SMEs are not aware or not convinced of the usefulness of accounting and 
financial reporting requirements for control and decision-making purposes; 
• Many SMEs lack skilled accounting personnel and infrastructure to implement existing 
accounting rules and regulations (UNCTAD, 2001: 1).  
As did the EFRAG and European commission: 
b. In their response to the 2004 IASCF Constitution Review, the European Commission 
also said the need exists and the IASB should develop an IFRS for SMEs. Similarly 
EFRAG’s response said that development of an IFRS for SMEs should be a specific 
objective of the IASB (IASB, 2008a: 5). 
And PAFA (ECSAFA):  
I think that we worked very closely with [the project leader] those days (Interviewee 18).   
Therefore, multiple organisations observe the dominance of the IASB, which reinforces IASB’s 
expertise, so that they become subservient to and work alongside the IASB. This reinforces the 
IASB’s technocracy and enhances their role as an agent of advanced financial capital. Despite 
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handing the main form of control over to the IASB, the UNCTAD, the EFRAG and PAFA agree 
to play a role of support in the development of the standard and work alongside the IASB: 
ISAR requests the IASB to take up this issue as a priority and on a timely basis. ISAR 
further indicates to the IASB that it has requested the ad hoc consultative group to 
continue its work and that ISAR is ready to cooperate with the IASB (UNCTAD, 2001: 
3). 
SME ACCOUNTING  
The IASB issued International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-
sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs) in 2009. The standard reflects many of the positions stated 
in EFRAG’s comment letter issued in February 2008 in response to the IASB’s Ed of the 
standard. In line with EFRAG’s position, the final standard is a stand-alone document, 
except for the references to IAS 39. Also, the final standard includes fewer options and 
the requirements have been further simplified compared to the ED… (EFRAG, 2009: 
30).  
This handing over of control to the IASB whilst also working with them, places the IASB in the 
centre of the regulatory conversation and others become subservient. Despite playing roles in the 
development of the standard and the IASB’s work to draw in some differences from their 
recommendations through LoD, the bodies are subsequently disappointed with IFRS for SMEs: 
… on the other hand, it is EFRAG’s view that a more thorough analysis of users’ 
information needs should have been carried out and the results of this should have been 
reflected in the final standard (EFRAG, 2009: 30). 
And from the perspective of a member of the UNCTAD ISAR group: 
… it’s a great shame, it’s a disaster really that the IASB decided to issue that standard… 
Ok, its achieved a lot, but a lower level standard could possibly have achieved more, and 
you certainly get developing countries coming to the SME committee and saying: can’t 
we use this for listed companies, this is you know, this is good enough for our listed 
companies… (Interviewee 27). 
And from the perspective of a member of PAFA (ECSAFA):  
… you know because, if they had met the needs then we would have had a reporting 
framework for the majority of our organisations, the fact that they don’t have a reporting 
framework shows that the needs were not met (Interviewee 18).  
The above quotes explain that the standard is unsuitable in many ways, for users and SMEs. 
Interviewee 27 argues that the standard is instead suitable for small listed entities, highlighting 
the dominance of the capital market orientation within the standard and the IASB’s lack of ability 
to see SMEs as different, and with different aims than to grow and become listed. However, in 
contention with the arguments made here that the board could have created something more 
suitable, this thesis argues that the creation of IFRS for SMEs by the IASB was bound to be 
disappointing in this way, because of their narrow focus and ideologies, the necessity to uphold 
their brand (the same brand that renders them the ‘right’ board to create the standard), and their 
attempts to condense all contingencies into one standard. As the issues concerning SMEs and 
developing countries that are identified, are problematised as needing to be resolved within the 
IFRS brand.  
Despite the pressures and threats that emerged for the IASB to create IFRS for SMEs, this also 
creates an opportunity for the IASB to extend their work beyond full IFRS, whilst in keeping with 
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full IFRS, in which they draw equivalences to cover over contingencies, whilst also drawing in 
differences to extend their hegemony.  
7.3 Problematisation by the IASB 
The IASB set up a working group and began having detailed discussions about the standard in 
the early 2000’s, as explained in the basis for conclusion:  
BC2 Shortly after its inception in 2001, the IASB began a project to develop accounting 
standards suitable for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs). The Board set up a 
working group of experts to provide advice on the issues and alternatives and potential 
solutions…  
BC4 At public meetings during the second half of 2003 and early 2004, the Board 
developed some preliminary and tentative views about the basic approach that it would 
follow in developing accounting standards for SMEs. It tested that approach by applying 
it to several IFRSs (IASB, 2009c: 6).  
During this time, the IASB were problematising the necessity to create IFRS for SMEs and making 
decisions about standards content, before undertaking the due process. Within this 
problematisaton, there are political logics at play, as the IASB are gaining further recognition and 
power so the ability to extend their expertise is expanding. Subsequently, they can reinstitute their 
hegemony by placing themselves at the centre of the differential reporting debate by changing 
their remit.   
7.3.1 The power to extend the IASB’s ‘expertise’ 
The IASB would not have been able to develop IFRS for SMEs if it had not been for their 
increasing power and legitimisation. The IASC had not had much movement or uptake of their 
international standards, and prior to EU adoption (with modification) the rules created by the 
IASC and the IASB had had limited impact (Botzem, 2012). Whilst there had been some adoption 
in developing countries due to pressure from IFIs, the EU’s adoption was a break-through for 
IFRS:  
After the initial success of IFRS being adopted in Europe and some other jurisdictions, 
there was a lot of demand, a lot of interest in international reporting and the benefits that 
it produces, the evidence had started to emerge that there were economic benefits, but in 
a lot of jurisdictions most of the economy is private companies, SMEs (Interviewee 2).  
This increased the IASB’s power and created a domino effect as many other countries followed 
the EU, increasing the recognition and credibility of IFRS. However, as interviewee 2 explains 
above, this was not meeting the needs of SMEs which is important as SMEs are of high economic 
importance across the globe. Therefore, the IASB’s extension to SMEs is important to the IASB’s 
expertise and role as an agent for advanced financial capital, as SME play a prominent role in 
global capital movement.  
After an increase in power, the IASB were perceived as the only board or organisation with 
enough credibility, legitimacy and expertise to create a standard for SMEs and/or developing 
countries. Any alternative (such as the UN’s SMEGA) is depicted as illegitimate in comparison 
to the brand of the IASB. Without this adoption and subsequent claims to comparability, global 
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accounting language and expertise, the IASB would not have been able to operate this extension 
in the same narrow manner. Indeed, during the development of the IFRS for SMEs, the IASB 
claim to have gained vast support in comparison to the creation of other standards:  
…people were enthusiastic to do it, standard setters, standard setters don’t do much that 
people like, its usually the opposite so if you’re, if you’re sitting their being criticized for 
these terrible things that you’re doing to banks or whatever it might be, you know, it’s 
kind of refreshing I suppose to all of a sudden do something that people will say boy this 
is really useful, boy were glad you’re doing this, and I think the opposition slowly eroded 
(Interviewee 17). 
This interviewee is referring to the erosion of opposition against IFRS for SMEs from board 
members, as they began to see that constituents believed that the standard was ‘really useful’. 
Thus, the internal board politics are an important aspect of the IASB’s problematisation, and the 
necessity to have the standard as close to full IFRS as possible. This equivalence emerged to 
please those that see the board as legitimate because of their expertise, the claims to high-quality, 
and to please the board members internally that the IFRS for SMEs would not be different from 
full IFRS. So, the IASB claim that equivalence can be drawn from full IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, 
but this is contingent and is challenged by external constituents:  
The Committee understands that while the differential reporting has been welcomed by 
some market participants, others have suggested that with full GAAP as a starting point, 
the differential reporting does not meet the needs of private companies (CL65, 2005: 7).  
The IASB are criticised for creating differential reporting from full GAAP. But as the IASB hold 
an increasing hegemony, they can reinstitute their hegemony and rely on the due process. As the 
IASB attempt to reinstitute their hegemony against counter articulations and contingencies, they 
construct themselves as experts in resolving differential reporting problems, pacifying any 
challenges. Indeed, they add SMEs and emerging economies to their remit:  
BC3 In their 2002 annual report, the Trustees of the IASC Foundation, under which the IASB 
operates, wrote ‘The Trustees also support efforts by the IASB to examine issues particular to 
emerging economies and to small and medium-sized entities.’ In July 2005 the Trustees formalised 
their support by restating the objectives of the Foundation and the IASB as set out in the 
Foundation’s Constitution. They added an objective that, in developing IFRSs, the IASB should 
take account of, as appropriate, the special needs of small and medium-sized entities and emerging 
economies. Similarly, the Standards Advisory Council has consistently encouraged the IASB to 
pursue the project (IASB, 2009c: 6).  
This quote identifies support from various constituents, to counter challenges to their work. This 
reinstitution of their ability and resolution to resolve temporarily silences alternatives and 
antagonisms. The ability to do this stems from their brand, their expertise and the legitimacy that 
they have constructed (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). Despite the legitimacy and hegemony that the 
IASB hold, they must continuously adapt to changing situations, each adaptation and change 
temporarily fixes the discourse, until further contingencies and antagonisms are revealed, as 
explored throughout the empirical chapters. For example, the IFRS for SMEs temporarily fixed 
the issues of differential reporting until the standard was adopted and further problems and 
contingencies were highlighted because the standard is unsuitable.  
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As stated, this was not simple, this was moving, adapting and changing, particularly as the lead 
board members and staff member on the project experienced resistance from the board. 
7.3.2 Changing the remit 
The internal politics further explains the equivalence drawn in the creation of IFRS for SMEs 
from full IFRS, as despite some board members supporting IFRS for SMEs there was resistance 
during problematisation and during the development of the standard. Interviewee 2 comments on 
the resistance, and how this resistance changed over time:  
…the IASB was, I think I am right in saying, expressly set up to write standards for the 
capital markets, for companies that are listed, raise money on the capital markets, that 
was there remit, and it means that they’re clearly looking at the most complex issues that 
companies are likely to encounter in financial reporting terms. I don’t think they saw it 
as their remit or their expertise to develop as standard for SMEs, and I think that’s a 
legitimate position to take. There were, as I said, pressures around the world and [the 
project leader] very much, after some false starts at the IASB he took on and drove that 
project and a lot of the success of it really is pretty much down to [the project leader’s] 
championing of the standard, his level of engagement around the world and working at a 
furious pace to develop that standard, to develop a credible standard, and he eventually, 
the board gradually, I mean there were changes in personnel on the board, I am not 
thinking of anyone in particular, but over the years the views do change and I think that 
probably worked to his advantage. and there was, gradually chipped away at the 
resistance that builds a sort of principle of IFRS is IFRS…  
This interviewee recalls the hesitation from the IASB to act on the creation of the standard because 
of their focus on capital markets, and their limited knowledge on SMEs (with similar comments 
being made by interviewees 2, 3, 14 20, 22, 24 and 27). The IASB do not hold expertise in this 
area, which created problems in the subsequent creation of the standard:  
…so as with insurance and with financial instruments they haven’t got the foggiest idea 
but [they] do talk to other people… I think that SMEs are rather special too, not quite as 
complicated as insurance, but they are special. If you haven’t actually sat down with the 
owner of a small company and explained why you need to do all this work and the owner 
said: but what benefit do I get after it, and gone through that experience it’s difficult to 
actually understand the issues. However you have got to accept the general principle that 
yes they get feedback from lots of people who are expert in the area (Interviewee 27).  
This interviewee is making comparisons to other standards the IASB have developed in areas 
where they lack specific expertise. But, justification and legitimacy is gained as they talk to other 
people and get feedback. This draws on the due process and enables the IASB to ignore the issues 
created by a lack of experience of SMEs, and a focus on listed entities and capital markets, further 
explored in chapters 8 and 9.  
As explained by interviewee 2 there was concern from board members that the development of 
an SME standard was outside of the board’s remit, so to address some of the resistance the 
Chairman and trustees changed the IASB’s constitutional remit:  
…the IASB is never simple, his view was that no it was outside the scope of the IASB 
remit…. I don’t think it was expertise, I think it was purely to do with [a board member’s] 
objection, and David [Tweedie] recognised that [the board member] was right, that you 
know read the words in the constitution, what does it say here, other than about listed 
companies and the answer is nothing at all. The trustees would have been committed to 
doing a review of the constitution after 3 years I think, and so I think David just slipped 
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that in and said ok while were updating the constitution lets nail that one as well, so that 
nobody, and particularly sponsors or anybody else can come back to use and say why are 
you doing this, it’s outside your legal competence, it’s outside your mandate (Interviewee 
27). 
This changed remit meant that internal actors could no longer object based on the remit, 
demonstrating the way the chairman pushed through the standard despite board resistance. 
Moreover, the project leader reported directly to the chairman to avoid such resistance (Ram, 
2013). Due to external politics and pressure, and the change in the remit, resistance no longer 
mattered, as those advocating the project would continue:  
He was a very good politician, the former chairman of the UK standards board as you 
probably know, he became the chairman of the IASB, he believed strongly in a separate 
simplified standard for SMEs, our trustees did as well, see they weren’t accountants, they 
didn’t have to worry about recognition and measurement simplification issues, they 
worried about the politics, the acceptability. Our vice chairman at the time of the IASB 
as well… (Interviewee 11). 
This change in remit draws an equivalence from IFRS to emerging economies and SMEs, as they 
retain a focus on creation the standard from full IFRS throughout:  
…to provide a simplified, self-contained set of accounting principles that are appropriate 
for smaller, non-listed entities and are based on full IFRS, which are developed to meet 
the needs of entities whose securities trade in public capital markets (IASB, 2009c: 8). 
The impact of the focus on full IFRS dismisses alternatives outside of full IFRS, which also stifles 
any future alternatives or discussions (this is discussed further in the following chapters which 
examine the due process). Thus, the IASB never moved to far away from full IFRS, they stayed 
as close to full IFRS as possible and resisted changes. Due to the way the IASB are set up and the 
logics that underpin their work this is not surprising, what is surprising is the continued legitimacy 
and power that the IASB hold, and the rhetoric that they purport to represent. This continues to 
ignore questions of suitability, and questions of expertise, as these are covered over in equivalence 
as the IASB continue to extend their hegemony.  
In particular, the lack of expertise that the IASB hold in the area of SMEs and differential 
reporting is intertwined in this logic of equivalence. As the IASB usually draw on superior 
expertise in the creation of IFRS, but IFRS for SMEs is in contradiction to this. So, they have to 
reconstruct themselves as experts in any area of standard setting, by drawing this equivalence. 
This operates to protect their standard setting role, and threats to their legitimacy. As, if this 
contingency emerged and grew deeper it could be a major problem in destabilising the IASB’s 
logics. Instead, as the IASB re-stabilise they extend their role as hegemonic agent of advanced 
financial capital. In this the IASB reinforce their role as technocratic, and cover over the threat to 
their role as the agent of advanced financial capital and increasing its access.  
This necessity to protect their role as standard setter and agent of advanced financial capital is 
important to this problematisation:  
 …so there was this growing concern at the IASB whether they want competition, not 
really competition but whether they want all these different countries to do their own 
different versions of SME standard (Interviewee 4). 
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As can also be seen in the meeting notes: 
David Tweedie… was concerned that the ED was going to be delayed again, when many 
people were desperate to see the draft… He added that there was not time to complete a 
comprehensive Basis for Conclusions… Tom Jones said the delay had already cause real 
problems and the Board was losing constituents every month while the ED failed to 
appear. He regretted how much time had been lost already but there was no alternative 
here. Hans Georg Bruns suggested that the Basis could be published later than the body 
of the ED. Mary Barth said she would be hesitant about doing that. Mr Pacter said he 
would do his best to complete as much as possible by the end of August (ISTAR, 2006f: 
25).  
This conversation outlines the necessity to move faster on the standard because, as this quote 
explains, the board members were concerned about the delay to the ED because ‘many people 
were desperate to see the draft’, so the IASB may not be able to complete the basis for conclusions 
in time. Indeed, the key point here is in the comments that follow from the board member who is 
concerned about the delay and the way that ‘the board was losing constituents every month while 
the ED failed to appear’, which illustrates a gradual loss of their control and power in standard 
setting. Thus, the resistance on the board is ‘slowly chipped away’ as articulated by interviewee 
2. This can also be seen in the discussion by various interviewees on the voting that occurred 
throughout the due process, showing that this voting was highly political.  
7.3.3 The politics of voting  
Board members cast various votes during the creation of the standard, but the focus here (as 
interviewees mentioned the importance), is the vote on final promulgation. One interviewee 
explains that once the standard had been finalised there was a feeling that members should not 
dissent:  
…there is a strong feeling within the board that you shouldn’t dissent, and that you 
shouldn’t vote against something that your colleagues support, and I don’t think this is in 
any sense underhand, I think its a question of collective action, collective responsibility, 
and you’ll be familiar in UK cabinet there is an issue of collective responsibility, ok you 
can debate a subject within the cabinet and you fight tooth and nail against it, but once 
the decision has been made you support it. There isn’t that kind of explicit understanding 
within the IASB, but there is an implicit understanding that it is not collegial… to 
continue to oppose something when there is a working majority of people who want to 
do it, you go along with it… (Interviewee 27).  
These logics of collective action, collegiality and support further narrow the IASB’s decisions. 
This ignores the suitability of the standard and focuses instead on support and the IASB’s 
reputation. Moreover, these logics ignore antagonisms and draw political frontiers and 
boundaries, with the feeling of collective action forming a feeling of us and them towards the 
outside world. Interviewee 21 also explains this:  
… there were probably things that I would have individually changed in the set of 
standards, but you know, you never get everything that you want, and our voting 
requirement on every standard was in order to vote against something you had to 
assume that you were the swing vote that was either going to make it a standard or 
not and you had to conclude that the world would be better off without it than with 
it, as a whole… philosophically I agreed that we had to have a standard for non-
publicly accountable entities, so the individual specifics to me were not perhaps as 
important… 
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This shows the despite earlier resistance once the standard had been pushed through (as described 
below) it was unlikely that board members were going to vote against. The leaders of the project 
and those in support of IFRS for SMEs on the board, raise important points about the risks and 
politics surrounding these votes:  
…it was split, really split, it was a push and I can’t remember how many, what 
number we had won, but when it was 14 members we had to get 9 votes and that was 
quite tough, you know we were wandering along at 8 for quite a while, eventually 
we got 13, although if it was up to 16 at that time I don’t think we would have got 
15, but we only had one dissent, but in the beginning it was difficult and what 
probably swung them was the fact that it was quite clear from the comments we got 
a lot of support for it (Interviewee 19). 
 
[The board member] was very good at pushing these things through, you know I 
always knew how many votes I had because [the board member] would tell me in 
advance because it is different if I go and ask you know, whereas [the board member] 
could go and ask casual over coffee, so depending on their votes I knew which way 
I should play it and [staff member] was superb, but that was really the background 
to it, but there was quite a lot of opposition at the beginning… (Interviewee 19). 
These quotes are linked to the necessity to protect the IASB’s technocratic reputation. Similarly, 
another board member discussed the politics of this voting, identifying that at times is was ‘touch 
and go how many votes we’ve got’ (Interviewee 5).  
Despite this politics and logics of collective action, there was one board member who dissented, 
because IFRS for SMEs was not necessary or desirable (IASB, 2009c). This board member 
disagreed with the standard throughout its creation because the decisions made about 
simplifications were not justified (Interviewee 17). Further investigation of the roles of different 
people in the development of this standard would be interesting, but is not the focus of this thesis.  
Examining the resistance on the board and the politics of voting identifies contingencies and 
antagonisms that threaten the creation of the standard, but they are ignored by attempts to 
legitimise the board, restabilise the IASB’s expertise, and hold the board together through 
collective action. Moreover, the IASB do not move too far away from IFRS, and set themselves 
up as the board to resolve the problem, in a form of ad-hocism. This demonstrates the power of 
the staff members in their ability to construct the standard in a manner that was agreeable both 
internally and externally. The extension did not sit comfortably with board members when they 
thought that they were going to be doing something outside, different or potentially threatening 
to full IFRS, but once this changed, they were persuaded to vote in protection of their standard 
setting role, and technocracy.  
7.4 Conclusion: Reinstituting hegemony 
This chapter began by explaining that analysis of the extension to IFRS for SMEs could be 
deceptively simple, if the politics and contestations of this extension were not considered. 
Invoking political analysis highlights the destabilising contingencies that the IASB respond to in 
the creation of IFRS for SMEs. Initially, this thesis sees the IASB and other IFIs requesting that 
national standard setters follow full IFRS, and believing that these standards are suitable for all 
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entities. Over time, as the logic of one-size-fits-all is destabilised, the work of the IASB also 
becomes destabilised as counter articulations emerge that threaten the hegemony that the IASB 
hold in standard setting as principle agent. Whilst differential reporting was a concern for the 
IASC, it did not take prominence as they focused on gaining legitimacy through their work with 
IOSCO. However, over time as the prominence of differential reporting was growing outside of 
the IASB, the contingencies in the IASB’s work grew, threatening their technocratic role. A 
combination of counter articulations from ‘IAS Lite’, national standard setters and transnational 
bodies, alongside demands from the WB and IMF highlighted contingencies in the IASB’s work, 
threatening to their work as principle standard setters constructing a global language for financial 
reporting and their role as an agent of advanced financial capital. Thus. they constructed IFRS for 
SMEs in a manner that draws in these different counter articulations in a LoD to re-stabilise their 
hegemony. Moreover, as they begin to problematise this contingency, their lack of expertise in 
the area, and a desire to focus on their core remit becomes prominent for the board members. So, 
to appease these concerns a LoE is drawn from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, covering over the 
contingencies of the movement and restabilising the IASB’s role and expertise. To reinstitute this 
hegemony key board members extend the remit of the IASB, and appease board members 
opposed to the standard through a focus on IFRS. The undertake this by reconstituting their 
technocratic expertise and due process logics, depicting to all that they are the experts, protecting 
their extension through de-politicisation.  
They act to reinstitute their hegemony to resolve these problems in a form of ad-hocism, in their 
extension. Within this there is a logic of ‘trust’ in which the IASB are constructed as the body 
that can resolve the problem. This is a form of Gramscian accommodation, as the threats that 
emerged have now become pacified by the reinstitution of the IASB’s ability to deal with the 
problem and reinstitute their hegemony. Within problematisation and the movement to begin the 
development of the standard by the IASB, LoE and LoD are in operation as the IASB attempt to 
reinstate their role in the regulatory conversation, as the center of the expertise for standard 
setting. Through the simultaneous construction of the necessity for differential reporting to remain 
within IFRS through LoD, whilst also operating LoE through the idea that IFRS for listed entities 
can be extended to become suitable for SMEs. They reinstate their position as technocratic 
regulator and they construct frontiers (within the differential reporting debate), through defence 
and naturalisation. 
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Figure 20: Drawing in contingencies 
 
The diagram illustrates full IFRS as a nodal point which focuses on financial reporting for listed 
entities and then the contingency which is outside of the IASB’s frontiers of differential reporting. 
Moving along the diagram this contingency is subsequently bought in to the nodal point of IFRS 
through LoD and LoE. The ‘contingency’ of differential reporting highlighted a potential area for 
‘dislocation’ in the full IFRS structure, as this was a contingent system which had become 
antagonised. However, the IASB’s structure never became full dislocated, as they were able to 
re-stabilise themselves. The perceived threats towards the IASB were subsequently 
problematised, as an opportunity for the IASB to extend their control in the creation of IFRS for 
SMEs as a technical solution to a problem. This opportunity acts to extend the IASB’s work 
beyond listed entities, which leads to a change in the overall remit, resulting in an extension of 
the IASB’s hegemony.   
This chapter has focused on the political logics of the emergence of IFRS for SMEs, the 
problematisation of differential reporting by different actors and the way that the IASB attempt 
to re-stabilise their hegemony by placing themselves back at the centre of the regulatory 
conversation. Throughout the chapter there have been questions about both the social and 
fantasmatic logics. This chapter identified that, in the creation of IFRS for SMEs the IASB have 
narrowed the debate and regulatory conversation by focusing on full IFRS and dismissing 
alternatives. Within this extension, the IASB are continuously adapting to changing situations, 
antagonisms and contingencies to maintain their hegemonic status, this is maintained through 
their due process, which will be explored further in chapter 8 and 9. As shown in the overview of 
the empirical chapters, the following chapter moves to consider the due process. This investigates 
further the necessity for the operation of LoD and LoE simultaneously in the construction, 
maintenance and extension of hegemony.   
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Chapter 8: Deconstructing the IASB’s ‘SMEs’ and ‘emerging economies’ 
Chapter 7 outlines the political logics that were involved in the IASB’s decision to extend to IFRS 
for SMEs, demonstrating the constant operation of LoE and LoD in this movement. This chapter 
moves to look at how the IASB operated the extension, by using their current due process to 
simultaneously delegitimise and incorporate alternative articulations. As the IASB define SMEs, 
and use the title ‘IFRS for SMEs’ they draw in many different definitions and articulations of what 
an SME is. Additionally, the IASB operate the due process under the assumption that if they meet 
the needs of SMEs in the standard they will automatically meet the needs of developing countries 
in the creation of the standard (this will be explored in the second half of the chapter). Throughout 
the due process the IASB construct a closed debate that is unable to question homogeneity, which 
ignores local contexts. The operation of difference and equivalence is constructed as logical in 
the due process, and socially sedimented practices which cover over competing articulations and 
contestations, by rendering them unnecessary and delegitimised. This has the effect of persuading 
key political actors that the IASB’s expertise and technocracy is required at the centre of standard 
setting. Indeed, this is the core focus for this thesis, examining how the IASB control regulatory 
conversations through their processes, to identify how they extended their processes as a 
technocratic regulator to SMEs and emerging economies. In this, this thesis is not making 
suggestions for incremental improvements to the IASB’s due process, instead this thesis is calling 
for the acknowledgement of the IASB’s role as an agent in the hegemony of advanced financial 
capital, as the ideologies surrounding this are detrimental to society. The thesis therefore calls for 
deeper, systematic change, and for the necessity to consider alternatives.  
This thesis does not consider every part of the due process, focusing instead on debates that are 
examples of the technocratic logics employed by the IASB. The first half of this chapter examines 
the debate surrounding the definition of ‘SMEs’ and the use of the title ‘IFRS for SMEs’, because 
this demonstrates the IASB’s hegemony.  
8.1 Defining SMEs  
Internationally, there are many different definitions of ‘SMEs’, which renders the IASB’s 
identification that IFRS for SMEs has been ‘designed for use by small and medium-sized entities 
(SMEs), which are estimated to represent more than 95 per cent of all companies’, a problematic 
and contestable claim. This claim rhetorically draws upon design as a metaphor, invoking certain 
understandings of the standard’s development. Moreover, the IASB claim that this ‘design’ is 
meant for ‘more than 95 percent of companies’, which constructs a one-size-fits-all (apart from 
listed entities) approach, warranting further exploration.  
The scope of IFRS for SMEs caused controversy and confusion during and after the development, 
both within the board and externally. The observer meeting notes demonstrate this, as the IASB 
repeatedly discussed defining SMEs, the standard’s scope, and the title, in almost all the board 
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meetings that discussed IFRS for SMEs. This therefore renders the topic crucial for further 
discussion in four elements: 
…the standard setters for years weren’t even really sure what they were talking about, 
are they talking about companies with 50 employees or with 500. And I think that they 
got the right answer, the right answer is nothing really to do with size… The only sensible 
distinction is between listed and not listed and that is where they eventually arrived, 
though of course the title never quite got there, so it stayed as SMEs which is 
unfortunately misleading (Interviewee 3).  
This interviewee points to four separate issues for IFRS for SMEs that will be discussed, 
including: the lack of clarity of scope from the IASB; the discussion of size criteria; the leaving 
behind of size criteria in the movement to the distinction between listed and unlisted entities; and, 
the title’s reference to size. Therefore, the following sections examine these four interconnected 
issues.  
8.2 Defining SMEs, micro debates and counter articulations 
The different definitions that exist globally for SMEs raise multiple micro debates and issues for 
the IASB, as an international standard setter that reaches across jurisdictions (micro debates on 
criteria were outlined in chapter 6) (Berisha & Pula, 2015; Di Pietra et al., 2008; OECD, 2010). 
Whilst the IASB claim not to have focused on size criteria through their definition, there are 
concerns raised about the size of the entity targeted by the IASB:  
…in the exposure draft, we made, what I would look back and say was a political mistake 
of saying in the basis for conclusions that this standard is intended for companies with 
fewer than approximately 50 employees, we said that in the basis for conclusions, but we 
didn’t actually put that in the definition of SMEs, well many people wrote back and said 
well is that your definition, if its 51 then they’ve got to use full IFRS, and in the end, we 
said we can’t sit in London and say a company with 51 employees has to use full IFRS, 
but 49 can use SME, we felt we’re better off advising the world, think about public 
accountability, you decide what’s publicly accountable… so to me we did say 50, we 
pulled that out of the final standard, because it was hard to, we had no basis to defend it 
(Interviewee 11).  
This interviewee explains that the size criterion given (50 employees) created confusion and lead 
to critique, to which the IASB responded with ‘public accountability’, because the 50 employee 
focus would not be suitable for ‘small entities’ which contrasts the title and the IASB’s claims: 
The ‘not public accountable’ entities representing the target of the IASB’s project have 
around 50 employees: this threshold appears far from the concept of ‘small entities’ in 
many European countries. As a consequence, the standard is too complex for most SMEs, 
in particular small and micro entities (CL93, 2007: 2-3).  
This demonstrates the way that the IASB cover over contingencies, debates and mistakes, 
combining many understandings of SMEs into one standard. The problem of defining the scope 
was dominant in the development of the standard, but this becomes masked in the final 
construction of the standard. Following this confusion and criticism the IASB reversed the focus 
given in the ED as this narrowed the standard’s target and they wanted to reach a wider audience 
(extending the reach of advanced financial capital as far as possible). However, the IStaR observer 
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notes (2006e: 2139) state that the standard ‘was aimed at companies with fewer than 50 
employees’, whilst the ED says the following (as also described in the staff overview of the ED):  
In deciding on the content of the proposed IFRS for SMEs, the IASB focused on the types 
of transactions and other events and conditions typically encountered by SMEs with 
about 50 employees. For such entities, the proposed IFRS is intended to be a stand-alone 
document, with minimal cross-references to full IFRSs (IASB, 2007b: 5).  
The nuances in the quotes are important, this does not focus on ‘fewer’ than 50 employees, instead 
focusing on ‘about’ 50 employees, which led to criticisms and questions about the scope. Even 
though the IASB removed this focus from their definition, it was drawn upon during the creation 
of the standard, as can be seen in the ED, and throughout board meetings. For example, in the 
IStaR (2008k: 24-25) observer notes:  
There were some very sensible ideas. They were dealing with very small companies, with 
fewer than 50 employees. Mr McGregor objected that they had never said they were 
trying to account for micro entities.  
The core problem here is that the focus of the standard is identified, but as this is seen as 
illegitimate, nonsensical, limited and contingent to external constituents (politically), the IASB 
attempt to cover over this ‘political mistake’. Indeed, the IASB realised that they could not give 
this narrow focus because it would limit the standard too much, and they would not have the same 
impact and adoption:  
He [Paul Pacter] thought the Board should discuss what sort of company they were 
aiming at. It might be that outsiders would say this was good for companies with €50m 
of turnover, and they could end up with very few companies using the standards (IStaR 
2004d: 7).  
As explained, there are many different definitions of SMEs globally. These different definitions 
across individual jurisdictions, which consider turnover, listing, number of employees, amount of 
assets and other criteria, impact the work of the IASB as they attempt to incorporate the outcome 
of each of these micro debates over specific criteria into one standard, as demonstrated in the 
following diagram:  
Figure 21: Defining SMEs micro debates 
 
                                               
39  These observer notes are labelled according to the month of the board meeting, for example 2008e is 
the board meeting that happened in May 2008.  
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This diagram illustrates the contestations concerning the definition of SMEs for the purposes of 
the standard. While the IASB focused on 50 employees throughout the due process, this diagram 
illustrates different definitions. Due to an argument concerning the precision of 50 employees, 
the IASB incorporated a range of alternatives, which brings about more flexibility and increases 
the potential scope for the use of IFRS for SMEs. But it should be noted that the focus on size and 
capital market listing has the impact of excluding alternative conceptions of SMEs, including a 
focus on innovation, entrepreneurship, families, cooperatives or community. Indeed, when 
cooperatives do contribute to the debate they are marginalised in the IASB’s meetings.  
During the due process the IASB ignore and silence SMEs themselves, as they narrow the debate 
and then consult on the decisions made, which only tells people the decisions that are made, and 
does not consider alternative logics (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). Indeed, the IASB construct 
SMEs as wanting access to capital, wanting to grow and become bigger and subsequently wanting 
to become listed (ideologies of advanced financial capital), despite potential alternative aims of 
SMEs.  
When interviewed, board members state that the focus was on public accountability and non-
public accountability, but this thesis argues that removing the size threshold from the final 
standard does not take away from the focus during the creation of the standard. Throughout the 
due process size criteria were frequently discussed, and there was a focus in many of the board 
members’ minds (not all the same sizes) which is not reflected in the final definition, as observed 
by interviewee 7:  
We want to develop a standard… for around about 50 employee firm… I was amazed 
really, in hindsight that none ever queried that, so he was saying really, that by developing 
a standard for 50 would mean that you would capture the needs of medium sized 
companies and the very small ones, which probably it doesn’t… they were very wary, 
and really they had no sort of, they had very little knowledge I think of what SME was 
or what, I don’t think they’re particularly interested you know.   
This interviewee highlights four separate points: first that the IASB were identifying a size 
criterion during the development of the standard, second that no one queried the problem of 
claiming that a standard created for entities with 50 employees would ‘capture the needs of 
medium sized companies and the very small ones’, third that the standard is not suitable for ‘very 
small’ entities, and fourth that IASB had little knowledge of SMEs and were not interested in this. 
Each of these elements highlight the IASB’s power as standard setter in regulatory conversations, 
in which they can go unquestioned, and even once they are questioned and critiqued they mask 
these questions through rhetoric. This links to the way that the IASB set up the due process, not 
only did they have ‘very little knowledge’ but they also were not ‘particularly interested’ 
(Interviewee 7 above), showing that the IASB construct their processes and practices in a closed 
and narrow manner. This lack of interest is arguably because they wanted to retain a focus on full 
IFRS principles: 
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 ‘The goal was to distil the full IFRSs down to the ones that would truly serve small and 
medium-sized entities around the world, especially in those countries where regulations 
are less developed.’ Paul Pacter, Director of Standards for SMEs (IASB, 2007e: 10) 
This focus on full IFRS (and its inherent neoliberal and advanced financial capital ideologies) 
shows how the IASB have used their existing due process to delegitimise other standards, as they 
construct that it is necessary and possible to distil IFRS to SMEs. This is concerned with their 
technocratic ability to distil the standards to SMEs, showing them as the experts, and placing them 
at the centre of the debate. Indeed, in terms of defining SMEs many believe that there should be 
a size criterion, because the distinction between listed and non-listed is arbitrary and does not 
consider differences and localities. Instead, the IASB claim that IFRS for SMEs can be everything 
to everyone, in a manner that is best described as condensation, which leads to many different 
understandings of the standard’s scope. The IASB consider other definitions of SMEs but these 
are disregarded in the political move for international recognition. The logics of the due process 
allow them to undertake this process of ‘considering’ but disregarding.  
This thesis is not concerned with the IASB’s focus on 50 employees, 10 employees, 500 
employees, 2,500 annual turnover, or 250,000 annual turnover. Instead the problem is that the 
IASB are trying to create a standard that is many different things to many different people in a 
one size fits all manner, as this comment letter explains:  
We believe that the scope of the standard is currently too wide and tries to be a “one size 
fits all”. We believe that both the user needs and types of transaction differ too much 
between the companies that may currently be within the scope of the standard. As a result 
it will not be possible to come to an appropriate and comprehensive standard. We suggest 
limiting the scope (e.g. excluding small and micro companies). (CL96, 2007:3).  
This creates a politics of condensation, covering over the local. As the IASB becomes threatened 
by counter articulations, discussed in the previous chapter, they counter these articulations by 
claiming to meet the needs of all by fusing together various articulations.  
The IASB operate this condensation by defining the scope as public accountability: 
P9 The IASB develops and issues a separate Standard intended to apply to the general 
purpose financial statements of, and other financial reporting by, entities that in many 
countries are referred to by a variety of terms, including small and medium-sized entities 
(SMEs), private entities and non-publicly accountable entities… Many jurisdictions 
around the world have developed their own definitions of SMEs for a broad range of 
purposes including prescribing financial reporting obligations. Often those national or 
regional definitions include quantified criteria based on revenue, assets, employees or 
other factors. Frequently, the term SMEs is used to mean or to include very small entities 
without regard to whether they publish general purpose financial statements for external 
users (IASB, 2015b: 7).  
This quote demonstrates the IASB’s focus on ‘private entities and non-publicly accountable 
entities’ publishing ‘general purpose financial statements’. Within this quote, the IASB 
acknowledge that there are many different terms and definitions (listing many of them in the 
quote) globally, and try to incorporate and condense all of them through the criteria of non-public 
accountability. The focus on public accountability raises confusion across jurisdictions, arguably 
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because the IASB are attempting to make one size fit all (Di Pietra et al., 2008). Alongside the 
claim to public accountability the IASB also claim to meet the needs of 95 per cent of companies: 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued today an International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) designed for use by small and medium-sized 
entities (SMEs), which are estimated to represent more than 95 per cent of all companies 
(IASB, 2009a:1).  
8.3 ‘95 per cent of all companies’ 
As stated, the IASB claim the standard is ‘designed’ for ‘more than 95 per cent of all companies’. 
This condenses micro, small, medium and large entities into one standard. Despite this claim, 
interviewee 14 claims that any misunderstandings of the definitions are due to misinterpretations: 
The other misuse of IFRS for SMEs is by genuine tiny companies, and what, in fact that’s 
the wrong expression, it’s for companies that don’t need to prepare what we call… 
general purpose financial statements… and you see an awful lot of that, South Africa has 
fixed their system and whenever I speak about it I try and encourage others to do the 
same, but in many other countries, and Brazil comes to mind, they have not (Interviewee 
14).  
This interviewee criticises jurisdictions for adopting the IASB’s standards for all entities. This is 
problematic as the IASB claim IFRS for SMEs is for all entities that publish general purpose 
financial statements for external users other than those that have public accountability. So 
inevitably some of these entities will be micros. Thus, if a country wants to require all companies 
(irrespective of size) to publish general purpose financial statements, that country cannot be 
criticised for requiring the use of IFRS for SMEs by those companies that do not have public 
accountability, as there is not an IFRS for micro-level entities (despite the micro-guide by the 
IASB that is discussed later in this chapter).  
The IASB give a further focus through ‘general purpose financial statements’ that are created for 
‘external users’ (IASB, 2009e: 7). This focus brings ‘users’ into the rhetoric, to justify the IASB’s 
work, which they define as ‘owners who are not involved in managing the business, existing and 
potential creditors, and credit rating agencies’ (IASB, 2009e: 10). The use of the concept of users 
by standard setters for legitimacy has been critiqued (Young, 2006),40 whilst it is an important 
element in the development of IFRS for SMEs, and an aspect of the definition, this concept is also 
discussed throughout the chapters that follow on the due process, in which the concept of users is 
used to offer justification.   
These different aspects lead to a concern about who the standard is created for, and the way that 
this ignores other entities, a concern that continues to be expressed in the recent comprehensive 
review:  
20. Some respondents expressed concern that the IASB’s primary aim in developing the 
IFRS for SMEs in paragraph 16 means the reporting needs of larger, more complex non-
publicly accountable entities are not effectively addressed (paragraph 17(b)). However, 
other respondents had concerns that the IFRS for SMEs is still too complex for ‘smaller’ 
SMEs (paragraph 17(d)). Such contrasting views have been evident throughout the 
                                               
40  As discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2 
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development of the IFRS for SMEs and show the challenge the IASB faces in 
determining the content of the IFRS for SMEs (IASB, 2014a: 7-8). 
This shows problems of suitability for small and large entities. This concern is expressed 
throughout the due process:  
The ED treats SMEs as a homogeneous group for which it proposes the same accounting 
rules with the same exemptions, assuming a common group of users, characterized by 
the same needs. However, for the largest number of SMEs (particularly the smaller and 
micro entities the ED’s 200+ pages and extensive requirements and rules may not provide 
an appropriate cost-benefit balance (Di Pietra et al., 2008: 4 (this was also a comment 
letter on the ED).  
This generalisation is problematic, and is explained through L&M’s politics of condensation. 
Throughout this section of the chapter there have been various demonstrations of the way that the 
IASB fuse together disparate articulations under IFRS for SMEs. The IFRS for SMEs combines 
many different definitions of SMEs that exist globally, to ignore and mask micro-debates 
concerned with defining SMEs. This is a political move, in which the IASB condense various 
significations together to cover over antagonisms and competing articulations of various 
significations. This condensation forms the nodal point of IFRS for SMEs, as the IASB combine, 
through their due process and rhetoric, small, medium, and large entities, and all the different 
ways that these entities can or have been defined (such as assets, turnover, number of employees 
and listing). This incorporates many different and competing understandings of differential 
reporting, delegitimising others through the claim that their standard is suitable for all, for 
comparability and high quality, as the IASB construct themselves as the experts with the ability 
to define SMEs. The claims to expertise and due process allow these forms of condensation to go 
unquestioned, as the IASB appear to be transparent and open to scrutiny, they gain the ability to 
operate a politics of condensation without being challenged. This condensation is illustrated in 
figure 21 which shows that at first the IASB develops IFRS for SMEs with a focus on 50 
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employees, which leads to many antagonisms, some of which are overlapping, and some of which 
are outside the standard.  
 
Figure 22: SMEs condensation 
Moving across the figure the IASB remove the ‘political mistake’ of 50 employees and condense 
the standard further to construct one-size-fits-all and draw in all the antagonisms beyond the 
antagonistic frontier. The elements in the diagram are examples of the condensation by the IASB 
and are not exhaustive, there are other aspects that could be considered here.  
This conceals the primary identity of the dissimilar (IFRS for SMEs), which is a lack of suitability 
and a capital market orientation inherent in IFRS for SMEs. Currently, IFRS for SMEs condenses 
many elements together, but this is failing in the long term, as is shown further on in the chapter. 
The condensation within IFRS for SMEs is further evidenced in the contradiction between 
‘tailored’ and one size fits all (in terms of both entity size and geographical variations). Moreover, 
the standard itself condenses all IFRS standards into one standard. Therefore, the way that the 
IASB use their due process to define the standard’s scope in a manner that is one-size-fits-all is 
an example of the operation of condensation that is prominent in the IASB’s work. This 
condensation also leads to a debate over the standard’s title. 
8.4 Giving the standard a title 
Throughout the development of the standard the title changed many times, and the final decision 
to name the standard ‘International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-Sized 
Entities’ (IFRS for SMEs) plays an important role as the term SMEs implies a size criterion for 
following the standard. Instead, the IASB draw on the criterion of publicly accountable and non-
publicly accountable. The following quote shows that during the development of the standard the 
title was debated extensively, and problems were created by the title. Nevertheless, the final title 
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shows that the political focus of attempting to create a standard recognised around the world 
overrides the concerns regarding suitability of the term: 
The title of the standard—IFRS for SMEs 
The term ‘SMEs’ is widely recognised and used around the world, although many 
jurisdictions have developed their own definitions of the term for a broad range of 
purposes including prescribing financial reporting obligations. Often those national or 
regional definitions include quantitative criteria based on revenue, assets, employees or 
other factors. Frequently, the term is used to mean or to include very small entities 
without regard to whether they publish general purpose financial statements for external 
users.  
The IASB considered whether to use another term. Even before publishing the exposure 
draft in February 2007, the IASB had used the term ‘non-publicly accountable entity’ 
(NPAE) for several months during 2005. During its redeliberations of the proposals in 
the exposure draft during 2008, the IASB also used both ‘NPAEs’ and ‘private entities’ 
for several months. Because the IASB concluded that full IFRSs are necessary for entities 
with public accountability, the terms ‘publicly accountable entity’ and ‘non-publicly 
accountable entity’ had some appeal. However, constituents argued that this term is not 
widely recognised, whereas ‘small and medium-sized entities’ and the acronym ‘SMEs’ 
are universally recognised. Also, some said that ‘non-publicly accountable entities’ 
seemed to imply, incorrectly, that the smaller entities were not publicly accountable for 
anything. Furthermore, the objectives of the IFRS Foundation and the IASB as set out in 
the Foundation’s Constitution use the term ‘small and medium-sized entities’…  
For these reasons, the IASB decided to use ‘small and medium-sized entities’ (IFRSF, 
2013a: 2).  
This quote explains, the term ‘SMEs’ is ‘widely recognised, which is crucial to the final decision. 
In the due process, the IASB acknowledge different definitions and factors, but either delegitimise 
or incorporate these variations. In the first paragraph the IASB delegitimise many different 
definitions by concluding that these definitions do not give ‘regard’ to ‘general purpose financial 
statements’ or ‘external users’. This is a political move which constructs the decisions of national 
standard setters as illegitimate, and covers over the local 
differences between them.  
Following this, in the second paragraph the IASB explain that 
they did consider other names based on the definition, but claim 
that constituents did not agree because the term is not widely 
recognised, whilst SMEs is. Again, referring to the due process 
and technocracy by mentioning feedback from constituents, 
which attempts to mask the political necessity to remain close to 
the constitution and retain international recognition. This 
demonstrates that there is narrow room for alteration, and 
instead there is a focus on wide recognition of the name, this is 
illustrated in figure 23, which shows the problems identified 
with other titles considered.  
Whilst the term ‘SMEs’ is widely recognised and used, the title does 
create confusion, misunderstandings, disappointment and different understandings of the purpose 
of the standard, as it is understood in different ways: 
Figure 23: Title Options 
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…we would observe that the title of the proposed Standard is 
misleading. To title the Standard ‘IFRS for SMEs’ when it 
applies, in fact, not to small and medium-sized entities but 
rather to those entities which are not publicly accountable, is 
not only confusing but totally inaccurate (CL8, 2007: 1).  
This comment letter explains that the title of IFRS for SMEs is 
misleading because ‘SMEs’ is not the focus of the standard, and 
the following comment similarly points to this issue:  
Although the title of the Standard refers to SMEs, the scope 
is actually much broader, encompassing all non-publicly 
accountable entities publishing general purpose financial 
statements. We believe that the IFRS will be very useful for 
companies in the range which falls below fully listed status and 
above micro/small. However, it seems that the title as 
currently expressed does not adequately indicate that the 
document should be used for these ‘middle ground’ 
entities (CL 156, 2007: 1). 
These quotes explain that the title is confusing, misleading and inaccurate, but the IASB ignore 
issues with the title because of the necessity for international recognition, as illustrated in figure 
24. 
Similarly, multiple interviewees discussed different understandings of SMEs varying from 
definitions in ‘national legislation’ (Interviewee 1),  ‘size criteria’ (Interviewee 10), ‘almost every 
country somewhere in their laws or regulations defines an SME for its own purpose’ (Interviewee 
11), ‘you can’t really call them SMEs strictly speaking [laughs] those are, they are bigger than 
SMEs, not SMEs’ (Interviewee 18), ‘threshold, revenue, number of employees… private entities’ 
(Interviewee 16), ‘European legislation… size thresholds’ (Interviewee 2), ‘employees’ 
(Interviewee 4). These quotes show that there are many different understandings of the term 
SMEs. Through the due process and the development of IFRS for SMEs, the IASB cover over 
these different definitions and understandings, and continue to use the title of SMEs, despite the 
mismatch between this title and the standards scope. This is an example of rhetorical redescription 
as the IASB attempt to reconceptualise the meaning of the term SMEs, so that they can use the 
definition and the title that suits them best, politically. By examining the politics of the IASB’s 
construction of IFRS for SMEs, the condensation is unpacked, identifying contestation over the 
definition and the title, which leads to displacement of the ‘common’ signifier resulting in 
confusion and disappointment once the standard is promulgated.  
Through this redescription, the IASB operate displacement because the wide recognition and 
various understandings of this title mean that it operates metonymically to conceal the primary 
identify of the dissimilar (IFRS for SMEs). Throughout the project the IASB rename the standard, 
but the final title attempts to re-conceptualise the term ‘SMEs’, revising its meaning as they focus 
on ‘non-publicly accountable’, but also retain the term because of its wide-spread use. Therefore, 
‘SMEs’ attempts to portray that the IASB have rendered the standard different from full IFRS, 
and met the needs of many, using SMEs for familiarity and international recognition, when in 
Figure 24: International Recognition 
of IFRS for SMEs 
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fact the standard is very similar to full IFRS, and is not suitable for what many would perceive to 
be an SME. This is explored further in the following chapter. 
Thus, the use of the term SMEs operates in two ways:  
1. As there are many understandings that can be taken from the term SMEs, and there are 
many associations made to the term (in contiguity), as shown in the quotes above, the 
term invokes an association of the mind because it is in proximity to many different 
understandings for many different people.  
2. The term and the use of this title also operates metonymically because the use of the term 
SMEs is a substitution for the way that the scope is defined (non-public accountability), 
instead employing a single characteristic (the reference made to size) to obscure and 
simplify the complexities of the standard. For L&M, this is the operation of displacement, 
which is metonymical as it invokes a broad domain of usage and an array of associations. 
Metonymy rhetorically employs a single characteristic to obscure and simplify 
complexities, working through a substitution of words and contiguity. 
Therefore, the IASB are not ‘tailoring’ as they claim, they are instead using a title in displacement, 
to give the appearance of reduced complexity and so that many different actors read many 
different elements into the standard. Arguably this is constructed purposefully so that the term is 
widely recognised and the standard can claim to meet the needs of many, obfuscating the nature 
of the standard, and displacing antagonisms by claiming to meet the needs of all, through 
procedural due process, technical expertise and capital markets (Botzem, 2012; Hines, 1988; 
Martinez-Diaz, 2005).  
In concealing the primary identity of IFRS for SMEs, the IASB is concealing the lack of suitability 
of the standard, and in attempting to become widely recognised they are attempting to cover over 
the local, and to politically meet all counter articulations and reinstate their role as international 
standard setter. The IASB have contaminated the identity of IFRS for SMEs by claiming to be 
everything to everyone, through condensation, so the meaning, identity, definition and use of the 
standard becomes difficult to identify. Thus, the title acts as displacement to remove this 
complexity, which shows that the use of the ‘IFRS for SMEs’ as a title incorporating many aspects 
for the IASB and displacing different understandings. Nevertheless, these complexities and 
antagonisms still exist, and after the promulgation of the standard these contingencies re-emerge, 
as the standard is unsuitable for ‘SMEs’ in many ways, particularly for micro-entities, so the 
IASB attempt to overcome this threat to legitimacy by constructing the micro-guide.  
8.5 The contingency of micro-entities 
The IASB’s social practices and due process allow them to operate a form of ad-hocism as it 
emerges that IFRS for SMEs is unsuitable for micro entities. The IASB re-position themselves as 
able to resolve this problem:  
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…the micro guide was created because there was, for lack of a better term, a thud factor 
so what had essentially happened is a lot of people were looking at our 250 page 
document and saying this is a really long document and we want something simpler and 
what was kind of recognised in that process was the problem was that a lot of small 
companies don’t have pension schemes, they don’t have share option schemes etcetera, 
and so we thought it might be useful to simply do an extract from IFRS for SMEs, put it 
into a smaller book and say if you don’t have these 10 things, if you don’t have a share 
option scheme and a pension fund and etcetera then you can use this 70 page book and 
that might actually make your life, you know, make, it is interesting in fact we haven’t 
had as many people use it as we thought (Interviewee 14).  
This interviewee explains the simplification of IFRS for SMEs and the micro-guide in a pragmatic 
and technocratic way, which ignores the ideological foundations of the standard, and the IASB’s 
capital market orientation (which shuts down alternative understandings of SMEs). Instead, there 
is a focus on a check list with pension schemes and share option schemes as examples. As some 
micro entities do not operate these forms of accounting the creation of the micro guide is 
constructed to resolve this technocratic problem. The micro-guide is not a separate standard, it is 
sections of IFRS for SMEs that are seen as likely (by the IASB) to be relevant for entities with 
less transactions, operating as an index for IFRS for SMEs, in an ad-hocism that does not consider 
the deeper problems of IFRS for SMEs. The suitability and capital market orientation of the 
standard is not considered in any further depth, which makes it unsurprising that the above 
interviewee notes that not ‘as many people use it as we thought’. This ad-hocism is illustrated in 
the following figure:  
 
Figure 25: Overdetermination and the micro-guide 
Figure 25 illustrates that the IASB attempt to condense the needs of small, medium and large 
entities into one standard, but this becomes overdetermined and micro entities become 
antagonistic to the IASB. The IASB then rearticulate and add on the micro guide to continue 
condensing and to incorporate antagonisms.  
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The construction of this micro-guide acts as a further restriction on the IASB’s debate, as they 
appear to have resolved the problem in a technocratic manner. 
In response to requests from constituents, the IASB has developed guidance both to assist 
micro-sized entities currently applying the IFRS for SMEs and to make the IFRS for SMEs 
more accessible for those considering applying it in the future. The guidance supports the 
IFRS for SMEs and does not constitute a separate Standard for micro-sized entities 
(IASB, 2013: 1) 
This resolution is shown to be important politically: 
Tom Jones urged caution, saying that there was tremendous competition from people 
who wanted to write standards for micros. A lot of the scope queries came from them 
(IStaR, 2008c: 11). 
These adaptations by the IASB are ongoing and continuous (temporary fixations), never allowing 
the credibility of the standard to be questioned. However, the arguments below show that the 
standard is not suitable for larger and medium sized entities (despite critiques that the standard is 
also not suitable for small entities):  
…but what we have started to hear now is a demand for companies that are in the middle 
tier, and I use demand in the economic sense rather than in the petitioning sense [laughs], 
a demand for companies that are middle tier, that are not big companies but are also not 
SMEs saying well what about us (Interviewee 14).  
And:  
We believe that the SME standard will in practice be used by medium sized companies, 
not the very small ones as – in our opinion – the standard would be far too burdensome 
for the smallest companies (CL 49, 2005: 1). 
And:  
IFAC is concerned that the SME project may eventually be steered towards providing an 
optimal solution to the reporting needs of larger unlisted entities. A focus on the needs of 
large private entities will likely result in a set of SME standards that are broadly the same 
as IFRSs, with only token simplification of their recognition and measurement principles. 
This outcome would result in SME standards ill-suited for application by the great 
majority of SMEs (CL44, 2005: 2).  
Each of the above quotes demonstrates different issues of suitability and shows the struggle that 
actors have over identifying who the standard is suitable for, thus showing that the nodal point of 
SMEs holds several meanings and has been represented many times, to the extent that it becomes 
overdetermined. Despite these critiques, the IASB are clear that they are not going to create 
standards that acknowledge these differences, as explained by a board member: 
I mean the reality is we were not going to go out and produce financial standards, 
different standards for everyone (Interviewee 14).  
This misses core issues of ideology and clarity, but (as shown in the previous sections) the IASB 
are wary of giving such clarity, as they are attempting to meet the needs of all. Indeed, Di Pietra 
et al. (2008: 6) (which was also a comment letter on the IFRS for SMEs ED) explain that part of 
the problem of this unsuitability is in the IASB’s use of ‘a very broad definition’ which creates 
many difficulties: 
The IASB uses a very broad definition, which makes it difficult to develop a standard 
suitable for the heterogeneous group of entities. Though the IASB used entities with 50 
employees as a guideline and explicitly states that the ED-IFRS for SMEs is suitable for 
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micro-entities, the content of the ED seems to suggest that the IASB’s focus was on larger 
SMEs (with more external users or stronger international orientation). The ED suggests 
that the financial reporting user needs for SMEs are similar or identical to those of 
bigger… it has been questioned whether the IFRS for SMEs can be suitable for micro 
entities… 
Di Pietra et al. (2008) go on to explain that the standard is too complex for smaller entities, who 
would be better suited to follow standards that fit with their local context and local tax rules (Sian 
& Roberts, 2006). This thesis is not concerned with technical suitability, but argues that the 
standard is not suitable for ‘95 per cent of all companies’, and cannot meet the needs of all of 
those that are unlisted, even with the caveats of general purpose financial statements and external 
users. The implication that IFRS for SMEs is suitable for the 95% of companies worldwide for 
whom full IFRS was not intended has never been tested through analysis of the experiences of 
companies using IFRS for SMEs, so the claim remains unsubstantiated. 
As the standard is promulgated it is perceived by all groups as unsuitable, and the only practical 
way out of this situation is to publish a micro-guide (as the standard has already been sold and 
disseminated by the IASB, along with IFIs). This is demonstrated by the opposition to the 
standard from developed countries as they believe IFRS for SMEs holds 
deep-seated ideologies and preconceptions of financial reporting. Thus, 
IFRS for SMEs is not a logical addition for these countries, but rather a 
Trojan horse that is pushing the philosophy of a focus on capital markets 
and listed entities: 
…you know apart from countries like Germany that wanted to do their 
own thing and there was concern that we were trying to take over the 
world and everything else, politicians are always weary of that sort of 
thing… (Interviewee 19). 
The inherent ideology within IFRS of neoliberalism means that there can 
only be one outcome in the construction of IFRS for SMEs, which is 
problematic, as the IASB claim to be neutral.  
As the IASB operate this LoD, which further incorporates contingencies 
into the standard through the micro guide, more signifieds surround the 
nodal point of ‘IFRS for SMEs’, rendering it even more difficult for actors 
to identify meaning. This difficulty of the identification of meaning and 
purpose is a threat to the IASB and IFRS for SMEs, as it highlights further 
contingencies, contingencies that subsequently have to be drawn into the 
condensation to obscure them, which is shown in the construction of the 
micro-guide. Indeed, as Di Pietra et al. (2008) point out, the broad 
definition and the heterogeneity within the standard makes the 
development and understanding difficult. The political movement of 
condensation conceals contingencies and covers over local issues with the 
standard, but this leads to overdetermination. The creation of the micro-guide does not have the 
Figure 26: The 
hegemonic movement 
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effect of improving suitability, or changing the nature of IFRS for SMEs because this standard 
was created from full IFRS, with a capital market, neo-liberal orientation to increase access for 
advanced financial capital. However, there are contingencies and antagonisms, as there are always 
limits and the standard cannot meet the needs of all. Ignoring these issues leads to a further 
monopoly over standard setting, extending the IASB’s work to prevent counter articulation and 
alternatives and to reinforce their technocracy (Sunder, 2011; Botzem, 2012). The IASB’s 
discussions are limited to a focus on IFRS, as will be discussed in chapter 9. The IASB believed 
that other organisations should not be changing or adapting IFRS for other types of entities. This 
narrows the space and enhances the IASB’s brand, technocracy and expertise. The extension of 
these logics spreads the message that accounting should be done in a certain way, and extends the 
IASB’s logic of expertise and accounting technologies to new areas (Lazzarato, 2012).  
The operation of condensation, displacement and overdetermination acts to conceal the broader 
politics at work for the IASB in which they operate as a geo-political agent for advanced financial 
capital, and extend this role to SMEs and developing countries in a narrow manner, extending 
their control. The metonymical displacement within IFRS for SMEs masks the political nature 
and aims of the IASB, through claims that the standard is ‘tailored’ for SMEs and their users. 
This excludes alternatives, as nodal points attempt to fix discourse by offering meaning, but it is 
a partial fixation, operating in the construction and maintenance of the IASB’s hegemony.  
8.6 Condensation and IFRS for SMEs   
So far in the chapter (sections 8-8.5) it has been demonstrated that the IASB have condensed 
many different entities into the standard. The signifier ‘SMEs’ leads to interested parties reading 
many different ideas and concepts in to the standard, and the IASB themselves make multi-
various claims. Subsequently, the signifier represents many different things to many different 
people, as the standard claims to meet the needs of a highly heterogeneous group of entities, 
including small, medium and large entities, across both developed and developing countries. The 
homogeneity within the standard reaches across many heterogeneous sectors and divisions in an 
act of condensation.  The IASB aimed to provide a technical solution to the problem of differential 
reporting across the globe, which was in some ways tainting full IFRS, through different 
adaptations that the IASB had not approved of. Thus, the IASB attempt to meet all of these counter 
articulations through one standard, covering over alternatives and different perspectives.  
The contingencies in full IFRS highlight that the needs of SMEs and developing countries cannot 
be met, which leads to counter articulations. Indeed, differential reporting threatens the myth of 
global accounting language that the IASB rhetorically construct. Whilst differential reporting is 
welcomed onto the market to an extent, the IASB’s creation of the standard from full IFRS covers 
over contingencies and reinforces the rhetoric and ideologies of IFRS. Due to one-size-fits-all and 
overdetermination the issue of suitability and micro entities emerged, so the IASB added on the 
micro-guide.  
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Therefore, this thesis argues that instead of listening to the bottom up demand that the IASB 
claimed was strong, the IASB worked in conjunction with other IFIs to decide what these 
countries needed, decide how they were going to meet that need, and implement adoption 
pressure. The IASB make these claims through the power of their brand as they try to constitute 
best practice for SMEs and differential reporting through the rhetoric of full IFRS, and claims to 
‘due process’, ‘consultation’, ‘high quality’ and ‘internationally recognised’. This leads to the 
following section, which focuses further on the IASB’s social logics. The way the IASB closes 
this debate is further explored in the following sections of this chapter and in chapter 9.  
So far, chapter 8 has outlined the IASB’s operation of LoD, in which the IASB incorporate many 
different articulations and understandings into one standard. The creation of IFRS for SMEs also 
operates LoE, as was shown in the overview of the empirical chapters, and this is now explored. 
8.7 Developing countries and SMEs  
As outlined in Figure 17 this section now moves to the connection that the IASB make from 
SMEs to developing countries during the due process. The IASB claim to have reflected 
geographical diversity throughout their due process in various forms: comment letters, field 
testing and the working group for the standard. Prior research has questioned the geographical 
diversity of the IASB’s due process, mainly through the quantification of comment letters (Devi 
& Samujh, 2015; Ram & Newberry, 2013; Singh & Newberry, 2008).  
8.7.1 Quantifying comment letters 
By analysing comment letters and tallying the responses for geographical diversity, researchers 
have demonstrated that the IASB’s geographical diversity is inadequate (Devi & Samujh, 2015; 
Singh & Newberry, 2008). This section extends this quantification by offering detailed analysis. 
Examining the due process identifies that there were limited opportunities for developing 
countries to express their concerns, and if concerns were expressed they were disregarded. Devi 
& Samujh (2015) adapt Singh & Newberry’s (2008) analysis of the responses to the IASB’s 
discussion paper (DP) in 2004 to highlight a lack of input from developing economies and 
academics. Singh & Newberry (2008) and Ram (2012) have shown that there is limited input 
from developing countries, as outlined in the literature review in chapter 6. However, this thesis 
extends these tallies in three ways, first in the consideration of the qualitative elements of these 
comment letters, second by considering the social logics in operation within this due process that 
enable exclusion, and third by offering further theoretical explanations for the lack of 
geographical diversity.  
8.7.2 Extending quantification  
a) Capital market orientation  
Whilst counting comment letters does reveal limitations, examining the content of these 
comments reveals further issues. This section considers all comment letters but focuses on those 
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that fall outside the standard format requirements requested by the IASB, as these letters attempt 
to open the debate to different perspectives outside the IASB’s due process. These comment 
letters are antagonistic to the debate, but are covered over through LoE and due process rhetoric. 
There are many comment letters on the ED that discuss the burden that will be placed on SMEs 
through IFRS for SMEs, because it is too complex and unsuitable (for example: CL15, 2004; 
CL86, 2004; CL3, 2007; CL27, 2007; CL28, 2004; CL35, 2007; CL55, 2007; CL66, 2007; 
CL152, 2007; CL160, 2007; CL161, 2007). Cairns (2006)41 discusses the complexity of the ED:  
Notwithstanding my support for IFRS for SMEs, I am very concerned about the 
complexity and length of the draft.  This reflects the IASB’ apparent policy of making its 
all its standards as complex and difficult to understand and interpret (while some of this 
complexity results from the increasing complexity of business transactions, much of it is 
the IASB’s own doing) (Cairns, 2006: 1).  
Despite his support for the IFRS for SMEs, Cairns is concerned about the complexity of the 
standard, which is linked to problems of full IFRS complexity:  
The draft IFRS for SMEs has been compiled by extracting the relevant parts of other 
IFRS which were written at different times and in different styles.  This is a similar to the 
“cut and paste” approach adopted by the old IASC with IAS 39.  But, as IAS 39 shows 
clearly, the “cut and paste” approach has many problems.  The draft IFRS for SMEs also 
suffers for its apparent failure to focus on SME issues (Cairns, 2006: 1).  
Similarly, many commented on creating the IFRS for SMEs from full IFRS and the complexities 
this creates (CL27, 2007; CL66, 2007; CL96, 2007; CL132, 2007; Devi & Samujh, 2015; 
Fearnley & Hines, 2007). This was also commented on in the DP, for example: 
In a purest sense, we agree with the objectives. However, we have real concerns about 
the financial reporting standards for SME’s being based on the same conceptual 
framework as IFRSs. The IFRSs framework may not be appropriate or meaningful for 
SME’s. We would need to see the details prior to making any further comment (CL28, 
2004: 3). 
These comment letters and critiques point to the issue of the standard being created from the 
unsuitable basis of full IFRS, the problem of the ‘top down’ approach: 
The IFRS for SMEs at hand represents a complex set of regulations, which is difficult to 
understand for a new user. On the one hand the board is of the opinion the IFRS for SMEs 
to be an independent standard; on the other hand the full IFRS have to be considered 
because of numerous references. In many cases the user has to know both sets of 
regulations to decide which one is more suitable for him. Therefore the medium-sized 
businesses would have to know two bodies of rules and regulations. This contradicts the 
stand-alone document. Also the chosen top-down-approach does not lead to the fact that 
the specific basic conditions for medium-sized businesses are considered sufficiently. 
With a bottom-up-development of the standard for medium-sized businesses compulsory 
and specific regulations could have been incorporated (CL66, 2007: 2) 
This comment argues that a different approach should have been taken for the standard, with a 
bottom up focus from SMEs. Arguably the consequence of the top down creation of the standard 
is that it leads to high cost constraints and burdens:  
For these interested companies, an IFRS for SME has to offer more advantages than 
stresses and strains. Cost-benefit-aspects have to be considered. The exposure draft seems 
to be still too voluminous and with rules which are not common in SMEs. The IFRS for 
                                               
41  This comment letter missed the comment letter deadline but was sent to the IASB and given to the 
author as a personal document.  
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SME should include only these financial reporting issues which are routine in an ordinary 
SME (CL35, 2007: 2).  
And, a capital market orientation (CL27, 2007; CL123, 2007; CL, 161, 2007): 
Although IFRS for SMEs is aimed at unlisted companies, the proposed IFRS for SMEs 
is heavily based on the framework of IFRS. Therefore it has a very strong focus on the 
needs of capital markets and investors (CL151, 2007: 1).  
This complexity stems from the social logics of the due process, which enable the IASB to take 
full IFRS and use what has been described as a ‘cut and paste method’ in the construction of IFRS 
for SMEs. This demonstrates a LoE, in which the IASB claim that IFRS for listed entities can be 
cut down to create a standard that is suitable for unlisted entities. This limits and narrows the due 
process, the impact of which is further explored in the following chapter. Here, what is crucial is 
the dominance of the capital market orientation and advanced financial capital within IFRS for 
SMEs, because the standard was created from full IFRS (Devi & Samujh, 2015). This leads to a 
disconnection between the standard and the needs of SMEs, which is particularly pertinent within 
developing countries and countries that are not focused on capital market logics or ideologies 
(Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Lawson, 2007; Peet, 2009).  
b) Ignoring developing countries  
The issue of geographical diversity became more prominent during the development of the 
standard. Responding to the IFRS for SMEs ED, CL150 (2007: 2) raised this issue at length:  
BC3 refers to the support of the trustees for the IASB’s efforts to “examine issues 
particular to emerging economies and to small and medium-sized entities”. The SME 
project initially included consideration of issues peculiar to emerging economies but this 
objective seems to have been removed at some point. The burden of complying with full 
IFRS is clearly great for SMEs in developing markets operating in emerging economies. 
The SME standards as drafted do very little to reduce this burden. The Board’s concern 
in the SME accounting project should be to develop standards for those jurisdictions 
where the need is greatest, and not for jurisdictions which already have their own 
standards and standard-setting bodies. 
This comment letter suggests that whilst the IASB did plan to consider issues peculiar to emerging 
economies, this objective seems to have been removed at some point, and that the SME standard 
(as it was in the ED) does very little to reduce the burden. Within the due process, the IASB claim 
to have acknowledged the lack of geographical diversity, and a lack of professional diversity (in 
terms of users), so special outreach was conducted through the R&M questionnaire, field tests 
and travelling and consultation by staff members (much of the latter is hidden from public view), 
to gain input from developing countries. Previous research has argued that a combination of this 
special outreach42 occurring too late (as many decisions had already been made), an overall lack 
of change from external input, and the top down approach to the development of the standard has 
meant that this special outreach had little impact (Devi & Samujh, 2015; Fearnley & Hines, 2007; 
Ram & Newberry, 2013). Whilst the IASB make claims to inclusiveness through token board 
                                               
42      The timing of these outreach activities is outlined in the chronology of development of IFRS for         
SMEs outlined in Appendix 1. 
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members and meetings with SME financial statement users (both of which are limited), the 
IASB’s due process continues to have a lack of inclusiveness and problems in the identification 
of who should be included (Quack, 2010). 
Indeed, interviewees explain that the IASB did not hear or listen to contributions from 
organisations in developing countries:  
…was I listened to, that’s a good question. Maybe I didn’t explain enough when I was 
talking, so they heard but I don’t think they understood (Interviewee 18).  
This demonstrates that the IASB were not listening to developing countries, as they claimed, 
which is problematic, as instead the IASB are disseminating their own ideas and ideologies, in an 
imperialistic manner (Annisette, 2004; Devi & Samujh, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et 
al., 2017; Poullaous & Sian, 2010). Importantly, developing countries have been the main 
countries to adopt the standard, as interviewee 12 explains, when discussing the key beneficiaries 
of the standard:  
… in some developing countries and countries where they might not have the resources 
to develop their own accounting standards, full IFRS have been required for most entities, 
even the very small ones, and in some cases entities do not have the expertise to apply 
full IFRS very well.  I think those countries could benefit most from the IFRS for SMEs. 
In countries where they have got a well- established GAAP for small companies and that 
GAAP is similar to the local tax requirements, then adopting the IFRS for SMEs might 
not be so beneficial. 
‘Developed’ or ‘advanced’ countries with advanced accounting infrastructure have not adopted 
the standard to the same extent:  
…the critical observation is to look around the world at the developed standard setters 
and ask why none of them have adopted it, none of them, and I think that the critical 
observation here is, everything depends on where you have been as to whether [IFRS for] 
SMEs is attractive or not… (Interviewee 22). 
This interviewee is explaining that many countries do not see the standard as necessary because 
of their previous experience with differential reporting, and their ‘developed’ status. The impact 
of not considering the local context is more important for SMEs, because SMEs have further 
exposure to their local context, as CL112 (2007:1) explains: 
Another concern is the ability of countries with limited resources to identify 
circumstances that would render the use of international standards inappropriate, 
especially given that we are sceptical that even more “sophisticated” countries are doing 
this well.  The ability to do this may be even more critical for SME’s than it is for large 
companies, as SME’s are perhaps exposed to and influenced by their local context to a 
greater extent. 
This explains that local contexts and cultures have been ignored by the IASB. Nevertheless, the 
IASB’s rhetoric claims to be helping SMEs and developing countries through helping them to 
gain access to capital:  
Millions of small companies in around 80 jurisdictions are already using the IFRS for 
SMEs. It is becoming a passport to raise capital on a local or cross-border basis (IFRS, 
2012: 1).  
However, this rhetoric is disputed as research and interviewees explain that the standard is not 
suitable for SMEs, particularly because the standard was created from full IFRS (Devi & Samujh, 
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2015). Nevertheless, the WB, the IMF and the IASB focus on the necessity to adopt for 
development and growth, structural adjustment and further access to capital, which is concerned 
with the extension of advanced financial capital. Indeed, interviewees believe that the key 
beneficiaries of the IFRS for SMEs are SMEs, because of their increased access to capital: 
…so the number one beneficiary, to me are small companies who get better access to 
capital, and as a result of that then the economy of their country grows, so that’s the big 
beneficiary (Interviewee, 11).  
However, other interviewees explain that the IASB were never clear about if they were talking to 
developing countries:  
… but that’s what happens and none of them have the remotest exposure to developing 
countries, so they acknowledged I think in board discussions that this was an issue that 
they needed to decide- whether they were talking about developing countries, or whether 
they were talking about developed countries. In other words were they helping the EU, 
or were they helping South Africa, and they never necessarily nailed that one publicly, 
but what in effect happened was that it became really focused on developed countries and 
they were quite explicit as it went on, that they recognize well we need to know are we 
writing a standard for 10 employee company or 100 employees, so they fixed on 50 
employees as the kind of company that they had in mind, and I, reading some of my own 
stuff I have seen that I said they were explicit about that in the standard, but I am not 
sure, you would know, does it say that in the basis of conclusions… (Interviewee 27). 
This demonstrates a contradiction in the IASB’s rhetoric, and the actual development of the IFRS 
for SMEs, which effectively excluded developing countries and instead constructs a conception 
of emerging economies that facilitates spreading advanced financial capital (Devi & Samujh, 
2016; Ram & Newberry, 2013). This exclusion is problematic because the IASB follow a line of 
development rhetoric with the WB, which has been critiqued for being imperialistic in nature 
(Annisette, 2004; Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Lawson, 2007; Poullaous & Sian, 
2010). The IASB suggest that capital providers will have further confidence in figures, if entities 
follow IFRS for SMEs. This focuses on external funding, and listing, but many SMEs do not 
desire this as their end goal. Nevertheless, this is linked to economic ‘improvement’ (Fortin et al., 
2010), a development logic and rhetoric which is critiqued and questioned (Hopper et al., 2017; 
Lawson, 2007). The empirics have raised issues with the role of experts and the notion of 
development industry, like Lawson (2007: 41) who critiques development logics for not 
considering those that are being ‘developed’ and only acting to reinforce hegemony. 
In the case of IFRS for SMEs, the IASB are placed at the centre of the discourse, with a focus on 
the development that they believe should be implemented. This reinforces the IASB’s power and 
role in the ‘development industry’, through logics of expertise constructed with the WB, to 
maintain certain development ‘truths’ (Lawson, 2007). This constructs the IASB as the expert, 
and is self-referential as they are both identifying what they think the problem is and developing 
the solutions to these problems (Gallhofer et al., 2011a; Hopper et al., 2017; Lawson, 2007).  
Arguably, the IASB exclude developing countries because of the connection and equivalence that 
they have drawn between SMEs and developing countries, which is further explored in the 
following section.  
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c) SMEs and developing countries  
The core extension that occurs here is between SMEs and emerging economies/ developing 
countries, which can be seen in the original objectives of the organisation:  
The objectives of the IASC Foundation and of the IASB are:  
(a) to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent and 
comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help 
participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic decisions;  
(b) to promote the use and rigorous application of those standards;  
(c) in fulfilling the objectives associated with (a) and (b), to take account of, as 
appropriate, the special needs of small and medium-sized entities and emerging 
economies; and  
(d) to bring about convergence of national accounting standards and International 
Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to high quality 
solutions (IASB, 2009e: 6 [emphasis added]).  
 
The IASB claim that alongside fulfilling objectives a and b, they will also take account of SMEs 
and emerging economies, as a combined objective. When interrogated further it is not clear when 
it was discussed or decided that they should be combined into the same objective. Indeed, as far 
back as the IASC, the discussion of SMEs and emerging economies/developing countries is never 
clear, which is arguably because emerging economies have many SMEs, and often do not have 
any listed entities in their jurisdiction. However, the lack of questioning of this combination is 
taken a step further by the IASB.  
As they meet the needs of SMEs they do not need to specifically consider developing countries 
in the due process, and the use of their expertise and technocracy allows them to do this. The 
IASB are depicted as giving their expertise in standard setting to developing countries, so there 
is no need to consider them or consider local differences. Indeed, the IASB make no 
differentiation between the needs of SMEs and emerging economies (and further than this, no 
differentiation between different emerging economies). The IASB suggests that they will 
automatically meet the needs of emerging economies/developing countries, a suggestion that was 
identified by interviewee 4:  
Well I think from the IASB’s point of view they had this impression that SMEs and 
developing countries have same problems so if we deal with one you automatically deal 
with the other one… I did not see them doing any differentiation between SMEs and 
developing countries.   
As explained, the IASB did not differentiate between SMEs and developing countries (similar 
sentiments are expressed by interviewees 11, 16, 17, 19, with others questioning the connection 
made). Interviewee 4 in the quote above explains that the IASB did not differentiate between 
SMEs and developing countries, holding the impression that they have the same problems, so if 
you deal with one you automatically deal with the other. In taking the analysis in the previous 
subsection in which there were many suggestions that the IASB did not listen or consider 
developing countries to the necessary extent, this equivalence arguably explains this issue. This 
is problematic as the IASB draw an equivalence, from SMEs to developing countries, and instead 
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of consulting developing countries to understand their needs, the IASB claim to focus on the 
needs of SMEs (which is also a contestable claim) to meet the needs of developing countries. 
When asked about SMEs and developing countries, interviewee 11 explains: 
I never saw a lot of difference… we defined SME quite precisely… I don’t quite know 
how to think about that in terms of a developing country… I don’t exactly, I don’t know 
what the needs of a developing country are, I do know the needs of a micro, and I 
wouldn’t be surprised if people who say you’ve got to do more for developing countries 
are really saying, you need to have a separate standard for micros… I said well what do 
you mean you’re a developing country, you’ve got some small companies sure, so I don’t, 
I never quite understood the idea of what can we do for developing countries, I think it 
better to focus on what can we do for a class of company, SMEs who don’t go to equity 
markets (Interviewee 11).  
Interviewee 11 struggles to articulate whether there are different accounting needs depending on 
a country’s level of development and tends to suggest that companies of a certain size can account 
in the same way, irrespective of country and context. This fails to consider the complexities of 
accounting and local contexts. When asked to explain this connection further, interviewees 
express that it is a logical extension to make, indeed interviewee 19 further explains the logic 
behind this equivalence:  
…how do you simplify without sort of over simplifying, I mean that’s one of the 
difficulties, and what we thought was with the SME standard, look, if you’re in Outer 
Mongolia you have hardly any accounting profession, there is no way you can do IFRSs, 
this one might help you, so it’s more in hope than research, we didn’t research it, we were 
working for small companies, but the basic idea was well if a small company without the 
accounting skills of the larger ones can do it then probably developing countries can do 
it as well, I mean there, we didn’t specifically do it that way, it was more in hope than 
research.  
Interviewee 19 highlights a lack of research and suggests that they rely on the concept of hope 
that the standard would support developing countries. This concept of ‘hope’ is surprising as it 
runs counter to technocracy and claims of expertise. This LoE covers over many alternatives and 
differences across different entities and different countries. However, interviewee 4 appreciates 
this logic:  
…if you address the problem of fair value accounting, it is a problem that faces SMEs 
both in developed and in developing countries, so what extra would you do to support 
developing countries, I think what they said was that developing countries need to be 
brought up to speed in terms of infrastructure and technology to use these standards, but 
they did not feel… [an international standard setter] said I could not be convinced why 
developing country had a special need, that would be addressed… he also said that… 
they had some representation of developing countries, or who have some understanding 
of developing countries, and as they go along, like they’ve got a board member from 
China, so as they go along if there are issues that come up, you know, they try to deal 
with it…  
The key points out of this are first, that the interviewees, and IASB, are not convinced that 
developing countries have special needs. Second, the IASB rely on ‘patchy’ geographical 
representation to represent the issues of emerging economies. This constitutes socially 
sedimented practices, that the interests of developing countries are met by board members, as 
particular board members are considered to be representative of particular countries or regions.  
  171 
The equivalence from SMEs to developing countries is claimed to be logical, and this is 
problematic in terms of the due process, because this question has never been asked or addressed. 
This identifies that the IASB have already decided about this extension, and so these decisions 
are presented as complete in the due process. Indeed, the questions surrounding this equivalence 
are important questions, but they have not been asked.  
Through the due process the IASB construct socially sedimented practices which narrow and 
close debates. It is not clear when the connection was made between SME and emerging 
economies, and this equivalence is never questioned in the due process. This draws an 
equivalence, enabling the IASB to effectively ignore developing countries, the impact of which 
is explored further in the following chapter. Here, a crucial movement was made, and was 
constructed as natural and logical, which shows a lack of due process and research, and hides the 
IASB’s decisions behind technocracy. This equivalence is political and problematic, but is not 
presented in that way. As people question this LoE, and question the IASB’s ability to consider 
developing countries, the board members defend this logic. Reliance on the due process and LoE 
in this way becomes instrumental in avoiding the politics of the extension to IFRS for SMEs, 
drawing on the due process to curtail potential contestation and contingency. Despite claims to 
open debate and transparency the documents that are issued as part of the due process are limited 
and shape the ensuing discussion, in particular not raising or considering debates on SMEs and 
emerging economies. This allows the IASB to shape the needs of emerging economies and claim 
they are met by meeting the needs of SMEs.  
Furthermore, the IASB’s construction of ‘SMEs’ and ‘emerging economies’ and the homogeneity 
of these constructions limits and shapes public debates, constructing frontiers and socially 
sedimented practices. In the case of this equivalence, the IASB do not engage with potential 
contestation, it is instead instituted as logical and as part of the due process, so this connection 
becomes instrumental, in the avoidance of politics. This demonstrates that the IASB have the 
ability to define questions and restrict debates. This constructs socially sedimented practices that 
become unquestioned logics in the IASB’s work, by shutting down the debate, in not asking, so 
that the debate is lost. If the question was not raised then the IASB do not have to address it, 
despite the flaws that this creates. In this the IASB are at the centre, defining the debate, and this 
is the power that they have at the technocratic level. This issue of power and control is a big 
problem in the due process, as the IASB narrow and close discussion through equivalence and 
difference, and the ability to name the questions. The IASB name the debate, and define the 
solution, which happens often as the IASB give a format for answering and guidance for 
respondents. Therefore, in this case the IASB use their existing due process, which is seen as 
legitimate to operate the extension to IFRS for SMEs.  
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There are other examples of these limits, therefore the following chapter further investigates due 
process documents and their limiting nature. Prior to moving to chapter 9, the following section 
offers a conclusion.  
8.8 Conclusion 
The first half of this chapter explored the way that the IASB defined SMEs through LoD and 
condensation, within which there are many micro debates and contingencies, because the term 
“SMEs” has become a signifier with many different understandings for different people. Whilst 
the IASB develop the standard for “SMEs” they never become clear on the focus of the scope, 
because of this heterogeneity, and their attempt to meet the needs of all. Indeed, in attempting to 
meet the needs of all, the IASB make the political mistake of publishing that they have a focus 
on entities with 50 employees. However, the focus on 50 employees threatens the political status 
of the standard, because it limits the focus. This provokes criticisms from many submissions to 
the due process, so the IASB attempt to cover over this mistake and claim to meet the needs of 
many more entities through public accountability, but this does not take away from the focus that 
they had throughout the due process.  
The IASB want to construct an extension of one size fits all, so they use condensation to cover 
over differences and contingencies, to claim that the standard can meet the needs of all. This leads 
to the use of the rhetorical trope of 95 per cent of companies. This draws a homogeneity across a 
heterogeneous group, and creates difficulties when giving the standard a title. Therefore, the final 
title operates displacement because the IASB are focused on international recognition, no matter 
how confusing, misleading or inappropriate the title is. In this the IASB win their definition of 
SMEs and their title, through the due process, which shows that they may have listened, but they 
disregard. Subsequently, once the standard is promulgated there is overdetermination, because of 
the extent of condensation, which leads to further contingencies, so the IASB ‘add on’ the micro 
guide in a further attempt to cover over contingencies, but with continued minimal divergence 
from IFRS. This limits regulatory conversations, which maintain and construct the hegemony of 
advanced financial capital. This also protects their technocratic ability to disregard others as they 
are the experts in standard setting.  
Linked to this, the second half of the chapter examines the equivalence that is drawn from SMEs 
to developing countries. This part of the chapter extends previous research which has identified a 
lack of consideration of developing countries by investigating the due process and quantifying 
comment letters. In this research, the IASB are identified as ignoring developing countries, but 
this thesis goes on to explain that the reason for this and justifications given by the IASB are 
linked to the equivalence that they draw from SMEs to developing countries. The claim is that if 
they meet the needs of SMEs they will automatically meet the needs of developing countries, 
because there is no difference, but this covers over local differences, contingencies and 
antagonisms. In this sense, the promulgation of IFRS for SMEs is an example of opening up 
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opportunities for financial capital investment in SMEs (especially in emerging economies) 
through an international language of accounting (as the IASB state that meeting needs of SMEs 
would simultaneously satisfy emerging economies. Moreover, enabling advanced financial 
capital access to SMEs enables SMEs further access to international capital (debt). Therefore, 
opening up SMEs and emerging economies to indebtedness. This has the impact of extension and 
equivalence which protects, enhances and reinforces the IASB’s role as a geo-political agent that 
is extending the access of advanced financial capital. This chapter identifies the extension of 
advanced financial capital to new areas, which shows that advanced financial capital is not 
concerned with where it makes money form, only that it makes money, so the IASB as an agent 
of advanced financial capital is only concerned with extending access.  
Thus, this chapter has shown that advanced financial capital has been extended through 
equivalency. The chapter has raised issues with equivalencies that the IASB has drawn in the 
development of IFRS for SMEs. They draw equivalencies without evidence and hope that it meets 
the needs of SMEs and developing countries. This runs counter to both claims of technocracy and 
the due process, so this thesis takes the examination of the due process further in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 9: Deconstructing the due process 
This chapter focuses on the Basis for Conclusion (BC), which was published alongside the final 
standard as justification. This document constitutes an interesting site of analysis as it contains 
many decisions and persuasive rhetoric. This chapter investigates the socially sedimented 
practices of the BC in which the IASB operate both LoD and LoE. The IASB claim in the BC to 
be simultaneously conducting, considering and incorporating extra outreach, whilst also retaining 
a focus on full IFRS. These two goals contradict each other, but operate hegemonically to enhance 
the IASB’s brand, expertise and the ability for IFRS to meet the needs of SMEs. This also 
maintains their inter-relationship with IFIs who want the IASB to produce a high-quality standard. 
These IFIs also want simplification for SMEs and their financial statement users, so they can 
comply with and understand standards of a ‘high quality’. Therefore, this chapter examines the 
due process and the socially sedimented practices, as the IASB attempt to control the conversation 
between regulator and regulated and reinstate their role of being able to fulfil these contradictory 
aims. The IASB claim that the due process is open and transparent:  
In fulfilling its standard-setting duties the IASB follows a thorough, open and transparent 
due process of which the publication of consultative documents, such as Discussion 
Papers and Exposure Drafts, for public comment is an important component (IASB, 
2016a: 1).   
Additionally, the IASB claim to have conducted international consultation:  
In developing the IFRS for SMEs the IASB consulted extensively worldwide (IASB, 
2009a: 2).  
First, this chapter gives examples to illustrate the purpose of the BC and the construction of this 
document. Second, the chapter moves to consider the way that the focus on full IFRS, narrows 
the due process. Following this, the chapter moves to consider the extra outreach conducted by 
the IASB.  
9.1 The purpose of the Basis for Conclusion  
This BC is a core social logic as it identifies why and how decisions were made within the 
standard (there is also a basis for conclusions when the ED is published): 
This Basis for Conclusion sets out the main issues addressed by the Board, the 
alternatives considered, and the Board’s reasons for accepting some alternatives and 
rejecting others (IASB, 2009c: 16) 
The IASB come to the BC through their due process, offering justification for the ED and final 
standard.43 The board’s decisions are based on the analysis and recommendations of the staff 
members, with board members voting on different proposals made by staff members. For 
example, the basis for conclusions for the ED and the final standard for IFRS for SMEs explain 
the decisions made regarding financial instruments:  
Many said that the requirements of IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement are burdensome for SMEs. They cited as especially burdensome for SMEs 
                                               
43    The publication chronology of each of these documents is outlined in appendix 1.  
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the complexities of classifying financial instruments into four categories, the ‘pass-
through’ and ‘continuing involvement’ tests for derecognition, and the detailed 
calculations required to qualify for hedge accounting. The Board agreed that 
simplifications of IAS 39 are appropriate for SMEs (IASB, 2007a: 27).  
This quote is taken from the section of the BC which explains the simplifications made by the 
IASB in the ED. Based on complex parts of full IFRS, the board agrees that simplifications are 
necessary. The BC then goes on to explain that there is ‘complexity’ because there are a ‘range 
of measurement attributes for financial instruments’ which ‘reduce comparability and impose 
measurement complexity’ (IASB, 2007a: 27). The IASB identifies why burdens and problems 
occur in IFRS, and the two core logics of justification for the decisions made by the IASB are 
comparability and complexity. Therefore, they claim that:  
The draft IFRS for SMEs enhances comparability and reduces complexity by defining a 
default measurement attribute and limiting the use of other measurement attributes 
(IASB, 2007a: 27).  
These explanations are linked to the logics of comparability and reliability which construct 
rhetoric. The BC then lists and explains the key simplifications proposed in the draft IFRS for 
SMEs, which include the classification of financial instruments (fewer categories available for 
classification), derecognition (a simple principle that does not involve the complex principles in 
IAS 39), and hedge accounting (focusing on ‘the types of hedging that SMEs are likely to do’, 
with ‘less strict conditions’ (IASB, 2007a: 28). This section also sees the board consider an 
alternative, referred to as ‘the shortcut method’, but they conclude that the ‘simplified 
effectiveness testing is preferable’ because the alternative would be inconsistent with the 
principles of IAS 39, and the requirements of the alternative would make the ‘accounting a 
practical impossibility for many, and perhaps most, SMEs’ (IASB, 2007a: 28- 29). Following 
this, the BC discusses some other elements of simplifications for hedge accounting, each based 
on what SME’s ‘do’:  
SMEs typically sell the cash hedging instrument when the hedging relationship 
terminates… 
Because hedging with options involves incurring a cost, SMEs are more likely to use 
forward contracts as hedging instruments rather than options… 
The Board does not believe that these simplifications will affect SMEs adversely because 
these are not hedging strategies that are typical of SMEs (IASB, 2007a: 29).  
Each point is proposed as logical and common sense about what SMEs ‘do’, but there is little 
evidence given to support such justifications. There are some other decisions outlined in this BC 
regarding financial instruments, but for the purposes of example, these points have demonstrated 
some of the key rhetorical tropes and justifications that the IASB offer within this BC and the 
work flow that leads to the document. However, the only ‘fall back’ that has remained within the 
IFRS for SMEs is the optional ‘fall back’ to IAS 39 Financial Instruments. Indeed, many of these 
justifications are repeated in the final standard’s BC, but with further reference to the ED 
comment letters, and field tests that had been undertaken, and they are further explored within 
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this chapter. As another example, the IASB also justifies when a simplification was considered 
but not adopted into IFRS for SMEs: 
In developing the IFRS for SMEs, the Board considered some recognition and 
measurement simplifications that it decided not to adopt. Some of those potential 
simplifications were identified in existing national accounting standards for SMEs. Some 
were proposed by the Board’s constituents in their responses to the 2004 discussion paper 
or the recognition and measurement questionnaire in 2005. Those proposals, and the 
Board’s reasons for rejecting them, are described in paragraphs BC138–BC150 (IASB, 
2009c: 44-45).  
This offers some further specifics, explaining where some of the alternatives considered came 
from. But the logics of the due process and the power they hold stifles the information that is 
given, and the plurality and subjectivity of contributions from respondents. The BC acts in some 
ways like the notes to the accounts, giving details on the decision, but it is not always clear how 
the decisions are made, or any further specifics. The following description gives an example of 
the explanation given when the simplification is not made:  
 
Fewer provisions 
BC143 Provisions are liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. Despite the uncertainties, 
they are obligations that have met the liability recognition criteria. Users of SMEs’ 
financial statements consistently say they want these obligations recognised in the 
statement of financial position, with the measurement uncertainties explained (IASB, 
2009c: 46 [Emphasis in original]).  
This quote explains that the board considered having fewer provisions in IFRS for SMEs, but 
based on users they decided not to reduce provisions. The justification through users here 
dismisses any consideration of simplification or changes from full IFRS. There are many elements 
missing here and for the reader to understand further why the decisions were made many 
documents and recordings would need to be investigated, rendering the transparency of these 
decisions limited. For example, using terms such as ‘they’ and ‘many’ in the previous examples 
does not give clearer specification. In the case above, which is concerned with provisions they 
use the term ‘users’, but it is not clear who the users are, or how many users they are referring to. 
Moreover, throughout the IStaR documents ‘users’ are mentioned in many meetings, often giving 
justifications. When asked for further details on the users that the IASB had contact with to further 
investigate these claims, interviewee 11 said:  
Users… we had at least 3 meetings, I remember a German banker coming, I remember a 
British banker coming and… a French Canadian banker, I mean these were all people 
who lend money to SMEs and we had a venture capitalist also, a British company… we 
asked them very point blank, how do you make a loan, do you use financial statements, 
do you like what you’re getting… the Barclays guy said look if my loan is under 250,000 
I don’t even look at their financial statements, he said if they’re an existing customer with 
me and they have never had an overdraft, they’ve never bounced a cheque, he said I know 
them, I don’t care about their financial statements. He said well we will get them we will 
put them in the filing cabinet, he said for everybody else yeah I look at them, we learned 
that kind of stuff, we learned what kind of assets they lend money on and which ones 
they say well sorry we just take it off… so we had education sessions like that, the board 
members could talk to the lenders… 
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This demonstrates the limits of the meetings that the IASB had with users, focusing on users from 
developed countries, ‘bankers’, and one venture capitalist. One of these educational sessions is 
documented in the observer notes:  
Today’s session was educational. Richard Roberts, SME Research Director at Barclays 
Bank would talk about what information was useful for banks, what lacking and what 
distinctions they made by size of borrower. Isobel Sharp, a partner at Deloitte and chair 
of the Committee on Accounting for Smaller Entities (CASE) in the UK would talk about 
the UK’s Financial Reporting Standard for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) (IStaR, 2005g: 22).  
This is focused on the experience of a UK Barclays Bank SME research director. Many of the 
other interactions with ‘users’ lack transparency:  
The staff would bring back a recommendation. That would also be discussed with the 
working group along with other recommended changes. Although there were only five 
users in the group and he was not sure if that was enough. They could send a questionnaire 
to bankers (IStaR, 2008c: 12). 
This quote states that the working groups has only five users, and to resolve this issue suggests 
sending a questionnaire to bankers, highlighting issues with the composition of the working 
group, which appear to be technocratically resolved through a questionnaire. 44 This reiterates the 
construction of the IASB’s identified user, delimits the potential for difference in SMEs, and 
reinforces the focus on bankers and access to capital, increasing the spread of advanced financial 
capital. Additionally, these discussions about users, and attempts to interact with users are 
instrumental and limited as they occur after the IASB have made many of the decisions, especially 
in the quote from the meeting from 2008 above. These quotes also illustrate the type of users, 
which is limited, and focused on advanced countries and advanced financial capital.  
Moreover, this discussion lack transparency, as many documents are written by staff members, 
which up until the publication of the ED and the field tests was only one person, after the field 
tests were completed (mid-2007) a second staff member was added to the project to help with 
analysis. These issues of transparency are highlighted in the following quote:  
He was also due to speak at a conference in Malta, where IFRS applies to all companies. 
Malta was having second thoughts about having pushed IFRS down beyond listed 
companies. He added that at the last meeting the Board had asked if he could collect 
users’ views on a number of issues and since then the German standard setter had 
organised a user group that was meeting for the first time in January. Jim Leisenring said 
that was a good idea, but he would want to see more public exposure of user issues – he 
did not want just a series of meetings behind closed doors. Mr. Pacter said that public 
meetings would happen as well, but later in the process (IStaR, 2005l: 31-32).    
There are two issues of transparency highlighted in this quote, the first is not discussed by the 
IASB, whilst the second is. Indeed, the conference discussion lacks specificity and transparency, 
demonstrating a reiteration of problems discussed in chapters 7 and 8 which were shown to pose 
a threat to the board, but not highlighting further details. The latter shows the lack of transparency 
                                               
44  Over time the IASB had groups that were working on the SME project, the working group had 33 
members which then grew to 40 members in 2007, when the second staff member was also recruited. 
There was also an informal panel of users, that have been referenced to which consisted of 8 members 
throughout the process.  
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in discussions with users, and a board member highlights this problem, arguing that further public 
exposure is necessary in discussions with users, not ‘just a series of meetings behind closed 
doors’, which is responded to by stating that the public meetings would happen, but later. Again, 
this is instrumental justification after decisions have been made. This reinforces a problem 
highlighted by Devi & Samujh (2015) who argue that much of the public exposure happened too 
late in the process. Many of the decisions have already been made and narrowed by the time there 
are further public meetings, highlighting an issue with the IASB’s ‘transparency’ and ‘due 
process’.  Indeed, each step further into the due process, the more condensed and limited the 
responses become, giving the IASB control.  
Returning to the claim that there are users on the working group, the public view here is also 
limited as many of the interactions with the working group are unclear, reference is made to them 
in meetings, but there is not further specific detail. A document published in 2009 that outlined 
the projects development stated that the working group for IFRS for SMEs met only four times 
during development of the standard, and submitted recommendations via email. These 
recommendations are then written as part of agenda papers by the staff members (a process that 
impacts the transparency of the working group) (IASB, 2009b). As an example of issues that this 
raises, interviewee 6 explains an ‘altercation’ that the working group (the interviewee refers to 
this group as the advisory group) had with the staff in the beginning of the process:  
…I don’t think they did enough, at times it came across that they weren’t in a listening 
mood, I remember that something happened with the advisory group… we had a bit of a 
sort of altercation early on in that we had a meeting and I can’t remember what the views 
were, but we then discovered that the subsequent report that went to the board didn’t 
express any of the views that had been expressed by the advisory group, the response 
[was] well yeah but advisory groups are advisory groups to the staff… I said well yeah 
but at least the board ought to know what our views were. I think it did change, but even 
so, some of the people involved weren’t really listening.   
This is a complex process as different people have different recollections and interpretations of 
past meetings, but demonstrates an issue of transparency. This transparency continues to be 
limited in the work of the SME implementation group (SMEIG):  
…we have actually only ever met once… we have only ever had one physical meeting… 
we do interact with them fairly regularly on email, so if I am looking at this year we have 
had four interactions with them… it’s really driven by something… that we wanted to 
understand… how the micro guidance had been used in practice and whether it was worth 
updating and stuff like that, and that is then something that is sent out to all of them, the 
responses are they are encouraged to respond not just to us but to the whole group, so we 
send the email out to the whole group and they’re encouraged to respond to the whole 
group, they don’t always do that but we try to encourage it so there’s an element of 
discussion going on (Interviewee 14). 
This quote demonstrates the somewhat hidden nature of the interactions that the board members 
have with the SMEIG, explaining that they do not have physical meetings, but have email 
interactions. These email interactions would then be analysed by staff members and presented to 
the board, so there are some limits placed on these interactions, which also has the effect of 
condensing the feedback.  
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Further investigation of the BC highlights the limits of transparency of the document. 
Nevertheless, the document is important for the IASB, because of the justification that it gives:  
Mary Barth asked if they had decided not to give SMEs a fair value option. Mr Pacter 
said they had decided not to. Mr Leisenring said that someone was going to have to write 
a Basis for Conclusions, this should say something other than they had just made random 
decisions (IStaR, 2006e: 40).  
This quote from the observer notes shows that the BC gives justification for the ED. The decisions 
reached by the IASB occur through a work flow that the IASB operate, some of which is common 
to every due process, and some of which is particular to the development of IFRS for SMEs, as 
shown in appendix 1. The examples in this section show how some of the decisions are reached, 
and show that there are cases where transparency is lacking or inconsistent. In particular, many 
points of the due process are internal. The work of the IASB including the BC claims to be 
transparent, but there are limits to this. Often the IASB shows the decision, but not how the 
decisions were reached, and further investigation into the due process shows that these decisions 
are focused on attempts to stay close to full IFRS. The purpose of the BC is to give justification 
to the decisions made for both the ED and the final standard, and there are many sedimented 
practices within these decisions that can be called into question. Indeed, these problems arise 
because the IASB are placed at the centre of this development, they construct the questions, they 
receive the answers, the make the decisions, and at times each of these stages lack transparency, 
which is justified on the basis that they are technocratic experts. The IASB is the only entity that 
is involved in the authority position, and every level of the due process works to reinforce the 
IASB as the expert and to dismiss those outside. Having outlined the purpose of the BC, the 
following section looks further at the way that the IASB narrow the due process.  
9.2 Narrowing the due process 
As the IASB develop IFRS for SMEs their due process narrows the debate. Despite the open terms 
of reference, and the construction of transparency, the IASB’s 2004 DP (called ‘Preliminary 
views of accounting standards for Small and Medium-sized Entities) limits, shapes and narrows 
the ensuing discussion. In particular, introducing the term SMEs, and question (f) focus on full 
IFRS below, shapes the debate: 
BC6  (a) Should the IASB develop special financial reporting standards for SMEs?  
(b) What should be the objectives of a set of financial reporting standards for SMEs?  
(c) For which entities would IASB standards for SMEs be intended?  
(d) If IASB standards for SMEs do not address a particular accounting recognition or 
measurement issue confronting an entity, how should that entity resolve the issue?  
 (e) May an entity using IASB standards for SMEs elect to follow a treatment permitted 
in an IFRS that differs from the treatment in the related IASB standard for SMEs?  
(f)  How should the Board approach the development of IASB standards for SMEs? 
To what extent should the foundation of SME standards be the concepts and 
principles and related mandatory guidance in IFRSs?  
(g)  If IASB standards for SMEs are built on the concepts and principles and related 
mandatory guidance in full IFRSs, what should be the basis for modifying those 
concepts and principles for SMEs?  
(h)  In what format should IASB standards for SMEs be published?  
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(IASB, 2009c: 6-7 [emphasis added]) 
Whilst these questions appear to be open, they limit the discussion. Although there were debates 
prior to the due process and these questions (as examined in chapters 7 and 8), these discussions 
and the questions above focus on full IFRS. The questions demonstrate the top down nature of 
this process, particularly the use of the term SMEs and part (f). Part (f) asks which approach the 
board should take when creating the standard, but instead of leaving the question open for 
different perspectives they follow up the question with a focus on full IFRS, as does question (g). 
As there is little evidence in this area, this is not evidence based-policy, instead this operates a 
logic of necessity to develop the standard, so they develop it, with little other justification than 
control and expertise over standard setting. Indeed, once the DP appears the debate is already 
circumscribed, and various issues are taken for granted, this is true for many standards, but 
important here because the standard is based on full IFRS. Therefore, much of the draft of IFRS 
for SMEs was already constructed before consultation, which leads CL55 (2005: 4-5) on the R&M 
questionnaire to question the due process:  
The IASB’s Project on Accounting Standards for SME’s, Issues for Discussion by the 
Standards Advisory Council, a statement indicating that drafts of some SME standards 
(i.e., IAS 2, 10 and 19) may have already been written. These revelations weaken our 
belief that due process will occur. We ask the IASB to clarify how an effective due 
process can occur under these circumstances… At the outset of this letter we stated that 
we want to be constructive and honest. Our proposal is as follows: That the IASB, along 
with the FASB, engage in a careful dialogue with the users of private company financial 
statements in order to first and foremost determine their needs… From this revised 
framework, differential accounting standards for private company users should be 
developed as indicated… we do believe that this approach is significantly different from 
the approach proposed by the IASB in the questionnaire and will more likely lead to user 
focused financial reporting standards for private companies.   
This letter argues that there should be further dialogue with users and SMEs.  
9.2.1 Demand for IFRS for SMEs 
Throughout the due process the IASB continue to cite demand and support to legitimise the 
standard (as also quoted in chapter 7):  
The IFRS for SMEs responds to strong international demand from both developed 
and emerging economies for a rigorous and common set of accounting standards for 
smaller and medium-sized businesses that is much simpler than full IFRSs (IASB, 2009a: 
1).   
The Board discussed the progress on its project on standards for SMEs at subsequent 
annual meetings of the world’s national accounting standard-setters in 2005–2008. 
Standard-setters continued to support the Board’s project (IASB, 2009c: 17). 
Following this, the IASB continue to focus on global recognition (IASB, 2012a) and in their 
education initiative the IASB reiterate the claim that the standard is internationally recognised 
(IFRSF, 2010). Alongside WB support in their promotion of the standard (shown in previous 
chapters), the continued reference to ‘international support’, ‘high quality’ and ‘rigor’ narrows 
the debate, and alternatives. Furthermore, national standard setters are likely to consider and 
potentially prefer IFRS for SMEs because of the impact of full IFRS, so in a circular manner a 
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demand occurs because of the problems created by the IASB and IFIs from their previous ‘one 
size fits all’ approach.  
The demand for simplified IFRS for SMEs has arisen primarily in countries which 
already use IFRS as national standards but which believe that current IFRS are too 
burdensome for SMEs. They favour the development and use of simplified IFRS that 
would meet the needs of users of the financial statements of SMEs, allows an easy 
transition to full IFRS for those entities that grow or seek public capital, facilitate 
education and training of accountants and facilitate the preparation and audit of the 
financial statements of SMEs (CL90, 2004: 3).  
…the responses to the discussion paper showed a clear demand for an International 
Financial Reporting Standard for SMEs (IFRS for SMEs) and a preference, in many 
countries, to adopt IFRS for SMEs rather than locally or regionally developed standards 
(IASB, 2004a: 7). 
In invoking the imagery of demand and support, the power of developing the standard and making 
decisions about the content remains with the IASB. The hegemony of capital markets is protected 
by creating IFRS for SMEs out of IFRS. This limits a range of arguments and debates, and 
marginalises any competing representations of appropriate regulatory interventions in differential 
reporting. The IASB follow a top down approach as the best methodology for the creation of an 
SME standard, despite actors arguing that this is inappropriate:  
It seems to us that this Discussion Paper has rather lost sight of the fact that the vast 
majority of SMEs will always be SMEs, will not have international business and will 
access capital through their proprietor(s) or local bank (CL3, 2004: 1).  
The CL states that the DP has ignored the common operations of SMEs. Arguably, the IASB lose 
sight of this because they are focused on capital markets, global capital movement, international 
business, expansion and profit maximisation. CLs suggest IFRS for SMEs is too complex and 
does not meet SME needs or user needs (see, CL3, 2004; CL9, 2004; CL15, 2004; CL106, 2004), 
and that the conceptual framework basis is inappropriate for SMEs (CL28, 2004: 3). CL90 
(2004:1) agrees that there is market demand for the project, but also argues this has not been 
understood: 
There seems to [be] confusion about the purpose and nature of the project and a lack of 
understanding of the market demand for the project. This confusion and lack of 
understanding should be resolved before the Board undertakes further work. This letter 
includes other suggestions for moving forward.   
Indeed, as the IASB shape and narrow the debate there is little room for understanding what is 
required in differential reporting, and minimal research.  
              For many jurisdictions, the proposed IFRS for SMEs would mean a significant change 
from the current reporting requirements for those SMEs that prepare general purpose 
financial statements.  The nature and extent of that change would depend on the 
circumstances of an individual entity and the accounting framework that it is currently 
using: 
(a) in some jurisdictions SMEs are either required or permitted to use full IFRSs. 
               (b) in others, they are required or permitted to use full national GAAP. 
               (c) some jurisdictions have adopted national SME standards that do not result in 
general purpose financial statements.  
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While the proposed IFRS for SMEs is based on full IFRSs, many simplifications have 
been made in the light of users’ needs and cost/benefit considerations.  The IASB made 
great efforts to ensure that the exposure draft is written in ‘plain English’ to enhance 
understandability (IASB, 2007c:1) 
There are multiple elements at play within this quote:  
• The IASB are operating an equivalence from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, by claiming that 
the IFRS for SMEs will be a significant change for SMEs that are overburdened with 
complex reporting requirements. These complexities enable the IASB to focus on full 
IFRS, ignore alternative ideas and silence contingencies, because any simplification 
offered (no matter the limits) constitutes a significant reduction in burden and silences 
resistance. 
• The IASB claim that simplifications have been made considering user needs, relying on 
the rhetorical construction of users to legitimise the decisions that they have made, despite 
critiques that users have not been considered to the necessary extent throughout the due 
process. As already examined, users were considered after many major decisions has been 
made (with a limited construction of the user), the IASB undertook limited consultation 
with users and/or empirical research on who the users are.  
• This quote also operates cost-benefit rhetoric, which acts to objectify that which may not 
be able to be objectified and gives rhetorical justification. Moreover, there is no evidence 
of cost-benefit analysis being presented, the costs and the benefits are just assumed. 
Throughout the discourse surrounding the standard the IASB use cost-benefit rhetoric in 
their claims that they have simplified the standard enough for SMEs, but this is limited. 
• The final element is the understandability, and the claim that the IASB has made ‘great 
efforts to ensure’ the IFRS for SMEs ED has been written in ‘plain English’. This further 
constructs the IASB as the expert as it depicts the IASB as understanding the standards 
so inherently that they can express them in different ways for different people. This 
constructs the IASB as the experts, and as the only people that can read and explain the 
standard more simply after ‘great efforts’, in a condescending manner, which reinforces 
the IASB’s expertise.    
9.2.2 Top-down approach to IFRS for SMEs 
Through rhetorical justifications, the IASB legitimise the methodology of creating the IFRS for 
SMEs from full IFRS, enabling them to draw the equivalence. However, this focus on full IFRS 
leads to the construction of an unsuitable and confusing standard:  
Experience and competence. As far as could be judged, the IASB has its primary 
experience and competence in dealing with the needs of listed companies. It can therefore 
be questioned whether the IASB has an appropriate composition in terms of experience 
and competence to constructively deal with the SMEs project. • Lack of focus. The IASB 
has struggled with the question which companies that typically should be the users of 
SMEs and what, if any, the specific user needs related to SMEs are. As far as could be 
understood from the outside, the IASB has not paid attention enough to this question… 
Not much seems to have been achieved simply by assuming that such surveys are not 
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needed for the developing of other standards and therefore not for the developing of 
standards for SMEs (CL13, 2005: 1).  
This comment suggests that not enough research has been conducted to create IFRS for SMEs. 
Therefore, demonstrating that this focus on IFRS has limited the discussion because ‘The IASB 
has indicated that the SME standards must be based on the same IASB Framework as IFRSs’ 
(CL44, 2005: 2). CL52 (2005) and CL55 (2005) propose that the SME standards should instead 
be based on a specific framework for SMEs, because the current framework is unsuitable: 
GNC expresses strong reservations on the approach adopted by the IASB. If a set of IFRS 
standards is to be developed for SMEs, new standards should be elaborated on the basis 
of the needs of SMEs, they should not be limited to a simplification of the existing IFRS 
standards (CL56, 2005: 2).  
The significantly different nature of the requirements 
applying to SME accounts calls for a draft standard that 
is original from bottom up. It was neither purposeful 
nor sensible simply to base it on full IFRS. We prefer a 
modernisation of national SME regulations 
accompanied by a cautious approximation to IFRS 
principles for certain issues (CL132, 2007: 2).  
Instead the IASB narrow the due process, by drawing on 
the top down approach. This is further narrowed in the ED, 
as the IASB’s due process operates the process outlined in 
figure 27. This figure shows that throughout the due 
process the IASB place themselves at the centre of every 
aspect of the decisions making process, analysis, questions 
and solutions. These sections have illustrated this 
funnelling and have highlighted that the IASB’s due 
process is mostly internal operating condensation and 
funnelling (further examples of this are discussed in the 
sections that follow).  
This then continues into the construction of the R&M 
questionnaire, and the ED. The questions asked in both 
stages are focused on full IFRS, delegitimising any alternative.  
9.2.3 Focus on full IFRS 
The IASB focus on full IFRS throughout the ED: 
The draft IFRS for SMEs was developed by: extracting the fundamental concepts from 
the IASB Framework and the principles and related mandatory guidance from full IFRSs 
(IASB, 2007b: 5). 
 
Are there other recognition or measurement simplifications that the Board should 
consider? In responding, please indicate: 
(a) the specific transactions, other events or conditions that create a specific recognition 
or measurement problem for SMEs under IFRSs; 
(b) why it is a problem; and 
(c) how that problem might be solved (IASB, 2007b: 5-6).  
Figure 27: Funnelling the work 
flow 
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And the R&M questionnaire:  
Question 1: 
What are the areas for possible simplification of recognition and measurement 
principles for SMEs? In responding, please indicate: 
· the specific accounting recognition or measurement problem for an SME under 
IFRSs; 
· the specific transactions or events that create the recognition or measurement 
problem for an SME under IFRSs; 
· why is it a problem; and 
· how that problem might be solved (IASB, 2009b: 6).  
Question 2 
17. From your experience, please indicate which topics addressed in IFRSs might be 
omitted from SME standards because they are unlikely to occur in an SME context. 
If they occur, the standards would require the SME to determine its appropriate 
accounting policy by looking to the applicable IFRSs (IASB, 2009b: 6).  
These quotes offer some examples of the way the ED and the R&M questionnaire narrow the 
focus of the debate to full IFRS. This protects and extends capital market reporting and IFRS, and 
defends the IASB’s due process and technocracy, constructing the IASB as the only people that 
can determine variations of full IFRS. Having received responses to these questions via comment 
letters the staff undertake analysis:  
But in the exposure draft there was a lot of cross overs, so something like [a] comment 
on what you wanted or expected to get in question 2 [was presented] in question 5… 
(Interviewee 12). 
Indeed, throughout the due process there are many examples of the IASB dismissing alternative 
practice or simplification if it is not in line with full IFRS. Furthermore, this quote illustrates that 
the comment letters were read and analysed with a purpose, which ignores how the answers were 
presented, and only reflects the answers that they want or expect under each question, 
demonstrating further limits of the due process.  
9.2.4 Focus on full IFRS: The example of Agriculture and fair value 
In the due process, SMEs question the incorporation of fair value in IFRS for SMEs, using the 
example of their experience of IAS 41 (Agriculture). There are many criticisms surrounding fair 
values complexity for both SMEs and emerging economies within IAS 41 through comment 
letters, the R&M questionnaire, and round table meetings, but the board decided to provide no 
simplification to IAS 41’s principles (Ram, 2012). Of 102 respondents to the IFRS for SMEs 
R&M questionnaire 62 commented on Agriculture. Of those 62 respondents, 35 argued applying 
the fair value method was too complex for SMEs (Ram, 2012). For example, CL15 (2005: 3) 
argues that:  
Probably, many SMEs in the agriculture industry do not have enough information and 
expertise to calculate the fair value and apply properly IAS 41 (furthermore, we 
understand that fair value should not be imposed in any area, as was mentioned before). 
Despite the issue being raised by many comment letters, the following discussion is outlined in 
the 2005 meeting notes:  
Mr. Pacter said that a very small number of commentators had addressed agriculture but 
those that did felt that the standard was a problem for SMEs, mainly because it was 
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difficult and costly to measure fair value reliably. Others, though, said that some small 
agricultural companies already use fair value and nothing else. Staff recommended no 
change to the principles of IAS 41 for SMEs, as the standard already includes a 
measurement reliability exception. The Board agreed (IStaR 2005l: 34).  
This narrows the discussion about fair value within the agriculture standard, identifying problems 
with fair value within the standard, but stating that a ‘very small number’ had addressed 
agriculture. Also, this point relies on ‘reliability’ rhetoric to end the discussion on fair value within 
agriculture. Indeed, there is rhetorical redescription within this in the claim of a ‘very small 
number of commentators’, and the recommendation that there should not be a change. This also 
ignores the crucial point which is questioning the role of fair value in IFRS for SMEs, 
demonstrating the ability to control and determine the regulatory conversation, by delegitimising 
and ignoring critique.  
This continues to the ED, for example, CL10 (2007) CL11 (2007), CL 14 (2007), CL16 (2007), 
CL 20 (2007), CL21 (2007), CL 25 (2007), CL26 (2007), CL31 (2007), CL32 (2007), CL34 
(2007) CL60 (2007), CL84 (2007), CL97 (2007), CL100 (2007), CL104 (2007), CL111 (2007), 
CL114 (2007), CL134 (2007), CL137 (2007) among others, comment on the complexities of fair 
value. Specifically, CL111 (2007: 5) commented that  
Agriculture… is probably one of standards that pose the most difficulty to SMEs, 
especially in so far as fair value measurement is concerned. In our view, there should also 
be an exception in instances where reliable fair value measurement will result in undue 
cost and effort. In such instances SMEs should be allowed to use cost instead of fair 
value.  
And CL134 (2007: 6):  
Certain of the IFRS may not be suitable for local application. For example, IAS 41 
Agriculture has been identified as a standard that could cause problems in 
implementation if it is adopted without amendment. 
Despite critique, the IASB decided not to simplify the principles of IAS 41, and the use of fair 
value is identified as problematic, specifically for SMEs in developing countries:  
This measurement requirement may be too costly for SMEs to apply, particularly, in less 
developed markets where fair value estimates may be difficult to obtain (b). It may be 
worthwhile to consider providing SMEs with an option to use cost based measurements, 
without limiting it only to exceptional situations where fair value becomes unreliable 
(CL85, 2005: 3).  
The dominance of fair value in the IFRS for SMEs is not surprising, given the dominance of fair 
value in full IFRS, but the impact of the ideologies of fair value has not been considered to the 
necessary extent, only focusing on technical components of the standard.  Indeed, despite many 
criticisms the IASB did not have any intention of making changes to these standards, even though 
this causes problems for both SMEs and emerging economies. This offers just one example of the 
IASB ignoring the call for simplification, despite the due process (and one example of the issues 
created by fair value within the standard), because of a necessity to retain focus on full IFRS. 
Again, the following quote reiterates the reliance on the undue cost and effort exemption to cover 
over this focus:  
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Mr Pacter said this came up in almost every letter. They said there was too much fair 
value in the ED… He thought people were losing sight of the fact that they needed current 
values to do things like impairment or bad debt reserves. The only non-financial asset 
that required fair value was agriculture, and they had added an undue cost or effort let 
out for that. Mr Jones said when investors said they did not want fair value, he was 
prepared to listen, but not preparers (IStaR, 2008c: 13) 
Later in 2008 a decision is made:  
Specialised industries - agriculture 
Ms Fisher said commentators had argued for the greater use of cost, for example by 
allowing the cost method as an accounting policy choice or by requiring fair value only 
in certain circumstances. Ms Fisher said staff felt that fair value measurement was often 
easier than cost in agriculture because quoted prices were generally available. Fair value 
was also seen as more relevant. Consequently staff were not recommending that the cost 
model should be an option. 
Jim Leisenring said he did not understand staff’s analysis since his understanding of the 
agriculture standard was that when current prices were readily available you were 
prohibited from using fair value. Bob Garnett said that was an issue for IAS 41, not this 
standard. Staff were only being consistent. The Board voted in favour of the staff 
recommendation (ISTAR 2008i: 25).  
This shows further narrowing of the responses gained on the agriculture standard as an example 
of a lack of simplification by the IASB. This passage shows that those commenting on the 
standard wanted a greater use of cost (which also shows the narrowing of options between cost 
and fair value), but the IASB claim that because fair value is more relevant, and easier to gain, so 
this simplification does not occur. The second paragraph returns to the importance of remaining 
consistent with full standards. The retention of a focus on full IFRS in the development of IFRS 
for SMEs calls the entire due process into question, as many of the decisions made could have 
been made without comment or due process, if the IASB were only making a cut down version 
of IFRS. The sedimented practice behind this, shown in the evidence above, is to retain a focus 
on full IFRS, and they offer weak justification through terms such as reliability, claims regarding 
the wants of investors (which the IASB have limited knowledge of in terms of SMEs), consistency 
and the undue cost or effort exemption. This also weakens the transparency of the due process, as 
the process shows that many commented in this area, but the ensuing discussion is narrow, limited 
and de-legitimises alternatives.  
Regarding IAS 41, the decisions made are shown in the BC as the following:  
BC124 Some preparers and auditors of the financial statements of SMEs engaged in 
agricultural activities said that the ‘fair value through profit or loss’ model is burdensome 
for SMEs, particularly when applied to biological assets of those SMEs operating in 
inactive markets or developing countries. They said that the presumption in IAS 41 that 
fair value can be estimated for biological assets and agricultural produce is unrealistic 
with respect to biological assets of some SMEs. Some proposed that SMEs should be 
permitted or required to use a ‘cost depreciation- impairment’ model for all such assets. 
The Board did not support this approach for the reasons explained in paragraph BC146. 
However, the Board concluded, both because of the measurement problems in inactive 
markets and developing countries and for cost-benefit reasons, that SMEs should be 
required to use the fair value through profit or loss model only when fair value is readily 
determinable without undue cost or effort. When that is not the case, the Board concluded 
that SMEs should follow the cost-depreciation-impairment model (IASB, 2009c: 41).  
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BC146 Not only is fair value generally regarded as a more relevant measure in this 
industry, quoted prices are often readily available, markets are active, and measuring cost 
is actually more burdensome and arbitrary because of the extensive allocations required. 
Moreover, managers of most SMEs that undertake agricultural activities say that they 
manage on the basis of market prices or other measures of current value rather than 
historical costs. Users also question the meaningfulness of allocated costs in this industry 
(IASB, 2009c: 46).  
Some of the points made here are not made referenced to in the discussions that are evidenced 
from the board meetings, but the basis offers justification for the decisions made about agriculture 
in a pragmatic way, and through the reliance on certain signifiers such as ‘users’ and ‘relevance’. 
Here, the quote illustrates the IASB attempting to downplay criticism to reinforce technocracy, 
as the board does not consider the people that are criticising the approach, but believed in their 
own approach and reinforced fair value. This demonstrates the methodology that the IASB follow 
to ignore the criticisms of burden and complexity and to reinforce fair value.  
The logics of the due process and the power that is held within this process to decide what is 
talked about, how it is talked about, and then what is published to outline discussions about are 
problematic. Indeed, the BC shows the decisions, but does little to show how the decisions are 
made. This gives the IASB extensive power in regulatory 
conversations. 
As explained, the questions asked in the DP are likely to gain 
supporting comments because of the combination of the IASB’s 
brand, the many countries that are overburdened by IFRS, and 
the demand for IFRS to be followed for structural adjustment, 
development and growth. The due process is narrowed and 
closed to focus on full IFRS, despite extra outreach (which is 
examined in the second half of this chapter). This narrowing 
occurs in various ways, as illustrated in figure 28. 
9.2.5 Funnelling the due process 
The due process becomes narrowed over time, through the 
following aspects: who the call for comments is sent to and the 
key actors that are already considered important in the IASB’s 
regulatory conversations; those already within the IASB’s 
processes and recognised commenters; what the call for 
comments and various other documents are called; when and 
what questions are asked; the suggested answers; and the 
suggested format for answering.  
This is a form of funnelling in the due process, as illustrated in figure 28, which shows that the 
socially sedimented practices of the IASB’s due process narrow the consultation that occurs. 
Therefore, the IASB rhetorically impact and narrow responses throughout the due process, 
Figure 28: Funnelling in 
the due process 
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legitimising their work and their focus on full IFRS (Botzem, 2012; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). 
The questions asked, suggested format and suggested answers act to delegitimise any alternatives.  
This funnelling is further shown through interviewees discussion of the commenting processes 
that their organisations undertake. For the average SME, there are many limits to resources and 
time to comment, funnelling the ability to comment. In comparison, when large bodies comment 
they have a long process and a schedule for preparation, as explained here:  
…we have a committee called the financial reporting committee which takes the lead on 
these things and is part of our financial reporting faculty… The head of our financial 
reporting faculty… effectively leads our representation work to people like the IASB, 
and  normally when something comes in from the IASB, we always respond to it: I think 
it is very rare for us not to respond. And the normal route that we use is to set up a working 
party to prepare a draft response and either people who are on our financial reporting 
committee or, usually people on the FRC plus some others if we can find them outside 
the committee who are interested in the topic and want to help prepare our comments on 
it…(Interviewee 1).  
Whilst this may be useful if the body has experience with SMEs, or gains information from SMEs 
during the process, this shows that the commenting process for this body is detailed and complex, 
and therefore other CLs would not have the same influence, similar sentiments are made by 
interviewee 2:  
…so there is a lot of discussion that goes into it, so our comment letters tend to be quite 
persuasive and highly regarded because of all that effort that goes into them (Interviewee 
2).  
Interviewee 2 explains that the comments constructed by a large professional body are persuasive 
and highly regarded. Of course, this may be legitimate ‘because of all the effort’ from the 
professional body. This reinforces the narrow and limited aspects of the groups that the IASB 
consider, and shows limits of their ‘public interest’. Indeed, it is likely that the public that the 
IASB engage with is so limited that many SMEs do not know that a rule is being made about 
them as the rule is being made. This is concerned with the IASB’s construction of technocracy 
and the method of seeking comment and communication which construct a certain user and 
respondent group. This also has the impact of delegitimising alternatives, and allowing the 
dominance of certain actors, voices and organisations, usually those in support of the IASB, their 
decisions and their expertise. Indeed, the IASB acknowledge the limits in the ‘type’ of actors that 
commented on the standard: 
Consistent with other outreach on the IFRS for SMEs, the vast majority of respondents 
were accounting organisations, ie standard setters, accounting firms or accounting bodies, 
with very limited direct participation from preparers themselves. Furthermore, the IASB 
did not receive any direct responses to the ED from investors, analysts, providers of credit 
to SMEs or other users of SME financial statements. This in part reflects the relatively 
limited capacity and resources in both preparer and user organisations that operate within 
the SME space (IASB, 2014c: 4).  
This quote confirms that most respondents to the comprehensive review of IFRS for SMEs were 
large accounting organisations (which is consistent with the full due process), and explains that 
there is limited capacity for those outside these organisations to contribute. The IASB did conduct 
extra outreach (which is discussed in the second half of this chapter), but this addition and extra 
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outreach ignores the issues of the due process and the way the due process narrows and closes. 
So, the due process undertaken is still seen as legitimate by not changing the due process but 
adding ad-hoc extra outreach. Indeed, the extra outreach occurs after many decisions are made, 
and reinforces the existing due process. This links to the IASB’s technocracy, as these bodies are 
also seen as holding the necessary expertise, delegitimising other comments.  
9.2.6 Expertise  
Within this, the construction of expertise surrounding the IASB and their due process, impacts 
the constituents that comment, and constructs legitimacy. Interviewee 23 discusses the 
importance of this construction of expertise:  
I think the core still is the idea that expertise and carriers of expertise are being organised 
and organise themselves in the field and hold up the claim of self-regulatory standard 
setting…its a self-mandated body of experts that can only survive if it successfully 
upholds this image of being apolitical. 
This interviewee explains that the core of the IASB is the idea that they are the carriers of 
expertise, which needs to continue to reinforce this expertise to uphold their image of being 
apolitical. In the case of IFRS for SMEs, as they have been criticised for not having expertise in 
SMEs, there is a necessity to draw equivalence from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, and construct the 
due process in a manner that excludes alternatives and claim that it is their role, as IFRS can 
respond to the contingencies and meet the needs of all through only small adaptations. Thus, the 
IASB are central in every element of the due process, and every level acts to reinforce the IASB 
as the expert.  
This highlights a process problem because the IASB are not applying a rule, they are creating the 
rule, and throughout the due process and development of IFRS for SMEs they are continuously 
creating rules. In creating these rules, they narrow the space through their public documentation 
which is based on limited evidence. This protects their image of a body of experts, to dismiss 
alternatives, as any other technique is not good enough, which defends their technocracy, as they 
created IFRS, and they therefore are the only people that can determine any variation on IFRS. 
Thus, with limited expertise and little evidence in the area, the IASB move forward with 
developing the standard, with a focus on the due process and their standard setting expertise, 
alongside continuous referral to the IASC’s foundation constitution and the necessity to have 
comparability. In a section of the BC titled ‘Should others do it?’, this is demonstrated:  
… the Board noted that its mission, as set out in the IASC Foundation’s Constitution (see 
paragraph BC42), is not restricted to standards for entities that participate in public capital 
markets. Focusing only on those entities is likely to result in standards or practices for 
other entities (which are over 99 per cent of all entities in virtually all jurisdictions) that 
may not address the needs of external users of financial statements, are not consistent 
with the IASB’s Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements 
or standards, may lack comparability across national boundaries or within a country, and 
may not allow for an easy transition to full IFRSs for entities that wish to enter the public 
capital markets. For those reasons, the Board decided to undertake the project (IASB, 
2009c: 17).  
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This statement refers to the IASC’s constitution to reinforce the IASB’s role as standard setters, 
and the way that standard setting for listed entities leaves a large contingency of entities that are 
outside this focus. This also refers to the rhetoric of comparability, and its necessity (despite 
critiques that comparability is not necessary for SMEs). Moreover, the necessity for an easy 
transition to capital markets (despite critiques that many SMEs do not have any hope of doing so) 
legitimises a focus on capital markets and advanced financial capital within the standard. Giving 
this reasoning legitimises the IASB’s decision to develop IFRS for SMEs, but as shown there are 
many flaws in these logics.  
These aspects of the due process construct social logics and socially sedimented practices within 
the IASB’s due process, which also act to legitimise the IASB, their decisions, and the lack of 
suitability of the IFRS for SMEs for SMEs. However, operating alongside this LoE, there is also 
a LoD as the IASB claim to have conducted extra outreach to incorporate different perspectives. 
9.3 Extra Outreach  
The IASB conducted extra outreach for the IFRS for SMEs due process:  
The Board recognised that, typically, SMEs and their auditors and bankers have not 
participated in the IASB’s due process. With the objectives of encouraging such parties 
to become familiar with the IASB and to consider and respond to the exposure draft, the 
staff undertook a comprehensive outreach programme on this project (IASB, 2009c: 13).  
The staff and the board identified that their perceived preparers (auditors) and users (bankers) had 
limited participation in the development of IFRS for SMEs so the IASB conduct extra outreach in 
the form of a R&M questionnaire, field testing, conferences, roundtables and presentations.  
Extraordinary outreach effort 
Consultations  
The IASB’s Director of Standards for SMEs has made presentation and participated in 
round tables or other meetings… The IASB launched a programme for field testing the 
proposals in the exposure draft… It will help to identify aspects of the proposals that may 
need reconsideration. It focuses especially on the potential operation of the proposals in 
smaller companies and organisations in emerging economies and developing countries 
(IASB, 2007e: 12).  
Within this extra outreach (both in terms of more outreach and unusual forms of outreach 
compared to the usual due process) there is a focus on the director of standards for SMEs and the 
presentations and meetings the director has participated in. Thus, the transparency of this extra 
outreach is lost, but a moral element of this outreach is presented, in the use of the term 
‘extraordinary’. These logics of effort are also found in the press release for IFRS for SMEs: 
For the first time, SMEs will have a common high quality and internationally respected 
set of accounting requirements. We believe the benefits will be felt in both developed 
and emerging economies.  
I thank Paul Pacter for his tireless efforts in leading the project, as well as the hundreds 
of people and SMEs worldwide who have assisted in the development of the 
IFRS. (IASB, 2009a: 2-3). 
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This quote refers to ‘tireless efforts’ and ‘hundreds of people and SMEs worldwide’, this links to 
a moral element of the construction of IFRS for SMEs, there is some elements of missing 
transparency and issues with the due process, but these are unquestioned and ignored because of 
the efforts of good people to develop the standard. This is not limited to documentation. 
Interviewees 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 17, 19 and 27 all refer to the efforts of the staff on the project. 
To the extent that interviewees who were critical of the outcome of the standard reduced their 
concerns by acknowledging the project leader’s efforts. Whilst this thesis is not focused on the 
role of different personalities within the development of IFRS for SMEs, there is an element of 
moral construct, by reinforcing tireless efforts as well as others who have helped. This group is 
constructed as being good people motivated for good reasons, but this is a problematic way of 
patching over gaps in transparency and the due process.  
Moreover, the claims to extra outreach are in contradiction with some interviewees who talk about 
the way that the project was ‘sold’ during this outreach:  
…they were quite happy to go around selling what they’d done but weren’t very good at 
listening (Interviewee 6).  
...we have kind of got the easy wins, it wasn’t really easy to do and [a staff member] did 
a huge amount of work to actually promote it to people, but a lot of the people for whom 
this is the easiest thing to do, have already done it (Interviewee 14). 
These quotes explain that the standard was ‘sold’ and ‘promoted’ in many countries, and for 
interviewee 14 in many cases this was ‘the easiest thing’ for countries to do (as explored this was 
because many countries were overburdening all entities with full IFRS). But this selling and 
promotion limits the consultation, as the first quote from interviewee 6 explains.  
Further investigation of the due process identifies critiques of the extra outreach from comment 
letters:  
In the course of the second consultation we recognized that most of the SME were not 
able to answer the questionnaire. The reasons are: SME are interested in IFRS because 
the topic is omnipresent in newspapers, presentations and other information material. 
However, the general SME does not know enough about the general IFRS to answer the 
specific questions of the questionnaire. Their knowledge is based on the application of 
the national German GAAP. For these reasons a detailed answer on your questionnaire 
is not possible (CL 39, 2005: 2). 
The issue raised here is that comments are limited because many SMEs are unable to comment, 
limiting discussions, and ignoring and covering over alternatives. Similarly, the IFAC (in CL44, 
2005: 2) is concerned that the SME project is going to be steered too much towards large unlisted 
entities as the standard is developed to be: ‘broadly the same as IFRSs, with only token 
simplification’, which would create standards that are ‘ill-suited for application by the great 
majority of SMEs’. The use of outreach demonstrates how the IASB claim draw in differences 
and contingencies, but these are token simplifications to enhance legitimacy.   
Another way that the IASB claim to have improved outreach is through an overview of the ED 
that was provided in ‘non-technical language’ on the website. The providing of a document such 
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as this does not mean that the IASB have opened-up the due process, and does not render them 
accountable or transparent within the due process, as this is still a monological act. Similarly, 
token simplifications do not take away limits on consultation and transparency. These 
simplifications are further explored in the following sections. Throughout the due process, the 
EFRAG was a key advocate for this for R&M simplifications: 
EFRAG believes there is an extremely wide range of SMEs … This creates difficulties 
for the IASB in developing its standards for SMEs. EFRAG is concerned that it also 
makes it more likely that the IASB will conclude that its SME standards should contain 
few if any differences on recognition and measurement from existing IFRSs, because 
differences will generally not be appropriate for entities that are almost identical to listed 
entities. This would be a great shame, because we believe that the users in a SME 
environment generally require less complex and less sophisticated financial reporting 
than users of listed entity financial statements since they are less capital market oriented 
(CL72, 2004: 3).  
This demonstrates the EFRAG’s attempt to persuade the IASB of the importance of changes to 
R&M. This can be seen as a positive movement for creating a suitable standard. However, by 
trying to keep IFRS for SMEs the same as IFRS, and simultaneously attempting to make it 
different from full IFRS, issues are created. These are further explored in relation to the R&M 
questionnaire.   
9.4 Outreach: Recognition and measurement questionnaire  
The IASB staff identified that: 
… most respondents to the discussion paper said that simplifications of the principles for 
recognising and measuring assets, liabilities, income and expenses were needed… 
(IASB, 2009c: 7).  
But, ‘few specifics were proposed’ and ‘when some specifics were proposed, the commentators 
generally did not indicate the particular transactions or other events or conditions that create the 
R&M problem for SMEs under IFRSs or how that problem might be solved’ (IASB, 2009c: 7). 
This explains that respondents were requesting simplifications but were not specific enough, 
which gives the IASB substantial power in making their own decisions about simplifications, 
internally, with minimal research or external input to support decisions (ICAEW, 2015). The lack 
of research by the IASB is critiqued: 
…we feel that more effort could have been made to more systematically and rigorously 
research and consultation during its development, in particular research into users’ needs 
(CL93, 2007: 2).  
The extra outreach is shown to lead to limited changes, as shown in the following comment letter 
which was also published as an article, DiPietra et al. (2008:6) explain:  
However, the recognition and measurement simplifications of the ED-IFRS for SMEs 
are generally considered very minor… and do not adequately take into account the 
specific business models and activities of SMEs as well as their shareholder and 
governance structures… 
The rhetoric purported by the IASB that not many specific suggestions were made by constituents 
continues throughout the due process: 
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Most respondents to the Discussion Paper felt that recognition and measurement 
simplifications were needed, but few specifics were proposed. And where some specifics 
were proposed, the commentators generally did not indicate:  
a. the specific accounting recognition or measurement problem for a private entity under 
IFRSs;  
b. the specific transactions or events that create the recognition or measurement problem 
for private entity under IFRSs;  
c. why is it a problem; and d. how that problem might be solved (IASB, 2009b: 5).  
Many field test entities did not highlight specific problem areas, but, where they did, 
these are listed by section below. Several field test entities commented that overall the 
language in the ED could be simplified. Some field test entities stated they would prefer 
to use full IFRSs if international accounting standards were deemed necessary since the 
ED provides little relief from full IFRSs and could be perceived by users as “second best” 
(IASB, 2008b: 6). 
This generalises across responses, whilst simultaneously incorporating differences into the 
standard, ignoring comments regarding the lack of suitability, the complexity of the standard, and 
suggestions. In the above quote, and throughout the BC there are various logics of persuasion 
invoked to rhetorically justify the decisions that the IASB make, drawing on words such as most, 
about, half and majority:  
Most respondents to the discussion paper (IASB, 2009c: 7).  
About half of the field test entities identified no, or only one or two issues or problems 
(IASB, 2009c: 10).  
Many respondents were of the view that the IFRS for SMEs should be based on existing 
IFRS (IASB, 2009c: 11).  
The great majority of the respondents addressing the issue (IASB, 2009c: 38). 
In the BC, the IASB also use percentages as a logic of persuasion which are misleading and have 
the effect of collapsing differences in the responses. This gives the IASB the power in analysis 
and the construction of support, as the percentages cover over the potential antagonisms, and 
differences.  
This gives the appearance of being open, but draws equivalences across the comment letters, and 
ignores those that were not in favour of the IASB’s decisions. For example, the responses outside 
these majorities may have been received from developing countries or SMEs, but these 
equivalences and persuasions do not show this. This is particularly important for IFRS for SMEs 
because there is scarce research on SMEs and the impact of the IASB’s decisions (Devi & 
Samujh, 2015; ICEAW, 2015; Ram & Newberry, 2013).  
…were the ones making the decisions of what doesn’t, isn’t necessary for them, were not 
qualified to do that… that board wasn’t qualified to decide what transactions SMEs was 
going to make… (Interviewee 17).  
Interviewee 17 identifies a focus on capital markets and argues that board members do not have 
the ability to make such decisions. With a lack of research and limited attention paid to external 
constituents, despite the claims to ‘extra outreach’, and the incorporation of some changes to 
R&M the unsuitable basis of full IFRS is not resolved:  
We do not see any value in approaching the development of accounting standards for 
private companies in this manner. Nor do we see this as creating “differential” 
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accounting. This approach appears to lead only to a condensed version of full IFRSs and 
does not provide any relief to SMEs from current reporting standards. In addition, we 
once again fail to find focus on the users of financial information… We believe the end 
result of the approach specified in Question 2 is shortsighted and may result in private 
company financial statement users erroneously assuming that the IASB is developing 
differential accounting, but learning after the fact, and too late, that nothing has changed 
(CL55, 2005: 3 [Emphasis in original]). 
In the construction of ‘extraordinary’ effort and outreach, the IASB attempt to portray that the 
issues created by the unsuitable basis are resolved through the incorporation of difference (LoD). 
This CL contends that the board’s approach is not differential reporting, and there is not enough 
focus on users of SME financial statements, only considering full IFRS which cannot be adapted 
to fit SMEs, therefore leading to a condensed version of IFRS. CL55 also explains this may lead 
those external to the IASB to believe that the IASB is developing differential reporting but when 
it is ‘too late’ learn that ‘nothing has changed’. This is important, as the extra outreach conducted 
by the IASB portrays IFRS for SMEs as different from the full IFRS, but this is not the case. 
Furthermore, SMEs do not appear to have been considered, only extra outreach to users and 
preparers was focused on, not SMEs themselves.  
The board conducted round table meetings, and the R&M questionnaire informed the focus of 
those meetings, narrowing the dialogue: 
The IASB concluded that it needed further information to assess possible recognition and 
measurement simplifications… The board instructed the staff to develop and publish a 
questionnaire as a tool to identify issues that should be discussed at those round-table 
meetings (IASB, 2009c: 7).  
The BC then explains that the responses were discussed with the Standards Advisory Council, the 
SME Working Group, World Standard Setters Meetings and Public round tables (IASB, 2009c: 
8). The IASB asked the following questions:  
1. What are the areas for possible simplification of recognition and measurement 
principle for SMEs?  
2. From your experience, please indicate which topics addressed in IFRSs might 
be omitted from SME standards because they are unlikely to occur in and SME context… 
(IASB, 2009c: 7).  
This outreach demonstrates the IASBs attempts to claim the standard is different to full IFRS in 
terms of R&M, but the standard is still focused on full IFRS and a capital market orientation, as 
demonstrated. The capital market and full IFRS focus creates an unsuitable standard:  
Clearly, the conceptual framework upon which IFRSs are based evolved over time and 
the evolution transcends over a century during which businesses evolved and the forms 
of organisations transformed. In the mid-twentieth century, capital market participants 
and their needs became central to financial reporting and hence the fundamental premise 
of capital markets… Therefore, it is clear that the full IFRSs that are premised on capital 
market participants' needs may not be suitable for all entities. It is important that IASB 
issue a separate set of financial reporting standards suitable for SMEs (CL96, 2005: 2) 
In practice the standard is limited to full IFRS. Nevertheless, the R&M questionnaire and 
subsequent simplifications draw in some differences. This sees the IASB attempt to create a 
standard that is simultaneously different to full IFRS (through simplification), to convince 
communities that the IASB are recognising their position and their interest through LoD, whilst 
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also falling within the same brand. This LoD incorporates alternatives to persuade constituents 
and cover over the unsuitable basis of full IFRS. This continues in field testing. 
9.5 Field Testing 
Another form of ‘extra outreach’ conducted by the IASB is ‘field testing’, which was undertaken 
to identify, among other aspects, the needs of developing countries and SMEs, users and micro 
entities, with the following goals:  
Goals of field testing 
Assess understandability… Assess scope… Assess burden… Assess impact… Assess 
accounting policy choices… Assess micro and developing country problems… Assess 
the adequacy of implementation guidance… (IASB, 2007c: 2-3).  
Additionally, interviewee 19 explains the purpose of the field test:  
…well I think it’s a case of… you know what’s your problem… its often a difficulty, can 
you do this if we require this, and what’s stopping you doing it, and it’s often rather, I 
can’t be bothered writing a letter sometimes, you know they send us a ferocious letter but 
they haven’t explained exactly what the problem is and when it’s written a) with passion, 
or b) with a sort of measure of this is just impractical, or this is not reflecting how it is, 
you know that is always a dangerous one, if we get that it means the standards could be 
flawed, because you are trying to portray economic reality, even if you’re simplifying it, 
and that is the sort of reasons for the field test… let’s go out and get a few companies and 
say could you do this? if this is what it is, you know rather than just put it out and everyone 
say well it’s garbage, we can’t deal with that, so you really want the exposure draft to be 
you know reasonably sure it has a good chance of getting through… 
This interviewee explains that the field test was undertaken because often the letters received 
needed to be more specific, and the IASB wanted to discover if the standard led to a true reflection 
operating some complex notions. The field tests requested respondent companies to prepare their 
accounts under IFRS for SMEs alongside their local GAAP, and ‘… respond to a series of 
questions designed to identify specific problems …’ (IASB, 2009c: 10). These questions act to 
further narrow the responses that the field testers can give: 
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Figure 29: IASB (2007f: 14) Field Test Questionnaire 
Nevertheless, these field tests act as LoD by acknowledging the necessity for change. The field 
tests were conducted by 117 companies in Argentina; Australia; Barbados; Denmark; France; 
Germany; India; Italy; Kenya; Malawi; Malaysia; Netherlands; Nigeria; Poland; South Africa; 
South Korea; Tanzania; Tunisia; United Kingdom; and the United States (IASB, 2008b). Not all 
of the companies completed the full requirements requested by the IASB: a ‘significant number 
did not provide certain documents, for example financial statements were provided without the 
IASB’s questionnaire or the questionnaire was provided without any financial statements’ (IASB, 
2008b: 4). Some submitted their own questionnaire or a memo, and some did not complete the 
financial statements in full, missing out certain statements as it was too ‘time consuming’ (IASB, 
2008b: 4). Commonly, the field testers did not include ‘the cash flow statement, or the statement 
of changes in equity… and certain note disclosures’ (IASB, 2008b: 4). So, at times there were 
problems identifying issues and some field testers suggested that there may be further problems 
when the financial statements were not being prepared outside field testing (IASB, 2008b: 4). 
These issues could be indicative of bigger problems with the standard (IASB, 2008b: 4-5). The 
IASB staff admit that this renders it difficult for them ‘to make a precise statement regarding how 
thoroughly the field test entities were able to apply the requirements’ (IASB, 2008b: 5). However, 
the staff also state the following:  
Overall impression. Although this agenda paper sets out to summarise the problems field 
test entities encountered, it’s worth noting from the outset that about half of the field test 
entities listed no, or only one or two, issues or problems. In addition, even while 
identifying a few problems they encountered, several of these field test entities 
specifically said they found the ED to be understandable and appropriate (IASB, 2008b: 
5-6). 
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This quote shows limits in the transparency and detail of the staff member’s descriptions, whilst 
the agenda paper does go on to give further detail this quote attempts to generalise away from the 
difficulties previously identified.  
There were reports from the field tests in which the respondents outlined their concerns, for 
example the accounting standards committee of Germany (ASCG) explained the following:  
To the understanding of the participants, the acceptance of an IFRS for SMEs will heavily 
depend upon further reductions of complexity of the IFRS for SMEs in order to reduce 
the burden to prepare those financial statements but also the general acceptance of an 
IFRS for SMEs will be crucial (ASCG, 2008: 21). 
These issues of complexity are focused on within the field test and throughout the analysis of the 
field test results, highlighting the complexities of the standard:  
25. Disclosures are too burdensome. The second most significant area causing problems 
is the nature, volume and complexity of disclosures. a. A significant number of the field 
test entities commented that the required disclosures are too onerous to prepare, in terms 
of time and costs. Many field test entities did not prepare some of the notes for field 
testing purposes for this reason. b. A few field test entities noted that, in some cases, they 
were required to publicly disclose sensitive information. c. One field test entity, currently 
applying full IFRSs in their annual financial statements, commented that the ED does not 
provide much presentation and disclosure relief from full IFRSs because many areas of 
full IFRSs are not relevant to small firms, so migrating to the IFRS for SMEs gives almost 
the same outcome (IASB, 2008b: 6).  
This explains that field test entities believed the requirements of IFRS for SMEs are too onerous 
because of the time and costs, which is linked to the previous points that some did not prepare 
parts of the standards because of these complexities. Moreover, field testers struggle to identify 
clear benefits of moving to IFRS for SMEs. Thus, they require ‘further simplifications’ as 
currently there is ‘undue effort’, that ‘would increase costs’ and the field test entities ‘staff do not 
have expertise and costly outside experts would have been necessary’ (IASB, 2008b: 6). 
Therefore, there is a simultaneous request placed on the IASB to make the standard different from 
full IFRS, alongside reference back to the importance of the IFRS brand:  
…Some field test entities stated they would prefer to use full IFRSs if international 
accounting standards were deemed necessary since the ED provides little relief from full 
IFRSs and could be perceived by users as “second best” (IASB, 2008b: 6).  
Finally, the field test report states we should: ‘Make IFRS for SMEs stand-alone and improve its 
structure’ (IASB, 2008b:6). This issue of stand-alone and the ED is crucial in the extra outreach 
as a LoD, as it is a focal point of change from the ED to the final standard, and will now be further 
explored.  
9.6 Exposure draft and stand-alone 
The core change from the ED to the final standard was to make the standard ‘stand-alone’: 
The main changes from the recognition, measurement and presentation principles 
proposed in the exposure draft that resulted from the Board’s redeliberations were: (a) 
making the final IFRS a stand-alone document (eliminating all but one of the 23 cross-
references to full IFRSs that had been proposed in the exposure draft, with the one 
remaining cross-reference providing an option, but not a requirement, to follow IAS 39 
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Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement instead of the two financial 
instruments sections of the IFRS for SMEs) (IASB, 2009c: 13). 
Prior to this there were ‘fallbacks’ within the standard, meaning that if the organisation needed to 
they could look to IFRS, but this fallback was debated: 
Mandatory fallback The Board discussed the WG recommendation for a stand-alone, 
self-contained IFRS for SMEs - with designated fallbacks to full IFRSs on specific 
matters, but not a general mandatory fallback. The Board decided: 
Standards in full IFRSs that address transactions, events or conditions commonly 
encountered by SMEs should be included in the IFRS for SMEs, either directly or by 
cross-reference back to the full IFRS. Standards relating to transactions, events, or 
conditions not generally encountered by SMEs should not be included in the IFRS for 
SMEs. The goal would be to minimise the circumstances in which an SME would need 
to fall back to full IFRSs in the absence of guidance in the IFRS for SMEs. 
 If the IFRS for SMEs does not specifically address a transaction, event or condition, an 
SME should be required to look to the requirements and guidance elsewhere in the IFRS 
for SMEs dealing with similar and related issues (that is, select an appropriate accounting 
policy ‘by analogy’). Failing that, the SME should be required to look to the requirements 
and guidance in IFRSs and Interpretations of IFRSs dealing with similar and related 
issues (IASB, 2006: 3). 
This demonstrates the debate and changing decisions about the fall back requirement. 
Subsequently, there are many references to the discussion of stand-alone or fall back within the 
board meetings, for example, in IStaR (2006a: 18-19): 
Mr Pacter said the cross-references in the draft were there for the Board’s benefit and he 
was not sure that they should be included in the ED or final standard. He added was that 
his aim was that the SME standard should stand alone as far as possible. Hans Georg 
Bruns said he would prefer not to see the cross-reference included in the final standard 
as they could be more confusing than helpful. Geoff Whittington asked whether it would 
be possible to include a derivation table without cluttering the draft. 
The core issue is the focus on remaining with the concepts and principles within full IFRS:  
On the question of the concepts and pervasive principles section, Mr Pacter said it had 
not been his intention in extracting the concepts from the Framework to change any of 
the concepts. The only change he had made was new wording for the objective of 
financial statements, which was taken from the conceptual framework project. One of the 
issues was the number of standards in which there is a reference to assets, liabilities, 
income or expense. It did not seem to him that it would be possible to ignore the 
definitions.  
He added that he did feel that a glossary was necessary and it was possible that some of 
the terms could be defined in that. But overall he did not think that the concepts and 
definitions question could be avoided. The idea of pervasive principles came from the 
working group, he added, who were concerned about a comprehensive mandatory 
fallback to full IFRS. The pervasive principles were a way of dealing with that (IStaR, 
2006a: 19).  
This shows attempts to persuade the board members that cross-references to full IFRS should be 
removed, but retain the focus on conceptual frameworks concepts and principles, through 
pervasive principles. This focus on the conceptual framework and pervasive principles is 
problematic as stand-alone portrays that the standard is ‘different’ from IFRS. The aim of stand-
alone is based on critiques from different aspects of the due process:  
Over 60% of the comment letters that addressed the ‘stand-alone’ issue would eliminate 
all cross-references to full IFRSs thereby making the IFRS for SMEs a fully stand-alone 
Standard (IASB, 2008c: 2).  
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Another 35% of the letters either (a) would keep the number of cross-references to an 
absolute minimum or (b) were indifferent between having minimal cross- references 
and removing all cross-references (IASB, 2008c: 2). 
Field tests. All relevant requirements should be within the IFRS for SMEs, and all 
cross-references should be removed. Needing to refer back to full IFRSs to apply 
certain options was found to be problematic (IASB, 2008c: 2) 
Therefore, the due process identified the necessity for the standard to be ‘stand-alone’. The core 
understanding of the term stand-alone is a technical understanding of the necessity to look at IFRS 
for SMEs to prepare their accounts:  
…to my mind it means a standard which is the only standards you’re required to make 
reference to when preparing a set of GAAP accounts and certainly that contrasts with 
IFRS where you have multiple standards and accompanying interpretations and other 
literature. Certainly I think the idea of the IFRS for SMEs, is that it would be a sole book, 
a sole point of reference incorporating all the requirements that an SME would need to 
be aware of, which obviously is a great benefits, its much shorter that IFRS (Interviewee 
2). 
…well of course they’re not stand-alone in a sense, but what we mean by stand-alone is 
that you can read them and nothing else and do your accounts, on the basis of it, you 
don’t have to refer to other documents, but of course, that when I say they’re not stand-
alone, they can’t be stand-alone for everybody (Interviewee 5).  
However, this thesis argues that making the standard stand-alone has a bigger impact on the 
discourse surrounding the IFRS for SMEs. By making the standard ‘stand-alone’ this draws in 
criticism, covering over the lack of suitability, the capital market orientation, and issues 
surrounding scope. By drawing in this difference (identified in the due process), the IASB are 
able to ignore other critiques and appear to be drawing in difference. This is shown in the 
following comment letter from the EFRAG, as an example, which agrees that the IASB has made 
good progress in making the standard stand-alone:  
EFRAG believes that the IASB has made good progress towards these objectives with 
the ED. For example, we think that the IASB has got it exactly right by deciding that the 
standards should be a stand-alone document, accepting recognition and measurement 
simplifications, and separating the ongoing maintenance of the standards from the 
revision process for full IFRS (CL161, 2007: 1).  
But CL161 (2007: 1-2) continues that this is not enough:  
However EFRAG also believes that the proposed standard can be—and needs to be— 
further improved. Our detailed comments are set out in the attachments in this letter, but 
a summary of the main areas in which we think improvement is both desirable and 
achievable is set out below… We have argued previously about the need for a thorough 
analysis of the information needs of users of SMEs‘ financial statements. That is because 
we believe that the information needs of users should play a fundamental role in 
determining the standards that are set, and we suspect that the needs of users of SMEs‘ 
financial statements are different from the needs of users of listed entity financial 
statements. 3 For example, our perception is that: (a) Users in a SME environment 
generally require less complex and less sophisticated financial reporting since they are 
less capital market oriented. (b) As users of SME financial statements may have limited 
resources to devote to an in-depth analysis of financial statements, they value 
standardisation in the preparation and presentation of financial statements more.  
Whilst the EFRAG is pleased that some of the differences have been drawn into the standard, 
making some of the necessary changes, they argue that this is not enough as the IASB have not 
researched SMEs or users to the necessary extent. The issue of stand-alone is important as 60% 
of comment letters focused on the stand-alone issue, showing the IASB drawing in a LoD from 
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these comment letters, and covering over other elements: 
Staff comments. The two most pervasive issues confronting the Board in redeliberating 
the ED are whether the final IFRS for SMEs should be completely stand-alone and 
whether SMEs should be allowed to use the more complex options currently available by 
cross-reference. These two issues are related… Staff recommend that the final Standard 
should be fully stand-alone for the following reasons: 
a. A stand-alone document would be more understandable and easier to use. It would also 
be perceived as a more user-friendly document and hence improve acceptance by 
jurisdictions considering adoption and by entities within the scope. Many respondents to 
the ED felt that the cross-references require SMEs to be familiar with both the IFRS for 
SMEs and full IFRSs – a requirement even more burdensome than for an entity following 
full IFRSs… There would be version control… There is an issue of where the cross 
references end… A key disadvantage of making the IFRS for SMEs stand-alone is that 
this may significantly increase the length (IASB, 2008c: 2-3).  
The move to stand-alone by the IASB is s prominent issue in the development of the standard: 
Responses to the exposure draft 
BC26 The Board received 162 letters of comment on the exposure draft. All letters were 
made available to Board members and posted on the IASB’s website. Paragraphs BC36–
BC158 discuss the Board’s reasoning on the chief technical issues in the project. Here is 
a brief summary of the main issues raised in the letters of comment on the exposure draft: 
(a) Stand-alone. The single most pervasive comment was to make the IFRS for SMEs a 
fully stand-alone document, or nearly so. Over 60 per cent of the respondents would 
eliminate all cross-references to full IFRSs. Virtually all of the remaining respondents 
either (i) would keep the number of cross-references to an absolute minimum or (ii) were 
indifferent between having minimal cross-references and removing all of them. The 
exposure draft had included 23 cross-references to full IFRSs (IASB, 2009c: 11). 
This is a key LoD because the stand-alone rhetoric indicates that the IFRS for SMEs is separate 
to full IFRS, despite the top down approach from full IFRS, being contained within the same 
brand, and being very similar: 
Indeed, IFRS for SMEs are based on full IFRS: the implementation and use of IFRS for 
SMEs would require a knowledge and understanding of the full IFRS, which would be 
difficult for small and medium-size entities which financial and human resources are far 
less developed than those of listed companies. We are concerned that the cost and burden 
of preparing financial statements compliant with IFRS for SMEs would be too high for 
many SMEs, and not counterbalanced by clear benefits (CL143, 2007: 1). 
Full IFRS had been a starting point in the development of the proposed standard for 
SMEs. In fact, were all direct references to full IFRS retrieved from IFRS for SMEs, the 
link between both standards will remain. In consequence, any significant changes to full 
IFRS will impact IFRS for SMEs (CL 21, 2007: 3) 
Within the IFRS for SMEs this is important as the due process gains significant criticism (as 
explained), but these criticisms are blunted through the LoD of stand-alone, and this as a key 
change from the ED to the final standard. This is core to the LoD, as Howarth (2010: 321) 
explains:  
It is here that proponents of poststructuralist discourse theory employ the logic of 
difference. The logic of difference involves the loosening-up or disarticulation of 
equivalential chains of demands and identities via various practices of challenge, 
institutionalization, deflection, or negation. This logic is marked either by the differential 
incorporation or even co-optation of claims and demands, where their cutting edge may 
be blunted, and/ or it is accompanied by the pluralizing or opening-up of a regime or 
practice to new demands and claims, where those in a social field acknowledge and 
accommodate difference. Policies may thus be devised and implemented to disarm 
challenges to the status quo by addressing some (or all) of the concerns expressed by 
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various groups or subjects, thereby preventing the linking together of demands and 
dampening their impact. 
In this case, the IASB incorporate a difference that they did not previously want to incorporate in 
order to blunt the cutting edge of criticisms. This thesis demonstrates that the term ‘stand-alone’ 
constructs a signifier that different people can identify with differently. This thesis argues that the 
standard would only be stand-alone if the IASB had created a new framework, but IFRS for SMEs 
was created from full IFRS. The IASB construct this stand-alone signifier to rhetorically portray 
that the standard is different from full IFRS, employing claims of understandability and ease of 
use. However, this claim is unsupported, as the standard was created from full IFRS, still links to 
full IFRS and is supported by many other documents for guidance. The pervasive use of cross-
references to full IFRS in earlier drafts of IFRS for SMEs was a key issue raised in comment 
letters.  The IASB acknowledged the criticism, and prepared the final version of the standard as 
a ‘stand-alone’ document, without fallback references to full IFRS. This is an extension of 
subjectivation and hegemony because they incorporated this antagonism and opposition into the 
standard through a LoD, in a manner that attempts to cover over other antagonisms. This 
demonstrates limits of the due process, because the IASB never talks outside full IFRS and places 
themselves at the centre of the debate. This reinforces their role as technocratic and enables the 
extension of advanced financial capital, with little consideration of the needs to SMEs.  
This thesis argues that the IASB undertake a limited debate, in which they have already made 
decisions before undertaking consultation. Nevertheless, there are some CLs that attempt to 
reopen the debate, and discuss a different aspect that the IASB did not ask for discussion of, in 
both the DP and the ED. When the IASB staff members analyse these CLs they draw on logics 
of persuasion, rendering their analysis limited, covering over CLs that fall outside the structure 
of their debate, and highlighting the power that the IASB staff hold.   
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the combination of LOD and LOE within the due process through a 
focus on the BC, as this document simultaneously identifies a focus on full IFRS in the 
development of IFRS for SMEs which operates a LoE by claiming that IFRS can be extended in 
equivalence to be suitable for SMEs, whilst also claiming to conduct and incorporate extra 
outreach which operates a LoD to incorporate criticisms, limits and different perspectives.  
As explained, there was extra outreach within the due process, and this draws in contingencies 
and antagonisms through LoD. The IASB state that a ‘five year development process’ was 
undertaken with ‘extensive consultation’ of ‘SMEs worldwide’ (IASB, 2009a). In this, the IASB 
draw on the due process to legitimise IFRS for SMEs, and construct democratic logics of open 
consultation and transparency.  
This rhetoric contributes to the IASB’s brand, giving legitimacy and justification to their 
decisions. The due process, including the BC, constitutes a significant social logic within the IFRS 
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for SMEs. Further examination of the due process enables the identification of key debates, 
contradictions, and can contribute to understanding what was not said. The focus on full IFRS 
constructs a limited debate for IFRS for SMEs. Indeed, the way that the IASB raises questions, 
and their ability to define the question, the outcome and the analysis restricts the debate. In the 
BC, justifications are given for the decisions that the IASB have made, but there are many limits 
to transparency within these decisions and the subsequent explanations. There are logics and 
socially sedimented practices that are ignored by the IASB, particularly through the focus on full 
IFRS. Within this the IASB shut down debates, which is the power that they have at the 
technocratic level because they are constructed as the experts that have complete control over the 
questions, the debate and the outcomes.  
The last two chapters have examined how the IASB operate their existing due process to 
simultaneously delegitimise and incorporate alternatives and differences. This also retains their 
legitimacy and reinforces their expertise, and their role as an agent of advanced financial capital. 
Throughout this process, logics of advanced financial capital are dominant, showing how the 
IASB construct who the regulated are and how they control the regulatory conversations. 
Throughout this due process, the IASB self-define all aspects of the due process, which highlights 
issues of power, transparency and accountability. This reinstates the IASB’s role as technocratic 
expert in standard setting, and extends their role to SMEs and emerging economies whilst 
retaining a focus on the hegemony of advanced financial capital. The question of how the 
regulated are constructed is further explored in the following chapter which examines the way 
that the IASB construct subjects to capture them ideologically, constructing conceptions of SMEs 
and emerging economies.   
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 Chapter 10: Fantasmatic logics and critique  
This chapter reflects on the fantasmatic logics and ideological presuppositions constructed by the 
IASB to grip subjects, particularly constructing SMEs and emerging economies as subjects, for 
the purposes of advanced financial capital and to sustain the IASB’s identity. These ideologies 
are attached to the social and political logics operated by the IASB. The fantasmatic logics are 
linked to the social logics, because the social logics allows the IASB to extend the object of their 
hegemony and sell their fantasy. Therefore, the fantasmatic logics examine the way that subjects 
are constructed for the purposes of this extension.  
To institute IFRS for SMEs, the IASB construct subjects, constructing SMEs and emerging 
economies as subjects that need ‘help’ from the IASB, to extend the expropriation of advanced 
financial capital. However, ideologies are not without contingencies and attempts to smooth over 
those contingencies, which is explored in this chapter. Therefore, this chapter follows the order 
of looking at how the IASB constructs subjects, why they construct subjects in that way, the 
contingencies in this construction and the way that the IASB attempts to smooth over 
contingencies. This includes logics of technocracy, helping SMEs, access to capital and 
comparability, which enables the IASB to enact their role as an agent of advanced financial 
capital, and to spread this hegemony to a new area.  
10.1. How the IASB and advanced financial capital constructs subjects  
In the development of IFRS for SMEs the IASB legitimise their work and sustain their identity by 
constructing fantasies that grip subjects. The IASB construct emerging economies and SMEs as 
needing and wanting to gain access to capital to develop and expand. In terms of SMEs, the IASB 
construct SMEs as wanting to gain access to capital to grow, expand and maximise profit. The 
fantasy constructed here is that the goal of an SME is to become a big listed entity, and this is 
problematic because most SMEs are not interested in becoming listed, external funding and/or 
external funding from capital markets. Whilst the IASB do go some way to recognise that there 
are different types of entities, they do not move towards the idea that they have different goals, 
which may not be to become a large listed entity. The IASB does not recognise any goal except 
growth towards becoming a large listed entity. This is evidenced in the IASB’s refusal to move 
away from full IFRS, which dismisses alternative aims, goals and structures. The role of fantasy, 
therefore is to ensure that radical contingencies and political dimensions remain in the background 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007).  
The IASB present the standard in various ways, they state the IFRS for SMEs is ‘good financial 
reporting made simple’ (IFRSF, 2010: 2). This claim is made on the basis of creating IFRS for 
SMEs from IFRS, which is the ‘good financial reporting’, and ‘simple’ is concerned with 
simplifications made in the due process, which construct the equivalence from IFRS to IFRS for 
SMEs. The IASB also state that IFRS for SMEs has been ‘designed specifically for SMEs’ and is 
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‘tailored for SMEs’ (IFRSF, 2010: 2). This is problematic because the standard is not ‘tailored’ 
for SMEs, as it has been created by drawing from full IFRS which was created for listed entities, 
so the IFRS for SMEs is unsuitable for many non-publically accountable entities. Instead of 
considering that SMEs may have different aims or needs, the IASB continue to function a capital 
market orientation within IFRS for SMEs. For example, many entities are not focused on capital 
markets, growth or profit maximisation in the same way as listed entities.  
The IASB also claim that the IFRS for SMEs is internationally recognised (IASB, 2012a; IFRSF, 
2010). The logic of expertise that surrounds the IASB (Botzem, 2012), and the importance of this 
international recognition, rhetorically places pressure on countries to adopt the standard, and 
provides ideological cover for the IASB to ignore local needs.  
The IASB construct the fantasy that SMEs and emerging economies need to improve, get better 
and develop, which sells a logic of meritocracy. This is constructed through logics of a dominant 
class of influential and well educated people (the IASB), that need to teach others how to improve, 
which is by following the IASB’s languages. This is shown through the continuous focus on 
access to capital in the standard, which depicts the IASB as helping others to speak their language 
and gain access to capital and development. As shown in the previous chapters ‘access to capital’ 
is core to the development of IFRS for SMEs, as the standard is seen as helping both individual 
SMEs gain further access to capital (debt) and developing countries to gain further access to 
capital for development (Lazzarato, 2012). Indeed, as shown in chapter 8, emerging economies 
and SMEs are linked together by the IASB, also highlighting this point.  
Through this the IASB, and IFIs are selling the fantasy that IFRS adoption (along with other 
structural adjustments), will lead to emerging economies becoming like Western developed 
countries, which constitutes pressure to adopt. This pressure holds that emerging economies need 
to become developed, in the image of Western Developed countries, which attempts to remove 
local differences through standardisation and harmonisation. This leads to the claim that emerging 
economies and SMEs can only achieve their aims (aims that the IASB construct them as desiring) 
through the adoption of the language of IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. The following section suggests 
why the IASB attempt to construct subjects in this manner.  
10.2 Why the IASB and advanced financial capital constructs subjects 
The IASB construct subjects in this manner for the purposes of advanced financial capital, and 
their role as technocratic expert (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). Emerging economies and SMEs are 
constructed in a similar way to listed entities and capital markets so that they can become subject 
to the mechanism of expropriation from advanced financial capital. In this the IASB construct 
both SMEs and emerging economies as subjects who need advanced financial capital, which 
expands the area of profiteering for advanced financial capital. Within this, the way that the IASB 
construct themselves as technocratic is crucial to the construction of fantasies that cover over this 
political goal. They claim to be the experts, in all areas of standard setting, despite critiques that 
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they are not experts in SMEs shown in previous chapters. Within this the IASB construct 
themselves as neutral and apolitical, but this thesis has politicised the IASB’s technocracy, 
demonstrating that they are not acting neutrally, and are instead focused on the political goal of 
extending advanced financial capital’s hegemony.   
Indeed, the IASB claim that their expertise was crucial in the creation of a credible, high-quality 
standard:  
Enhancing quality and credibility…  
So something had to be devised that retained the same underlying conceptual framework. 
‘It was a question of following the same principles’, said Garnett, ‘but applying them in 
a different way that would satisfy users.’ The IASB entrusted Paul Pacter, a seasoned 
professional and enthusiastic promoter of IFRSs, with the leadership of the immense task 
to develop accounting standards for SMEs… Asked about what he perceived as the main 
goal of the project, Pacter said ‘We want to enable SMEs to have better access to capital. 
Good financial reporting standards for SMEs are the key to enhancing the quality and 
credibility of the financial information that SMEs report—this is especially true for 
emerging and developing countries.’ (IASB, 2007e: 10-11 [Emphasis in original]). 
This quote explains several elements about the IFRS for SMEs, suggesting that the standard is 
going to enhance reporting quality and the credibility of financial reporting. It demonstrates that 
the IFRS for SMEs is still following the IFRS conceptual framework, following the same 
principles. Through this, and the due process, the IASB continue to claim expertise. These logics 
of expertise and technocracy construct organisational legitimacy as a rhetorical strategy which 
constructs their ‘public interest’ claims and masks their focus on advanced financial capital and 
capital markets (Black, 2008; Quack, 2010). These logics mask the politics of regulation and their 
non-democratic nature through technocratic governance. The concepts of tailoring for SMEs, 
helping SMEs, and acting in the public interest are attempts by the IASB to reinforce their 
technocracy. This ideology represents IFRS for SMEs in a certain way, within which the IASB 
focus on spreading the ‘IFRS Mindset’ (IASB, 2016b), through a standard that claims to be tailor-
made for SMEs and to meet the needs of emerging economies, but minimizes their role in the due 
process.  
The IASB is a geo-political player, but the perceived neutrality, objectivity and technocracy of 
advanced financial reporting more generally, and the IASB’s work in particular, obfuscates the 
politics of accounting as an instrument of exploitation and expropriation (Botzem, 2012; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Hines, 1988; Lazzrato, 2012). This technocracy belies the focus 
within IFRS for SMEs on capital markets, which extends the hegemony of financial capital. To 
hide this power, the IASB continue to reinforce their expertise for creating standards and the 
importance of their high-quality brand through the links between IFRS to IFRS for SMEs. This 
links to the construction of the IASB’s brand, and the impression that the brand gives. The brand 
informs the decision to adopt, as actors see the standards as high-quality and important for 
development. This provides ideological cover to ignore antagonisms, contexts and local 
differences. Moreover, as the brand becomes an integral part to structural adjustment and 
development plans there is increased pressure to adopt and enforce both IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. 
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Through their rhetoric, the IASB alongside IFIs claim that IFRS for SMEs is the best and only 
option, and therefore should be adopted, so that countries can fit into the global accounting 
language and gain access to capital.  
The IASB construct subjects in this manner to cover over radical contingencies and to stop 
counter articulations of differential reporting that may destabilise them. The IASB construct 
fantasies, and when these fantasies are questioned they respond through technical, procedural and 
process responses. Alongside claims to the necessity for comparability and increasing access to 
capital, these responses ignore ideological impacts, so radical contingencies emerge. Thus, the 
radical contingencies of these fantasies are now explored.  
10.3 What are the contingencies in these fantasies? 
The construction of subjects and ideologies is not without contingencies. There are many 
contingencies in the IASB’s conceptions of SMEs and emerging economies. With regards to their 
construction of SMEs, the IASB ignore the idea that SMEs could be different to listed entities 
and not have the aims of gaining access to capital, expanding and become listed for profit 
maximisation. This does not consider that SMEs may have other aims or goals. Many SMEs are 
family held firms that want to remain family held, whilst the IASB acknowledge that SMEs are 
slightly different to listed entities, they do not consider that their end goal may be different, or 
should be different.  
In this the IASB do not consider that SMEs may want to remain closely held, and the only end 
goal that is considered is that entities want to grow and eventually become big, listed companies. 
Chua (1986) discusses the role of the positivist, which is to be an expert that can give instructions 
for achieving a desired end, giving technical answers to preconceived questions. In this, the 
technocratic idea is to provide the means for answering the question and reaching the desired end. 
However, in the case of IFRS for SMEs the IASB extend this technocracy a step further, to 
normatively giving a prescription of both the means and the end, prescribing how the whole of 
the emerging world and how all SMEs should account. In some ways, this is the fantasy of 
technocracy, as the IASB are prescribing what the end goal of an SME should be (to become a 
big listed company, and to become rich). This is the fantasy of technocracy because the IASB are 
acting politically and determining what the end should be, at the same time as providing the means 
to the end. The role of the positivist is to provide research that is value-free, and within the means-
end dichotomy these researchers do not comment on ends, as commenting on the ends would 
involve a value judgement, which would remove rationality and would be wholly subjective 
(Chua, 1986). Whilst the IASB claim to operate a due process and hold technical expertise, they 
are constructing both the means and the ends, in a subjective manner. Through this they suggest 
that SMEs and emerging economies are wrong, and that the whole world should instead account 
through their language, in a normative prescription, as part of their role as an agent of advanced 
financial capital hegemony. The end goal of financial reporting for listed entities is to provide 
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information for economic decision usefulness, for investors. So, the IASB extend this end goal to 
SMEs and emerging economies, with no consideration of alternative ends or goals. This operates 
an extension which redefines the end goal of SME financial reporting. A listed entities goal is to 
provide the best mechanism to attract external investment. Here, the IASB extend this by saying 
that the purpose of being an entity is to attract investment, which is defining the end. However, 
this is contingent because many entitles are not focused on this end, as shown in the previous 
empirical chapters. 
The IASB focus on logics of development and improvement, portraying that if SMEs and 
emerging economies follow IFRS for SMEs they will be able to improve, gain access to capital 
and grow. This also constructs the second contingent fantasy which is focused on opportunity and 
the fantasy that both SMEs and emerging economies can get to the ‘top of the pyramid’. In terms 
of emerging economies becoming developed, and SMEs becoming large and/or listed and profit 
maximising. Through meritocracy and the idea of a ruling or influential class of people in society, 
this constructs the fantasy that if you have skill then you will be able to reach this high level. The 
IASB construct their languages of IFRS and IFRS for SMEs as the language that needs to be 
followed in financial reporting to achieve this. This fantasy that you can reach the top is 
constructed through logics of emergence, logics of opportunity and logic of development. 
However, this fantasy is contingent in two ways, first as it does not recognise that for some to get 
to the ‘top’ others have to fail. Second, it does not recognise that if you are funded by the outside 
(through access to capital) then large chunks of your profit will go outside, which is not something 
that many SMEs want. In terms of both SMEs and emerging economies this fantasy ignores that 
money leaving the community is not development, and that access to capital is access to debt 
(Lazzarato, 2012).  
Another contingency within the IASB’s fantasies is that the benefits outweigh the costs. The 
IASB identify benefits of adoption in many ways, throughout the due process and throughout the 
published documentation surrounding the IFRS for SMEs. However, this thesis has shown that 
this is not empirically driven. Indeed, many of the decisions that the IASB make throughout the 
due process are not empirically driven, so they create a standard that leads to many burdens and 
costs. Although, they construct the idea of access to capital as a benefit, to depict that benefits 
outweighing the costs, this is also an aspect of the fantasy that is constructed.  
In terms of benefits and costs, and more generally, a clear case is not made for the development 
of IFRS for SMEs by the IASB, aside from the depiction that they are the only experts in standard 
setting with a strong enough brand to do so. Hence the commitment by the IASB to reinforce their 
technocracy and control and the spread of advanced financial capital through normativity and 
minimal empirical support. Interviewee 6 comments:  
…it was very clear to me early on in the advisory group that those people in the IASB 
that wanted to do this project, you know, they decided it would be done and we will 
encourage countries to use it (Interviewee 6). 
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Indeed, many of the contingencies in the fantasy that the IASB construct are very loosely covered 
over, and follow statements of how the IASB think that the world should be. Indeed, as the IASB 
try to claim that the creation of the standard is a process, uncovering the radical contingencies 
highlights the levels of normativism within the IASB’s work. In many ways, the IASB assert 
validity and logic. This is deductive in that there are few empirical elements, mainly claims to 
truth values and logic.  
10.4 How these contingencies are covered over   
a) Technocracy 
Despite contingencies, the IASB continue to reinforce fantasies and ideologies surrounding IFRS 
for SMEs. As explained, the way that the IASB cover over many of these contingencies is through 
technocracy, and claims to superior expertise that others need. So, SMEs and emerging economies 
need their expertise and help, and those not following the standards are constructed as lesser. 
Indeed, the IASB appear to be helping SMEs in presentations that are given after the development 
of IFRS for SMEs which state that the benefits of following IFRS for SMEs are:  
Improve access to credit… Improve access to equity capital… Educating and training… 
Auditing efficiencies… Ease burden where full IFRS is required… Improved 
comparability… Improved quality of reporting as compared to existing national GAAP 
(IFRSF, 2011: 5, 19 (powerpoint slides)) 
These claims also construct national GAAP as lesser. Therefore, the IASB construct themselves 
as the body that will help the IASB to improve the quality of financial reporting, improve access 
to capital and help emerging economies to develop. However, this covers over the costs and debt 
that SMEs and emerging economies will incur.   
Different organisations constructed standards for SMEs, or state that they will if the IASB does 
not, so the IASB responds by claiming that they can construct a higher quality standard. This 
defence is not through research or evidence, but instead through their claims to technocracy and 
expertise (Botzem, 2012; Gaffikin, 2008). Additionally, this is a normative presupposition, 
concerned with how the IASB want the world to be. The lack of research and evidence is 
highlighted after the standard is promulgated and it is discovered that extensive education is 
necessary as many entities and actors do not understand the standard, as shown in the literature 
and empirically. Therefore, the education initiative constructed by the IASB constitutes a further 
site of research in this area.  
b)  Top down focus on full IFRS  
The contingencies in ideologies are also covered over through a form of model building, which 
is demonstrated in the top down nature of the standard. As a traditional listed entity follows full 
IFRS, the IASB identify (as experts) what listed entities should disclose, how they should 
disclose, the best measurement system for that disclosure and the best information for that 
disclosure. In this, the end goal has already been defined, which is to provide information that is 
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useful for the interests of economies. This steps outside acceptability and due process, and 
constructs inevitability and normativity. The focus by the IASB on full IFRS and their role as an 
agent of advanced financial capital means the it does not matter what happens in the due process, 
as the IFRS for SMEs was always going to be a cut down version of IFRS, they would never have 
created something different, so the claims to difference are problematic and misleading. In this, 
the IASB have moralised the right way of doing financial reporting which is where the problem 
lies (as illustrated empirically). This further shows the importance of extending traditional 
regulatory theory, as examined in chapter 3, as this examination of the fantasies and subjects 
constructed constitutes a critique of theories and research that depicts the IASB as purely 
economic regulators. Instead, this thesis identifies that the IASB attempt to institute the outcome 
which is beyond neutrality, and further highlights the necessity to draw on political theory, 
hegemony and the examination of regulatory conversations.  
c) Comparability 
When justifying the development of IFRS for SMEs, the IASB also focus on the necessity for 
comparability, despite comments and research that states that SMEs do not require comparability 
in the same way that listed entities do:  
The IFRS objectives, aimed at ensuring international comparability of balance sheets and 
increasing transparency for the financial market, may not be relevant for a majority of 
SMEs, and even less so for cooperatives. Cooperatives, and a majority of SMEs not 
operating in a logic of financial market, their needs are not focused on international 
comparability of balance sheets, but rather on simple financial reporting helping them to 
identify new contributors to the entity (whatever the form of the economic contribution) 
and reduce the cost of financing (CL103, 2007: 1) 
The Exposure Draft of an IFRS for SMEs is generally in the interest of some SMEs in 
Europe, those active at international level. However, international comparability of 
financial statements is not relevant for the smaller companies, which represent the 
majority of the SMEs, since they perform on the domestic market and follow the local 
General Accounting Standards (CL55, 2007: 2) 
Nevertheless, the IASB draw equivalence of comparability from IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, by 
stating that focusing on capital market entities hinders comparability across the globe because, as 
already quoted, there are many entities that are SMEs so not considering these entities may lead 
to a: 
…lack [of] comparability across national boundaries or within a country, and may not 
allow for an easy transition to full IFRSs for entities that wish to enter the public capital 
markets. For those reasons, the Board decided to undertake the project (IASB, 2009c: 
17).  
The necessity for comparability is another fantasy that the IASB construct to sell IFRS for SMEs. 
Comparability and the ‘global accounting language’ informs the IASB’s rhetoric, constructing an 
ideology of the necessity to follow the IASB’s standards to be a part of that comparability, which 
excludes those that are not. This comparability is important to the IASB’s construction of 
hegemony and is constructed as desirable and necessary for SMEs. Despite the differences that 
impact comparability the IASB need to portray that there is comparability within their standard 
and across countries that adopt their standards, in support of the myth of global accounting 
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standards. As this comparability is unachievable the IASB are constructing a hegemonic myth. 
Moreover, comparability is not concerned with benefits to entities, it is instead concerned with 
access for advanced financial capital (Lazzrato, 2012).  
d) No enforcement power 
In response to critiques, the IASB reiterate a focus on their lack of enforcement power, and refer 
to high voluntary adoption, but this disregards the multifaceted nature of the power that the IASB 
hold, and ignores the role of IFIs. Empirically, this thesis showed that there was a lot of pressure 
placed on developing countries to adopt from IFIs, and an increasing pressure of globalisation. 
Nevertheless, interviewees and the IASB continue to claim that the IASB do not have 
enforcement power, and instead that adoption occurs because countries and entities want to adopt 
because ‘it works’:  
I have never understood the logic of saying we must have national standards when the 
world is globalized, and you know if you’ve got the best standard, well we should have 
those, the argument, and that caught on you’ve got 130 countries using IFRS and 80 odd 
using this, it works (Interviewee 19).  
The reliance on listing all of the countries that have adopted the standard and stating that this 
adoption is because ‘it works’ offers a technocratic response which ignores the IASB’s 
multifaceted power and its ideologies. Further, interviewee 12 explains that the IASB ‘don’t 
decide which entities should be applying [the standards]’, this removes the ability to claim that 
the IASB have an impact on countries and entities, through the claim that they are not making the 
decisions. Whereas, interviewee 4 sees the IASB as an independent private body that does not 
have any power to force countries to adopt, but the interviewee agrees that other bodies 
advocating have an influence:  
… the IASB as such does not have any power, it is just an independent body, private 
body that is setting standards, and the IASB cannot force any country to adopt its 
standards, so as such it does not have any power to enforce over any country to adopt 
IFRS or the standards. But then there are other bodies like IFAC, World Bank and they 
are sort of advocating that the, you know international standards should be adopted, 
adopted by countries, so there are other pressures they force countries to adopt 
standards…  
Whilst this interviewee does go some way to acknowledge that there is pressure placed on 
countries to adopt the IASB’s standards by IFIs, which is important and similarly acknowledged 
by other interviewees, this quote still dismisses the multifaceted power that the IASB themselves 
hold. This thesis is not concerned with technical responses, as these miss the ideological 
argument. Constructing the IASB as an independent, private body with no enforcement power 
enables the IASB to wash their hands of the impact that they have. This leaves the question, ‘why 
would countries choose to adopt’ unanswered which is concerned with the risk that countries face 
if they do not adopt. Indeed, IFIs and structural adjustment do hold the direct power over countries 
to adopt the standard, but the IASB do have power in their role as agents of advanced financial 
capital. This highlights that power takes multiple forms, so it is too simplistic to state that the 
IASB do not have any enforcement power. The empirical chapters have shown that the IASB hold 
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a moralising power, a coalition power, power around comparability and access, and power from 
the discourse of development. Therefore, there are many discourses of power that the IASB use 
but the construction of them as a private, independent and neutral body of experts that simply set 
standards attempts to mask this political power and dismantles the conversation about the power 
that they hold.  
10.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated the way the IASB construct subjects for ideological control. The 
fantasies that the IASB construct, build conceptions of SMEs and emerging economies so that the 
IASB can grip subjects and increase their hegemony in standard setting. Each of these elements 
reiterates the importance of seeing the IASB as an agent of advanced financial capital, and their 
role in increasing access for advanced financial capital. This leads to the conclusion for the thesis 
which considers the exploration undertaken in this thesis and the core contributions.  
  
  212 
 Chapter 11: Conclusion  
11.1 Overview  
To examine the IASB’s role as rule maker for regulation it was necessary to consider regulatory 
theory. This demonstrated the necessity to consider the IASB’s political power and processes 
which operate to reinforce their role. Therefore, this thesis proposed that Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory was suitable for two reasons a) the theoretical lens for examining the work of 
the IASB, and b) the core theoretical concepts which enable explanations of the IASB’s work and 
regulation as hegemonic practice. In particular, Logics of Equivalence and Logics of Difference 
have been used to frame the empirical chapters. Whilst the flexibility of Laclau and Mouffe is 
integral to this thesis, it also led to the necessity to follow Glynos and Howarth’s Logics of Critical 
Explanation, which offered further tools for the empirical investigation. This was outlined in 
Chapter 4, alongside the data collection, and details on empirical analysis. The following chapters 
(5 and 6) examined the relevant literature in the area, highlighting, first, literature that critiqued 
the IASB, and, second, literature that has examined IFRS for SMEs. These chapters highlighted 
some key themes for the empirical investigation including the impact of the IASB and IFRS for 
SMEs on accounting, the deconstruction of the rhetoric drawn upon by the IASB, the importance 
of the due process to the IASB and the necessity to deconstruct these processes, and the constructs 
of technocracy, public interest, accountability, comparability and geographical diversity that the 
IASB draw upon as signifiers. Moreover, chapter 6 also highlighted the importance of further 
interrogation of the IASB’s geopolitical role with other IFIs.  
After this literature review, the empirical chapters (7 to 10) interrogated the research material. 
These empirical chapters highlight the constant interplay of LoD and LoE, as the IASB attempt 
to maintain and extend their role as hegemonic agent. Indeed, this conclusion brings together the 
research findings and demonstrates how the social, political and fantasmatic chapters complement 
each other to construct the key thesis contributions.  
This chapter will now return to the core research questions for this thesis: 
Why did the IASB create IFRS for SMEs? 
Chapter 7 examined the political logics in order to give an explanation as to ‘why’ the IASB 
decided to create the IFRS for SMEs. This chapter offered insight into the IASB’s movement in 
the creation of the standard, and argued that this movement acts to protect and enhance the IASB’s 
roles, as both technocratic regulator with superior expertise, and as an agent for spreading the 
hegemony of advanced financial capital. The increasing proliferation of differential reporting 
standards was (and still is) in opposition to the IASB’s construction of a global language of 
financial reporting, so as the IASB identify these threats, they have to act in order to counter these 
articulations and restabilise their command and control. The IASB restabilise this through LoE 
that construct IFRS as being able to be extended to the needs of SMEs, and LoD that draw in 
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counter articulations. This chapter also highlighted the interconnected nature of the IASB with 
the WB and the IMF, and the necessity for the IASB to respond to their calls in order to maintain 
their expert legitimacy in the geo-political space. As these threats could have had the impact of 
dislocating the IASB’s role as experts, but the IASB prevent this through their creation of IFRS 
for SMEs in their due process, which leads to chapter 8.  
How did the IASB extend their work to IFRS for SMEs? 
Chapter 8 examined the social logics and socially sedimented practices that the IASB operate to 
extend their standard setting role from full IFRS to IFRS for SMEs, focusing on ‘how’ the IASB 
operate this extension (which responds to the second research question for this thesis). This is 
concerned with interrogation of the due process and focuses specifically on the political 
contestation surrounding the definition of SMEs. This chapter demonstrates the politics of 
condensation and LoD that the IASB operate within this definition of SMEs. This chapter also 
examined an equivalence drawn by the IASB from SMEs to developing countries. This 
equivalence appears to have little political contestation as it is constructed as logical and 
technocratic. This began the interrogation of the IASB’s due process and the way that they 
construct SMEs and emerging economies, which led to further interrogation of the due process in 
chapter 9.  
Chapter 9 identifies the simultaneous operation of equivalence and difference in the due process 
and the construction of the basis for conclusions. The basis for conclusions offers justifications 
for the standards that the IASB create. In the creation of IFRS for SMEs there is a simultaneous 
attempt to focus on full IFRS, and draw equivalence from the needs of listed entities to the needs 
of ‘SMEs’, whilst also operating a claim that there was extra outreach, and that the standard is 
different from full IFRS. This operates for the maintenance and extension of hegemony, which is 
also undertaken by the IASB through the construction of subjects and fantasies, which leads to 
chapter 10.  
What is the inter-relationship between the IASB, advanced financial capital and IFRS for SMEs? 
Chapter 10 offers analysis of the fantasies that the IASB construct and explores the contingencies 
that the IASB attempt to cover over. The IASB construct SMEs and emerging economies in a 
certain way in order to grip subjects through logics of advanced financial capital, neoliberalism, 
technocracy and meritocracy. This chapter further deconstructs the IASB’s claims to technocracy 
and the way that they extend from listed entities to SMEs. There are some contingencies in these 
constructions, but the IASB continue to mask these contingencies through their rhetorical claims.  
Moreover, Chapter 10 offers a crucial contribution to the literature in the examination of subjects 
and ideologies that grip those subjects, extending previous literature that has examined the 
political role of the IASB. These contributions and extensions to the literature and theory are 
explored further in the following section. 
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11.2 Extensions and contributions 
This thesis extends the literature in multiple ways:  
• Through L&M and G&H the thesis further challenges and develops the interface of 
politics and accounting. Whilst this has been raised previously in the literature, the use of 
L&M extends this and enables the interrogation of the IASB’s role as a geopolitical agent 
in the hegemony of advanced financial capital. Within this, this thesis extends literature 
by further illustrating the interconnected nature of the work of the IASB and IFIs in the 
development of IFRS for SMEs.  
• Previous literature identified that emerging economies were marginalised by the IASB 
during the creation of IFRS for SMEs, and this thesis extends this research by identifying 
that the IASB marginalise emerging economies through equivalence. With regards to 
IFRS for SMEs there is limited theoretical exploration into the IASB’s creation of IFRS 
for SMEs, so this thesis makes a contribution by offering theoretical explanations for the 
phenomena observed.  
• Therefore, this thesis also extends previous regulatory theory by drawing on a flexible, 
pluralistic approach to the analysis of regulation and standard setting, and by identifying 
the role of regulation as hegemonic practice. In particular, this extends traditional 
regulatory theory which sees the IASB as purely economic regulators and literature that 
depicts the IASB’s role as neutral. This also extends literature that sees accounting as 
objective and neutral, by demonstrating the political and social impact of accounting. 
Whilst the extensions to traditional theory and literature are more obvious, this thesis also 
extends more critical depictions of the IASB as political and technocratic, as many of 
these studies do not consider the impact of this interface of politics and technocracy.  
• This thesis also extends the understanding of hegemony within the accounting literature 
through L&M (2001), by presenting the conception of hegemony as constantly changing, 
evolving and adapting, and identifying the constant interplay of LoE and LoD within this 
case of hegemony. This hegemony is seen as always incomplete and antagonised. This is 
demonstrated in the case as initially differential reporting is seen by the IASB as 
irrelevant, but as the construct of different reporting regimes becomes threatening to the 
IASB they move to restabilise their role. This thesis shows that the development of IFRS 
for SMEs is an example of the ‘politics of condensation’ as the IASB condense the needs 
of all developing countries, and all non-publicly accountable entities into one standard. 
In this, the IASB claims that meeting the financial reporting needs of SMEs will 
automatically meet the needs of developing countries, and through the extension of 
international accounting standards to new entities in a ‘one size fits all’ manner, the IASB 
constructs the ‘politics of the same’ through a LoE. This thesis identifies the IASB’s role 
as focused on the facilitation of advanced financial capital and global capital movement, 
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which has the impact of expropriating from and exploiting the poor (particularly in 
emerging economies) to increase the wealth of a few.  
• In some ways, this identifies a story of inevitability as despite comment letters and the 
due process there is a focus on advanced financial capital within the IASB and IFIs. So, 
the development of IFRS for SMEs in the manner that it was developed is inevitable 
because of the analytical framework and ideologies of the IASB. The IASB focuses on 
remaining close to full IFRS and advanced financial capital. Arguably, no matter the good 
intentions of some members of the IASB to help SMEs and those in developing countries, 
the narrow approach that the IASB has towards standard setting means that IFRS for 
SMEs was bound to be one size fits all. Additionally, with the involvement of other IFIs 
this inevitability is increased as IFIs are focused on trying to get entities to behave like 
Western advanced financial capitalist entities.  
• When the IASB published IFRS for SMEs they extended their work beyond standard 
setting for listed entities and the board’s discourse presented an image of democratic 
ethos and technocratic expertise. This thesis shows that this presentation obfuscates the 
ways that the IASB controls the regulatory conversation to advance its role as an agent 
of advanced financial capital.  
In undertaking this thesis, the core investigation was concerned with why and how the IASB 
constructs and controls regulatory conversations (as considered important in my research 
questions). In this work, the IASB self-defines many aspects of the regulatory conversation: who 
it will talk to and how it is going to talk to them by speaking on behalf of many different actors. 
This thesis examines the way the IASB self-defines the regulated, regulator relationship, which 
links to deconstruction of the IASB’s due process. The deconstruction of the due process 
exemplifies the “politics of condensation” as the IASB condense the needs of all developing 
countries and all non-publicly accountable entities into one standard. Moreover, within this the 
IASB claim that meeting the needs of SMEs will automatically meet the needs of developing 
countries. These logics create an extension of the one size fits all approach that the IASB adopt 
and construct logics of equivalence and difference. Therefore, this thesis contributes an 
interrogation of the IASB’s political processes, which also contributes a politicisation of the 
IASB’s technocracy. This considers how and why the IASB extend their work to SMEs and 
emerging economies, in which the IASB recreate emerging economies and SMEs as an area for 
extending the ability for advanced financial capital to profiteer and hegemonise. In this extension, 
the IASB constructs conceptions of SMEs as profit-maximising entities and emerging economies 
as requiring development along “Western” lines that reflect advanced financial capital ideologies. 
This also identifies the way that the IASB is becoming further integrated as a geo-political player 
with IFIs, examining the influential role of the WB and the IMF in the development, promotion, 
adoption and enforcement of IFRS for SMEs. This leads to a gradual, ever-changing and adapting 
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hegemony as IFRS for SMEs acts as a master signifier that speaks to many and extends the 
hegemony of advanced financial capital.  
1. This thesis has drawn on L&M’s DT and the LOCE in the area of financial accounting, 
showing the importance of this political examination within this area, and the importance 
of the application of this methodology to examine the grip of ideologies.  
2. This thesis has also politicised technocracy through the interrogation of the impact of the 
IASB’s technocracy, looking at what this technocracy does for the IASB politically.  
This thesis has offered theoretical explanations for the IASB’s extension to IFRS for SMEs, 
identifying the role of neoliberalism, advanced financial capital and the examination of the 
IASB’s construction of the subject. Whilst the contributions are clear, there are some limitations 
and areas for further research.  
11.3 Limitations and further research 
This thesis has various limitations. From the perspective of positivism this thesis cannot be 
replicated, as this research is influenced by my own experiences, but this was not the aim of my 
post-structural research. Where possible the work has been affirmed in interviewees and with 
documentary sources, but the methodology was never intended to offer positivistic conclusions. 
Indeed, qualitative research attracts criticisms from positivistic research because the research 
process is openly subjective, and is not intended to be generalised. However, the methodologies 
employed are suitable for the approach adopted.  
There are also theoretical limits in this research as many of the theoretical concepts can appear 
complex, and the empirical data is rich. These concepts and analysis are open to varying 
interpretations that can be challenged. The concepts at times are complex and confusing, but the 
research is intended to show the political messiness, and not to oversimplify the IASB’s work and 
the contestations surrounding their work. Moreover, this thesis has focused on deconstructing the 
IASB’s construction of IFRS for SMEs and the impact of this extension. However, this thesis has 
not focused on analysis of the way that the standard was received by constituents, this would be 
an area for further research.  
There are some elements within this thesis that are beyond the focus of the work, but are sites for 
further research. For example, the education initiative is imposed on many countries by the IASB 
and the WB, so the work within this initiative warrants further interrogation. Another element 
that could be explored is the comprehensive review that the IASB undertook after the 
promulgation of the IFRS for SMEs, this attempts to further legitimise the creation of the standard 
and is a further area for deconstruction of their due process. Theoretically, it has been noted by 
some research that the IASB is acting imperialistically, this warrants further exploration as a 
hegemonic strategy for the IASB, especially in the case of the IFRS for SMEs because this 
standard is focused on developing countries, but it is not the focus of this thesis.  
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Overall, this thesis recognises the IASB’s role as a hegemonic agent for advanced financial 
capital, and interrogates the processes and strategies that are used to stabilise, maintain, adapt and 
extend this role through a constant interplay of logics of equivalence and logics of difference. By 
uncovering the IASB’s hegemonic role, the thesis has shown how the IASB’s self-image of 
technocratic superiority and ideology of neoliberlaism blinds the Board to the demands of SMEs 
and developing countries for accounting standards that serve their needs rather than those of 
advanced financial capital.   
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Appendix 1: The development of IFRS for SMEs  
Month/ year Developments  
1990’s and 2000’s Discussion and debates on differential reporting occur 
Discussion of a project specific to SMEs is discussed by the IASC 
Dec/2000 IASB-IASC transition report stated that a demand for a special version of accounting 
standards for small entities.  
March/ 2001 The IASB was established.  
April/2001- 
June/2001 
SAC and NSS discussions surrounding SME accounting 
July/2001 The accounting for SMEs project is extended to ‘Accounting for SMEs and Emerging 
Economies’.  
Aug/2001- 
May/2002 
Continued discussions surrounding SMEs  
June/2002 Project is added to IASB’s research agenda as ‘Accounting for SMEs and Developing 
Countries’.  
April/2003 Working Group meeting about SMEs 
July/2003 IASB deliberations begin; Paul Pacter is appointed as SME project director 
Sept/2003 Meeting of the World Standard Setters  
July/2003- 
Feb/2007 
Issues begin to be deliberated in public board meetings until the ED was published in 2007 
There are also 7 SAC meetings in this time 
June/2004 Discussion paper ‘Preliminary Views on Accounting Standards for Small and Medium-
sized Entities (SMEs)’ is issued. 
April/2005 Staff questionnaire ‘Possible Recognition and Measurement Modifications for Small and 
Medium-sized Entities (SMEs) is issued.  
June/2005 Working Group meeting 
Sept/2005 Meeting of the World Standard Setters (WSS meetings were also held 2006, 2007 and 
2008).  
Oct/2005 Public round-table on R&M simplifications 
Jan/2006 Staff present a completed copy of the Exposure draft to the board  
Feb/2007 Exposure Draft published  
April/2007 Exposure Draft Staff Overview issued  
June/2007 Exposure draft field testing with a deadline of Nov/2007 that was extended from Oct/2007 
Nov/2007 Comment letter deadline changed to this date from the previously deadline of Oct/2007 
 Various translations published across 2007 
March/2008 Overview of comment letters presented to the board, educational in nature  
April/2008 Working Group meeting; board work further on IFRS for SMEs   
May/2008  Issues discussed presented to the board; Re-deliberations began until Feb/2009 
April/2009 Draft Ballot of the ED 
March/2009 Decided not to re-expose  
April/2009 Final name decided  
May/2009 Near-final draft published  
July/2009 IFRS for SMEs standard issued  
Review period 
2010 The SME implementation group (SMEIG) was set up  
2012 Initial Comprehensive review began 
June/2012 IASB issues a request for information (RFI) 
Nov 2012 Comment letter deadline 
Feb 2013 SMEIG Meeting 
October 2013 Exposure draft issued 
March 2014 Exposure draft comment letter deadline 
May 2015 Conclusions drawn: basis of conclusion 
March 2016 Editorial Amendments 
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Appendix 2: Consent form terms  
1. I understand that the interview will be audio recorded. The researchers 
will be the only ones with access to these recordings and subsequent raw 
transcripts. 
2. I understand that the material included in any audio recordings may be 
used in scholarly publications derived from the research project. In the case of 
such publications, in the form of journal articles, books, or otherwise, I will be 
given the opportunity to comment on any proposed publication where my 
interview is quoted, as these will be attributed. However, if I have requested 
anonymity then these quotes will not be attributed and the anonymity will be 
ensured by keeping consent forms separate to transcripts.  
Please delete as appropriate: 
I do not request anonymity     
I request anonymity    
3. I understand that all of the material including audio recordings will be 
kept in a secure place.  
4. I have read and understand the explanation of the project provided to me 
above. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily 
agree to participate in this study. 
5. I am aware that I can terminate the interview at any time and that I may 
withdraw my consent to being quoted in any output from this research at any time 
prior to publication. Following this the data will be destroyed.  
6. I have been given a copy of this consent form.  
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Appendix 3: IFRS and IFRS for SMEs similarities and differences 
 
Key difference between full IFRS and IFRS for SMEs adapted from Perera and Chand (2015: 6) and Ernst 
& Young, (2010) and IASB (2009e).  
IFRS for SMEs  IFRS  Key areas of difference or similarity 
Scope IAS 1 Simplified  Has to meet the non-public accountability 
definition, has to publish general purpose 
financial statements for external users.  
Must complain compliance with the standard 
complied with.  
Financial statement 
objectives 
IAS 1 No 
difference 
No difference in objectives. 
Acknowledges different users.  
Qualitative characteristics IAS 1 No 
difference 
 Also no difference in the qualitative 
characteristics interpretation, only less detail. 
Consistent in underlying messages.  
Elements of financial 
statements and recognition of 
elements 
IAS 1 No 
difference 
Abbreviated but no difference in interpretation 
or application. Recognition follows IFRS 
framework.   
Measurement  IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
IFRS for SMEs: amortized historical cost and 
fair value, and specified throughout. IFRS can 
have different measurement basis.  
Accrual basis IAS 1 No 
difference 
Both Accrual basis  
Offsetting  IAS 1 Slight 
Difference 
Specifically disallows unless requires or 
permitted in relevant section. IAS 1 contains 
specific disclosures.  
Fair presentation IAS 1 No 
difference 
Application of standard would result in fair 
presentation 
Going concern  IAS 1 No 
difference 
Both have to make an assessment as to 
whether they are a going concern.  
Frequency, consistency, 
comparative information, 
materiality and aggregation.  
IAS 1 No 
difference 
All requirements are the same for each of these 
aspects of the standards.  
Annual reporting, only change to consistency 
when significant changes or the standard 
requires a change, comparative information 
required, each class disclosed separately.  
Financial statements set and 
identification of financial 
statements  
IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
No third balance sheet requirement in IFRS for 
SMEs. Also aggregation or omission is 
allowed in certain circumstances.  
Same requirements for identification, IFRS for 
SMEs slightly reduces disclosure.  
Additional information IAS 1 Simplified  Do not require the same disclosure of certain 
items.  
Information to be presented 
in SOFP 
IAS 1 Simplified Simplified lists.  
Current and non-current 
distinction 
IAS 1 Slight 
difference  
Same requirements, less disclosure 
requirement if liquidity option chosen.  
Additional information in 
SOFP 
IAS 1 Simplified Simplified disclosure requirements 
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Presentation of total 
comprehensive incomes 
IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
Differently set out but requirements should 
provide similar results 
Other comprehensive 
income 
IAS 1 Simplified  Simplified items outlined.  
Analysis of expenses  IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
There is an extra materiality disclosure in full 
IFRS, but the same requirements other than 
that.  
SOCE and SOIE information 
to be presented 
IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
Only an extra point in full IFRS about 
dividend.  
Statement of changes in 
equity and statement of 
income and retained 
earnings 
IAS 1 Simplified New statement: “Statement of income & 
Retained earnings” can be used in particular 
cases.   
Cash equivalents IAS 7 Slight 
difference 
Similar concepts, but full IFRS adds a 
requirement about risks of changes in value. 
Statement of cash flows IAS 7 No 
difference 
The same classification of cash flows. 
Cash flow from operating 
activities 
IAS 7 No 
difference  
Same presentation requirements. 
Cash flow from investing 
and financing activities  
 
IAS 7 Simplified  IFRS for SMEs does not have the same benefit 
of net presentation of certain cash flows as 
IFRS does, less disclosure but the IFRS for 
SMEs are seen as more onerous for preparers.  
Foreign currency cash flows; 
Interests and dividends and 
income tax 
IAS 7 No 
difference 
Same requirements  
Non cash transactions and 
Other disclosures 
IAS 7   No 
difference  
Same requirements  
Components of cash and 
cash equivalent  
IAS 7 Slight 
difference 
Disclosure relief 
Note to the financial 
statements: structure of the 
notes 
IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
Reduction in disclosable items. 
Notes: accounting policies IAS 1 Slight 
difference 
IFRS has slightly increased guidance  
Accounting policies, 
estimates and errors 
IAS 8 Simplified  If not addressed management can use 
judgement in creating accounting policy by 
considering similar issues and definitions, 
criteria, measurement concepts and principles.  
Could select different policies through IFRS 
for SMEs. No difference in estimates. Full 
IFRS has additional relief in errors, but other 
than this they are accounted for on a similar 
basis.  
Events after the End of the 
reporting Period 
Definition; Recognition and 
measurement  
IAS 10 No 
difference 
No difference in the classification or 
treatment.  
Events after: Dividend IAS 10 Simplified  IFRS for SMEs allows segregation of retained 
earnings.  
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Related party disclosures: 
Scope; Definition 
IAS 24  No 
difference 
Scope and Identification are the same. Slightly 
different outline in the definition but not 
expected to have an impact.  
Subsidiary relationships IAS 24 No 
difference 
Same requirements. 
Key management personnel 
compensation 
IAS 24 Simplified Less disclosure requirements, no need to 
further analyse. 
Related party transaction 
Disclosures  
IAS 24 Slight 
differences 
Same disclosure requirements. 
Less disaggregation of the disclosures.  
Different exemptions from disclosures.  
Hyperinflation: Scope and 
indicators  
IAS 29 No 
difference. 
Same scope and same indicators.  
Hyperinflation: restatement 
of financial statements  
IAS 29 No 
difference. 
Same requirements. 
Hyperinflation: Gain or loss 
on net monetary position; 
economies ceasing to be 
hyperinflationary 
IAS 29 No 
difference 
Same requirements.  
Business combination and 
goodwill: Scope 
IFRS 3 Slight 
difference 
Extra exclusion in IFRS 3.  
Business combination and 
goodwill: Definition 
IFRS 3 Simplified  Narrower scope in definition in IFRS. IFRS 
for SMEs refers more broadly to bringing 
together entities or businesses.  
Similar definition of business, but IFRS 
definition is broader and does not have to 
consider outputs, therefore more cases would 
be treated as business combinations under 
IFRS.  
Business combination and 
goodwill: Method of 
accounting 
IFRS 3 Simplified  IFRS for SMEs uses cost based approach, 
whereas IFRS uses fair value.  
No difference in identifying the acquirer.  
IFRS includes more costs when calculating the 
costs of business combination, therefore IFRS 
for SMEs goodwill may be higher than IFRS.  
Contingent consideration IFRS 3 Simplified Different treatment for changes in amounts.  
Allocating cost of business 
combination 
IFRS 3 Simplified Both require fair value, but IFRS has more 
exemptions, and there are differences in 
recognition criteria.  
Provisional accounting for 
business combinations  
IFRS 3 Slight 
difference  
No limitation in IFRS for SMEs to 
adjustments of provisions.  
Non-controlling interests  IFRS 3 Slight 
difference 
Option removed.  
Definition of goodwill IFRS 3 No 
difference  
No practical difference in the definition.  
Measurement of goodwill IFRS 3 Simplified  Different computations, IFRS for SMEs 
adopts cost based approach. IFRS for SMEs 
requires amortization, over useful life, and if 
there is not a reliable useful life then 10 years 
must be used. Alongside impairment. IFRS 
does not have amortization.  
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Bargain purchase  IFRS 3 Slight 
difference  
The substance of the requirements are the 
same but the wording is simplified.  
Consolidated and separate 
financial statements: Scope 
IAS 27 
SIC 12 
Simplified  Similar Scope 
Combined financial statements are permitted 
in IFRS for SMEs.  
Exemption from preparing 
consolidated statements  
IAS 27 Simplified Similar exemptions, but there are specific 
differences.  
Definition of control IAS 27 No 
difference  
Same, slightly simplified wording 
Special purpose entities  IAS 27 Slight 
difference 
Same conditions, wording for decision making 
delegation is a little different.  
Currently exercisable 
options  
IAS 27 Slight 
difference 
Similar requirements.  
Consolidation procedures  IAS 27 No 
difference 
Same procedures. 
Disposal and separate 
financial statements  
IAS 27 Simplified  The treatment in IFRS for SMEs has been 
simplified, which will lead to a different 
outcome.  
Non-controlling interest IAS 27 No 
difference 
Same requirements.  
Separate financial statements  IAS 27 Simplified  Simplified accounting for financial 
instruments and simplified impairment leads 
to differences in accounting for investments 
and jointly controlled entities.   
Investment in joint ventures: 
Scope 
IAS 31 Simplified  Simplified exemptions, often unable to apply 
the standards 
Investment in joint ventures: 
Definitions 
IAS 31 No 
difference  
Slightly simplified wording but the same 
 
Jointly controlled operations; 
jointly controlled assets; 
definition of jointly 
controlled entities  
IAS 31 No 
difference  
Same definition and requirements 
Measurement of jointly 
controlled entities  
IAS 31 Difference  Permits the cost model, and allows use of the 
fair value model, neither of these models are 
available under IFRS.  
No requirements for assets classified as held 
for sale.  
Transactions between a 
venture and joint venture  
IAS 31  No 
difference 
No difference apart from a difference in 
terminology  
Investments in Associates: 
Scope 
IAS 28 Slight 
difference 
Less exemptions in what can be included  
Investments in Associates: 
definition 
IAS 28 No 
difference 
Same definition 
Investments in associates: 
measurement  
IAS 28 Simplified  Permits the cost model and allows fair value, 
both not allowed in IFRS. No requirements 
regarding assets held for sale.  
Equity method: adjustments 
to the carrying amounts; 
potential voting rights  
IAS 28 No 
difference 
Same requirements. 
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Equity method: implicit 
goodwill and fair value 
adjustments  
IAS 28 No 
difference 
There is no difference in the requirements, but 
accounting for goodwill does differ due to 
amortization previously outlined.  
Equity method: Impairment IAS 28 No 
difference 
There is no difference in these requirements 
but impairment requirements differ, as already 
outlined.  
Equity method: investor 
transactions with associates 
IAS 28 No 
difference 
Same requirements. 
Equity method: date of 
associates financial 
statements 
IAS 28 Simplified IFRS for SMEs less restrictive. IFRS is 
stricter. Both have an impracticality 
exemption.  
Equity method: Accounting 
policies  
IAS 28 Slight 
difference 
There is an impracticality exemption in IFRS 
for SMEs.  
Equity method: Losses in 
excesses of investment  
IAS 28 Simplified IFRS for SMEs does not need to include 
investors interest in the associate.  
Discontinuing the equity 
method 
IAS 28 Simplified  IFRS for SMEs makes different distinctions to 
IFRS 
Investment in associates: 
Classification 
IAS 28 No 
difference 
Same classification 
Property Plant and 
Equipment (PPE): Scope; 
Definition; Recognition 
IAS 16 No 
difference 
Same in IFRS for SMEs as IFRS.  
PPE: Initial Measurement  IAS 16 Slight 
difference  
Not much difference aside from capitalization 
of borrowing costs under full IFRS.  
PPE: Subsequent 
measurement  
IAS 16 Simplified IFRS for SMEs does not permit revaluation; 
no difference in depreciation, the depreciation 
method selection process is the same, but only 
reviewed under IFRS for SMEs if there is 
indication that there is necessity (not every 
year); residual value only reviewed if there are 
indicators that it is necessary, not every year 
like full IFRS; no difference in component 
patterns. 
PPE: Derecognition  IAS 16 Slight 
difference 
Same result, some additional guidance in 
IFRS.  
Investment property: Scope  IAS 40 Simplified  Undue cost or effort exemption for SMEs if 
fair value cannot be measured reliably.  
Investment property: 
definition and initial 
measurement 
IAS 40 Slight 
difference 
No difference apart from borrowing cost 
capitalization under IFRS.  
Investment property: 
Subsequent measurement  
IAS 40 Simplified IFRS for SMEs requires the fair value model, 
if it can be measured without undue cost or 
effort.  
Transfers IAS 40 No 
difference 
Same result, IFRS has some additional 
guidance.  
Intangible assets and 
goodwill: Scope 
IAS 38 Slight 
difference 
IFRS excludes more intangible assets. 
Definition of intangible asset IAS 38 No 
difference 
Same definition.  
Intangible assets and 
goodwill: Recognition and 
measurement  
IAS 38 Simplified IFRS for SMEs does not allow for capitalizing 
internally generate intangible assets. Same 
measurement for intangible assets apart from 
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government grants which IFRS for SMEs 
requires fair value. Also IFRS for SMEs does 
not permit revaluation.  
Intangible assets and 
goodwill: Amortization 
IAS 38 Simplified  Intangible asset does not have indefinite life, 
only useful life of 10 years, other than that 
there is no difference.  
Intangible assets and 
goodwill: Residual values 
IAS 38 No 
difference 
Same requirements.  
Review of amortization IAS 38 Difference No requirement to review every year under 
IFRS for SMEs.  
Intangible assets and 
goodwill: derecognition  
IAS 38 Slight 
difference 
IFRS has some additional guidance.  
Leases: Scope; definition.  IAS 17 Slight 
difference 
Wording differs but same application; 
definition only had minor explanation 
differences 
Leases: recognition IAS 17 Slight 
difference  
No difference, but IFRS has additional 
guidance.  
Initial measurement for 
different types of leases: 
Lessees: finance and 
operating 
IAS 17 Slight 
difference 
No difference bit additional guidance in IFRS 
for SMEs for operating.  
Lessors: Finance and 
operation 
IAS 17 Slight 
difference  
No difference for finance, for operating there 
is recognition of structured payments related 
to inflation.  
Sale and Leaseback: 
Operating and finance  
IAS 17 No 
difference 
No difference. 
Subsequent measurement for 
finance leases 
IAS 17 No 
difference  
Same requirements.  
Derecognition of leases IAS 17  No 
difference 
Same requirements  
Impairment of assets: 
Scope 
IAS 36 Slight 
difference 
Wording in the scope differs but no difference 
in practice.  
General principles  IAS 36 Slight 
difference  
No difference on when impairment occurs, but 
IFRS for SMEs does not permit revaluation 
model.  
Indicators of impairment  IAS 36 Slight 
difference 
No difference in indicators, but under IFRS for 
SMEs, there is only impairment if there is an 
indicator, not yearly as in IFRS.  
Fair value less cost to sell; 
value in use; goodwill 
impairment  
IAS 36 No 
difference  
Same requirements. 
Impairment reversal IAS36 Slight 
difference 
IFRS contains some additional guidance and 
distinction of reversal, but same result in 
application.  
Inventories: Scope; 
definition; Measurement; 
cost of inventories; 
impairment; derecognition 
IAS 2 No 
difference  
No difference, some wording differences but 
same substance. Additional guidance on 
estimates of net realizable value in IFRS but 
not difference in application.  
Income tax: Scope  IAS 12 No 
difference 
Same scope.  
Tax base IAS 12 Simplified  Different tax base calculation requirements  
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Recognition of deferred tax 
assets 
IAS 12 Simplified  Have to record deferred tax assets that were 
not required to be recorded under IAS 12. 
Need additional tracking and documentation.  
Uncertain tax positions IAS 12 Simplified  Different measurement, need further data and 
more effort from SMEs.  
Backward tracking IAS 12 No 
difference 
Same requirement, only slide difference in 
wording.  
Initial recognition exemption IAS 12 Simplified  Does not describe how to account for 
temporary differences as IAS 12 does.  
Income tax: Investments  IAS 12 Simplified  Further requirements in IFRS for SMEs and 
further work for SMEs. 
Income tax: classifications IAS 12 No 
difference 
No difference in classification.  
Applicable tax rate IAS 12 No 
difference 
No difference, some further detail.  
Disclosure  IAS 12 Simplified  IFRS for SMEs has more onerous 
requirements for disclosure than IFRS.  
Liabilities and Equity: 
Scope 
IAS 32 Slight 
difference  
Some differences in scope, but in line with full 
IFRS. No application guidance in IFRS for 
SMEs.  
Liabilities and Equity: 
Definition 
IAS 32 Slight 
difference 
Some differences in the definition, also 
definition in appendix of IFRS for SMEs.  
Liabilities and Equity: 
Classifications as a liability 
and equity 
IAS 32 Slight 
difference  
Similar concepts, less guidance in IFRS for 
SMEs, could lead to different interpretations.  
Equity transactions  IAS 32 Slight 
difference 
Similar requirements, some greater detail in 
IFRS for SMEs but some extra guidance 
missing.  
Convertible debt IAS 32 Slight 
difference 
No difference in concept, but less application 
guidance in IFRS for SMEs.  
Liabilities and equity: 
Distribution to owners  
IAS 32 Slight 
difference 
IFRS for SMEs more prescriptive, some 
difference requirements.  
Non-controlling interests  IAS 32 No 
difference 
Aligned with revised IAS 27.  
Financial instruments: 
Accounting policy 
 
IAS 39 Simplified Relief of some disclosures provided to SMEs 
 
Financial instruments: scope IAS 39 Simplified  Scoping is similar but there are differences, 
some aspects added in to IFRS for SMEs and 
some scoped in.  
Financial instruments: 
Embedded derivatives 
IAS 39 Simplified No concept of embedded derivatives as there 
is in IAS 39. Simplifications for de-
recognition and hedging.  
Financial instruments: 
classification 
IAS 39 Simplified  All based on the classification. Reclassifiction 
not considered under IFRS for SMEs.  
Financial instruments: 
Recognition 
IAS 39 No 
difference  
Same recognition. 
Financial instruments: initial 
measurement 
IAS 39 Simplified  Simplified measurement for IFRS for SMEs. 
Different basis and proxy.  
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Financial instruments: 
Subsequent measurement 
IAS 39 Slight 
difference 
Same forms of measurement but dependent on 
classifications.  
Financial instruments: 
Amortized cost 
IAS 39 Slight 
difference 
Similar definitions, similar basis, but some 
different wording.  
Impairment of basic and 
other financial instruments 
IAS 39 Slight 
difference 
Similar provisions for impairments and 
triggered by loss events, but some different 
requirements in IAS 39 
Fair Value  IAS 39 No 
difference 
Same principles but IAS 39 has more 
application guidance.  
Derecognition  IAS 39 No 
difference 
Same risk and reward principles, but IAS 39 
has further guidance. 
Hedge accounting IAS 39 Simplified Similar requirements but less onerous in IFRS 
for SMEs, and more restrictive for SMEs.  
Hedge risks 
Hedging instruments 
IAS 39 Simplified IFRS for SMEs is much more restrictive  
Hedge of a fixed interest rate 
risk 
Hedge of a variable interest 
rate risk  
IAS 39 Slight 
difference 
Treated in a similar way to fair value hedges, 
the latter is treated in a similar way to IFRS 
cash flow hedges.  
Discontinuing hedge 
accounting  
IAS 39 No 
difference  
Same criteria  
Share based payment: 
scope 
IFRS 2 Simplified  The scope is different, IFRS 2 includes 
different transactions and treatment is 
different.  
Share based payment: 
recognition 
IFRS 2 No 
difference 
No different in general recognition principles. 
Share based payment: 
Recognition of vesting 
conditions  
IFRS 2 No 
difference 
Principles are the same.  
Share based payment: 
Measurement  
IFRS 2 Slight 
difference  
General measurement principles are the same 
apart from incases of optionality, classifying 
differs.  
Fair value of equity 
instruments  
IFRS 2 Sight 
difference 
Both require fair value, but IFRS for SMEs 
can use directors valuation if the fair value is 
not observable, but the circumstances for this 
are unclear.  
Modifications and 
cancellations  
IFRS 2 Slight 
difference 
Similar but some wording differences 
Provisions and 
Contingencies: Scope 
IAS 37 No 
difference 
Only minor differences in explanation 
Provisions and 
contingencies: Definitions; 
Recognition; Initial 
measurement; subsequent 
measurement; contingent 
liabilities; contingent assets; 
derecognition.  
IAS 37 No 
difference 
There is no difference, only minor explanation 
differences.  
Treatment of contingent liabilities in business 
combinations has some differences, outlines in 
business combinations.  
Employee benefits: Scope; 
recognition; short term 
employee benefits; post-
employment benefit plans  
IAS 19 No 
difference  
There is no difference in each part.  
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Defined contribution plans  IAS 19 Slight 
difference 
Same requirements but there are provisions for 
discounting under full IFRS.  
Defined benefit plans IAS 19 Simplified  Differences in the recognition and 
measurement, and an undue cost or effort 
exemption for IFRS for SMEs.  
There is also a difference in the recognition of 
actuarial gains and losses, IFRS for SMEs 
requires them to be recognized in full, but 
entities have a choice for where to recognize 
them.  
Other long-term employment 
benefits  
IAS 19 Slight 
difference 
Same requirements for recognizing a liability, 
but IFRS for SMEs does not specify 
measurements.  
Termination benefits  IAS 19 Slight 
difference 
Principles are similar, but greater guidance in 
IFRS.  
Specialized activities: 
Agriculture: Scope 
IAS 41 Slight 
difference 
Not identical but similar.  
Specialized activities: 
Definitions 
IAS 41 No 
difference 
Same definitions. 
Specialized Activities: 
Recognition  
IAS 41 Slight 
difference 
Only difference is the undue cost or effort 
exemption.  
Specialized Activities: 
Measurement 
IAS 41 Slight 
difference 
Similar requirements, IFRS for SMEs gives 
more detail on what can be used on fair value.  
Specialized Activities: 
Grants 
IAS 41 Slight 
difference  
Recognition is the same, but significant costs 
to sell can be deducted under full IFRS.  
Specialized activities: 
extractive industries  
IFRS 6 Simplified  Different recognition criteria under IFRS for 
SMEs, different recognition of assets.   
Specialized activities: 
Service concession 
arrangements: Scope 
IFRIC 
12 
No 
difference 
Similar Scope 
Concession arrangements  IFRIC 
12 
No 
difference 
Same categories 
Financial asset model IFRIC 
12 
Difference Considerable differences.  
Intangible asset model IFRIC 
12 
No 
difference 
No difference in measurements, similar 
requirements.  
Revenue: Scope IAS 18; 
IAS 11 
Simplified IFRS for SMEs combines other components 
into the scope of this part of the standard.  
Definition of revenue; 
Definition of construction 
contract; Recognition; 
Measurement; Sale of goods; 
Rendering of services; 
Interest, royalties and 
dividends; construction 
contracts; Percentage of 
completion method; Barter 
transactions; Discounting of 
revenues; Agreements for the 
construction of real estate; 
Customer loyalty 
programmes.  
IAS 18; 
IAS 11 
No 
difference 
No difference in each part.  
IAS 11 Construction contracts has additional 
guidance.  
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Foreign Currency 
Translations: definitions; 
functional currency; foreign 
currency translations  
IAS 21  No 
difference 
No difference between IFRS for SMEs and 
IFRS.  
Recognition of exchange 
differences 
IAS 21 Slight 
difference 
Some different recognition and classification 
between IAS and IFRS for SMEs.  
Change in functional 
currency; presentation 
currency  
IAS 21 No 
difference 
Same requirements.  
 
Borrowing costs: Scope IAS 23 Slight  
difference  
There is no difference but IFRS for SMEs has 
less scope exemption.  
Borrowing Costs: 
Recognition 
IAS 23 Simplified  Major difference between the two standards, 
some entities may find this difference 
disadvantageous, because of expensing the 
borrowing costs.  
Government grants: Scope  IAS 20 Simplified There is no difference in definition. The main 
scope difference is that under IFRS for SMEs 
the governments grant scope relates to 
agriculture. This is dealt with separately under 
IFRS.   
Disclosure requirements are reduced under 
IFRS for SMEs.  
Government grants  IAS 20 Simplified  Simplifications under IFRS for SMEs.  
Transition to IFRS for 
SMEs 
 Simplified Different requirements for the first time 
adopter of IFRS for SMEs, in an attempt to 
simplify the transition.  
Investments in associates and 
joint ventures 
IAS 28 
& 31 
Simplified IFRS for SMEs permits only fair value (no 
equity method), can use cost if no price 
quotation.  
 
Investment Property IAS 40 Simplified  Investment property measured at fair value if 
there is a reliable fair value and there no undue 
cost or effort. All other uses cost-depreciation-
impairment model. 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
IAS 16 Simplified  Measured at cost less accumulated 
depreciation and accumulated impairment. 
Only historical cost, no revaluation. 
Intangible assets other than 
goodwill and business 
combinations and goodwill 
IAS 38 Simplified  Intangible assets: Cost less accumulated 
amortization and impairment, no revaluation 
model.  
Goodwill and Intangible assets: amortized 
over useful life, if no useful life then 10 years.  
Leases IAS 17 Simplified  Additional guidance. Straight line basis and 
expensed for operating leases. Or other if it 
represents the assets use. If increase with 
inflation, then expensed when payable.  
Government grants IAS 20 Simplified  Recognized according to the grants nature.  
Measured at fair value.  
Borrowing costs  IAS 23 Simplified  All expensed in P&L within the period 
incurred. 
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Share-based payments IFRS 2 Simplified  Hierarchy to determine the fair value of shares 
issued.  
Employee benefits  IAS 19 Simplified  All gains and losses recognized in full. 
Defined benefit plan has different recognition 
and measurement.  
Income tax IAS 12 Simplified  Deferred tax asset recorded with offsetting 
valuation allowanced, also incorporated 
measurement and recognition for “Uncertain 
tax positions”.  
Foreign currency translations IAS 21 Simplified  Exchange differences recognized in P&L 
except for investment. These differences are 
recognized in other comprehensive income 
and reported as component of equity.  
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Appendix 4: Research on the impact of promulgation and adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
Country Pre IFRS for SMEs Post- IFRS for SMEs  Country specific research 
United 
Kingdom  
SMEs were first regulated by the FRSSE 
in 1997, with an impact from EU 
directives, attempted to accommodate for 
SME needs through simplified options 
and exemptions, with many changes 
relating to companies acts45 (Nobes, 
2010; Napier, 2010; Fearnley & Hines, 
2007; Baldarelli et al. 2007).  
FRS 102 has been based on 
IFRS for SMEs (IFRS UK, 
2016).  
Prior to SMEs being part of the IASB’s agenda, research in the UK 
found that statutory accounts were not considered useful to small 
businesses (Jarvis & Collis, 2003). However, they do act to confirm 
reliability, and maintain relationships with banks (Jarvis & Collis, 
2003). Research also questioned the FRSSE’s suitability, critiquing the 
UK ASB for not considering user needs to the necessary extent 
(Samujh, 2007; Fearnley & Hines, 2007). Similarly, in analysis of IFRS 
for SMES, Fearnley & Hines (2007) find that actors are concerned with 
the standards complexity, but the desire for consistency and 
comparability within the IASB dominates.  
Australia  Differential reporting, with special 
conditions for unlisted entities, debated 
since 1980’s (Faux & Wise, 2004).  
 
There is no convergence with 
IFRS for SMEs in Australia, the 
AASB construct a reduced 
disclosure framework (IFRS 
Australia, 2015).  
Potter et al., (2013) research Australia’s differential reporting, which 
modifies IFRS by considering differential reporting needs to construct 
requirements, as the AASB in Australia have already completed this 
task they see IFRS for SMEs as unnecessary in the Australian context 
(Goodwin & Ahmed, 2006).  
New 
Zealand 
Exempt company scheme and differential 
reporting framework, exempting SMEs 
from full requirements, reduced burdens 
similar to Malaysia, Australia and 
Canada (Samujh, 2007). SME’s have to 
adhere to The Financial Reporting Order 
to meet tax requirements and core 
information needs (New Zealand 
Legislation, 1994).  
New Zealand have retained the 
tier approach with reduced 
disclosures which is partly 
based on disclosure concession 
in IFRS for SMEs (IFRS New 
Zealand, 2014; Samujh, 2007). 
Many SMEs are not required to 
prepare general purpose 
statements (IFRS New 
Zealand, 2014).  
Despite approving of the IASB’s harmonization objectives, Samujh 
(2007) argues IFRS for SMEs is not relevant nor appropriate for New 
Zealand’s SMEs, because of the full IFRS basis which creates 
complexities and costs. Thus Samujh (2007) argues the current 
approach should be retained, but this research is hypothetical.  
Canada SMEs follow Canadian GAAP the AcSB 
developed separate standards for private 
entities, claiming they are tailor-made 
(IFRS Canada, 2013; Briciu, Groza & 
Ganfalean, 2009; Maingot & Zeghal, 
2006).  
Considered converging with 
IFRS for SMEs but decided to 
continue using their own 
GAAP (IFRS Canada, 2013).  
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Canada.  
                                               
45  Focusing on the UK, in 1907 the Companies Act was published, which exempted private entities from complying until 1967 (Nobes, 2010). During this time, 
in 1948 there was a ‘consolidating’ act which combined together all previous Companies Acts, to ensure that this exemption would not affect group accounts 
(Roberts, Weetman, & Gordon, 2008). In 1967, the Companies Act exemption was abandoned, so all UK entities followed the same rules (Napier, 2010). During 
1981, the UK enforced EU accounting directives, which contain SME exemptions (EC Commission, 1978; Nobes, 2010). These exemptions (e.g. presentation) 
enable member states to introduce alternative SME reporting (Baldarelli et al., 2007). 
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USA SME regulation is flexible, considering 
cost burdens, and debates regarding ‘little 
GAAP’ (Baldarelli et al., 2007; Samujh, 
2007; Maingot & Zeghal, 2006).  
Not adopted IFRS or IFRS for 
SMEs (Baldarelli et al., 2007; 
Maingot & Zeghal, 2006).  
Pacter (2013) argues that IFRS for SMEs would be beneficial to the US 
SMEs and their stakeholders, due to the differences from the full 
standard (that consider SMEs and user needs), and the extra guidance 
provided. However, Pacter (2013) advocates adoption as the project 
leader and this is not based on empirical research.  
France46  French SMEs follow French GAAP 
(IFRS France, 2013).  
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs 
(Albu et al., 2010).  
Albu et al. (2010) state Counseil Natonal de la Comptabilite concluded 
SMEs do not need IFRS for SMEs. There is no further empirical 
research in this area, and Albu et al., (2010) do not focus further on 
SMEs.  
Germany Different requirements and exceptions 
based on size for disclosure, presentation, 
recognition and measurement (Nobes, 
2010).  
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs 
(IFRS Germany, 2017). 
Eierle and Haller (2009) focus on the impact of company size within 
Germany through a questionnaire, finding that size and structure 
impacts adoption of IFRS for SMEs due to cost-benefit considerations. 
Thus, when adopting IFRS for SMEs, organizational size would be 
considered, but their conclusions remain hypothetical. Furthermore, 
Eierle & Haller (2009) argue SMEs have no need for comparability, 
rendering IFRS for SMEs obsolete to German companies.  
Italy  
 
Prior to IFRS Italy followed SME 
company law exemptions, alongside 
abridged annual accounts options, 
introducing Fourth Directive alternatives 
(Baldarelli et al., 2007).  
Italy has not adopted IFRS for 
SMEs (IFRS Italy, 2015).  
Baldarelli et al. (2007) compare the applicability of IFRS for SMEs in 
Croatia and Italy, concluding that the standard would only add 
administrative burdens in Italy, recommending that they continue with 
their national framework. Similarly, recommending that Baldarelli et al. 
(2007) agree with the IASB that SMEs are not separate from large 
companies, but argue that IFRS for SMEs is too complex for European 
SMEs.  
Croatia Entities that do not follow full IFRS 
prepare financial statements following 
Croatian financial reporting standards 
(IFRS Croatia, 2017).  
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs 
(IFRS Croatia, 2017).  
Originally, Croatia decided SMEs should prepare information with full 
standards, but later decided this was unsuitable, acknowledging IFRS 
for SMEs but requesting further simplification (Baldarelli et al., 2007). 
Sačer et al., (2015) investigate the impact of simplifications on micro 
entities, focusing on Croatia, arguing the standard is not suitable for 
micro entities, only increasing their administrative burden, due to 
unsuitable topics and the full IFRS basis. Like Italy, Baldarelli et al., 
(2007) recommend that Croatia continues with national frameworks 
rather than IFRS for SMEs because of complexities and burdens, despite 
pressures to globalize and harmonize.  
Poland  SMEs follow national accounting 
standards from the Polish Accounting 
Standards Committee (KSR) (IFRS 
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs 
(IFRS Poland, 2013).  
Grabinski et al. (2014) do not focus empirically on IFRS for SMEs, 
instead drawing together other research, concluding that IFRS for SMEs 
could be suitable in Poland but there are doubts and concerns 
                                               
46  There are compatibility problems between IFRS for SMEs and the EU directives, meaning that anyone within the EU has to adapt IFRS for SMEs to follow 
the standard without breaking EU Directives, leading to extensive modifications (Christodoulou, 2010). 
  271 
Poland, 2013).  surrounding suitability and timing.  
Spain 
 
 
General Accounting Plan for SMEs 
(IFRS Spain, 2013).  
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs, 
consolidated statements can 
choose EU IFRS, or the 
General Accounting Plan for 
SMEs (IFRS Spain, 2013). 
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Spain. 
Japan  Historically, Japan had centralized 
control, but no codified commercial legal 
system, recently they have converged 
with full IFRS, differing to their 
government influence (Nobes & Parker, 
2012).  
Japan have not yet adopted 
IFRS for SMEs, perhaps due to 
large differences (IFRS Japan, 
2014). 
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Japan. 
China  China’s history is similar to Japan, but 
recently undertook economic reforms, 
transforming Chinese financial reporting, 
during which Anglo-Saxon accounting 
has been influential but there are still 
many differences (Nobes & Parker, 
2012).  
Chinese SMEs follow 
accounting standards for small 
entities published by the 
ministry of finance in 2011, 
influenced by IFRS for SMEs 
(IFRS China, 2014). 
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and China. 
Fiji  All entities in Fiji followed accounting 
standards by the Fiji Institute of 
Accountants, influenced by Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries (Hussain 
et al., 2012).  
Fiji requires IFRS for SMEs, 
effective 2011, without 
modifications (IFRS Fiji, 
2013). 
Chand and White (2007) argue entities within Fiji are unlikely to be 
compatible with IFRS for SMEs. Similarly, Hussain et al., (2012) 
investigate practitioner’s perceptions in Fiji, suggesting that the 
standard is not applicable in emerging economies such as Fiji, due to a 
lack of training and guidance, and reporting burdens from IFRS for 
SMEs. This study only focuses on Fiji, so conclusions are difficult to 
generalize, nevertheless, Hussian et al. (2012) believe these problems 
are discovered in Fiji because the standard does not accommodate 
developing countries, so argue that the conclusions could be extended 
to other developing countries. 
Turkey  
 
Historically Turkish accounting was 
effected by the Turkish Commercial 
Code, bank and tax requirements 
(Türegün & Kaya, 2014; Balsari & 
Varan, 2014). 
Turkey adopted IFRS for 
SMEs, without modification, 
but depending on size some do 
not follow the standard (micro 
entities follow SMEGA), and 
follow Turkish National GAAP 
(IFRS Turkey, 2013). 
Many researchers have examined the adoption of IFRS for SMEs in 
Turkey because they were at the forefront of adoption (Turegun & 
Kaya, 2014; Alp & Ustundag, 2009; Balsari & Varan, 2014). Turegun 
and Kaya (2014) conduct questionnaires with 109 Turkish accountants, 
finding that there is a lack of knowledge so Turkish accountants require 
further education and a gradual adoption process. Balsari and Varan 
(2014) concur, but also question why the IASB created the standard, as 
there are problems with application in Turkey, because there are too 
many complexities and Turkish SMEs require further differential 
reporting. Balsari & Varan (2014) focus on fair value and tax within 
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IFRS for SMEs, also arguing that further education is needed, alongside 
increased guidance and accessibility through collaborations with other 
organizations (Larson & Street, 2011; Adela & Silvia, 2009). Uyar and 
Güngörmüş (2013) identify proponents, and similarly discover that a 
lack of training hinders implementation and understanding. However, 
these Turkish studies pontificate, forming obvious conclusions 
surrounding a lack of education, without a deeper analysis.  
Similarly, Kılıç et al., (2016) finds that Turkey is ill-prepared for IFRS 
for SMEs, as different firm characteristics of size and auditing 
independence impact preparedness. They agree that there is a demand 
for standards for unlisted entities, to increase access to capital, but they 
believe that Turkish SMEs are not prepared for IFRS for SMEs (Kılıç et 
al., 2016).  
Nigeria SMEs followed standards set by The 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria 
(FRNC) (Balsari & Varan, 2014; IFRS 
Nigeria, 2013). Prior to adoption of IFRS 
for SMEs, SMEs were required to use full 
GAAP or IFRS as endorsed by the 
FRCN/NASB (Bohušová & Blašková, 
2012). 
The FRNC adopted IFRS for 
SMEs, effective 2014 (Balsari 
& Varan, 2014; IFRS Nigeria, 
2013). The micro entities may 
choose to use the UN’s 
SMEGA (IFRS Nigeria 2017). 
Adetula, Owolabi and Ifemo (2014) assess the suitability of IFRS for 
SMEs in Nigeria, and obstacles in adoption, identifying that Nigeria 
feels a globalization pressure towards IFRSs, to increase comparability. 
However, they identify high implementation and training costs, so 
Nigeria should not adopt and education is necessary (Adetula et al., 
2014; Hodgdon et al. 2011). There is currently limited empirical 
research that has looked at IFRS for SMEs and Nigeria. Kanu et al., 
(2014) who draws on Bohušová (2011) to argue that Nigeria would 
similarly benefit from increased access to finance, but this is not 
empirical research, only an assumption. 
South Africa In 1993, South African GAAP 
harmonized with IFRS, SMEs were not 
monitored to ensure compliance, but 
there was differential reporting within 
South African GAAP (Schutte & Buys, 
2011ab; Stainbank & Wells, 2005; 
Stainbank, 2008; IFRS South Africa, 
2013).  
Adopted IFRS for SMEs, from 
the Exposure Draft (IFRS 
South Africa, 2013). 
Schutte and Buys (2011ab) conducted research in South Africa, 
comparatively examining South African SMEs financial statements and 
IFRS requirements. They demonstrate that due to different objectives 
and the focus on full IFRS the adequacy of the IFRS for SMEs standard 
is doubtful for SMEs in South Africa, as this leads to a capital market 
orientation (Shutte & Buys, 2011ab). Thus, questioning the relevance 
of the standards framework through comparative analysis, and analysis 
of SME user needs (Schutte & Buys, 2011b). Schutte & Buys (2011ab) 
argue that the standard is not suitable in South Africa, as the IASB lack 
input from South Africa and Africa, not considering the needs of 
developing countries to the necessary extent, as the majority of 
responses came from within Europe. Furthermore, this research 
criticizes the manner in which South Africa has become a representative 
for the whole of Africa (Schutte & Buys, 2011a;b).  
Schutte and Buys (2011b) find that South African SMEs have different 
needs, for example, the balance sheet and income statements are more 
commonly used than the statement of cash flows, statement of changes 
in equity and the financial statement notes. The diversified nature of 
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SMEs within South Africa also means that specialized activities are not 
considered in IFRS for SMEs (Schutte & Buys, 2011b). Determining 
that the standards adoption will be complicated and costly due to limited 
international engagement (Schutte & Buys, 2011b). Alternatively, 
Stainbank’s (2010) contextual analysis shows IFRS for SMEs is suitable 
for South African SMEs, reducing the burden. 
Swaziland Swaziland had national standards for 
SMEs or they follow full IFRS (IFRS 
Swaziland, 2017).  
SME’s can elect not to publish 
financial statements, but if they 
do they can follow IFRS or 
IFRS for SMEs (IFRS 
Swaziland, 2017).  
Sithole (2015) conducted questionnaires to analyze if IFRS for SMEs is 
a suitable solution for Swaziland, communicating with those that have 
direct and indirect interest in SMEs. Through this research, they found 
that there are stakeholders that see IFRS for SMEs as relevant, but they 
are inconclusive as they also found that stakeholders see the standard as 
inapplicable, and believe their current framework is more suitable 
(Sithole, 2015). However, they also found that there was little 
knowledge or interest in the standard (Sithole, 2015).  
Kenya  Olango and Kerongo (2014) state Kenyan 
SMEs followed reporting standards for 
listed entities, until 2011, creating many 
burdens. 
Currently, in Kenya non-
publicly accountable entities 
are permitted IFRS for SMEs, 
but can also use full IFRS 
(IFRS Kenya, 2013). 
Olango and Kerongo (2014) identify that financial reports have 
improved in Kenya, however the study is limited and had a limited 
number of respondents. There is not further research in Kenya.  
South Korea In South Korea SMEs follow Korean 
GAAP (Accounting standards for Non-
Public Accountable Entities), or choose 
full IFRS (IFRS South Korea, 2013). 
Not adopted IFRS for SMEs, 
they use Korean GAAP, new 
SME accounting standards or 
can choose full IFRS (IFRS 
South Korea, 2013).  
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and South Korea. 
Brazil Brazilian SMEs could follow BR GAAP 
or IFRS Standards (IFRS Brazil, 2016). 
Prior to IFRS for SMEs they were 
following either full GAAP or full IFRS.  
Adopted IFRS for SMEs with 
one exception, micro’s can use 
another simplified set of 
standards, SMEs can also 
choose to use full IFRS (IFRS 
Brazil, 2016).  
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Brazil. 
Ghana Prior to the adoption of IFRS for SMEs, 
SMEs were required to use full GAAP or 
IFRS (Bohušová & Blašková, 2012).  
Adopted IFRS for SMEs in 
2010, mandatory for all SMEs, 
or they can opt to use full IFRS 
(Bohušová & Blašková, 2012).  
There is currently no empirical research that has looked specifically at 
IFRS for SMEs and Ghana. Bohušová & Blašková (2012) state that 
based on secondary research from Bohušová (2011) in less developed 
countries, it is assumed that IFRS for SMEs will improve access to 
finance and help them to gain access to financial markets. However, this 
research is based on attitudes and assumptions, offering limited 
evidence.   
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Jamaica Prior to the adoption of IFRS for SMEs, 
SMEs were required to use full GAAP or 
IFRS (Bohušová & Blašková, 2012). 
Adopted IFRS for SMEs in 
2011 for all companies without 
public accountability, except 
those who choose full IFRS, or 
government owned entities 
(Bohušová & Blašková, 2012; 
IFRS Jamaica, 2017).  
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Jamaica. 
Peru  Prior to IFRS for SMEs, SMEs followed 
the standards set by the Consejo 
Normativo de Contabilidad (CNC) 
[Accounting Standards Council] and they 
endorsed IFRS for all companies (IFRS 
Peru, 2017).   
Adopted IFRS for SMEs in 
2012, all companies except 
large SMEs or publicly traded 
entities (Bohušová & Blašková, 
2012).   
There is currently no empirical research that has looked at IFRS for 
SMEs and Peru. 
 
 
 
  275 
Appendix 5: Documents analysed 
   
Type of document    Year of publication 
IASB publications: IFRS for SMEs   
    
  
Due process documents, such as: Request for information, 
Discussion paper, Exposure Draft, Field test details and 
reports, Questionnaires, full standards, basis for 
conclusion , working group information, agenda papers 2002-2009 
  Comprehensive review documents  2012-2015  
  Press Releases  2002-2009 (related to IFRS for SMEs and relevant issues of due process and structure) 
  Information for observers  2002-2010 
  Project history  2009 
  Update newsletters  2001-2016 
  Annual reports  2009 
  Insight Newsletters  2001-2009 
  
Training materials and guidance and Implementation 
issues and SMEIG Q&As 2009 onwards  
  SMEIG documents 2013 onwards 
  Guidance for Micro-sized entities  2013 
  Educaiton initiative: Train the trainers documentation  2010-2015 
  Presentations about IFRS for SMEs  2010-2014 
  Staff overviews and snapshots 2002-2015 (related to IFRS for SMEs) 
IASB webpages, such as "What are IFRS?, "How we are structured"  
  Many webpages over time, both new and archived  
IASB publications 
  2001-2009 
  Due process handbooks  2006, 2008, 2010 
  Constitution documents  2003, 2004, 2005 
  Constitution review documents  2003-2004 
  IFRS as global standards: Pocket guide 2015 & new editions 
  Who we are 2015 & new editions 
  Working in the public interest  2012 
Comment letters  
    
  R&M Questionnaire  101 comment letters  
  Discussion paper comment letters  120 comment letters 
 Exposure draft comment letters 161 comment letters  
IASB/ IFRS Foundation 
publications Meeting Agenda documents    
  IFRS Jurisdiction profiles  Multiple jurisdictions 2013-2017  
Private documents    Given by interviewees from various points in time 
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IstaR IASB Meeting observer notes  2003-2009 
EFRAG Annual review  2002-2015 
  Webpages 2014 onwards (once I started the project)  
European Commission Green papers 2015 
IOSCO Document on their work with IFRS foundation 2005 onwards 
World Bank  ROSC reports and overviews of ROSC program 2002-2009 (every month that discussed IFRS for SMEs in a meeting) 
  
Acocunting for Growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2010 
  
Implementation of International Accounting and Auditing 
Standards: Lessons Learned from the World Bank’s 
Accounting and Auditing ROSC Program 2004 
  
Small and Medium Enterprises: Overcoming Growth 
Constraints 2012 
UNCTAD  
Promoting Transparency and Financial Disclosure: 
Accounting by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 2000 
  Annual reports  2003-2009 
  Reports and presentations on SMEs and IFRS 2000 onwards 
  SMEGA standard relevant documents 2009 onwards 
  UNTAD IFRS joint workshop documents 2013 
  Webpages 2014 onwards (once I started the project)  
IFAC Documents on the public interest and IFRS 2009 onwards 
IAS Plus Webpages relevant to IFRS for SMEs  2014 onwards (once I started the project)  
ICAEW Webpages relevant to IFRS for SMEs  2014 onwards (once I started the project)  
  
Report: SME accounting requirements: basing policy on 
evidence 2015 
Ernst & Young IFRS for SMEs relevant documents    
KPMG IFRS for SMEs relevant documents    
Deloitte  IFRS for SMEs relevant documents    
 
